Bava Metzia 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

Meitive:

from that which was taught: In the case of a loan document in which it is written, “So-and-so borrowed from his fellow

sela'im,”

but it is not written in the document how many sela'im he borrowed; or it is written in the document that “So-and-so borrowed from his fellow

dinars,”

but it is not written how many dinars. And the

lender says

that the amount of the loan was

five

sela'im or dinars,

while

the

borrower says

that the loan was only

three

sela'im or dinars—

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since

the borrower

admitted

to

part

of

the claim

of the lender, who claims that he owes him five—

he must take an oath

as one who admits to part of a claim.

Rabbi Akiva says: He is merely like one who returns a lost object, and is exempt.

We learned in a Mishna [Gittin 48b]: If one finds a lost object and returns it, and the owner of the lost object claims that the finder did not return the entire lost object, the finder does not take an oath of one who admits to part of a claim “for the betterment of the world,” since if we obligate him to take an oath, people will refrain from returning lost objects to their owners—

And according to the letter of the law, anyone who admits to part of a claim is like one who returns a lost object, since he could have denied everything and thereby become exempt; and by admitting to part of the claim, he is like one who returns a lost object to its owners. Nevertheless, he must take an oath, as was explained earlier in the Gemara, because even if he wishes to deny the entire claim, he cannot deny everything, since a person does not have the audacity to face his creditor—

But here, where the document merely states “sela'im,” in this case the borrower is considered like one who “returns a lost object,” since he could have claimed that he borrowed only two—and this is not audacity, because if he had made such a claim, the wording of the document would support his claim — Since the document states only “sela'im,” it is reasonable that the loan was only two, because it was for this reason that they did not trouble to write the amount of the loan in the document, but wrote only “sela'im” or “dinars,” since the minimum of a plural is two—

And if so, when he claims that he owes three, he is like one who returns a lost object to its owners, since he could have claimed that he owes two. Therefore, he is exempt from an oath, as one who returns a lost object is exempt from the oath of one who admits to part of a claim.

Does it teach this there?

In any event, we learned in this beraita that

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since he admitted to part of the claim, he must take an oath.

The Gemara infers: It follows from the wording of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that

the reason is that he said three—

that this entire rule applies specifically in a case where the borrower claimed that the amount of the loan was three—

but two—

whereas if the borrower claimed that the amount of the loan was two, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar agrees that he is

exempt

from an oath—

And the reason is that with regard to two there is clear proof from the wording of the document, since the word “sela'im” [which is plural] includes at least two sela'im. It follows that the borrower’s land was encumbered to the lender for this amount , in accordance with the rule that in every loan documented in a loan document, the borrower’s land is encumbered to the lender up to the amount written in the document.

And

if so, since the borrower’s land is encumbered,

this document, concerning which he admits,

is a case of “here it is”!

When he claims that the debt was only two, it is as though he said to him, “Here it is,” since at the time the borrower admits, the lender has land encumbered to the amount of this debt —

And infer from this: “Here it is” exempts one from an oath!

And we answer:

No! I will say to you that in fact

even if the borrower claims that he borrowed

two, he is liable

to take an oath. And although this is like “here it is,” the halakha is that “here it is” makes one liable.

And the reason he teaches three

is that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated his ruling in a case where the lender claims three, rather than in a case where the lender claims two, because he wishes

to exclude the

words of

Rabbi Akiva, who says: He is like one who returns a lost object.

For if the borrower claims three, he is like one who returns a lost object, because he could have claimed two,

and is exempt

from an oath.

Concerning this,

he teaches us

that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that even where he claims three—

he is one who admits to part of the claim, and is liable

to take an oath, and is not considered one who returns a lost object. But if Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar had stated his ruling in a case where the borrower says two, Rabbi Akiva would not have disagreed with him, since when he claims two, even Rabbi Akiva agrees that he is liable and is not considered one who returns a lost object, as the document proves that he borrowed at least two.

And we challenge this:

If so,

if the entire innovation of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is that even when he claims three he is not considered one who returns a lost object, the tanna should not have phrased his ruling as follows—“

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since he admitted to part of the claim, he must take an oath”—

but rather, “

He too must take an oath should have been stated!”

He should have taught it this way: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: “Even” [one who admits to three] must take an oath [in addition to one who admits to two, who certainly must take an oath]—

And from the wording that we learned, “Since he admitted to part of the claim,” it follows that he caused himself to admit to part of the claim, since if he had admitted to two, he would have been exempt from an oath; because the document supports him, this is like “here it is.”

Rather, in fact,

if the borrower claims

two, he is exempt

from an oath—and although this is like “here it is,” and generally one who says

“here it is” is liable

to take an oath—

And

nevertheless, here he is exempt from an oath, because

here is different, since the document supports him.

For when he claims two, the document supports him, since its meaning is that he borrowed two; and this is as though the witnesses who signed the document testified that he borrowed two. Therefore, he is exempt from an oath!

Alternatively, because

of this, when he claims two he does not take an oath,

since it is a document establishing an encumbrance on land.

For the wording of the document proves that he borrowed at least two, and for this amount the borrower’s land becomes encumbered to the lender, in accordance with the rule governing every loan documented in a loan document—

It follows that by admitting to two, he is also admitting that his land is encumbered—

And

we have already learned:

One does not take an oath concerning a denial of an encumbrance on land!

One does not take an oath in a case where he admits to an encumbrance on land, since land was excluded by a verse from the law of oaths:

There are those who raise an objection,

with

the

the

conclusion

of the beraita against the one who says that “here it is” exempts from an oath—

For we learned in the conclusion:

Rabbi Akiva says:

If the borrower said that he owes three,

he is merely like one who returns a lost object.

For he could have claimed that he owes only two,

and

therefore he is

exempt

from an oath.

The challenger infers:

The reason is that he said three,

since Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling in a case where the borrower claims three, and did not establish it in a case where the borrower claims that the loan was two. One should infer:

but two—

if the borrower claims that the amount of the loan was two, he is

liable.

For if he claims two, he is not one who returns a lost object, since the document proves that he owes at least two.

But this document, since he admits to it, is like “here it is”!

For when he admits to two, he admits to what is written in the document, and one who admits to what is written in a document is like “here it is” [as explained above]; nevertheless, it follows that he is liable to take an oath—

Infer from this that “here it is” makes one liable!

And we answer:

No! I will say to you that

even if the borrower claimed that he owes

two, he too is exempt

from an oath, since this is like “here it is”—and “here it is” exempts one from an oath.

And the reason he teaches three

is that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling in a case where the lender claims three, and did not state it in a case where the lender claims that the borrower borrowed two, because he wished

to exclude the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

to exclude Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s position,

who says

that even when the borrower claims three,

he is one who admits to part of the claim, and is liable

to take an oath. Therefore,

he teaches us

Rabbi Akiva

that he is one who returns a lost object,

not like one who admits to part of a claim, but rather his status is that of one who returns a lost object to its owners,

and is exempt

from an oath—

But if Rabbi Akiva had stated his ruling concerning two, it would still have been possible to say that concerning three he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that the borrower is liable to take an oath, and that he exempts him specifically concerning two because of “here it is.” But if he claims three, concerning the third maneh there is no proof from the document and the land was not encumbered for it; this is not “here it is,” and he should be liable. Therefore, Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling when he claims three, to teach us that even there he is exempt, since he is like one who returns a lost object.

And the Gemara adds:

This too is evidently so,

that according to Rabbi Akiva, even when the borrower claims two, he is exempt,

for if it enters your mind that when he claims two he is liable,

if we say that when he claims that the amount of the loan was two, he is liable to take an oath—

in the case of three, how could Rabbi Akiva exempt him!?

Why did Rabbi Akiva exempt him from an oath if he claimed three? Is it not possible that

this one is manipulating matters,

that he is attempting to deceive us, and

he thinks

to himself:

If I say two, I will have to take an oath;

if I claim two, I will become liable to take an oath. Therefore,

let me say “three,”

it is preferable for me to claim three,

so that I will be,

in that case,

like one who returns a lost object and will be exempt.

I will be exempt from an oath, as is the law of one who returns a lost object.

Rather,

from the fact that Rabbi Akiva was not concerned about this deception,

infer from this that when he claims two as well, he is exempt!

And we challenge this:

Rather, this is difficult for Rabbi Ḥiyya!—

According to what we were forced to conclude, Rabbi Akiva holds that if the borrower claims two, he is exempt from an oath, even though this is “here it is.” If so, it follows that “here it is” exempts from an oath, which is difficult for Rabbi Ḥiyya, who holds that “here it is” makes one liable.

And we answer:

The case there is different, as the document supports him.

For when he claims that he owes two, he has support from the document, whose implication is that he borrowed two. It is therefore as though the witnesses who signed the document had testified that he borrowed two, and consequently he is exempt from an oath!

Alternatively, because

when he claims that he owes two, he does not take an oath,

as it is a document establishing a lien on land.

Since the document provides proof concerning the two, the borrower’s land is automatically encumbered to the lender for that amount [as is the law with every loan documented in writing]. Thus, when he admits that he owes two, he is admitting that his land is encumbered,

and

therefore he does not take an oath, as we learned:

One does not take an oath concerning denial of a lien on land,

and likewise one does not take an oath in a case in which he admits to a lien on land, since land was excluded by the verse from the law of oaths.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, raised an objection:

We learned in the Mishna in tractate Shevuot:

If one claimed

from another person

utensils and land,

and the other

admitted to the utensils and denied the land,

or

admitted to the land and denied the utensils—

even though he admitted to part of the claim,

he is exempt

from an oath, since land was excluded from the law of oaths . Therefore, one does not take an oath concerning denial of land, and an admission concerning land does not obligate him to take an oath. Likewise, if he

admitted

to

part of the land, he is exempt

from an oath for this reason—

But if he admitted to

part of the utensils, he is liable

to take an oath under the law governing one who admits to part of a claim, and in this case he must take an oath even concerning the land that he denies. Although one does not take an oath concerning land, that is specifically when he is not taking an oath concerning movable property; but if he takes an oath concerning the movable property, an oath concerning the land is also imposed upon him through the mechanism of extending an oath, as we learned in Kiddushin [26a].

Now, if one claimed utensils and land, and the other admitted to the land, this is equivalent to the case of “Here it is,” since as soon as he admits to the land, it is in the possession of its owner. Nevertheless, the Mishna did not give an example of “Here it is” involving movable property, but specifically involving land. From this one may infer:

The reason is that the case involves utensils and land;

specifically, in the case of utensils and land he is exempt from an oath,

because land is not subject to an oath,

since land is not subject to an oath—

And it follows from this:

But in the case of utensils and utensils, analogous to utensils and land,

if he claimed utensils from him and the other admitted to part of them—even if the circumstances of the claim are analogous to those of utensils and land [in that he said, “Here it is,” as the Gemara immediately explains],

he is liable

to take an oath.

And

what are the circumstances,

that involve utensils and utensils analogous to utensils and land?

It is not that he said to him, “Here it is,”

for example, when he said concerning the utensils to which he admitted, “Here it is.”

And infer from this that in the case of “Here it is,” he is liable!

And we reject this:

No; I can tell you that in fact,

if he claimed

utensils and

the other admitted to part of the

utensils,

and said to him, “Here it is,”

he is also exempt,

because “Here it is” exempts one from an oath—

And the fact that it teaches the case of utensils and land,

that the Mishna wrote that in the case of utensils and land he is exempt, but did not write that in the case of utensils and utensils, when he said to him, “Here it is,” he is exempt, is because there is a special novelty in the case of utensils and land—

For

this teaches us

that if he

admitted to part of the utensils, he is liable

to take an oath

even concerning the land.

For one who takes an oath concerning movable property is also made to take an oath concerning land, through the mechanism of extending an oath, as we learned in tractate Kiddushin [26a]: “Movable property, which has no guarantee, causes property that has a guarantee [land] to be included in the oath.”

And we raise a difficulty:

What does it teach us by stating, ‘causes to be included’!?

How can it be said that the tanna came to teach us the law of extending an oath? We already

learned it,

as we learned in the Mishna in tractate Kiddushin:

Movable property, which has no guarantee, causes property that has a guarantee to be included in the oath?

And we answer:

Here, it is the primary teaching,

here the tanna taught the fundamental law of extending an oath—but

there, it was brought incidentally, by association.

In the Mishna in Kiddushin, the tanna taught it only incidentally.