Bava Metzia 4b — the Talmud in English

Meitivi

From that which was taught: A loan document in which it is written, “So-and-so borrowed from his fellow

sela,”

but it is not written in the document how many sela he borrowed, or it is written in the document that “So-and-so borrowed from his fellow

dinars,”

but it is not written how many dinars. And the

lender says

that the amount of the loan was

five

sela or dinars,

while

the

borrower says

that the loan was only

three

sela or dinars—

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since

the borrower

admitted

to

part

of

the claim

of the lender, who claims five from him—

he shall take an oath

according to the law of one who admits part of a claim.

Rabbi Akiva says: He is merely like one who returns a lost object, and he is exempt.

We learned in a Mishna [Gittin 48b]: One who finds a lost object and returns it, and the owner of the lost object claims that the finder did not return the entire lost object—the finder does not take the oath of one who admits part of a claim, “for the betterment of the world,” since, if we obligate him to take an oath, people will refrain from returning lost objects to their owners—

And according to the law, every person who admits part of a claim is like one who returns a lost object, for he could have denied everything and become exempt, and in that which he admitted in part he is like one who returns a lost object to its owners—but nevertheless he takes an oath, as was explained in the Gemara above, because even if he wishes to deny, he cannot deny everything, since a person does not have the boldness to be insolent before his creditor—

But here, where “sela” is written in the document without specification, in this case the borrower is considered “one who returns a lost object,” for he could have claimed that he borrowed only two—and this is not boldness, since if he had claimed this, the wording of the document supports his claim— since only “sela” is written in the document, it is reasonable that the loan was only two, because it was for this reason that they did not take the trouble to write the amount of the loan in the document, but only “sela” or “dinars,” since the smallest number of a plural is two—

And if so, when he claims that he owes three, he is like one who returns a lost object to its owners, since he could have claimed that he owed two; therefore he is exempt from an oath, for one who returns a lost object is exempt from the oath of one who admits part of a claim.

It is taught there, then,

in any event we learned in this beraita that

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since he admitted part of the claim, he shall take an oath.

And the Gemara infers: It follows from the wording of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that

the reason is that he said three—

that this entire law applies specifically in a case where the borrower claimed that the amount of the loan was three—

but two,

but if the borrower claimed that the amount of the loan was two, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar admits that he is

exempt

from an oath—

And the reason is that, concerning two, there is clear proof from the wording of the document—for the word “sela” [which is plural terminology] includes within it at least two sela. It follows that, concerning this amount, the borrower’s lands became mortgaged to the lender, according to the law of every loan in a document, in which the borrower’s lands become mortgaged to the lender for the amount written in the document.

And

if so, since the borrower’s lands are mortgaged,

this document concerning which he admits,

is heilekh!

When he claimed to him that the debt was only two, this is as though he said to him, “Heilekh,” for at the moment the borrower admits, the lender has mortgaged land in his possession corresponding to this amount—

and infer from here: heilekh is exempt!

And we answer:

No! I can say that forever,

in truth, one must say that even if the borrower claims that he borrowed

two, he is liable

to take an oath. And although this is like heilekh, the halakha is that heilekh entails liability!

And the fact that he teaches three,

the reason Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated his ruling concerning a case in which the lender claims three, and did not state it where the lender claims two, is that he wishes

to exclude the words of

words of

Rabbi Akiva, who says: He is one who returns a lost object.

For if the borrower claims three, he is like one who returns a lost object, because he could have claimed two,

and he is exempt

from an oath.

And concerning this

he informs us

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that even where he claims three—

he is one who admits part of the claim, and he is liable

to take an oath, and he is not considered one who returns a lost object. But if Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar had stated his ruling in a case where the borrower says two, Rabbi Akiva would not have disagreed with him, for in the manner in which he claims two, Rabbi Akiva also admits that he is liable, and he is not considered one who returns a lost object, since the document proves that he borrowed at least two.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s entire novel teaching is that even when he claims three he is not considered one who returns a lost object, the tanna should not have stated his wording—“

Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Since he admitted part of the claim, he shall take an oath”—

but rather,

“He too shall take an oath” would have been required of him!

He should have stated it as follows: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says, “He too” [the one who admits three] must take an oath [in addition to the one who admits two, who certainly must take an oath]—

And from this wording, which we learned—“Since he admitted part of the claim”—it follows that he caused himself to admit part of the claim, for had he admitted two, he would have been exempt from an oath, since the document supports him, and this is like heilekh.

Rather, forever

if the borrower claims

two, he is exempt

from an oath—and even though this is like heilekh, and in general even one who says

“heilekh” is liable

to take an oath—

and

nevertheless, here he is exempt from an oath. For

here it is different, since the document supports him.

For when he claims two, he has the document’s support, whose meaning is that he borrowed two, and this is as though the witnesses who signed the document testified that he borrowed two; therefore he is exempt from an oath!

Alternatively, because of

this, when he claims two he does not take an oath,

for it is a document creating a lien upon lands.

For the wording of the document proves that he borrowed at least two, and concerning this amount the borrower’s lands become mortgaged to the lender, according to the law of every loan in a document—

It follows that in his admission concerning two, an admission that his lands are mortgaged is included—

and

we already learned:

One does not take an oath concerning a denial of a lien upon lands!

One does not take an oath where he admits a lien upon lands, since lands were excluded by a verse from the law of an oath:

There are those who raise an objection,

there are those who challenged

from

the

final clause

of the beraita against the one who says that heilekh is exempt—

For we learned in the final clause:

Rabbi Akiva says:

If the borrower said that he owed three,

he is merely like one who returns a lost object.

For he could have claimed that he owed only two,

and

therefore he is

exempt

from an oath.

And the one who raises the objection infers:

The reason is that he said three,

for from the fact that Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling in a case where the borrower claims three, and did not establish it in a case where the borrower claims that the loan was two, one should infer:

but two,

if the borrower claimed that the amount of the loan was two,

he is liable.

For if he claims two, he is not one who returns a lost object, since the document proves that he owes at least two.

And this document, since he admits to it, is considered heilekh!

For when he admits two, he admits to that which is written in the document, and one who admits to a document is like heilekh [as explained above], and nevertheless it follows that he is liable to take an oath—

infer from here that heilekh entails liability!

We answer:

No! I can say that forever,

even if the borrower claimed that he owed

two, he too is exempt

from an oath, for this is like heilekh—and heilekh exempts from an oath.

And the fact that he teaches three,

the reason Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling concerning a case in which the lender claims three, and did not state it where the lender claims that he borrowed two, is because he wished

to exclude the position of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

to exclude the view of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar,

who says

that even when he claims three,

he is one who admits part of the claim, and he is liable

to take an oath. Therefore

he informs us

Rabbi Akiva

that he is one who returns a lost object,

that he is not like every person who admits part of a claim, but his law is like that of one who returns a lost object to its owners,

and he is exempt

from an oath—

But if Rabbi Akiva had stated his ruling concerning two, it could still have been said that concerning three he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar that he is liable to take an oath, and that he exempts only concerning two because of heilekh. But if he claims three, concerning the third maneh there is no proof from the document and the lands did not become mortgaged for it; this is not heilekh, and he is liable. Therefore Rabbi Akiva stated his ruling when he claims three, to teach us that there too he is exempt, since he is one who returns a lost object.

And the Gemara adds:

This too is reasonably evident,

that according to Rabbi Akiva, even when he claims two he is exempt,

for if it should enter your mind that he is liable concerning two,

if we say that if he claims that the amount of the loan was two, he is liable to take an oath—

concerning three, how did Rabbi Akiva exempt him!?

Why did Rabbi Akiva exempt him from an oath if he claimed three? Is it not possible that

this one is acting craftily,

that he is trying to outwit us, and

he thinks

to himself:

If I say two, I will need to take an oath,

for if I claim two, I will become liable to take an oath. Therefore

I will say “three,”

it is preferable for me to claim three,

for then it will be

that I will be

like one who returns a lost object, and I will be exempt.

I will be exempt from an oath according to the law of one who returns a lost object.

Rather,

from the fact that Rabbi Akiva did not concern himself with this ruse,

infer from here that concerning two also he is exempt!

And we raise an objection:

Rather, this is difficult for Rabbi Hiyya!

According to what we were forced to say—that Rabbi Akiva holds that if he claims two he is exempt from an oath, even though this is heilekh—it follows that heilekh is exempt, and this is difficult for Rabbi Hiyya, who holds that heilekh entails liability.

And we answer:

It is different there, for the document assists him.

For when he claims two, he has assistance from the document, whose meaning is that he borrowed two; and it is as though the witnesses who signed the document testified that he borrowed two. Therefore, he is exempt from an oath!

Alternatively, because

when he claims two he does not swear,

for it is a document of a lien on land.

Since there is proof from the document concerning two, his lands are thereby encumbered for this amount to the lender [as is the law with every loan by document]. It follows that when he admits to two, he admits that his lands are encumbered,

and

therefore he does not swear, as we learned:

One does not swear concerning a denial of a lien on land;

so too, one does not swear in a place where he admits to a lien on land—for the lands were excluded by the verse from the law of an oath.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, objected:

For we learned in the Mishna in tractate Shevuot:

If he claimed,

one who was claiming from his fellow

vessels and lands, and the other

and the other

admitted concerning the vessels and denied concerning the lands,

or

admitted concerning the lands and denied concerning the vessels—

even though he admitted to part of the claim,

he is exempt

from an oath, since lands were excluded from the law of an oath . Therefore, one does not swear concerning a denial of lands, and an admission concerning them does not obligate an oath. And likewise, if he

admitted

to

part of the lands, he is exempt

from an oath for this reason—

But if he admitted to

part of the vessels, he is liable

for an oath according to the law of one who admits to part [of the claim], and in this case he is liable to swear even concerning the lands that he denies. And although one does not swear concerning lands, this is specifically in a place where he does not swear concerning movable property; but if he swears concerning the movable property, an oath concerning the lands is also imposed upon him through the rolling over of an oath, as we learned in Kiddushin [26a].

But if he claimed vessels and lands and admitted concerning the lands, this is like heilakh, since immediately when he admits concerning the land, it is in the possession of its owner—and nevertheless, the Mishna did not bring an example of heilakh with movable property, but specifically with lands. And from this one may infer:

The reason is that [the case involves] vessels and lands;

specifically with vessels and lands is he exempt from an oath,

for land is not subject to an oath,

since land is not subject to an oath—

And it is precise from this:

But vessels and vessels, analogous to vessels and lands,

if he claimed vessels from him and he admitted to him concerning part of them—even if the state of the claim is analogous to vessels and lands [where he said heilakh, as the Gemara explains immediately],

he is liable

for an oath.

And

what are the circumstances,

and what is the situation with vessels and vessels that is analogous to vessels and lands?

Is it not that he said to him, “heilakh,”

such as when he said to him concerning the vessels that he admits to him, “heilakh.”

And infer from this: heilakh is liable!

And we reject this:

No! In truth, I can say to you,

if he claimed

vessels and

admitted to him concerning part of the

vessels,

and said to him, “heilakh,”

he is also exempt,

because heilakh is exempt from an oath—

And this that it teaches, vessels and lands,

and the reason that the Mishna wrote that with vessels and lands he is exempt, but did not write that likewise with vessels and vessels, where he said to him, “heilakh,” he is exempt—is because with vessels and lands there is a special novelty—

that

it teaches us this:

that if he

admitted to part of the vessels, he is liable

for an oath

even concerning the lands.

For one who swears concerning movable property has an oath imposed upon him even concerning the lands, as we learned in tractate Kiddushin [26a]: “Movable property, which does not secure a claim, imposes upon land, which does secure a claim, [the requirement] to swear concerning them.”

And we ask:

What does it teach us, ‘imposes’!?

How can it be said that the tan​na—a Sage of the Mishnaic era—came to teach us the law of extending an oath? We have already

learned it:

we learned this in the Mishna in tractate Kiddushin:

Movable property, which does not secure a claim, imposes upon land, which does secure a claim, [the requirement] to swear concerning them?

And we answer:

Here, it is the principal [teaching],

here the tan​na taught the primary law of extending an oath—but

there, it was brought incidentally, by way of a dragged-along statement.

In the Mishna in Kiddushin, the tan​na taught this law only incidentally.