Bava Metzia 76b (עו:) — the Talmud in English

What comparison is this now!?

What is the comparison!? The case under discussion is not analogous to the proof.

Granted, if it was stated in the reverse manner,

that the woman says to her agent

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

and the agent says to the husband, “

Your wife said: Bring me my bill of divorce,” and he,

the husband,

says: “Here it is

this bill of divorce,

as she said.”

And

regarding this

Rav Naḥman said, in the name of Rabba bar Avuha, in the name of Rav: Once the bill of divorce reaches his hand, she is divorced.

Apparently,

it would then be evident

that he relies on her statement,

and therefore he gives him the bill of divorce as he would to an agent appointed to receive it. Consequently, she is divorced immediately.

Alternatively,

if Rav Naḥman had said:

“Once it reaches her hand, she is divorced,”

and the agent is merely an agent to deliver the bill of divorce,

apparently,

it would be evident

that he relies on his statement,

and he gave him the bill of divorce only on the understanding that he is an agent to deliver it, and not an agent to receive it, as the woman wished.

Rather, there,

when the woman said to the agent, “Bring me my bill of divorce,” and he came to the husband and said to him, “Your wife said: Receive my bill of divorce for me,” she is not divorced. And the reason is

because the agent completely uprooted his agency!

That is, we assess the agent’s intention

as saying to him,

the agent said to the husband: “I do not wish to trouble myself to place the bill of divorce in the woman’s hand.” Therefore,

“I will be an agent to receive it,”

and she will be divorced immediately, and I will not have to trouble myself to give it to her. But to trouble myself to go to the woman’s home as an agent

“to deliver it—I will not!”

I do not want this. Consequently, she is not divorced, since he is an agent neither to receive the bill of divorce nor to deliver it.

The Gemara now returns to explain what we learned in the Mishna, “They deceived one another,” in a different manner:

Alternatively, this tanna

in our Mishna intends to say that if the workers or the employer retract, they have nothing against one another but a grievance. And the reason he used the expression “they deceived” is that

the tanna also calls retraction “deception”

.

The proof that the tanna calls retraction by the term “deception” is from what we learned concerning the retraction of workers, using the expression “they deceived.”

As it was taught in a beraita: One who hires craftsmen, and they deceived the employer,

by retracting from their employment,

or

the

employer deceived them,

and retracted,

the one has no [

who does not retract

claim against the other [

who retracts

except a grievance.

When are these matters stated: When they have not yet gone

to the place of their work in the field, and the employer retracts. In that case he is not liable to pay them wages, since the hiring relationship has not yet begun.

But

if

the porters went,

with the intention that the employer would have them bring grain,

and did not find

the

grain

that they had been hired to reap or bring there,

or the workers went

who had been hired to plow a field, to the field,

and found

the

field

that they had been hired to plow

wet,

so that it was impossible to plow it,

he gives them

the employer

their full wages.

But

only according to what is appropriate for them, as will be explained. For

a worker

does not

coming from the field

when he is

laden

with grain

compare to coming

from the field

empty-handed,

and

it is not the same for one

who is performing work as for one who is sitting idle.

Therefore, we assess the porters’ intention: how much they would agree to deduct from their wages in exchange for being idle, and the employer pays them that amount.

This distinction between whether the workers went or did not go was stated with regard to a day laborer.

The beraita now explains this matter with regard to a contractor.

When are these matters stated,

that we learned that they have nothing against one another but a grievance? When the contractors

have not begun

the

work.

But if they began the work,

and the contractors retracted,

the value of what they did is assessed for them,

and the employer pays them that amount.

According to this tanna, the one who retracts does not have the disadvantageous hand.

How so?

If they received standing grain to reap, and

in return they were to receive

two sela, and they reaped half and left half,

or they received a garment to weave for two sela, and they wove half and left half,

and the worker or the employer came and retracted,

the value of what they did is assessed for them.

If they performed half the work, they receive half the wage, which is one sela, in accordance with what they agreed between themselves.

And this is so even if the employer thereby suffers a loss; for example, if

it was worth [

the value of completing what they had left unfinished in the middle of their work was

six dinars [

which is one and a half sela, since the price of the work had risen

Nevertheless,

he gives them one sela,

which is the appropriate payment for half their work.

Or they may complete their work [

if they wish to continue and finish the work

and take

then

two sela [

for all the work. Although the employer would pay another contractor who came in their place to complete the remaining half one and a half sela, and in total he would pay two and a half sela for the entire work

And if the value of completing the remaining part of the work

was one sela, he gives them one sela.

The novelty of this will be explained below.

This differs from what is stated in the Mishna, that anyone who retracts has the disadvantageous hand.

For according to the first tanna in the beraita, even if the remaining part to be completed was worth six dinars, and the contractor retracted, the employer is nevertheless obligated to pay him one sela. The employer thereby loses half a sela, which he must add to the wages of the other workers for completing the work!

Rabbi Dosa says:

Anyone who retracts has the disadvantageous hand. Therefore,

the value is assessed for them,

the contractors,

of what remains to be done—

how many zuz the employer will have to pay workers in order to complete his work.

Consequently, if

what remains to be done

was worth

six dinars,

the employer deducts two dinars from the wages of the original workers, and does not

give them

more than

one shekel,

which is half a sela. For if the employer paid them one sela according to the calculation for half the work, he would suffer a loss of two dinars.

Or the original workers may complete

themselves

their work and take two sela.

And if the wages of the later workers are only

one sela, he gives them one sela,

the wage for half the work.

It follows that even according to Rabbi Dosa, the workers are not charged more than the cost of completing the work by the later workers.

When are these matters stated,

when the employer hired them to perform work

involving no irretrievable loss

if they are prevented from doing their work?

But in the case of irretrievable loss, he hires other workers in their place

the employer hires other workers, even at a much higher price, at the expense of the original workers,

or he deceives them.

How does he deceive them?

He says to them:

“Although initially I had set only

one sela

for

your wages,

for half the work, now I am increasing your wages so that you will agree to complete the work for me. Therefore,

come and take two

sela for completing the remaining half of the work.” But in practice, he pays them only one sela for it.

And up to how much

money

does he hire

workers

in their place

with the original workers responsible for paying their wages?

Up to forty or fifty zuz.

When are these matters stated,

that we learned, “he hires workers in their place at a higher price”?

When there are no workers

other

to hire.

But if there are other workers to hire

at a lower price,

and

one of the workers who retracted says to the employer:

“Go and hire from these,”

workers who can be hired cheaply,

he has no

the employer

claim against them except a grievance.

A tanna taught [

an amora

before Rav

the following statement of the beraita:

“Porters went and did not find grain; the employer gives them their full wages.”

He said to him

Rav said to the amora who had taught this before him:

“My dear one,

Rabbi Ḥiyya, my uncle,

said: ‘If I had been

the employer,

I would have given them only the wage of an idle worker.’”

As explained above, one who comes laden is not comparable to one who comes empty-handed.

And

if

you said

in the beraita that you taught before me that

“he gives them their full wages,”

like the wages of a worker who performed his work!?

But the Gemara immediately expresses astonishment at what Rav said to that amora:

How did Rav understand the words of that amora who had taught the beraita before him?

But it is taught in the latter clause

of the beraita explicitly, in support of Rav’s assertion:

“One who comes laden is not comparable to one who comes empty-handed;

nor is one who performs work comparable to one who sits idle.”

Indeed, he pays him only the wage of an idle worker!

The Gemara answers:

He had not completed it before him;

that amora had not managed to finish reciting the words of the beraita before Rav questioned him about it.

Some say:

Yes,

he had completed it before him

Rav,

and this is what Rav said: “My dear one said: ‘If I had been

the employer,

I would not have given him anything at all,’

not even the wage of an idle worker,

and

if

you said

that he should pay him

the wage of an idle worker!?”

The Gemara raises an objection:

But this is difficult

according to Rav’s report in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya:

this

beraita, which disagrees with Rabbi Ḥiyya’s statement, and is also logical on its own terms. Why should he not pay him anything at all? They suffered a loss, since they could have hired themselves out to others!?

The Gemara explains:

It is not difficult.

This

statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya applies in a case

where the employer inspected

the land with the workers

from the previous evening.

The employer took them to inspect the field the evening before. Since the workers saw the land, they should have paid attention to the fact that it was wet. Even if they did not notice the moisture in the evening and thought that it was dry, they accepted employment on that understanding. Likewise, they accepted upon themselves any loss that would subsequently occur, even if rain fell during the night and they would not be needed.

This

the beraita speaks of a case

where he did not inspect

the land with the workers

from the previous evening,

and therefore he should have stipulated with them: “If you find a wet field, I will not pay you anything.” Since he did not stipulate this, he pays them the wage of an idle worker.

As Rava said: One who hires workers to dig channels,

one who hires workers to dig trenches in his field,

and rain comes and fills them with water,

and the rain fills the field with water, so that they cannot perform their work,

if he inspected,

if

the employer

inspected the land with the workers

from the previous evening,

from the evening before,