Bava Metzia 55a — the Talmud in English

Rav Ashi said to Ravina:

But

is there an impure animal at the beginning of consecration, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact page location")

[or] in the middle of consecration

[such as when he designated it in place of another animal, and he wishes to redeem it]

there is not?!

And why do we derive from it that one does not add a fifth [to the value] in a second consecration?

He said to him: Because it is not at the end of consecration.

That is to say, it is not fit for the altar, and it is impossible to immerse it in the building of the Temple. And we derive the middle of consecration, that is, a second consecration, from the end of consecration, as follows.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina:

Behold,

in the middle of consecration, at any rate, it exists,

for he can designate it in place of another animal,

and

if so,

should he also add a fifth?

He said to him:

The middle of consecration

is like the end of consecration: just as at the end of consecration one does not add a fifth, so too, in the middle of consecration one does not add a fifth.

Rav Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: What have you seen that you compare it to the end of consecration? Compare it to the beginning of consecration!

He said to him: It is logical that it should be compared to the end of consecration, since

it is preferable to derive

something designated from something designated.

And we challenge this:

On the contrary, it should be compared to the beginning of consecration, since

it is preferable to derive

something that has sanctity after it

[that is, it is possible to redeem it]

from something

that has sanctity after it?

This is not so with the “end of consecration,” for it is no longer possible to redeem it; rather, one must offer them or immerse them in the building.

And we answer: We derive it from what is written, “the impure,”

as Rava said: “the burnt offering” means the first burnt offering

, so too here,

we derive:

“the impure” means the first impure one.

To exclude a second consecration, for one does not add a fifth to it.

It was taught in accordance with [the opinion of] Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi:

One who says,

“This cow is in place of a consecrated cow

, this cloak is in place of a consecrated cloak,”

even though their values were not equal,

his consecration is redeemed.

For if consecration worth one hundred zuz was exchanged for something worth one peruta, it is redeemed. It is permitted to benefit from it, and he is obligated to pay the Temple treasury the difference.

And

in any event,

the hand of the Temple treasury is on top.

And if the second cow was worth more, the sanctity seized all of it. Likewise, if the consecrated property was worth more, they compel him to complete the missing payment.

And likewise, if he said

“This cow for five sela, in place of a consecrated cow,”

or

“This cloak for five sela, in place of a consecrated cloak,” his consecration is redeemed.

Even though the consecrated property was worth more, as above. And we do not say: Since he assigned a value to it, and it is not worth what he said, his words have no effect. Rather, the consecrated property is redeemed, and he completes its value.

And the beraita concludes:

For a first consecration, he adds a fifth; for a second consecration, he does not add a fifth.

And this is in accordance with the words of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi.

Mishna:

A. The measure of

overreaching

in a sale that one is obligated to return is

four

silver

coins

per sela, for in a sela there are twenty-four silver coins; and if he overcharged him by four coins, that is, one-sixth of the amount of the sale, he is obligated to return the overcharge.

B.

And the claim —

if a person claimed money from his fellow, and his fellow admitted to him only part of the obligation, the court does not obligate the defendant with the oath of one who admits to part [of the claim], unless the claim is at least the amount of

two

coins

of silver,

that is, one-third of a dinar. For the oath administered by judges does not apply to a claim of less than two silver coins.

And the admission

of the defendant concerning the obligation must be at least

worth a peruta,

which is one thirty-second of a ma'ah. For if he admits to less than a peruta, he is not considered to have admitted at all.

C.

There are five perutot —

in five matters the measure of a peruta is stated:

A.

The admission

of part [of the claim] to which the defendant admits is considered an admission to part only if he admitted to at least

worth a peruta,

as was explained here in the Mishna.

B.

And the woman becomes betrothed

to her husband with money

worth

a peruta.

C.

And one who derives benefit worth a peruta from consecrated property commits sacrilege

and is obligated to bring a sacrilege offering.

D.

And one who finds

a lost object that is

worth a peruta is obligated to proclaim

it and return it to its owners; but for less than a peruta he is not obligated to proclaim it, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 22:3], “And so you shall do for every lost object of your brother that is lost from him and you find it,” and the Sages interpreted: “that is lost from him” — excluding a lost object that has no value of a peruta, which is not called a lost object.

E.

And one who robs his fellow

of the amount of

the value of

a peruta

and swears to him

falsely that he did not rob him, and afterward admits that he robbed him —

he must take it after him even

to Media ,

for he has no atonement until he returns the robbery into the hand of the robbed person himself, and not to his agent , even if he is in a distant country. As it is stated [Numbers 5:7], “And he shall give it to the one to whom he is indebted.”

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “The overcharge is four silver [coins],” etc.

And we challenge: Behold, already

we learned it once

We learned this law earlier [49b]: The measure of

the overcharge

that one is obligated to return is

four

coins

of silver, from twenty-four silver coins to a sela,

that is:

one-sixth of the sale!

One-sixth of the amount of the sale!

And why did the Mishna repeat this law here?

And we answer: The law taught in our Mishna,

“the claim is two silver [coins] and the admission is worth a peruta,” was necessary for it;

the Mishna needed to teach this novelty, and incidentally to this law the Mishna also brought the law taught earlier, that the measure of the overcharge one is obligated to return is one-sixth of the amount of the sale.

And we refute:

This too we learned,

this law [that the claim is two silver [coins] and the admission is worth a peruta] was also already taught, and the Mishna did not need to teach it as a novelty, for we learned in Shevuot [38b]:

The oath administered by judges

— the oath that the judges impose upon the defendant when he admits to part of the claim — the defendant is not obligated by it unless

the claim

is at least the amount of

two

coins

of silver,

that is, one-third of a dinar.

And the admission

of the defendant is at least the amount of

a peruta!

And we answer:

The latter clause

of our Mishna

was necessary for it;

the Mishna needed to teach a novelty, and incidentally to the law in the latter clause, the laws in the first clause were brought.

For it teaches

in the latter clause of our Mishna:

There are five perutot.

For five matters the measure of a peruta is stated, and incidentally to this law, which they needed to teach as a novelty, the Mishna brought the laws in the first clause, even though they had already been taught elsewhere.

We learned in the Mishna:

“There are five perutot,” etc.

Only five matters in which the measure of a peruta is stated were brought in the Mishna.

And we challenge:

And let it also teach,

that the Mishna should also teach that even if

the overcharge

is an amount of one-sixth of the sale, he returns it only if the overcharge is worth

a peruta,

that is, the sale is at least an amount of six perutot.

Rav Kahana said: This is to say

from the fact that the Mishna did not bring this case, it follows that

there is no overreaching for perutot

— for a sale of “perutot,” which are copper coins, but only in a sale of an “issar,” which is a silver coin [whose value is eight perutot] . Therefore, they did not need to bring in the Mishna that the overcharge must be at least a peruta, since there is overreaching only with regard to a sale that is at least an issar.

And Levi said: There is overreaching

also

for perutot

— for a sale in the amount of copper perutot.

And if so, it must be explained that the law of overcharging was stated only in a situation where the overcharge was worth at least a peruta, and overcharging must be included among the matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated.

And so he taught [

the version reads ]

Levi in his Mishna [in his Mishna]:

that overcharging is included among the five matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated:

And this is what he taught in his Mishna:

There are five perutot—

in these five matters, the measure of a peruta was stated:

1.

The overcharge

which must be returned [when it is one-sixth of the purchase] must be worth at least

a peruta.

2.

And the admission

concerning part of the claim, which obligates an oath of one who admits part of the claim, must be at least for an amount worth

a peruta.

3.

And the betrothal of a woman

to her husband through money must be at least

a peruta.

4.

And robbery,

if he swore falsely, and afterward admitted that he had robbed, he is obligated to bring the guilt-offering for a false oath and to take it after him, if the robbery was worth

a peruta.

5.

And the sitting of the judges

who sit to adjudicate and compel a person concerning whom there is proof that he owes money to his fellow and refuses to pay, even

for a peruta.

If so, according to Levi’s version, the Mishna brought the case of overcharging, whose law is that it is returned only if it is more than a peruta, because in his opinion there is overcharging even in a purchase of perutot worth less than an issar. Therefore, it is necessary to explain that the law of overcharging in a purchase applies only if the overcharge itself was worth at least a peruta.

According to Levi’s version, one of the five matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated is: the sitting of the judges.

And we raise a difficulty:

And our tanna

our tanna

for what reason did he not teach

why he did not teach

the sitting of the judges

among the matters concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated.

And we answer: According to the tanna of our Mishna, he already

taught it

taught the sitting of the judges, which was included together with

robbery,

because since there is robbery with regard to something worth a peruta, it is consequently money, and they adjudicate it in court.

And we raise a difficulty: The Mishna should still have brought the sitting of the judges, for the Mishna also specified cases included in robbery,

and did he not teach

did he not teach

robbery and teach

and also teach

a lost object

which is included in robbery? For if there is robbery with regard to something worth a peruta, it is consequently money, and there is an obligation to return the lost object.

If so, just as he taught robbery and also taught a lost object, which is included in robbery, so he should also have taught the sitting of the judges, even though it is included in robbery.

And we answer: The reason that the Mishna brought both robbery and a lost object, even though a lost object is included in robbery, is that

these were needed for him

these were needed to be brought in order to inform us of the novel laws that the Gemara will now specify. This is not so with the sitting of the judges, which contains no novel law; the tanna did not need to inform us of it.

Robbery—

it was written to inform us that

one who robs his fellow of something worth a peruta and swears to him

falsely that he did not rob, and afterward admits—

must take it after him, even to Mede.

A lost object—

it was written to inform us that

one who finds a lost object worth a peruta is obligated to proclaim it, even though it depreciated

so that it became cheaper from the time of the finding, and now it is not worth a peruta.

And Levi,

who did not have the version of a lost object in his Mishna,

for what reason did he not teach

that the returning of

a lost object

is

with regard to a peruta?

And we answer: Because he already

taught robbery

and if robbery applies to something worth a peruta, it is money, and one is obligated concerning it in the returning of a lost object.

And we raise a difficulty:

And did he not teach robbery and teach the sitting of the judges

even though it is included in robbery? For if there is robbery with regard to something worth a peruta, it is consequently money, and they adjudicate it in court. Nevertheless, he taught “the sitting of the judges,” that the court adjudicates a claim for a peruta. If so, why did he not also teach the law that they proclaim a lost object worth a peruta?

And we answer: According to Levi, there is no need to specify all the matters included in robbery. And the reason that the Mishna brought

the sitting of the judges

even though it is included in robbery is that

it was needed for him

in order

to exclude the view of Rav Ketina.

For Rav Ketina said: A court takes up a case

to adjudicate and obligate a person

even for less than the value of a peruta.

For this reason, the Mishna needed to bring the sitting of the judges, in order to inform us that there is no sitting of the judges concerning less than the value of a peruta. But the other matters included in robbery did not need to be brought.

And we raise another difficulty:

And Levi, for what reason did he not teach consecrated property,

for one is obligated in misuse if he misused consecrated property worth a peruta? For misuse is not included in any of the five matters [concerning which the measure of a peruta was stated] brought in his Mishna.

And we answer: According to Levi, the Mishna

is speaking only of non-sacred property,

but

is not speaking of consecrated property,

and therefore the Mishna did not bring this law, that there is misuse of consecrated property for a peruta.

And we raise a difficulty against our tanna:

Rather, our tanna, who is speaking of consecrated property,

for he brought the law of misuse—why did he not

teach tithes

whose law is

with regard to a peruta,

and whose redemption does not take effect for less than a peruta?

And we answer: Our tanna holds

in accordance with the one who says: One does not

redeem tithes until they contain four perutot, so that there will be

in its fifth a peruta,

because there is a law that one must add a fifth in the redemption of tithes, and only if the tithes contain an amount of four perutot can one add a fifth worth a peruta in their redemption.

It follows that the law of the redemption of tithes is for more than a peruta, and therefore our tanna did not bring it together with the other matters whose law is for a peruta.

And we raise a difficulty: Since our tanna holds that one redeems tithes only when there is a peruta in its fifth,

then let him teach

that the tanna should bring that the law of adding

a fifth

in the redemption of

tithes

is

for a peruta!

And we answer: According to our tanna, the Mishna

is speaking only of the principal

in the payments of the principal

but is speaking,

but

is not speaking of the fifth.

As for the matter itself,

we learned above:

Rav Ketina said: A court takes up a case

to adjudicate and obligate a person

even for less than the value of a peruta.