Bava Metzia 80a — the Talmud in English

Mishna:

One who rents

from his fellow

the cow,

if he rented it on the condition

to plow on the mountain,

and he deviated from the condition of the rental,

and he plowed

with it

in the valley,

if the plowshare was broken,

the peg of the plow whose sharpened point is driven into the ground and makes it furrows furrows

, he is exempt,

because the soil of the valley is easier to plow than the soil of the mountain.

And if the plowshare was broken in the valley, it certainly would have broken even if he had been plowing on the mountain; the damage was not caused by his deviation from the condition of the owner of the house.

But if he rented it on the condition of plowing

in the valley,

where the soil is softer,

and he plowed

with it

on the mountain, if the plowshare was broken, he is liable.

For had he not deviated from the condition of the owner of the house, it may be assumed that the plowshare would not have broken, because the soil of the mountain is harder, and had he plowed in the valley, it would not have broken.

And another law is explained in the Mishna:

One who rents the cow

in order

to thresh legumes, and he threshes grain,

and the cow slipped and was injured,

he is exempt.

Because legumes are more slippery than grain, and the damage did not come on account of his deviation; on the contrary, had he not deviated, it would have been more likely that she would slip.

But if he rented it

to thresh grain,

and he deviated

and threshed legumes, he is liable. Because the legumes cause slipping,

and had he not deviated from the condition of the owner of the house, she would not have slipped.

Gemara:

And we raise an objection concerning it:

In a case where he did not deviate from it,

for example, he rented it to plow on the mountain and plowed on the mountain, and the plowshare broke,

who pays

the cost of the plowshare? Is the one who guides the animal responsible, or the worker who holds the peg of the plow?

Rav Pappa said:

The guide,

who holds the rein,

who holds the bridle,

pays,

because had he guided her properly within the furrow, the plowshare would not have broken.

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: The one who holds the implement,

the one who holds the peg of the plow,

pays,

because had he not driven the point of the plow so deeply into the ground, it would not have broken.

And the halakha is: The one who holds the implement pays.

And if

the place of plowing is

a place that contains stones,

a place of rocks and stony ground,

both of them pay,

because in this place the event could occur both through the fault of the guide and through the fault of the plowman, and it is uncertain; and because of the uncertainty, they divide the payment between them.

Rabbi Yohanan said: One who sells a cow to his fellow and says to him

at the time of the sale, “Know that

this cow is a gorer, she is a biter, she is a kicker, she is a prostrator,

all these defects together,”

and

in truth

she had one defect

of them alone,

and he appended it,

the seller mentioned it

among the defects

that she did not have—for example, she was a kicker, and he said to him, “She is a prostrator, she is a kicker, she is a gorer”—

this is a mistaken transaction.

For the buyer can claim: “I discovered that she is neither a prostrator nor a gorer, and I thought that you had lied about all of them, and that she was not even a gorer. Now it has become clear that she is a gorer, and I did not buy her on that understanding.”

But if he said to him

the seller said to him at the time of the sale, “She has

this defect,”

for example, she is a gorer,

and another defect,

but he did not specify to him what that other defect was, and it indeed became clear that she is a gorer, even if she has no other defect,

this is not a mistaken transaction,

for he should have examined whether she was a gorer, since he had told him this defect explicitly.

It was also taught so: One who sells a maidservant to his fellow, and says

to him

the seller said to him at the time of the sale

, “This maidservant is foolish, she is epileptic”

[a falling illness]

, she is mad,

she is insane, and she has all these defects together,

and she had one defect

of them alone, for example, she was foolish,

and he appended it,

the seller mentioned it

among the defects

he enumerated, for example, he said to him, “She is foolish, she is mad, she is epileptic,” as above,

this is a mistaken transaction,

for the buyer can claim: “I discovered that she is not epileptic, and I thought that you had been lying about everything and that she had no defects at all,”

But if he said to him, “She has this defect”

for example, she is foolish,

and another defect,

but he did not name a particular defect,

this is not a mistaken transaction,

and he cannot claim, “I discovered that she had no other defect,” for he should have examined whether she was foolish, since he had told him this explicitly.

Rav Aha, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi:

One who sells a maidservant to his fellow and enumerates for him all the defects above, and indeed

she had all these defects,

but he is particular only about one of them

, what is the law?

Can he claim: “I thought you were enumerating many defects, some that she had and some that she did not have; but had I known that this defect was indeed in her, I would not have bought her,” or not?

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: This is what we say in the name of Rava: If she had all these defects, this is not a mistaken transaction.

Mishna:

One who rents the donkey

on the condition

of bringing wheat upon it, and he brought barley upon it,

which is lighter than wheat, and he increased the quantity of barley upon it until it reached the weight of wheat, the amount that it is accustomed to carry of wheat, and the animal was injured,

he is liable.

And likewise, if he rented it to bring upon it

grain, and he brought straw upon it,

whose weight is lighter than grain [grain is the upper part of the ear together with the kernels, while straw is the lower part, which is merely stalk], and he increased the quantity of straw until it reached the weight of the grain that it is accustomed to carry,

he is liable.

Because the volume

of the load

is difficult

for the animal

like the load,

that is, although the straw’s weight is less, if he increased the volume, the load is difficult for her, even though in terms of weight it is now equal to the weight of the grain that she is accustomed to carry.

But if he rented it

to bring

upon it

a lethekh

[half a kor]

of wheat,

and he brought

upon it

a lethekh of barley, he is exempt,

for he did not increase the volume.

And if he adds to

its load, he is liable.

As explained.

And how much may he add to its load and become liable?

Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A seah for a camel, three kav for a donkey.

But for less than this measure, although he added somewhat to the volume, he is exempt.

Gemara:

It was stated,

that which we learned, that the volume is difficult for the animal:

Abaye said: We learned, “difficult like the load.”

Rava said: We learned, “difficult for the load.”

And we explain:

Abaye said: We learned, “difficult like the load”,

that is, the volume is difficult for the animal like the load—as its weight; and this is

volume like weight—

the volume is like the weight. Since the volume of the barley is equal to the volume of the wheat, he may not add an additional weight, for he may not increase the volume.

And if he adds three kav,

according to Abaye, even if the weight of the load will still be lighter than the weight of the wheat that she is accustomed to carry,

he is liable!

Because the volume is difficult for her like weight.

Rava said: We learned, “difficult for the load”,

that is, if he increases the volume until the weight reaches the weight of wheat that she is accustomed to carry, he is liable. Because

weight like weight,

their weight at this time, after the addition, is identical

, and the volume is an addition,

and he makes it difficult for her through what he added to the volume.

That is, according to Rava, he is liable specifically if he adds to the weight of the load until it reaches the weight of wheat; specifically then is he liable because of the addition of the volume. But if the load is lighter than the weight of the wheat, even though it is very great in volume, he is exempt.

And the Gemara proves from our Mishna in accordance with Abaye:

We learned: “One who rents the donkey to bring a lethekh of wheat, and he brought a lethekh of barley, he is exempt.”

For he did not add, and it is certainly an accident, since barley is lighter than wheat.

And if he added to its load

of the donkey additional barley

, he is liable.

And we raise an objection concerning it:

Is it not

that he added

three kav,

and he is liable even though, after the addition, the load is lighter than a wheat load? This proves the view of Abaye, who makes him liable for an addition of volume even if the weight is less than the weight of the wheat they stipulated between them, [a lethekh].

But the Gemara rejects:

No,

the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he adds

a seah,

and then the weight of the barley is equal to the weight of the wheat, and he is liable because of the addition of the volume even according to Rava.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty: How is it possible to explain the words of the Mishna as referring to one who added a seah to the donkey?

But concerning it,

concerning what was said, “if he added, he is liable,”

it teaches

in our Mishna:

“And how much may he add to its load and become liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: A seah for a camel, three kav for a donkey.”

If so, it is explained in our Mishna in accordance with Abaye: if he added three kav to a donkey, he is liable even though its load is lighter than a wheat load!

And we answer:

This is what the tanna

in our Mishna

is saying: “Where he did not deviate,”

but rather, for example,

“wheat, and he brought wheat,” or “barley, and he brought barley”: how much may he add to its load and become liable? Sumakhos says in the name of Rabbi Meir: a seah for a camel, three kav for a donkey.”

That is, if he stipulated with him to bring wheat of a certain weight, and he brought a greater weight, if the measure of the addition is a seah for a camel or three kav for a donkey, he is liable for the animal’s damage. But if he deviated—for example, wheat and he brought barley upon it—then if the load is lighter than a wheat load, even though he added a great deal, he is exempt, in accordance with Rava.

Come and hear

from what we learned:

“One who rents the donkey to bring a lethekh of wheat,