Bava Metzia 76b — the Talmud in English

What is the comparison now!?

What is the similarity!? But surely the matter under discussion is not analogous to the proof.

Granted, if it was stated the other way around,

that the woman says to her agent

“Receive my bill of divorce for me,”

and the agent says to the husband,

“Your wife said: Bring me my bill of divorce,” and he,

the husband,

says, “Here you are,”

this bill of divorce,

as she said.

And

concerning this

Rav Naḥman said, Rav Abba bar Avua said that Rav said: Once the bill of divorce reaches his hand, she is divorced.

Apparently,

it was then demonstrated

that he relies on her statement,

and therefore he gives him the bill of divorce as to an agent for receipt. And for this reason she is divorced immediately.

Alternatively,

if Rav Naḥman had said:

“Once it reaches her hand, she is divorced,”

and the agent is only an agent for conveyance,

apparently,

it would have been demonstrated

that he relies on his statement,

and he gave him the bill of divorce only on the understanding that he is an agent for conveyance, and not for receipt, in accordance with the woman’s request.

Rather, there,

when the woman said to the agent, “Bring me my bill of divorce,” and he came to the husband and said to him, “Your wife said: Receive my bill of divorce for me,” she is not divorced. And the reason is

because the agent completely uprooted his agency!

That is, we assess the agent’s intention,

for he said to him,

the agent said to the husband: I do not wish to trouble myself to place the bill of divorce in the woman’s hand. Therefore,

I shall be an agent for receipt,

and she will be divorced immediately, and I will not need to trouble myself in order to give it to her. But to trouble myself to go to the woman’s house as an agent

for conveyance, I shall not be!

I do not desire this. And for this reason she is not divorced, for he is an agent neither for receipt nor for conveyance.

And now the Gemara returns and explains what we learned in the Mishna, “They deceived one another,” in another manner:

Alternatively, this tannai

in our Mishna intends to say: If the workers or the employer changed their minds, they have nothing against one another except a grievance. And the reason he used the expression “they deceived” is that

“they changed their minds” is also called “they deceived”

by the tannai.

And the proof that the tannai calls changing one’s mind by the expression “deception” is from this, that we learned concerning workers’ changing their minds with the expression “they deceived.”

As it was taught in a beraita: One who hires craftsmen, and they deceived the employer,

that they changed their minds about their hiring,

or

the

employer deceived them,

and changed his mind,

neither of them has

who does not change his mind

against the other

who changes his mind

anything except a grievance.

In what case is this statement said: That they did not go

yet to the place of their work in the field, and the employer changed his mind; in that case he is not obligated to pay them wages, since the hiring transaction had not yet begun.

But

if

the donkey drivers went,

with the intention that the employer would have them bring produce,

and did not find

there the

produce

that they had been hired to reap or bring,

or workers went

who had been hired to plow a field, to the field,

and found

the

field

that they had been hired to plow

when it was wet,

and it was impossible to plow it,

he gives them

the employer

their full wages.

But

specifically according to what is appropriate for them, as will be explained, for

a worker

does not resemble

one coming from the field

when he is

laden

with produce

to one coming

from the field

empty-handed,

and

one who

is doing work does not resemble one who is sitting idle.

Therefore, we assess the intention of the donkey drivers: how much they would agree to reduce from their wages in order to be idle from work, and this amount the employer pays them.

And this distinction between whether the workers went or did not go was stated concerning a day laborer.

And now the beraita explains this matter concerning a contractor.

In what case is this statement said,

what we learned, that they have nothing against one another except a grievance: When the contractors

had not begun

the

work.

But if they began the work,

and the contractors changed their minds,

the value of what they did is assessed for them,

and this amount the employer pays them.

And according to this tannai, the returning parties do not have the inferior hand.

How so?

They accepted standing grain to reap, and

in return they would receive

two sela, and they reaped half of it and left half of it,

or they accepted a garment to weave for two sela, and wove half of it and left half of it,

and the worker or the employer came and changed his mind,

the value of what they did is assessed for them;

if they did half the work, they receive half the wage, which is one sela, according to what they agreed between them.

And this is so even if the employer thereby suffers a loss, such as if

it was worth

the wage of the work to complete now what they left at the midpoint of their work

six dinars

which are one and a half sela, since the price of the work became more expensive.

Even so,

he gives them one sela,

which is the payment appropriate for half their work.

Or they shall complete their work

if they wish to continue and finish the work,

and they shall take

then

two sela

for all the work. Even though for another contractor who would come in their place to complete half the work, the employer would pay one and a half sela for completing the work, and in total he would pay two and a half sela for all the work.

And if the portion of the work that needed to be completed was worth

one sela, he gives them one sela.

And below it will be explained what the novelty in this is.

And this is different from what is explained in the Mishna, that everyone who changes his mind has the inferior hand.

For according to the first tannai in the beraita, even if the portion remaining to be completed was worth six zuz, and the contractor changed his mind, nevertheless the employer is obligated to pay him one sela, and thereby the employer loses half a sela, which he must add to the other workers for completing the work!

Rabbi Dosa says:

Anyone who changes his mind has the inferior hand. And for this reason

the value is assessed for them

the contractors

of what is destined to be done—

how many zuz the employer will need to pay the workers so that they complete his work.

Therefore, if

what is destined to be done

was worth

six dinars,

the employer deducts two dinars from the wages of the first workers, and

gives them

only

a shekel,

which is half a sela. For if the employer pays them a sela according to the calculation for half the work, it emerges that he loses two dinars.

Or they shall complete

the first workers themselves now

their work, and they shall take two sela.

And if the rental payment of the latter workers is only

one sela, he gives them one sela,

the wage for half the work.

And it emerges that even according to Rabbi Dosa, the workers are not charged more than the cost of completing the wage of the latter workers.

In what case is this statement said,

when the employer hired them to do work

in a matter that would not be lost

if they were idle from their work.

But in a matter involving a loss, he hires others in their place

the employer hires other workers, even at a much higher price, at the expense of the first workers,

or he deceives them.

How does he deceive them?

He says to them:

Indeed, at first only

one sela

one

I fixed for you

as the wage for half the work, but now I am increasing your wage so that you will agree to complete the work for me, and therefore

come and take two

sela for completing the remaining half of the work. But in fact, he pays them only one sela for it.

And up to how many

zuz

does he hire

workers

in their place,

and they are to pay their wages?

Up to forty or fifty zuz.

In what case is this statement said,

that we learned, “He hires others in their place at a higher price”:

when there are no workers

other

to hire.

But if there are other workers to hire

cheaply,

and

one of the workers who changed their minds said to the employer:

“Go and hire from these,”

the workers who are hired cheaply,

he has

the employer

nothing against them except a grievance.

A tannai taught

an amora

before Rav

the words of the beraita:

“The donkey drivers went and did not find produce; the employer gives them their full wages.”

He said to him,

Rav said to the amora who recited the teaching before him:

“My beloved,

Rabbi Ḥiyya, my uncle,

said: ‘If I had been the one,

if I had been the employer,

I would have given them only the wage of an idle worker.’”

And as was explained above, one who comes laden does not resemble one who comes empty-handed.

And

if

you said

in the beraita that you have just recited, that

“he gives them their full wages,”

like the wage of a worker who did his work!?

But immediately the Gemara is astonished at what Rav said to that amora:

How did Rav understand this way in the words of that amora who recited the beraita before him?

But it is taught in the latter clause

in the beraita explicitly, as Rav claimed:

“One who comes laden does not resemble one who comes empty-handed;

one who does work does not resemble one who sits idle.”

And indeed, he pays him only the wage of an idle worker!

And we answer:

He had not finished it before him;

that amora had not managed to finish the words of the beraita before Rav questioned him about it.

There are those who say:

so,

he had finished it before him,

before Rav,

and this is what Rav said: “My beloved said: If I had been the one,”

the employer,

“I would not have given him anything at all,”

not even the wage of an idle worker,

and

if

you said

to pay him

the wage of an idle worker!?

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

But it is difficult

according to the words of Rav in the name of Rabbi Ḥiyya,

this

beraita, which disagrees with the words of Rabbi Ḥiyya and is also reasonable logically, for why should he not pay him anything at all? After all, they suffered a loss, since he could have hired himself out to others!?

And we explain:

It is not difficult.

This

what Rabbi Ḥiyya said is in a place

where the employer surveyed

with the workers

the land from the previous evening.

He took them to survey the field from the previous evening. And since the workers saw the land, they should have paid attention to the fact that the land was wet; and even if in the evening they did not notice the wetness of the land and thought that it was dry, nevertheless they were hired on this understanding. And likewise, they accepted upon themselves any loss that would subsequently occur, even if rain fell during the night and they would not be needed.

This

the beraita is speaking in a case

where he did not survey

the employer with the workers

the land from the previous evening,

and therefore he should have stipulated with them: If you find a wet field, I will not pay you anything at all. And since he did not stipulate, he pays them the wage of an idle worker.

As Rav said: “One who hires workers to dig furrows,

one who hired workers to dig ditches in his field,

and rain came and filled them with water,”

and the rain filled the field with water, so that they cannot do their work,

if he surveyed,

if he surveyed

the employer

with the workers

the land from the previous evening,

from the previous evening,