Bava Metzia 72b (עב:) — the Talmud in English

He admits that he wrote the document:

One who admits with regard to a document that he wrote it, but claims that the document has been paid, once he has admitted that the document is not forged,

he no longer needs

the creditor

to authenticate it

through the witnesses who signed it,

and

the creditor

may collect from liened property.

Rava said

to Abaye:

Are the cases comparable

—can our case be compared to that of Rabbi Asi—!?

But

there—

in Rabbi Asi’s ruling—

the document was

written

in a manner permitting it to be written,

but

here,

the document

could not be written, since the land does not belong to the writer of the document, and he wrote the document against his will.

Marimar sat and stated this teaching

—Marimar was sitting and stating Rava’s distinction.

Ravina said to Marimar:

But—if the matter is as Rava says—

there is a difficulty from

that which

Rabbi Yohanan

Rabbi Yohanan

had to say, as the reason for the ruling that one may not collect at all with documents written in advance,

lest he collect from the earlier date—

For even without this,

let us say:

Therefore, he cannot collect with this document because

the document was not

written

in a manner permitting it to be written!?

He said to him

Marimar to Ravina:

Can this be compared

—is the proof comparable to the case under discussion—!?

There,

in Rabbi Yohanan’s statement,

although it could not be

written

from the earlier date, it could be written from the later date, and therefore there is no reason that he should not collect from the later date were it not for the decree.

But

But

here,

in Rava’s statement,

the document

could not be

written at all, since the field does not belong to the writer of the document.

We nevertheless continue to challenge Rava’s reasoning:

We still raise an objection to Rava’s reasoning:

And

but what of the beraita that teaches to explain what we learned: “One does not collect payment for produce consumed or for improvements to land from liened property, for the betterment of the world”:

to explain what we learned: “One does not collect payment for produce consumed or for improvements to land from liened property, for the betterment of the world”:

For improvements to land—

for which one does not collect from liened property—

how so:

If one robbed a field from another, sold it to someone else, and that other person improved it,

the purchaser,

and it is taken out

by the person robbed

from his possession,

that of the purchaser,

when he,

the purchaser,

collects

from the one who sold it to him the money he lost and the value of the improvement, he

collects the principal—

that is, the purchase money—

from liened property, and

the

improvement

he does not

collect

except

from unsold property.

In any event, it is explained that he collects the purchase money from liened property. But according to Rava,

let us say:

But

the document was not

written

in a manner permitting it to be written

at all, since the field does not belong to the seller, and he should not collect from liened property!?

And we answer:

Can this be compared!?

The Gemara above, on page 15b, reads: “Shmuel asked Rav: If the robber who sold a field that did not belong to him to another then returned and purchased it from the original owners, what is the law? Is it the purchaser’s, or the seller’s?”

He said to him: “The first seller sold to the second every right that would come into his possession”; that is, it belongs to the purchaser.

And there we explain: What is the reason? Mar Zutra said: It is satisfactory to the seller that the purchaser not call him a robber; therefore, when he purchased the field from the owners, he purchased it for the purchaser. Rav Ashi said: The robber acquired it for the purchaser because it is satisfactory to the seller to maintain his reputation in the purchaser’s eyes as a trustworthy person.

There,

with regard to a deed of sale from a robber, the document is therefore valid, for

if,

whether

according to the one who says

that when he returned and purchased it from the original owners, he intended to acquire it for the purchaser because

it was not satisfactory to him that he be called a robber, or if

whether

according to the one who says:

because it was

satisfactory to him to maintain his reputation,

in the end

he appeases the owner and validates his document

—the robber’s intention is to purchase it from the original owners and validate his deed of sale—and therefore the document can be written.

But

here,

in our case,

his intention is to remove it from him

—he sold it to him in order to remove it from his possession—and if so, is it possible that

he validates the document

—that he intends to return and purchase it from his son in order to leave it in the purchaser’s possession? If so, it is a document that could not be written, and therefore he cannot collect with it.

Mishna:

One may not set a price,

it is forbidden to advance and give a sum of money to the seller at a time when the price is low,

for produce,

on the condition that the seller give the owner of the money—the purchaser—produce at that low price at a later time, in an amount corresponding to his money; and this prohibition applies

until the market price has been established—

the price publicized and fixed in the city markets for this produce. The reason for the prohibition is that, since the price at which this produce is sold has not yet been established, we are concerned that it will become more expensive when its market price is established, with the result that the purchaser will profit from waiting for the money to be returned.

But if

the market price has been established

publicly and fixed in the city markets for this produce,

one may set a price:

the purchaser is permitted to agree with him that he will give him produce at a later time, according to the price that has already been established; and even if the produce subsequently becomes more expensive, this does not constitute interest.

And this price-setting is permitted

even

though the seller does not have

produce at the time of the agreement;

another person has it,

and the seller can purchase it now with the money he received. The purchaser is permitted to agree with the seller that he will give him wheat, even if the market price has not been established, if

he was

the seller

the first among the reapers,

and already has a stack—a heap of cut grain piled in the field—

the purchaser may set a price

with

him,

with the seller,

for the stack

that the seller has. The reason for the permission is that, since the seller has it, this is not interest, because it is acquired for him from now; even though he has not performed meshikha, since when he does not have it the prohibition is only rabbinic, and when he has it, the Sages did not decree.

And for the vat of grapes.

The purchaser is permitted to agree that the seller will give him wine, even though the market price has not been established, if the seller’s grapes are gathered in a large vessel—that is, a vat—which is placed there before treading; they become warm and ripen so that their wine will be extracted properly.

And for the trough of olives.

The purchaser is permitted to agree that the seller will give him oil, even though the market price has not been established, as with wine above; only the vessel containing olives is called a “trough.”

And for the eggs

of the potter.

The purchaser is permitted to agree that the seller—the potter—will give him pots, even though the market price has not been established, if the potter has prepared eggs, balls of clay that the potter rounds,

And for lime once it has been placed in the kiln.

And the purchaser is permitted to agree that the seller will make pots from it, that the seller will give him lime, even though the market price has not been established, once the lime stones and wood have been placed in the kiln in order to burn them and make lime.

The purchaser may set a price

at whatever price he wishes

with him,

with the seller,

for manure,

that he will supply him with manure—for fertilizing fields—

throughout the entire year,

both in summer and in winter.

Rabbi Yosei says:

He disputes the first tanna and maintains:

One may not set a price for manure unless he has

the seller

manure in the refuse heap.

the seller manure in a refuse heap.

And the Sages permit.

The Gemara, 74a–b, explains the dispute between the first tanna and the Sages.

The purchaser may set a price

with

him,

with the seller,

at the higher market rate—

that is, at a low price, at which one gives a large quantity of produce for a small amount of money— meaning: When the price becomes lower than it is now, he will give him produce at the lower price; and if it becomes more expensive, he will give it to him at the current price.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

He disagrees with the first tanna and maintains:

Even though he did not set a price

the purchaser

with him,

with the seller [at the higher market price],

the purchaser can

the purchaser

say

to the seller:

Give me this,

produce at the lower price,

or give me

my money!

Gemara:

Rav Asi said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: One may not set a price according to the market rate

because it is not fixed.

Rabbi Zeira said to Rav Asi:

Did

Rabbi Yohanan say

that one may not set a price

even at the rate of the durmus

—a large and substantial marketplace—

this

whose price is fixed?

He said to him

Rav Asi to Rabbi Zeira:

Rabbi Yohanan did not say

that one may fix a price

except in the market of towns,

because their market prices are not fixed

for their price is not fixed.

And we challenge this:

But according to the one who initially understood,

according to Rabbi Zeira’s understanding,

that Rabbi Yohanan said

that one may not fix a price

even at

the rate

of this durmos, but the Mishna,

which teaches

which the tanna taught in it,

“One may not fix a price for produce until the market price is established; once

the market price is established, one may fix a price”—how can you find such a case?

Where can you find a situation in which it is permitted to fix a price according to its market price?

And we answer:

The Mishna

which says that once the market price is established one may fix a price,

refers to wheat from storehouses

[storehouses]

and ships

[ships]

whose market price remains in effect longer,

for their price remains in effect longer than the price of this durmos. That is, once householders and owners of produce storehouses begin opening their storehouses, and ships bring grain to sell, their price remains in effect for a long time, since there is much grain.

The Sages taught:

It was taught in the Tosefta:

One may not fix a price for produce until the market price is established.

Once the market price is established, one may fix a price

because

even though this person does not have it, that person has it.

If there was

new produce

priced at four,

which had not yet dried sufficiently,

and

at a price of four se’a per sela,

while

produce

was priced at three

at a price of three se’a per sela,

one may not fix a price

for new produce at four,

until

the market price is established

at four

for both the new and the old,

which is a fixed market price.

If there was

produce of

gleaners,

belonging to the poor, which is gleaned from several fields and is not of high quality, as rye sheaves [one of the five species of grain] are mixed with wheat sheaves,

at four

four se’a per sela.

And for everyone,

the produce of other people,

at three,

three se’a per sela,

one may not fix a price

with a householder at four,

until the market price is established

at four

for the gleaner,

for the produce of the poor person who gleans,

and for the seller,

the regular householder.

Rav Nahman said: One may fix a price for gleaners

for the poor who glean, with regard to the produce of gleaners,

according to the rate for gleaners,

which is four se’a per sela.

Rava said to him

he asked

Rav Nahman: What is different about the gleaner,

in what way is the law of the gleaner different, such that it is permitted even when he does not have it, from the law of the householder, for whom it is prohibited,

for if he does not have it,

since if the gleaner does not have produce,

he can borrow

mixed produce

from his fellow gleaner,

and therefore he is considered as one who “has it,” and therefore it should be permitted;

the householder, too, can borrow from a gleaner.

And if so, why is it prohibited for a householder to fix a price with an ordinary person for produce of gleaners according to the rate for gleaners, since it should be considered that he “has it,” because he can borrow from the gleaners?

He said to him

Rav Nahman answered Rava:

For a householder, it is degrading,

it is disgraceful for him,

to borrow from a gleaner

and therefore he is considered one who “does not have it,” and it is prohibited.

Alternatively, one may say: The one who gives money

the one who gives money

to a householder gives it for superior produce,

with the understanding that he will give him good produce, and not produce of gleaners.

Rav Sheshet said in the name of Rav Huna: One may not borrow according to the market rate,

that is, one may not borrow money in the manner of a loan on the condition that if he does not repay the money by a particular time, he will give him produce at the current rate. And it is prohibited, lest the produce become more expensive.

He

challenged

Rav Yosef bar Hama challenged Rav Sheshet, and some say

there were members of the academy who stated this challenge in the name of

Rav Yosei bar Abba to Rav Sheshet: Did Rav Huna really say this

did Rav Huna indeed say so?,

for they asked Rav Huna,

as Rav Huna was asked,

“These members of the academy,

the members of the academy,

who borrow

who borrow money

in Tishrei and repay

produce

in Tevet

at the rate of Tishrei,

is it permitted or prohibited,

is it permitted or prohibited?”

He said to them

Rav Huna answered them:

“These are wheat from Hini,

a place name,

and those are wheat from Shili;

a place name,

if they wish, they can buy and repay him.”

If they wish, they can now purchase wheat in the nearby places and repay him immediately, and therefore the members of the academy are acting in accordance with the law,

and if so, how could Rav Sheshet have said in the name of Rav Huna that one may not borrow according to the market rate?

And Rav Sheshet answers:

Initially,

at first,

Rav Huna thought, “One may not borrow”

according to the market rate.

Once he heard what Rav Shmuel bar Hiyya said in the name of Rabbi Elazar,

that one may borrow, Rav Huna retracted his view, and

he too said, “One may borrow,”

and therefore he said that the members of the academy were acting in accordance with the law.

The Sages taught:

A person

who transports a bundle

of merchandise [of his own]

from a place

where it is cheap

to a place

where it is expensive,

his fellow met him

in the cheap place

and said to him, “Give it to me,

and I will transport it to the expensive place,

and I will increase the amount for you as they increase it for you in that place,”

and I will sell it there, use the money for my needs until a specified time, and repay you according to its value there.