Bava Metzia 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

there

in the case of the Mishna,

it is in his power

to plow and sow, and therefore he is liable

here

in the case of an agent sent to purchase wine,

it is not in his power

perhaps they will not sell him wine.

Rava said: In the case of these three people who gave money to one person to purchase something for them

three people who gave money to one person to purchase an item for them,

and he purchased for one of them

the agent purchased for one of them,

he purchased for all of them

the purchase belongs to all of them.

And we said this

and this law applies

only when each person’s money is not bundled and sealed separately.

The money of each individual was not bundled and sealed separately, indicating that they intended to form a partnership, as, for example, when all the money was combined, and therefore the purchase belongs to all of them.

But if each person’s money is bundled and sealed separately,

if the money of each individual was bundled and sealed separately,

for the one for whom he purchased, he purchased; and for the one for whom he did not purchase, he did not purchase.

He acquired the item only for the person with whose money the purchase was made.

Rav Pappa said in the name

in the name

of Rava: This situmta,

a seal, that is, in a place where merchants customarily mark the barrels they purchase with their seal [and afterward, when they need them, they take them one by one to sell in the store],

effects acquisition.

The purchase is acquired through the seal, because this is the accepted practice, even though he neither gave money nor performed meshikha, and did not carry out any of the recognized acts of acquisition.

And we challenge this:

For what halakhic purpose?!

Since he did not perform any recognized act of acquisition, with regard to what halakha did Rav Pappi say that the buyer acquires the item? And we answer:

Rav Ḥaviva said: To acquire it fully.

The buyer acquires it completely, as though he had performed a fully established act of acquisition.

And

the Sages

of the academy

said:

He does not acquire it fully; rather, only with regard

to accepting upon himself

that whoever retracts must accept upon himself the curse of

“the one whom He punished” [

as is the law with one who gave money but did not perform meshikha].

And the halakha is:

the halakha in this dispute is

that he accepts upon himself “the one whom He punished.”

And in a place

where

they practice

the custom

of acquiring it fully,

where it is customary to mark the merchandise with the intention that this act should effect a complete acquisition, as though he had performed meshikha,

he acquires it.

The purchase is acquired, and neither party may retract from it at all.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If he was first among the reapers”:

This is the law taught in the Mishna (72b): A person may establish a price for produce even though the market price has not yet been set, since the seller possesses some produce of that kind, even though its processing has not been completed.

Rav said:

Specifically, if it is

lacking two

stages of processing—its completion requires [one or] two additional tasks—he

may establish a price

for it, because it is considered “in his possession.” But if it is lacking

three

tasks,

he may not establish a price

for it, since it is like something that is not in his possession, and he may establish a price for it only if the market price has been set.

And Shmuel said

that he disagrees with Rav and maintains that the matter does not depend on the number of missing tasks, but rather on whether the tasks are

within human control

to perform:

even if

one hundred tasks

are

still lacking, he

may establish a price,

since the matter is within his control and it is therefore considered “in his possession.” But if the missing tasks are not within human control, but rather

in the hands of Heaven

to perform [and one who promises him that they will indeed occur],[

even

if only one task

is lacking, he may not establish a price

for it, since it is like something that is not in his possession, and he may establish a price for it only if the market price has been set.

And we challenge Rav from the Mishna:

“He may establish a price with him for the pile of grain; but”

the pile

is lacking

three tasks [until its processing is complete]:

a.

To spread it in the sun to dry,

to spread the sheaves in the sun to dry.

b.

And to thresh,

to thresh the grain.

c.

And to winnow,

to winnow the chaff after threshing with a winnowing shovel, so that it will be dispersed by the wind and the kernels will remain. This is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking, he may not establish a price!

And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as

being the case

where he spread it in the sun and it dried.

He had already spread the sheaves in the sun and they had dried; thus the question against Rav is resolved, since only two tasks remain [above,

b, c].

And we challenge this:

But according to Shmuel, who said that when the task is in the hands of Heaven, even if only one task is lacking he may not establish a price, yet

the pile

is lacking winnowing

winnowing with the wind,

which is in the hands of Heaven,

as it requires an uncommon wind. If so, why does the Mishna say that he may establish a price for the pile?

And we answer:

It is possible

to perform it by human agency as well, for example

with a sieve

a large sieve through which the chaff is separated from the kernels.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And for the vat of grapes”:

This passage continues the preceding discussion.

And we challenge Rav from the Mishna: Why is one permitted to establish a price for wine when the seller has a vat [a large vessel in which the grapes are gathered before pressing, so that they will warm and ripen and produce fine wine],

yet

before it becomes wine it

is lacking

four tasks:

a. Heating

so that the grapes will warm.

b. And bringing them in

to bring them

into the winepress

the winepress.

c. Threshing

treading the grapes in the winepress.

d. And drawing off

drawing the wine into the pit before the winepress [and transferring it into barrels].

This is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price: in the case of the vat, four tasks are lacking, and nevertheless he may establish a price!

And we answer:

Rav teaches that the Mishna reads

as Rabbi Hiyya taught:

as Rabbi Hiyya taught:

“For the heap of olives,”

that is, the Mishna says that one may establish a price for the “heap” of olives [olives gathered in a vessel that still need to warm], whereas Rabbi Hiyya taught that one may establish a price for the “heap” of olives [olives that have already warmed].

Here too,

Rav teaches that the Mishna should be read this way with regard to grapes one may establish a price for

“the heap of grapes” [

grapes that have already warmed], and not as the Mishna was taught: one may establish a price for the “vat” of grapes [which still need to warm]. If so, the difficulty against Rav is resolved, since the task of “heating” is no longer lacking [above, point a].

And we challenge this:

Yet

even now it

is lacking three

tasks [above,

b, c, d], and this is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price.

And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as being in a place

where

it is customary

that the one who purchases

the buyer

is the one who draws off

the wine into the pit before the winepress [and transfers it into barrels]. It follows that the grapes in the seller’s possession are lacking only two tasks [above,

b, c], and Rav’s statement that one may establish a price when two tasks are lacking is thereby resolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And for the heap of olives”:

This passage continues the preceding discussion.

And we challenge Rav from the Mishna: Why is one permitted to establish a price for oil when the seller has a heap [a large vessel in which the olives are gathered so that they will warm and ripen],

yet

before it becomes oil it

is lacking

four tasks:

a. Heating

so that the olives will warm.

b. And bringing them in

to bring them

into the oil press

the oil press.

c. And threshing

treading the olives.

d. And drawing off

drawing the oil into the pit [and transferring it into barrels]. This is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price: in the case of the heap, four tasks are lacking, and nevertheless he may establish a price!

And we answer:

Rabbi Hiyya taught

Rabbi Hiyya taught:

“For the heap of olives,”

that is, for olives that have already warmed [as explained above]. The difficulty against Rav is therefore resolved, since the task of “heating” is no longer lacking [above, point

a].

And we challenge this:

Yet three remain

three tasks are still lacking [above,

b, c, d], and this is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price.

And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as being in a place

where

it is customary

that the one who purchases

the buyer

is

the one who draws off

the oil into the pit [and transfers it into barrels]. It follows that the olives in the seller’s possession are lacking only two tasks [above,

b, c], and Rav’s statement that one may establish a price when two tasks are lacking is thereby resolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And for the eggs of the potter”:

This passage continues the preceding discussion.

And we challenge Rav from the Mishna: Why is one permitted to establish a price for pots if the potter has eggs [balls of clay that the potter shapes into pots],

yet

before they become pots they

are lacking

four tasks:

a. Rolling

rolling the eggs [to make a receptacle] according to the dimensions of the vessel he wishes to make from them, small or large,

and drying

drying them;

b. bringing them in

to bring them

into the kiln

the kiln;

c. firing

firing them in the kiln;

d. and taking them out

taking them out of the kiln.

This is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price: in the case of the eggs, four tasks are lacking, and nevertheless he may establish a price! And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as

being the case

where they have already been rolled and dried

the eggs have already been rolled and dried. The difficulty against Rav is therefore resolved, since the tasks of “rolling and drying” are no longer lacking [above, point a].

And we challenge this:

Yet three remain

three tasks are still lacking [above, b, c, d], and this is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price.

And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as being in a place

where

it is customary

that the one who purchases

is the one who takes out

the eggs from the kiln. It follows that the eggs in the potter’s possession are lacking only two tasks [above,

b, c], and Rav’s statement that one may establish a price when two tasks are lacking is thereby resolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

“And for lime once it has been placed in the kiln”:

This passage continues the preceding discussion. And we challenge Rav from the Mishna: Why is one permitted to establish a price for lime once it has been placed [the limestone] in the kiln [to fire it and turn it into lime],

yet

before it becomes lime it

is lacking

three

tasks:

a. Firing,

firing it in the kiln;

b. and taking it out,

taking it out of the kiln;

c. and grinding,

after removing the fired pieces from the kiln, placing a small amount of water on them, whereupon they are crushed on their own like ground flour. This is difficult for Rav, who said that when three tasks are lacking one may not establish a price: here, with the limestone, three tasks are lacking, and nevertheless he may establish a price! And we answer: Rav interprets the Mishna

as being in a place

where

it is customary

that the purchaser

performs the grinding

himself. It follows that with regard to the owner of the limestone, only two tasks are lacking [above: a, b], and Rav’s statement that one may establish a price when two tasks are lacking is thereby resolved.

And we challenge this:

But according to Shmuel, who said that when tasks are within human control, even if one hundred are lacking, he may establish a price, why does the Mishna need to say, “once it has been placed in the kiln”?

That is, why did the Mishna require [in order to permit establishing a price] that the owner of the limestone “place it” in the kiln? According to Shmuel, it should be permitted to establish a price even when tasks that are within human control still remain to be performed! [According to Rav, this is understandable, since the Mishna required this so that only two tasks would remain, as explained above, a, b.]

And we answer:

Say

that the Mishna means

“from the time when it is fit to be placed in the kiln”

and one may establish a price once he has prepared the limestone and the wood and everything is in his control and ready for placement in the kiln [even though he has not yet placed it there].

We learned in the Mishna:

and for the potter’s beitzim:

The Sages taught: One may not fix a price for the potter’s beitzim until they have been made; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir,

meaning: it is forbidden to fix a price [if the market price has not been established] for the potter to give him pots until the potter makes their beitzim [at which point it is considered that “he has it”].

Rabbi Yosei said: When are these words applicable

when it is necessary for the potter to have beitzim

made from white earth

which is not readily available;

but with regard to black earth

which is readily available, it is permitted to fix a price for vessels made from it, even though the potter has not made beitzim from it [from the black earth],

such as Kfar Ḥananya and its environs

[the nearby places]

Kfar Shiḥin and its environs

[the nearby places], for black earth is readily available in all these places, and the reason for the permission is:

even though this one does not have it, that one has it,

and it is therefore always considered that “he has it.”

Ameimar gave money

he gave money in order to purchase pots

once they brought in earth

once the seller had brought in and stockpiled earth in his house, and it was black earth.

And we raise a difficulty:

According to whom

does Ameimar hold?

If it is according to Rabbi Meir, who says: “until they have been made”

[the beitzim], and Ameimar gave the money even before the seller had made the beitzim,

or if it is according to Rabbi Yosei, who says: “even though this one does not have it, that one has it.”

Why, then, did Ameimar give the money only after the seller had brought in and stockpiled earth in his house? According to Rabbi Yosei, it is not necessary at all for him to have earth!

And we answer:

Actually,

Ameimar held

in accordance with Rabbi Yosei; but in Ameimar’s location

and in Ameimar’s place

the earth was expensive,

it was costly,

the earth

[the black earth].

If the earth had been brought in,

if the seller had already brought in and stockpiled earth in his house,

his mind relied upon it,

as he relied on the assumption that he would make beitzim and pots from the earth, since he had already stockpiled it; and one who retracts would receive Mi Shepara, since he had given him money.

But if not,

if he had not stockpiled the earth,

his mind did not rely upon it

he did not rely on the assumption, and was not certain that he would find earth [which was not readily available]; and one who retracted would not receive Mi Shepara, even though he had given money, because he had given it only on the basis of uncertainty.

We learned in the Mishna:

and he may fix a price with him for manure throughout the entire year:

This is the view of the tanna kamma.

And we raise a difficulty: We learned in the Mishna,

and the Sages

permit it; and if so, the difficulty is:

this is identical to the tanna kamma.

In what, then, do the tanna kamma and the Sages disagree?