Bava Metzia 87b (פז:) — the Talmud in English

a. One who works with produce attached to the ground -

when the completion of its work has not yet been reached.

For example, one who weeds unwanted plants from a field of onions may not eat from the onions, since the onions are still at the stage of growth and have not yet reached the stage at which the cultivation of the onions is complete.

b.

And

likewise, a worker who performs work

with produce detached from the ground

may not eat

since its work has been completed

with regard to the obligation of tithing the fruit [or since the stage of processing the flour has been completed, with regard to the obligation to separate challa from the dough], as the Mishna will explain below [93b].

c. And any worker who performs work

with an item whose growth is not from the ground

may not eat from the item with which he is working.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this matter:

From where are these matters

derived? From where do we know, from Torah law, that a worker eats from that with which he is occupied when it is attached to the ground?

As it is written

with regard to a worker’s right to eat from the produce of the owner of the field while he is engaged in his work [Deuteronomy 23]:

“When you come into the vineyard of your fellow, you may eat

and satisfy yourself, but you shall not put any into your vessel.” The wording of the verse indicates that Scripture is speaking of a time when the fruit is fit to be placed in a vessel—that is, after it has been detached from that which is attached to the ground. The Torah states that the worker may eat at his place of work, but he may not place the produce in his own vessel in order to take it home.

The Gemara continues its discussion:

We have found

a source for a worker’s right to eat when working in a vineyard, since the verse speaks of a vineyard, but

for all other matters,

other work involving produce,

from where do we know

that a worker has the right to eat from them?

We derive it

from this,

from a vineyard:

Just as with a vineyard,

just as, when performing the work of harvesting a vineyard, the Torah granted the worker the right to eat from it,

And the harvesting of a vineyard is

characterized

by being work with a

thing

that is

grown from the ground, and at the time when “the completion of its work”

has been reached—that is, when the work of attaching the fruit to the ground is completed—the Torah granted

the worker

permission to be

eating from it,

from the grapes of the vineyard.

So too, with regard to every item that is grown from the ground, when the completion of its work has been reached -

the worker may eat from it.

But the Gemara rejects this: It is impossible to derive the law of other species from a vineyard!

For

what is there to say about a vineyard, since

it contains a special law that does not apply to other produce, in that it is

subject to the obligation of leaving the defective clusters,

to leave the defective clusters of the vineyard for the poor , and this law applies only to a vineyard.

Rather,

we derive it

—the law that a worker eats while performing his work—

from a standing grain

of grain.

Just as, when harvesting standing grain, a worker eats from it, so too is the law with regard to all other types of food.

And as for standing grain itself, from where do we know

that a worker eats from it at the time of harvesting?

As it is written

[there]:

“When you come into the standing grain of your fellow, you may pluck the ears with your hand.”

But the Gemara rejects this: The law of other species cannot be derived from standing grain!

For

what is there to say about standing grain, since

its laws are more stringent than those of other types of food, as it is

subject to the obligation of challa,

because one who makes dough from grain renders the dough subject to the separation of challa, whereas this obligation does not apply to other things.

And perhaps you would wish to resolve the matter by saying that one can challenge this rejection:

And from what

[do you know]

that this “standing grain”

mentioned with regard to a worker is

standing grain

of grain,

which is subject to the obligation of challa,

so that you can reject the derivation and say that it cannot be applied elsewhere?

Perhaps

the verse is speaking of

“all standing grain”;

even standing grain of legumes, which is also piled up into a “standing grain,”

the Merciful One said

that a worker eats from it. If so, since species that are not subject to challa [such as legumes] are also included in the category of “standing grain,” it is possible to derive the law for every item from standing grain.

Your answer is that this is not a challenge to the rejection and therefore does not resolve it, because:

It comes

—the derivation that Scripture is speaking of standing grain of grain that is subject to challa—by means of a verbal analogy

“standing grain, standing grain.”

It is written here,

with regard to a worker’s eating,

“When you come into the standing grain of your fellow.” And

it is written there,

“from the beginning of the sickle

[when they begin to harvest]

into the standing grain,”

with regard to the barley grain brought for the Omer offering, in the counting of fifty days beginning with the harvesting of the grain for the Omer offering [on the night of 16 Nisan], as the mitzva of “the counting of the Omer” consists of fifty days [Deuteronomy 16].

Just as there,

with regard to harvesting the Omer, Scripture speaks of

standing grain subject to challa,

as barley flour is subject to challa,

so too here,

with regard to a worker’s eating, Scripture speaks of

standing grain subject to challa.

If so, the question returns and stands: How can we derive from standing grain, from which a worker eats, the law concerning other things? One could reject the derivation and say: What is there to say about standing grain, whose obligations are more stringent because it is subject to challa? That is why a worker eats from it. Can you say the same with regard to other species, which are not subject to challa? From where do we know that a worker eats from them?

Rather,

a vineyard will prove

the point, since it is not subject to the obligation of challa, yet a worker eats from it.

From here we learn the law concerning every place, including an item that is not subject to the obligation of challa.

And if you reject this as you did previously,

what is there to say about a vineyard, since

its obligations are more stringent than those of other types of food, as it is

subject to the obligation of leaving the defective clusters,

then

standing grain will prove

the point, since it is not subject to the obligation of leaving defective clusters, and nevertheless a worker eats from it. You have therefore learned that the stringency of the obligation concerning defective clusters is not what causes the worker to be entitled to eat.

And the matter returns

to being derived from both of them [from a vineyard and standing grain] with regard to other things:

For

this one cannot be viewed as that one,

the stringency of a vineyard is not identical to the stringency of standing grain, and this proves that their stringencies are not the reason for the worker’s eating.

Therefore, the law of a worker’s eating can be derived by means of

the common denominator between them,

since both of them are

an item that

is

grown from the ground, and

the Torah stated with regard to them that

when the completion of its work has been reached,

when it has been completed for eating [that is, the vineyard and the standing grain mentioned in the verse refer to the time of harvesting or reaping],

the worker may eat from it.

So too, every item that

is

grown from the ground, when the completion of its work has been reached -

the worker may eat from it.

But the Gemara still rejects this:

What is there to say about the common denominator between them,

between a vineyard and standing grain,

since they contain

the special stringency of

being associated with the altar,

as they are brought upon the altar [standing grain is used for meal offerings, and grapes are used for libations], and perhaps it is by virtue of this distinction that a worker is entitled to eat from them.

And

according to this common denominator,

it also follows

that a worker who harvests the wood of an

olive tree, which possesses

in the olive tree

the special association with the altar,

since the oil produced from the olive is used for meal offerings, may eat from it.

But with regard to other types of trees and seeds, from where do we know that a worker eats from them?

The Gemara is astonished by the wording of the rejection:

And

why should

an olive tree

come only from the derivation of

“by means of the common denominator”

of standing grain and a vineyard?

It comes

from that derivation!?

But the olive tree

itself is called a “vineyard”!

As it is written

[Judges 15]:

“And he burned from the stack of grain to the standing grain, and to the olive vineyard,”

and it follows that the olive itself is included in the wording of the verse: “When you come into the vineyard of your fellow, you may eat grapes.” Why, then, did you say that it is derived from “by means of the common denominator”?

Rav Pappa said:

An olive tree is called only

“an olive vineyard”;

that is what it is called, but

it is not called simply “a vineyard.”

Yet in the verse concerning a worker’s eating, the word “vineyard” appears without qualification, and therefore an olive tree is not included.

But

in any event, there is a difficulty:

from where do we know the law concerning other trees and seeds, that a worker eats from them?

Rather,

Shmuel said: The verse says:

“When you come into the standing grain of your fellow, you may pluck the ears with your hand,

but a sickle

you shall not wield over the standing grain of your fellow.” Rather, pluck with your hand and eat.

And the fact that Scripture states “sickle” apparently teaches that a worker has the right to eat

from every item harvested with a sickle.

That is, everything harvested with a sickle is included in the verse.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And this,

after all,

“sickle”

is

needed for it,

as it is needed to teach that only

at the time of the sickle,

at the time of harvesting,

eat,

but

not at the time of the sickle,

if the worker’s labor took place before the harvest—for example, weeding unwanted plants from the field, which is not the time at which the work of the fruit is completed—

you shall not eat.

If so, the word “sickle” is not superfluous, such that we could derive from it the inclusion of every item harvested with a sickle!

The Gemara answers:

That matter,

the law that a worker eats only when the completion of the work has been reached,

is derived from “but you shall not put any into your vessel”!

For the Torah warned the worker not to place the produce of the owner in his own vessels at the time when the work is completed in order to take it home; rather, he may place it only into the owner’s vessels. From here it is proven that the time when a worker may eat is when the work is completed.

It follows that the word “sickle” is superfluous, in order to teach us that the verse speaks of all produce harvested with a sickle.

The Gemara raises an objection: Indeed, from here we have learned to include all species harvested with a sickle.

But

that works

for fruit

that

is

“a thing harvested with a sickle,”

meaning even legumes, which are also harvested with a sickle; they too can properly be derived from here.

But fruit

that is not “a thing harvested with a sickle,”

such as other tree fruits, which are not harvested with a sickle,

from where do we know

that a worker eats from them?

Rather, Rabbi Yitzḥak said:

Scripture used a superfluous expression,

“standing grain,”

in order

to include all “owners of standing grain,”

those that grow and stand upright above the ground; and all fruit is included.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But you said

that the word “standing grain” was stated in order to teach by means of the verbal analogy

“standing grain, standing grain, subject to challa,”

that is, this standing grain is like the standing grain mentioned with regard to the counting of the Omer, which is subject to challa, and not legumes, which are exempt from challa!?

The Gemara answers:

This statement

that we derived the verbal analogy “standing grain, standing grain,” to say that Scripture speaks only of standing grain subject to challa and excludes legumes, applies

before we learned

the derivation from

“sickle”

to include all species harvested with a sickle.

But

now,

at present,

since “sickle” has come -

every item harvested with a sickle has been included,

so that a worker eats from all species harvested with a sickle,

even though it is not subject to challa,

such as legumes, which are harvested with a sickle; and we no longer need to apply that verbal analogy.

And perhaps if you say so,

“standing grain”—why do I need it?

Why did Scripture need to state “standing grain” at all? After all, you can no longer say, as you said earlier, that it comes to teach by means of a verbal analogy that a worker eats only from fruit subject to the obligation of challa, since we have now said that once “sickle” is written, even legumes are included!?

Your answer is that the verse “standing grain” comes

to include all those possessing standing grain,

whose stature stands upright upon the ground, like trees, from which a worker may eat.

Yet there is still a difficulty:

And now, since it is derived for us from “sickle”

to include everything harvested with a sickle,

and from “standing grain”

to include everything that possesses height—that is, trees—if so,

why do I need “When you come into the vineyard of your fellow”?

All species are already included under “sickle” and “standing grain,” including a vineyard, and Scripture did not need to state, “When you come into the vineyard of your fellow”!

Rava

said:

This verse was necessary

for its laws,

the laws of a worker’s eating that are derived from it, as follows:

As it is taught in a beraita:

With regard to a worker’s eating, it is written:

“When you come

into the vineyard of your fellow.”

“Coming” is stated here, and below

with regard to the prohibition against delaying a worker’s wages,

“The sun shall not set upon him.”

And we derive the matter by means of a verbal analogy based on the expression “coming”:

Just as there, Scripture is speaking of a worker,

prohibiting one from delaying his wages,

so too here, Scripture is speaking of a worker,

and not of everyone who enters his fellow’s vineyard.

And the verse says:

“Into the vineyard of your fellow”

—you may not put produce into your vessels in order to eat it after the work,

but not into the vineyard of a gentile.

Rather, there, a worker employed by him is permitted even to place the produce into his own vessels.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

This works well according to the one who says that robbing a gentile

[a non-Jew]

is prohibited; this is why the verse was necessary to permit the worker,

to permit a Jewish worker employed by a gentile to place produce into his own vessels, so that he would not be prohibited from doing so on account of robbery.

But according to the one who says that robbing a gentile is permitted,

the need for this permission is difficult: After all,

now,

any

robbery

of a gentile

is permitted.

If so,

with regard to a worker,

who has the right to eat while working,

is it necessary

to state that he may do so? Is it really necessary for Scripture to state this permission? Surely he is certainly permitted to place produce into his vessels as well. Why is a special permission needed for a worker employed by a gentile to place produce into his own vessels?

The Gemara answers: According to the one who says that robbing a gentile is permitted,

he interprets it

—he understands

“into the vineyard of your fellow”

as coming to exclude and state that only “in the vineyard of your fellow” may a worker eat,

but not

may a worker eat who works in a vineyard

belonging to consecrated property.

Scripture therefore needed to introduce the novel ruling that a worker engaged in the vineyard of consecrated property may not eat from the produce.

The Gemara now continues by bringing several additional laws concerning a worker in a vineyard, derived from the verse “When you come into the vineyard of your fellow”:

and you shall eat -

but not suck

the grapes.

“Grapes,”

it is permitted to eat them by themselves,

but not grapes together with something else!

The laborer may not eat them with bread, because in this way he increases his consumption of the grapes; rather, he may eat them only as they are.

“According to your soul,”

that the law governing your eating of these fruits should be as though these fruits were yours [“according to your soul”—you

What is meant by “your soul”

[as though, if these grapes were yours], you would

eat, and be exempt from tithing,

because the work on the fruits has not yet been completed for the purpose of tithing, and before the completion of the work, it is permitted to eat without separating tithes.

The soul of the laborer likewise permits him to eat, and exempts him

from tithing.

The Gemara below will explain why there might have been reason to say that a laborer differs from the owner and is required to tithe in a case where the owner is exempt, until the verse was needed to state that he does not differ from the owner.

“To your satisfaction,”

only eating that is enough to satisfy is permitted,

but not excessive eating,

which a person’s soul finds repulsive.

“And you shall not place any in your vessels” -

when you place produce in the vessels of the owner,

at the time of harvesting the fruits, only then

may you eat.

And

if

when you are not placing produce in the vessels of the owner,

when the completion of their work has not yet been reached, as, for example, when one is working with attached fruits that still need to grow,

you may not eat!

Introduction:

The fruits of a person that grew in his field [in the Land of Israel] are tevel, and he may not eat them until he separates terumot and tithes from them.

However, they do not become forbidden to eat as tevel immediately upon being picked; rather, this occurs only after they reach the “completion of their work,” when all the processes of preparing the fruits have been completed and they have reached the stage at which they are ready and designated for eating.

Therefore, before the completion of the work, the fruits are permitted for eating by Torah law. However, the Sages restricted the permission to eat before the completion of the work to incidental eating בלבד.

In the language of the Sages, the stage at which fruits become obligated in tithing is called “designation for tithing.”

This stage is

after

the preparation of the fruits, when the matter has been “designated,” through certain factors [as will be explained below], so that the fruits are henceforth ready and designated for eating.

Several things are stated to “designate” the fruits as prepared and ready for eating, thereby making it necessary to separate terumot and tithes from them from that point onward. Some of them establish the obligation to tithe by Torah law, while others establish the obligation to tithe only by rabbinic ordinance:

a. When the owner of the fruits [after gathering them in his field] brings them into his house.

b. When he brings them into his courtyard.

c. From the time he performs the “completion of the work” on them [even in the field], when he piles them into a heap in the field and smooths its surface. This is called in the language of the Sages the making of a “granary.”

d. A sale conducted involving the fruits, in which case the fruits purchased by the buyer become designated for the obligation of tithing while still in the field, even before he brings them into his house.

However, as stated, all these acts of designation are not equivalent. Some of them impose the obligation of tithing by Torah law, while in the case of others, it is considered that the fruits reached the stage of designation for the obligation of tithing only by rabbinic ordinance.

Our sugya comes to discuss which of them establish the obligation to tithe by Torah law and which do so only by rabbinic ordinance.

Rabbi Yannai said: Tevel does not become obligated in tithing,

and it is permitted for the owners to eat from it without separating terumot and tithes, even though they have already completed gathering it,