Bava Metzia 99a — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: The borrower said to him: “Send it to me ... by means of your slave ...,” and he sent it, and it died—the borrower is liable.

And we raise a difficulty:

By means of his slave

of the lender—

is he liable?

But

the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master, and this is like the lender having brought it. Even if he did so at the borrower’s instruction, and it died on the way, he is exempt, since it did not leave the lender’s possession!

[Note: This segment continues the question above.]

And we answer:

Shmuel said:

The Mishna is speaking

of a Hebrew slave, for his body is not acquired by him,

who does not have ownership of his body , and he can serve as the borrower’s agent.

Rav said

another answer:

Even if you say [that it is] a Canaanite slave,

when the borrower says to send it by means of a Canaanite slave, upon whom it is not fitting to rely ,

it is considered as though he said to him

the borrower said to the lender:

“Strike it with a stick and it will come

to me by itself,” and when he says this, he obligates himself to be liable for it from the moment the cow leaves the lender’s possession .

Meitivi

[they raise an objection in the beit-midrash] against Rav from a beraita:

If one borrows a cow, and the lender sent it to him

the lender

by means of his son

or

by means of his agent,

with the borrower’s knowledge, the borrower is liable, as it is written in the Mishna.

And if he sent it

by means of his slave—

he is exempt,

even though the matter was with the borrower’s knowledge.

Granted, according to Shmuel,

[according to Shmuel, there is no contradiction] between the Mishna and the beraita, because

the Mishna is [speaking] of a Hebrew slave,

whose hand is not like his master’s hand, whereas

the beraita is [speaking] of a Canaanite slave,

whose hand is like his master’s hand.

But according to Rav, it is difficult,

for according to him, even one who says, “Send it by means of a Canaanite slave,” is like one who says, “Strike it with a stick,” and the borrower is liable.

And we answer:

Rav could say to you: Do not say

[do not say] that one who says, “Send it by means of a Canaanite slave,”

is considered as though he said to him

“Strike it with a stick”;

rather, say

[rather, say] this as the answer: The Mishna is speaking

when he said

to him: “Strike it with a stick and it will come .

Реувен сказал Шимону:

And the Gemara brings a proof for this from that

which was stated:

Reuben said to Shimon:

“Lend me your cow,”

and Shimon said to him:

“By whose hand

shall I send it to you?”

And he said to him,

Reuben said:

“Strike it with a stick and it will come.”

Rav Nahman said that Rabbah bar Avuha said that Rav said: Once it left the lender’s possession and died—

he is liable.

It follows from Rav’s words that only if he answered him concerning the question, “By whose hand?” and said, “Strike it with a stick,” does the borrower become liable from the moment it itself leaves the lender’s possession.

Let us say that this supports him

[shall we say that there is proof] for Rav from this beraita:

For it was taught: Reuben said to Shimon:

“Lend me your cow,” and he said to him: “By whose hand shall I send it?”

And he said to him: “Strike it with a stick and it will come,”

the law is:

Once it left the lender’s possession and died—

he is liable.

Here it is explicitly stated in the beraita exactly as Rav said.

And we reject this:

Rav Ashi said: What are we dealing with here

[the beraita is dealing] only with

a case where the borrower’s courtyard was inside the lender’s courtyard, and the courtyard

of the lender had an opening to the public domain, and it had an opening to the borrower’s inner courtyard,

for when he sends it

the lender, by striking it with a stick in order to lead it to the borrower’s courtyard,

it will certainly go there

[it will certainly go there], and when the borrower said, “Strike it with a stick,” he truly intended that the lender should do so, and he obligated himself to be liable for it from when it entered his possession.

But in Rav’s case, where the public domain separates the borrower’s courtyard from the lender’s courtyard, when the borrower said, “Strike it with a stick and it will come,” he did not truly intend that the lender should abandon it and lead it without supervision, and he did not become liable for it .

And we challenge Rav Ashi’s interpretation:

If so, what does it teach us

[if so, what does the beraita teach us]? In this case the borrower is certainly liable!

And we answer:

It is necessary [to teach this] because there are corners

[it is speaking when there are corners] in the lender’s courtyard, where the animal can turn aside and hide.

Lest you say, his mind does not rely on it

[there would be room to say that the borrower’s mind is not secure and confident] in this case, and he is concerned

that perhaps it remains there and does not go straight

[perhaps it will go to the corners and not go straight] to him, and perhaps he did not truly intend what he said.

It teaches us

the beraita

that his mind does rely on it

nevertheless .

Now the Gemara brings a dispute among the amoraim: from what point does the borrowing begin with regard to a particular matter?

Rav Huna said: One who borrows an axe from his fellow,

if

he split wood with it—

he acquired it

for the period of the borrowing;

if he did not split wood with it,

even though he pulled it—

he did not acquire it.

And we clarify:

For what purpose,

for what matter does the borrowing depend on using the axe?

If you say, for accidents,

if it is with regard to this: that the borrower is not liable for accidents as long as he has not split wood with the axe,

what is different

[what is different] about an axe from

a cow, for from the time of borrowing

the borrower is liable for accidents involving it? For it is explained in the Mishna that if the lender sent the cow to him with his knowledge, he is liable for accidents, even though he did not use the cow.

And we conclude:

Rather,

Rav Huna’s words were stated

with regard to

the matter of

retraction,

where the lender wishes to retract the loan and take back the axe. Then, if

he split wood with it,

the borrower,

he cannot retract

[he will not be able to retract]

the lender; if he did not split wood with it, the lender can retract,

because the borrower acquires the right to use it through the use itself, and not through pulling .

And

the statement of Rav Huna

disagrees with Rabbi Ami.

[Rav Huna disagrees with Rabbi Ami.]

For Rabbi Ami said: One who lends

to his fellow

an axe belonging to the Temple

unintentionally,

commits misuse,

the lender, and must pay the Temple

according to the benefit it contains,

and he does not pay the value of the axe, since he did not remove it completely from the Temple; rather, one assesses how much benefit the lender values the borrower’s gratitude for holding it, and he pays that.

And his fellow,

who borrowed the axe,

is permitted to split wood with it ab initio,

even after he learned that the axe belonged to the Temple, since the law is that misuse removes Temple property into the ordinary domain. Although the axe itself was not desacralized, since he did not remove it from the Temple, nevertheless the right to benefit from the axe was desacralized.

And

we learn from Rabbi Ami that one who lends an ordinary axe to his fellow acquires it through pulling, for

if he did not acquire it

through pulling,

why did he commit misuse,

the lender? He could retract, and he had still not removed it from the Temple’s possession.

And

likewise, if Rabbi Ami held that one who splits wood with an axe acquires it,

why is his fellow permitted to split wood with it ab initio?

Let him return it, and not acquire it, and not commit misuse.

[He should return it, not acquire it, and there would be no misuse.]

It follows from Rabbi Ami’s words that the borrower acquires the borrowed object through pulling by Torah law . And now the Gemara brings another view that disagrees with Rav Huna , and holds that the borrower acquires through pulling by rabbinic law.

And it disagrees with Rabbi Eleazar

[Rav Huna disagrees with Rabbi Eleazar].

For Rabbi Eleazar said:

By Torah law, one who purchases an object from his fellow acquires the object through money, and the Sages instituted that only pulling effects acquisition of movable property. And just as

they instituted pulling for purchasers, so they instituted pulling for guardians .

And the Gemara brings a beraita in accordance with Rabbi Eleazar: It was taught likewise: Just as they instituted pulling for purchasers, so they instituted pulling for guardians.