Bava Metzia 55a (נה.) — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi said to Ravina:

But

is a non-kosher animal found at the beginning of consecration?

At the middle of consecration

[for example, he designated it in place of another animal and now wishes to redeem it]

is it not found?!

And why do we derive from it that one does not add a fifth when redeeming a second consecration?

He said to him: Because it is not at the end of consecration.

That is, it is not fit for the altar, and it is impossible to use it in the construction of the Temple. And we derive the middle of consecration, meaning a second consecration, from the end of consecration, as follows.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina:

But

it is at least found at the middle of consecration,

as he can designate it in place of another animal,

and

if so,

let him also add a fifth?

He said to him:

The middle of consecration

is equivalent to the end of consecration: Just as at the end of consecration one does not add a fifth, so too, at the middle of consecration one does not add a fifth.

Rav Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: What have you seen that makes you compare it to the end of consecration? Compare it to the beginning of consecration!

He said to him: It stands to reason that it should be compared to the end of consecration, since

it is preferable to derive

an item that has been designated in place of another item from an item that has been designated in place of another item.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, it should be compared to the beginning of consecration, since

it is preferable to derive

something that has sanctity after it

that is, something that can be redeemed,

from something

that has sanctity after it?

This is unlike the “end of consecration,” which can no longer be redeemed, but must either be offered or used in construction.

And we answer: We derive it from what is written, “the impure”

as Rava said: “‘The burnt-offering’ means the first burnt-offering,

so too,

we derive:

‘the impure’ means the first impure item.”

This excludes a second consecration, for which one does not add a fifth.

It was taught in a beraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

One who says,

“This cow is in place of a consecrated cow

, and this cloak is in place of a consecrated cloak,”

even though their values were not equal,

his consecrated item is redeemed.

For if a consecrated item worth one hundred dinars was redeemed with an item worth one peruta, it is redeemed. It is permitted to benefit from it, but he must pay the difference to the consecration.

And

nevertheless,

the consecration has the upper hand.

If the second cow was worth more, the sanctity takes hold of all of it. And likewise, if the consecrated item was worth more, he is compelled to complete the missing sum.

And likewise, if he said,

“This cow is for five sela, in place of a consecrated cow,”

or

“This cloak is for five sela in place of a consecrated cloak, its consecration is redeemed.”

This is so even if the consecrated item was worth more, as stated above. We do not say that since he assigned a value to it and it is not worth what he said, his words are of no effect. Rather, the consecrated item is redeemed, and he must complete its value.

And the beraita concludes:

For a first consecration, one adds a fifth; for a second consecration, one does not add a fifth.

And this is in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

Mishna:

A. The measure of

the overcharge

in a sale that must be returned is

four

silver

coins

for each sela. There are twenty-four silver coins in a sela, and if he overcharged him by four coins, meaning one-sixth of the sale price, he must return the overcharge.

B.

And the claim—

if a person claimed money from another, and the other admitted only part of the obligation, the court does not obligate the defendant to take the oath of one who admits part of a claim unless the claim is at least a sum of

two

silver

coins,

that is, one-third of a dinar. For the oath imposed by the judges does not apply to a claim of less than two silver coins.

And the admission

of the defendant to the obligation must be at least

the value of one peruta,

which is one thirty-second of a ma'a. For if he admits to less than the value of a peruta, he is not considered to have admitted anything.

C.

There are five instances involving a peruta—

the measure of a peruta is stated in five matters:

A.

The admission

to part of the claim, which the defendant admits, is considered an admission to part only if he admits to at least

the value of a peruta,

as explained here in the Mishna.

B.

And a woman becomes betrothed

to her husband with money

worth

a peruta.

C.

And one who derives benefit worth a peruta from consecrated property commits sacrilege

and must bring a sacrifice for misuse of consecrated property.

D.

And one who finds

a lost item that is

worth a peruta must announce

it and return it to its owner. But for less than the value of a peruta he is not required to announce it, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:3]: “And so shall you do for every lost item of your brother that is lost from him and you find it.” And the Sages expounded: “That is lost from him”—to exclude a lost item that has no value of a peruta, which is not called a lost item.

E.

And one who robs another

of an amount of

the value

of a peruta

and swears to him

falsely that he did not rob him, and afterward admits that he robbed him—

must take it after him even

to Media,

for he has no atonement until he returns the stolen item directly to the robbed party himself, and not to his agent, even if he is in a distant country. As it is stated [Numbers 5:7]: “And he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The overcharge is four silver coins, etc.

And we challenge this: It was already

taught once

above [49b]: The measure of

the overcharge

that must be returned is

four

silver

coins, out of twenty-four silver coins per sela,

that is:

one-sixth of the sale!

One-sixth of the sale price!

And why did the Mishna repeat this law here?

And we answer: The law taught in our Mishna,

“The claim is two silver coins and the admission is the value of a peruta,” was necessary for it.

The Mishna needed to teach this novel point, and incidentally to this law, the Mishna also brought the law taught above, that the measure of the overcharge that must be returned is one-sixth of the sale price.

And we challenge this:

This too was taught once,

the law that the claim is two silver coins and the admission is the value of a peruta was also already taught, and the Mishna did not need to teach it anew, for we learned in Shevuot [38b]:

The oath imposed by the judges—

the oath that the judges impose upon the defendant when he admits part of the claim—the defendant becomes obligated to take it only if

the claim

is at least a sum of

two

silver

coins,

that is, one-third of a dinar.

And the admission

of the defendant is at least the sum of

the value of a peruta!

And we answer:

The concluding clause

of our Mishna

was necessary for it;

the Mishna needed to teach a novel point, and incidentally to the law in the concluding clause, the laws in the opening clause were brought.

As it teaches

in the concluding clause of our Mishna:

There are five instances involving a peruta.

The measure of a peruta is stated in five matters, and incidentally to this law, which needed to be taught anew, the Mishna brought the laws in the opening clause, even though they had already been taught elsewhere.

We learned in the Mishna:

There are five instances involving a peruta, etc.

The Mishna lists only five matters in which the measure of a peruta is stated.

And we challenge this:

And let it also teach:

that the Mishna should also teach that even if

the overcharge

is one-sixth of the sale price, one returns it only if the overcharge is worth

a peruta,

that is, the sale is at least a sum of six perutot.

Rav Kahana said: This indicates

from the fact that the Mishna did not mention this case, it follows that

there is no overcharge for perutot—

in a sale involving “perutot,” which are copper coins, but only in a sale involving an issar, which is a silver coin [worth eight perutot], and therefore the Mishna did not need to teach that the overcharge must be at least a peruta, since overcharge applies only to a sale worth at least an issar. This is Rashi’s explanation. The Rosh wrote that Rashi’s words imply that the issar is the smallest silver coin, and the Rosh raises a difficulty, since the ma'a is the smallest coin. Therefore, the Rosh explains that overcharge applies to a ma'a, since it is the smallest of all the silver coins. See Kiddushin 12a. The early authorities disagree about the value of a sale to which the law of overcharge applies. a. Rashi explains that there is no overcharge for less than an issar, but the early authorities disagree about his intention. The Rosh, the Ran, and the Ritva understood that the measure of the overcharge is an issar, whereas the Ritbatz, in the Shitta Mekubetzet, understood that the value of the sale must be an issar. The Rashash and the Beit Aharon wrote that this is explicit in Rashi below [56b, s.v. “for perutot”], and according to this, the measure of the overcharge is one peruta and one-third, meaning one-sixth of an issar, whose value is eight perutot. b. The view of the Ra'avad, in the Shitta Mekubetzet, and of the Ritbatz in the name of the Ra'ah is that the measure of the overcharge is an issar. c. The Rambam [Sale 12:4, cited in the Ran and in the glosses of the Gra to the Rosh] wrote that any amount greater than a peruta constitutes overcharge and must be returned. d. The Rosh explains that there is no overcharge for less than a ma'a, which is the smallest silver coin. e. The Ra'avad and the Ritva cite those who explain that “there is no overcharge for perutot” stringently, meaning that even for less than a peruta one must return the overcharge. The Ra'avad raises a difficulty, since it is evident from the Gemara below [56b] that Rav Kahana said leniently that there is no overcharge for a peruta. f. Rabbi Yonatan, in the Shitta Mekubetzet, explains that there is no overcharge if the sale was worth a peruta and the overcharge was consequently less than a peruta, because a person waives less than the value of a peruta. According to this, if the overcharge itself was a peruta, there is overcharge.

And Levi said: There is overcharge

also

for perutot

—in a sale involving a sum of copper perutot.

And if so, it must be explained that the law of ona'a applies only when the ona'a is worth at least one peruta, and ona'a must be included among the matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated.

And likewise he taught [

reads]

Levi in his Mishna [

in his teaching]: that ona'a is included among the five matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated:

And this is how he taught in his Mishna:

There are five perutot—

in these five matters, the measure of a peruta was stated:

A.

The ona'a

that must be returned [when it amounts to one-sixth of the purchase] must be worth at least

a peruta.

B.

An admission

in part, which obligates one to take the oath of one who admits in part, must be an admission concerning an amount worth at least

a peruta.

C.

The betrothal of a woman

to her husband through money must be worth at least

a peruta.

D.

Theft:

if one swore falsely and subsequently admitted that he had stolen, he is obligated to bring an offering for a false oath and to take it after him, if the stolen item was worth

a peruta.

E.

The sitting of the judges,

who sit to adjudicate and compel a person against whom there is evidence that he owes money to his fellow and refuses to pay, even

for a peruta.

According to Levi’s version, the Mishna included ona'a, whose law requires returning the overcharge only if it is more than a peruta, because in his view ona'a applies even to a transaction involving coins worth less than an issar. Therefore, it is necessary to explain that the law of ona'a in a transaction applies only when the overcharge itself was worth at least a peruta.

According to Levi’s version, one of the five matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated is: the sitting of the judges.

And we raise an objection:

But as for our tanna,

our tanna,

for what reason did he not teach

why he did not teach

the sitting of the judges

among the matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated.

And we answer: According to the tanna of our Mishna, he already

taught it—

he taught the sitting of the judges together with

theft,

because since theft applies to an item worth a peruta, it is consequently a monetary claim, and it is adjudicated in court.

And we raise an objection: The Mishna should still have included the sitting of the judges, since the Mishna also specified cases included under theft,

and did he not teach

did he not teach

theft and teach

and also teach

lost property

included under theft? For if theft applies to an item worth a peruta, it is consequently a monetary claim, and there is an obligation to return the lost property.

If so, just as he taught theft and also taught lost property, which is included under theft, he should likewise have taught the sitting of the judges, even though it is included under theft.

And we answer: The reason the Mishna included both theft and lost property, even though lost property is included under theft, is that

these were necessary

these had to be included in order to teach us the novel laws that the Gemara will now specify. This is not so with regard to the sitting of the judges, which contains no novel law; the tanna therefore did not need to teach it to us.

Theft—

it was written to teach us that

one who steals from his fellow an item worth a peruta and swears to him

falsely that he did not steal, and subsequently admits—

must take it after him, even to Media.

Lost property—

it was written to teach us that

one who finds lost property worth a peruta is obligated to make a proclamation, even though it depreciated

so that it declined in value from the time it was found and now is not worth a peruta.

And as for Levi,

who did not have lost property in his version of the Mishna,

for what reason did he not teach

that the return of

lost property

is

for a peruta?

And we answer: Because he had already

taught theft,

and if theft applies to an item worth a peruta, it is monetary property, and one is obligated to return it as lost property.

And we raise an objection:

But did he not teach theft and teach the sitting of the judges

even though it is included under theft? For if theft applies to an item worth a peruta, it is consequently monetary property, and it is adjudicated in court. Nevertheless, he taught “the sitting of the judges,” that a court adjudicates a claim involving a peruta. If so, why did he not also teach the law that one makes a proclamation concerning lost property worth a peruta?

And we answer: According to Levi, there is no need to specify all the matters included under theft. As for the fact that the Mishna included

the sitting of the judges

even though it is included under theft,

it was necessary

in order

to exclude the view of Rav Ketina.

For Rav Ketina said: A court attends to a case

to adjudicate and obligate a person

even for less than the value of a peruta.

Therefore, the Mishna had to include the sitting of the judges in order to teach us that a court does not sit to adjudicate a claim involving less than the value of a peruta. But the other matters included under theft did not need to be included.

And furthermore, we raise an objection:

And as for Levi, for what reason did he not teach consecrated property,

for one is liable for misuse if he misuses consecrated property worth a peruta? For misuse is not included among the five matters [concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated] that are listed in his version of the Mishna.

And we answer: According to Levi, the Mishna

is speaking only of non-sacred property,

but

it is not speaking of consecrated property,

and therefore the Mishna did not include this law, that misuse of consecrated property applies to a peruta.

And we raise an objection to our tanna:

But our tanna, who is speaking of consecrated property,

as he included the law of misuse, why did he not

teach the tithe

whose law is

for a peruta,

and whose redemption does not take effect for less than a peruta?

And we answer: Our tanna holds

in accordance with the one who says: One does not

redeem second tithe until it is worth four perutot, so that

its fifth is a peruta,

because there is a law that one must add a fifth when redeeming second tithe, and only if the tithe is worth four perutot can one add a fifth worth a peruta in its redemption.

It follows that the law of redeeming second tithe involves more than a peruta, and therefore our tanna did not include it together with the other matters whose measure is a peruta.

And we raise an objection: Since our tanna holds that one may redeem second tithe only when its fifth is a peruta,

let him teach

that the law of adding a

fifth

in the redemption of

second tithe

is

for a peruta!

And we answer: According to our tanna, the Mishna

is speaking only of the principal

the principal payments,

but is speaking

not

of the fifth.

As for the matter itself,

we learned above:

Rav Ketina said: A court attends to a case

to adjudicate and obligate a person

even for less than the value of a peruta.