Bava Metzia 51b — the Talmud in English

But here, who knew

the purchaser that there was overreaching in the sale,

that he would waive it?!

and therefore his condition is void .

And Shmuel said: I am the one who says “

he has no claim of overreaching against him,”

even according to

the view of

Rabbi Meir,

who says that when one stipulates against that which is written in the Torah in a monetary matter, his condition is void; here he will agree with my words, that his condition is valid.

For

Rabbi Meir said there only,

his condition is void,

but

because

he is certainly uprooting [the law]. [

He certainly transgressed that which is written in the Torah.]

But here,

since he stipulated, “on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,”

who says that he is uprooting anything [

perhaps overreaching will be found in it, and it will turn out that the Torah’s law has not been uprooted]?

Rav Anan said: For me, it was explained to me by my master

Shmuel, [

Shmuel transmitted to me an explanation of his words]:

One who says to his fellow, “on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,” has no claim of overreaching against him.

As explained above: one who stipulates against that which is written in the Torah in such a case, his condition is valid, for “who says that he uprooted it.”

However, if he says to him

“on condition that there is no overreaching in it,”

and overreaching is found in it,

then it indeed has overreaching.

Since the meaning of this expression is not that he waived his claim of overreaching, but that in reality there is no overreaching here, and overreaching was indeed found in it .

The Gemara returns to discuss the words of Rav and Shmuel, whether their dispute depends upon the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda: And we challenge it:

It was objected:

we learned in the Tosefta:

One who buys and sells on trust, [

that is, he said to his fellow, “Sell me this object for whatever you find [for it], and give me its money at such-and-such a time. I rely upon you,” and he gave him payment for his effort ],

and

likewise

one who says to his fellow, “on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,

I will sell you this object,”

he has no

law of

overreaching against him.

Thus far the Tosefta .

Now,

according to

the view of

Rav, who said

above,

“I am the one who says

he has a claim of overreaching against him,

even according to Rabbi Yehuda”—whose view is it [

according to whose view does the aforementioned Tosefta hold]?

Is it not the case that according to his words, no one disputes that if he said, “on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,” his condition is void?

Abaye said: It is clear [

it is proved by virtue of this challenge] that

Rav,

who

said

that his condition is void, held

like Rabbi Meir, while Shmuel, who said

that his condition is valid, held

like Rabbi Yehuda .

And Rav will establish the aforementioned Tosefta as according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Rava said: It is not difficult. Here, it is stated without specification.

That is, he said to him, “on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,” but did not explicitly say that there was overreaching in this object. In such a case, according to Rav, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that his condition is void, since “he did not know that he was waiving it.”

Here [

the Tosefta is speaking]

it is stated explicitly.

That is, he said to him, “This object has overreaching in it, and I am selling it to you on condition that you have no overreaching” .

And in such a case Rabbi Yehuda holds that his condition is valid, as with “on condition that you have no claim against me for sustenance and clothing.”

And as

it was taught

in a beraita:

When are these words said,

that they have claims of overreaching against one another? If he sold it to him

without specification; but when it is stated explicitly, the seller,

for example,

said to the purchaser:

“This object that I am selling you for two hundred, I know that it is worth only one hundred ,

and I am selling it to you

on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me,” he has no claim of overreaching against him .

And likewise, a purchaser who said to the seller, “This object that I am taking from you for one hundred, I know that it is worth two hundred,

and I am taking it

on condition that you have no claim of overreaching against me, he has no claim of overreaching against him.”

Since we mentioned above the law of “one who buys and sells on trust,” another law concerning this matter was brought here:

The Sages taught: One who buys and sells on trust may not calculate the inferior [wine] on trust and the superior at its [full] value.

For example, one who had two types of wine: one, superior wine for which there was great demand, and the other, inferior wine that was sold only slowly in the shop.

And he came to give the inferior wine to someone to sell it on trust, as above, and said to him: “Here is superior wine for its value, on condition that you sell the inferior wine for me in the shop as best you can. And when it is sold, give me the money for both.”

And this will be your payment for your labor: that you will leave the money for the superior wine in your possession until you sell the inferior wine—that is, payment for waiting for the money. And this is like interest, and is prohibited .

Rather, either

he should give him

both and both on trust, or both and both at their [full] value.

And

if he gave them to him on trust, when they come to calculate his payment,

he gives him payment for the porter, [

the porter who carries it from his house to the shop], and if he required a camel, he also gives him

payment for the camel,

and

payment for the lodging.

But

he does not take payment for himself, since he has already given him his full payment.

And we challenge it:

“His full payment”—from where does he give it to him? [

Where did he give it to him]?

Rav Pappa said: With hemp-cloth sellers, [

a seller of hemp garments], whose payment is fixed:

they give

them as payment for the effort of selling them

four

perutot

per hundred.

Mishna:

Just as there is a law of overreaching with regard to the price of merchandise, so too there is a law of overreaching with regard to coins . For a coin circulating in the market becomes worn through use and is reduced in weight. Our Mishna comes to teach what the measure of overreaching is with regard to coins.

By how much may the sela be deficient

from its weight,

and shall it not have

the law of

overreaching?

Rabbi Meir says:

If it is deficient by

four issarim

per sela,

an issar per dinar.

That is, 1/24, for the sela is four dinarim, and the dinar is 24 issarim .

And Rabbi Yehuda says: four pundeyonin

per sela,

a pundeyon per dinar.

That is, 1/12, for the dinar is worth six silver maot, and the ma'a is two pundeyonin.