Bava Metzia 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who rents

from another

a cow, if he rented it on the condition

that it be used

to plow in the mountain,

but he deviated from the rental conditions

and plowed

with it

in the valley,

if the plowshare broke,

the peg of the plow whose sharpened end is driven into the ground and makes furrows in it

, he is exempt,

because the soil of the valley is easier to plow than the soil of the mountain.

And if the plowshare broke in the valley, it is certain that it would also have broken had he been plowing in the mountain; the damage did not result from his deviating from the condition set by the employer.

But if he rented it on the condition that it be used to plow

in the valley,

where the soil is softer,

and he

plowed with it

in the mountain, if the plowshare broke, he is liable.

For had he not deviated from the employer’s condition, it may be assumed that the plowshare would not have broken, because the soil of the mountain is harder; had he plowed in the valley, it would not have broken.

An additional law is explained in the Mishna:

One who rents the cow

in order

to thresh legumes, but threshes grain,

and the cow slipped and was injured,

he is exempt.

This is because legumes are more slippery than grain, and the damage did not result from his deviation; on the contrary, had he not deviated, it would have been more likely that she would slip.

But if he rented it

to thresh grain,

and deviated

and threshed legumes, he is liable. Because the legumes are more slippery,

and had he not deviated from the employer’s condition, she would not have slipped.

Gemara:

And we raised a discussion concerning this:

In a case where he did not deviate with it,

for example, he rented it to plow in the mountain and plowed in the mountain, and the plowshare broke,

who pays

for the value of the plowshare? Is the one leading the animal at fault, or the worker holding the peg of the plow?

Rav Pappa said:

The one leading the animal,

who holds the reins,

who grasps the bridle,

pays,

because had he guided her properly within the furrow, the plowshare would not have broken.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The one who holds the implement,

the one holding the peg of the plow,

pays,

because had he not driven the point of the plow so deeply into the ground, it would not have broken.

And the halakha is: The one who holds the implement pays.

And if

the place of plowing is

a place containing stones,

a place of rocks and stony ground,

both pay,

because in such a place this can happen through the fault either of the one leading the animal or of the one plowing. It is therefore uncertain, and in a case of uncertainty they divide the payment between them.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: One who sells a cow to another and says to him

at the time of the sale: Know that

this cow is a gorer, she is a biter, she kicks, and she lies down,

all these defects together,

and

in truth

she had only one defect

among them,

and he included it,

the seller mentioned it

among the defects

that she did not have—for example, she was a kicker, and he said to him, “She lies down, she kicks, and she gores”—

this is a mistaken transaction.

For the buyer can claim: “I discovered that she neither lies down nor gores, and I assumed that you had lied about all of them, and that she was not even a gorer. Now it has become clear that she is a gorer, and I did not buy her on that basis.”

But if he said to him

the seller at the time of the sale: She has

this defect,

such as being a gorer,

and another defect,

but he did not specify what that other defect was, and it indeed became clear that she was a gorer, even though she had no other defect,

this is not a mistaken transaction,

because he should have examined whether she was a gorer, since the seller had explicitly told him of this defect.

It was likewise taught in a beraita: One who sells a maidservant to another and says

to him

the seller at the time of the sale

, “This maidservant is a fool; she is epileptic

(a seizure disorder)

, she is deranged,”

she is insane, and she has all these defects together,

and she had one defect

among them alone, for example, she was a fool,

and he included it,

the seller mentioned it

among the defects

he listed, for example, he said to him, “She is a fool, she is deranged, and she is epileptic,” as above,

this is a mistaken transaction,

because the buyer can claim: “I discovered that she is not epileptic, and I assumed that you had been lying about everything and that she had no defects at all,”

But if he said to him, “She has this defect”

such as being a fool,

“and another defect,”

but did not specify a particular defect,

this is not a mistaken transaction,

and he cannot claim: “I discovered that she had no other defect,” for he should have examined whether she was a fool, since that defect had been explicitly mentioned to him.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi:

One who sells a maidservant to another and lists all the defects mentioned above, and indeed

she had all these defects,

but he is particular about only one of them

, what is the law?

Can he claim: “I assumed that you were listing numerous defects, some that she had and some that she did not have; had I known that she actually had this defect, I would not have bought her,” or not?

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Rava: If she had all these defects, this is not a mistaken transaction.

Mishna:

One who rents a donkey

on the condition

that he will bring wheat upon it, but he brings barley,

which is lighter than wheat, and he increased the quantity of barley placed upon it until it reached the weight of the quantity of wheat that it is accustomed to carry, and the animal was injured,

he is liable.

And likewise, if he rented it to bring upon it

grain, but brought straw,

whose weight is lighter than grain [grain is the upper part of the ear together with the kernels, whereas straw is the lower part, consisting only of stalks], and he increased the quantity of straw until it reached the weight of the grain that it is accustomed to carry,

he is liable.

Because the volume

of the load

is as difficult

for the animal

as the weight,

that is, although the straw weighs less, if he increased its volume, the load is difficult for her, even though in terms of weight it is now equal to the weight of grain that she is accustomed to carry.

But if he rented it

to bring

upon it

a letekh

(half a kor)

of wheat,

and he brought

upon it

a letekh of barley, he is exempt,

since he did not increase the volume.

And if he adds to

its load, he is liable.

As explained above.

And how much may he add to its load and become liable?

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A se’a for a camel, three kav for a donkey.

But for less than this measure, even though he slightly increased the volume, he is exempt.

Gemara:

It was stated:

with regard to what we learned, that volume is difficult for the animal,

Abaye said: We learned that it is as difficult as weight.

Rava said: We learned that it is difficult for the load.

And we explain:

Abaye said: We learned that it is as difficult as weight,

that is, the volume is as difficult for the animal as the load—as its weight; and this means

the volume is like the weight—

the volume is equivalent to the weight. Since the volume of the barley is equal to the volume of the wheat, he may not add additional weight, as he may not increase the volume.

And if he adds three kav,

according to Abaye, even if the weight of the load will still be lighter than the weight of the wheat that she is accustomed to carry,

he is liable!

Because volume is as difficult for her as weight.

Rava said: We learned that it is difficult for the load,

that is, if he increases the volume until its weight reaches the weight of wheat that she is accustomed to carry, he is liable. Because

the weight is like the weight,

their weight at this point, after the addition, is identical

, and the volume constitutes an addition,

and what he added to the volume makes the load difficult for her.

That is, according to Rava, he is liable for the addition to the volume only if he adds to the weight of the load until it reaches the weight of wheat. But if the load is lighter than the weight of the wheat, he is exempt, even though its volume is considerably greater.

The Gemara proves from our Mishna in accordance with Abaye:

We learned: One who rents a donkey to bring a letekh of wheat, but brings a letekh of barley, is exempt.

For he did not add anything, and it is certainly an unavoidable accident, since barley is lighter than wheat.

And if he adds to its load

of the donkey additional barley

, he is liable.

And we raised a discussion concerning this:

Is that not

a case in which he added

three kav,

and he is liable even though after the addition the load is lighter than a load of wheat? This proves Abaye’s view, which imposes liability for an increase in volume even when the weight is less than the agreed-upon weight of wheat, [letekh].

But the Gemara rejects this:

No,

the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he adds

a se’a,

in which case the weight of the barley is equal to the weight of the wheat, and he is liable because of the addition in volume even according to Rava.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the Mishna be interpreted as referring to one who added a se’a to the donkey?

But concerning it,

with regard to the statement that if he adds he is liable,

it teaches

in our Mishna:

“And how much may he add to its load and become liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A se’a for a camel, three kav for a donkey.”

If so, our Mishna is explicitly in accordance with Abaye: If he adds three kav to a donkey, he is liable, even though its load is lighter than a load of wheat!?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna of our Mishna

said: Where he did not deviate,

but rather, for example,

“he brought wheat and brought wheat, or barley and brought barley: How much may he add to its load and become liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A se’a for a camel, three kav for a donkey.”

That is, if he stipulated with him that he would bring wheat at a certain weight, and he brought a greater weight, if the measure of the addition is a se’a for a camel or three kav for a donkey, he is liable for damage to the animal. But if he deviated—for example, he was to bring wheat and brought barley—then if the load is lighter than a load of wheat, he is exempt even if he added a great deal, in accordance with Rava.

Come and hear

from what we learned:

One who rents a donkey to bring a letekh of wheat,