Bava Metzia 91b (צא:) — the Talmud in English

As it was taught:

Had it said, “You shall not mate your animal,”

without the verse specifying that the prohibition concerns mating animals of different species,

I would have said: A person may not hold

the animal when a male mounts it,

lest this lead him to improper thoughts. And this would apply even when mating animals of the same species.

The verse therefore states “of different kinds,”

indicating that the prohibition applies specifically when he mates it with an animal of a different species.

And Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami proves:

Is it not

the case

that

the beraita permitted holding the animal during mating specifically when it is with one of its own species? This implies that

with regard to mating different species, even holding

the animal itself

is also not permitted,

even though he does not actually insert the male organ into the female.

The Gemara rejects this:

What is the meaning of “holding”?

Insertion.

And why does it call it “holding”?

It is a refined expression

a euphemism.

Rav Yehuda said: When they are of the same species, it is permitted to insert

the male organ into the female

like a paintbrush into a tube, and there is no concern even of licentiousness

that this might lead to improper thoughts;

there is none.

Although we learned that a person may not look at a male donkey and a female donkey when they are mating, and certainly it is forbidden to mate them by hand, here the animals belong to him, and the matter is different.

What is the reason? —

He is preoccupied with his work

and is not free to entertain improper thoughts.

Rav Aḥadvoi bar Ami raised an objection: Had it said, “You shall not mate your animal,”

and the verse had not stated specifically “of different kinds,”

I would have said: A person may not hold the animal so that a male will mount it.

The verse therefore states “of different kinds,”

indicating that the Torah prohibited this only with animals of different kinds.

And the Gemara infers:

It is only mating different kinds that is prohibited. But mating animals of the same

species is permitted,

and there is no concern that this might lead to improper thoughts.

And even with animals of the same species, holding is permitted, but insertion is not.

Only holding the animal is permitted, but

insertion

of the male into the female

is not,

lest this lead to improper thoughts.

This presents a difficulty for Rav Yehuda, who says that a homeowner preoccupied with his work is permitted even to insert the male organ.

The Gemara answers:

What is the meaning of “holding”? Insertion.

And the beraita stated that this is prohibited with animals of different kinds, but permitted with animals of the same species.

And why does it call it “holding”

rather than insertion? Because

it employed a refined expression,

a euphemism.

Rav Ashi said: This matter was asked of me by the household of

the household of

Rav Neḥemya:

What is the ruling for the Exilarch concerning bringing an animal together with an animal of its own species and one of a different species into a pen,

is there a prohibition of mating animals of different kinds?

Since an animal of its own species is present, it follows its own species,

and there is no need to be concerned that by bringing an animal of a different species along with it, he will cause them to mate.

Or perhaps, even so, it is not permitted,

lest it mate with the animal of a different species, in which case the person who brought them together into the pen would be the cause.

And they resolved the matter for him as prohibited, though this was not the halakha,

as the strict law permits it; rather, I imposed a stringency upon them

because of the licentiousness of the servants,

out of concern that they might come to treat the prohibition against mating different species lightly.

Mishna:

If the laborer

works

with his work

with his hands, but not

with his feet.

Or if the laborer works

with his feet,

for example, he treads grapes in the winepress,

but not with his hands.

Even if the laborer works only with his shoulder,

as when he carries the produce,

he may eat.

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: A laborer may not eat until he works with his hands and his feet.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

From where do we derive this,

that the first tanna holds that in every manner in which the laborer works, he may eat, even if he does not work with both his hands and his feet?

As it is stated:

“When you come”

“into the vineyard of your fellow, and you eat grapes,”

the meaning of the verse is that

whatever work he performs

he may eat, even if he works only with his hands.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda says: Until he works with his hands and his feet.

And the Gemara asks:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda?

It is because the laborer who is permitted to eat is compared

to an ox,

as he resembles an ox, which may not be muzzled.

Just as with an ox,

the prohibition against muzzling it was not stated

until it works with its hands and its feet,

for the prohibition was stated only with regard to muzzling it during its threshing, and an ox threshes with its feet.

So too, a laborer

may not eat

until he works with his hands and his feet.

Rabba bar Rav Huna raised a dilemma: If one threshes with geese and chickens, according to Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Yehuda,

who prohibits muzzling an ox during threshing only when it threshes with its hands and feet together,

what is the ruling

regarding muzzling geese that thresh only with their feet?

Does the requirement of hands and feet stated with regard to an ox mean that

all its strength is required

for the prohibition against muzzling,

and this condition exists here?

The geese, too, work with all their strength when they thresh with their feet, and it is prohibited to muzzle them while they do so.

Or perhaps, hands and feet are required

for the prohibition against muzzling, precisely as with an ox, which works with its hands and feet,

and this condition does not exist

with geese and chickens, since they thresh only with their feet, and it is not prohibited to muzzle them.

And we conclude:

The dilemma remains unresolved.

Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said: Laborers

who tread grapes in order to make wine,

before they have walked back and forth in the winepress,

before the flow of wine from the grapes is discernible,

may eat grapes.

But they may not drink wine,

for their work is not yet with wine, but only with grapes that are softening in preparation for the continued treading that will extract wine from them.

Once they have walked back and forth in the winepress,

and much wine has flowed from the grapes, they have already reached the stage of making wine. Those who make wine

may eat both grapes,

since the treading is ultimately performed on grapes, even though the principal object of their work is the wine,

and wine.

Mishna:

If the laborer

works with figs, he may not eat grapes.

This is so even though he was also hired to pick grapes. In any event, since he is currently working with figs, he may not eat grapes, as the grapes are not presently the type of produce with which he is working.

Similarly, if he works

with grapes, he may not eat figs,

even though he was also hired to pick figs.

But

the laborer is permitted

to restrain himself

in the meantime—to let himself go hungry at the beginning of his work and refrain from eating the produce—

until he reaches the place of the choice produce, whereupon he may eat.

This is so even though, because he made himself hungry by refraining from eating until then, he will eat a large quantity of the choice produce.

And with regard to laborers

all of them, it was said

that they may eat from the owner’s produce

only while they are working,

and they may not interrupt their work for the sake of eating.

But for the sake of preventing the loss of the owners’ property,

so that eating during the work would not interfere with the laborers’ work,

the Sages said

they enacted

that laborers eat as they walk from one row to another,

from one row of trees to the next, even though by Torah law they may not eat at that time,

and

they likewise enacted that laborers eat in the winepress

when they return from the winepress.

And with regard to a donkey, when it is unloading,

it is prohibited by Torah law to muzzle it against eating from the produce of its load.

Gemara:

The law of our Mishna—that one who works with figs may not eat grapes—primarily concerns a laborer who will ultimately also work with grapes. Otherwise, it is obvious that one who works with figs may not eat grapes, as the Gemara learned from the verse, “You shall not place it in your own vessel”: When you place produce into the owner’s vessel, you may eat. This laborer is placing produce into his vessel while working and picking his vineyard for him. But one who picks only figs—what connection does he have to grapes?

It must be that our Mishna is primarily discussing a laborer who was also hired to pick grapes. Our Mishna teaches that since he is currently working with figs, with regard to the grapes he is still considered an outsider, and he has no right to eat from them until he begins working with them.

Accordingly, we must examine every laborer who comes to work in a field: At what point is he considered a laborer with regard to a particular type of produce, even though he is not actually working with it at that moment? This is the issue discussed below.

They raised a dilemma:

A laborer

working on this vine—what is the ruling concerning his eating from another vine,

when he is carrying choice produce from the vine on which he is working: May he go and cut a fine cluster of grapes from another vine and return to the vine where he is working to eat those choice grapes, even though he is not currently harvesting the grapes of the other vine?

That is to say, is it sufficient for determining the produce with which he is considered a laborer that

“of the type that you place into the owner’s vessel” is required,

so that the entire type of produce with which he works is considered the type with which he is working, and therefore one who works on one tree is considered to be working on all of them,

and this condition exists

—“of the type with which you work”; consequently, one harvesting one vine may eat from another vine?

Or perhaps

only

from what

is from that very tree

that you place into the owner’s vessel is required, and this condition does not exist!

The Gemara attempts to resolve the dilemma and establish that a laborer may eat from all the vines, and need not limit his eating to the vine on which he is currently working, for:

And if you would say

[Rashi’s version: And if you say], that a laborer

working on this vine may not eat from another vine,

even though they are all of one species, this is difficult:

If so, an ox working among attached produce,

which we learned above from the verses may eat,

how could it eat!?

The ox’s work is not actually among attached produce. Rather, it carries produce that is picked from the attached plants and loaded onto the wagon harnessed to the ox [by means of a yoke], with the wagon behind the ox.

Consequently, the vine adjacent to the wagon, from which the clusters are loaded onto the wagon, is behind the ox, whereas the produce that the ox can eat while the wagon behind it is being loaded consists only of the produce of the vine in front of it. Thus, it eats from another tree!

The Gemara rejects the proof:

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It is referring to a trailing branch,

a case in which there is a long vine branch extending from the vine from which the produce is loaded all the way to the ox’s mouth; the prohibition against muzzling applies only with regard to that branch.

The Gemara offers a proof to resolve the dilemma:

Ta shma

from what we learned:

If he was working with figs, he may not eat grapes,

because he is working with figs, which are a different species.

And it follows:

Figs and figs,

which are of the same species,

analogous to figs and grapes,

that is, figs from different trees,

he may eat.

And if you say that one working on this vine may not eat from another vine, how can you find a case

of a laborer eating from different trees?

After all, he may eat only if he is working on that same tree; so how can there be a laborer working on two trees at once?!

The Gemara rejects this:

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It is referring to a trained vine.

Our Mishna is speaking of a vine trained over a fig tree. In order to pick the figs, the laborer must raise and separate the branches of the vine so that they do not obstruct him. Were the vine not a different species, he would be considered to be working on it as well and would be permitted to eat from it. Similarly, with figs and figs trained over one another, he eats from both trees.

Ta shma

a proof from what we learned:

But

he is permitted

to restrain himself

from eating

until he reaches the place of the choice produce, whereupon he may eat.

And if you say that one working on this vine may eat from another vine,

why must he restrain himself in the meantime until he reaches the place of the choice produce?

Let him go

to the choice produce immediately at the beginning of his work,

bring it,

and bring himself choice produce,

and eat!

Rather, this proves that one working on this vine may not eat from another vine. Therefore, since he is not yet working on the choice trees, he may not eat from them, even though they are of the same species.

The Gemara rejects this:

There, because of neglecting his work, it is not being asked

whether he may go and bring produce for himself from distant trees, as he is prohibited from interrupting his work for that purpose.

The dilemma is being asked where he has a wife and children

who bring the produce for him, so that he does not interrupt his work;

what

is the ruling? Does he have the right to eat from a tree on which he is not currently working, or not?

Ta shma

from what we learned in our Mishna:

And with regard to all of them, it was said only while they are working.

It is prohibited to interrupt the work in order to eat from the produce.

But for the sake of preventing the loss of the owners’ property,

so that their laborers would work without the interruption of eating in the middle,

they said

[they enacted] that

laborers eat as they walk from one row to another, and when they return from the winepress.

This is so even though by Torah law they have no right to eat at those times.

They assumed

the people in the study hall assumed that the

one walking

in the field on his way to the tree on which he is to work

is considered as one performing an act,

as walking is also part of the work; he has the status of a laborer who has already begun working and has the right to eat.

And

nevertheless, it is only

for the sake of preventing the loss of the owners’ property that he eats,

that is, the laborer walking from one row of trees to the next to pick produce eats by virtue of the Sages’ enactment, but

by Torah law, he does not eat!

Evidently,

it necessarily follows from here that one

working on this vine,

[the vine toward which he is walking in order to harvest it,]

does not eat from another vine,

except by virtue of the Sages’ enactment.

The Gemara rejects this:

No; in fact, I can say that one working on this vine may eat from another vine.

And as for the one walking,

the reason the Sages had to enact that he may eat is that he

is not considered as one performing an act,

and without the Sages’ enactment he may eat only while actually working.

There are those who say:

This is how the discussion should be presented:

They assumed

in the study hall that

one walking is not considered as one performing an act.

And this is the reason that by Torah law he does not eat,

one walking from one row of trees to another,

because he is not considered as one performing an act.

And it follows:

If he is performing an act, he eats by Torah law,

even though his work is on the vine toward which he is walking in order to harvest it, whereas the produce in his hand, from which he is eating, is from another vine.

Evidently,

it is proven that one

working on this vine eats from another vine.

The Gemara rejects this:

No. In fact, I can say that one working on this vine may not eat from another vine,

and therefore one walking to another vine would not eat without the Sages’ enactment.

But one walking is considered as one performing an act.