Bava Metzia 31a — the Talmud in English

It was also taught likewise: If one found a cloak and a hatchet

or a hatchet]

on a public road

a road paved for the public],

and a cow was running among the vineyards—

this is an aveida.

But if he found

a cloak beside a fence, a hatchet beside a fence, and a cow grazing,

and not running,

among the vineyards—

this is not an aveida,

because it is the way of their owners to place them thus intentionally.

But if he saw the cow

three days one after the other—

this is an aveida.

If he saw water that was flowing and coming

toward his fellow’s field, and if they did not stop it, they would flood the field,

he fences before it

so that it will not enter the field, for in this case too there is the restoration of an aveida.

Rava said:

It is written concerning the restoration of an aveida:

“For every lost article of your brother,”

which implies

to include the loss of land.

That is, damage to land is also included among aveidot, and he is obligated to prevent it.

Rav Ḥananya said to Rava: It was taught in a beraita that supports you: If he saw water that was flowing and coming—

he fences before it.

And it is proven that an obligation to restore an aveida is imposed upon him even with regard to land, since they obligated him to fence before the water so that it would not destroy his fellow’s land.

He said to him

Rava:

If because of this,

do not derive support.

For it can be said that

here, with what are we dealing?—

where there are sheaves

in the field; and the obligation of rescue is not because of damage to the land, but because of the rescue of the sheaves, and it is concerning such a case that the verse came to include it.

And we raise an objection:

If there are sheaves, what need is there to say it?

How is this aveida different from every other aveida, and why is it necessary to include them from the verse “for every”?

And the Gemara explains:

It is necessary,

it is speaking

where there are

in the field

sheaves

attached to the ground,

which require

still

the land. What might you say: Since they require the land—

they are considered like the body of the land

and they would not be subject to an obligation of restoration]—

it teaches us

from the inclusion of the verse that this is not so, and he is obligated to restore them.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If one found a donkey and a cow, etc.”

This itself is difficult!

You said

at the beginning:

“If one found a donkey and a cow grazing on the road”—

this is not an aveida.

This implies that specifically when he found them

grazing on the road,

where there are two favorable aspects: one, that it is grazing and not running; and furthermore, even if it were running, it would not be damaged, since it is not running among the vineyards—

then it is not an aveida.

It implies:

but

if he found a cow that

was running on the road, and

also if he found a cow that

was grazing among the vineyards,

where there is one favorable aspect—that it is on the road and not among the vineyards, or that it is grazing and not running—and, on the other hand, there is one unfavorable aspect—

it is an aveida!

Come and hear the latter clause: “A donkey with its gear overturned, and a cow running among the vineyards”—

this is an aveida!

This implies that specifically when it

is running among the vineyards,

where there are two unfavorable matters, both that it is running and that it is among the vineyards—

then it is an aveida. But

if it

is running on the road, and grazing among the vineyards,

where there is only one unfavorable aspect—

this is not an aveida!

Abaye said:

The essential distinction is between running and grazing, and it makes no difference whether this was on the road or among the vineyards. And the tanna stated his words in the language of

“Its fellow testifies concerning it”

its companion testifies concerning it]. That is, the beginning and the end of our Mishna testify concerning one another:

The tanna

at the beginning

stated: “grazing on the road, which is not an aveida,” and

we learn from this that

the same law applies to grazing among the vineyards,

that this is not an aveida.

And likewise

the tanna

at the end

stated: “running among the vineyards”—

which is an aveida, and

we learn from this that

the same law applies to running on the road,

for this is an aveida.

Rava said to him: If

the tanna stated it this way because of

“Its fellow testifies concerning it,”

and the rule is that every case of grazing is not an aveida, whereas every case of running is an aveida, then

let him state the easier case,

that the tanna should state the easier one,

and

we would know

all the more so the more stringent case:

Let him state

at the end

“running on the road,” for

even in such a case

it is an aveida, and

we would know

all the more so running among the vineyards,

since it is damaged by the vines!

And

likewise

let him state

at the beginning

“grazing among the vineyards, which is not an aveida,”

even though sometimes, when it grazes there, it is damaged by the vines,

and

we would know

all the more so grazing on the road,

which is not damaged, is not an aveida!

Rather, Rava said:

What we asked from the beginning, which implies that

running

on the road is an aveida,

but the end, which implies that

the latter clause indicates that

running

on the road is not an aveida—

this is not difficult.

Because

this,

the beginning, is speaking

when it was fleeing toward the wilderness

the face of the cow that is running was toward the field], and therefore this is an aveida.

Whereas

this,

the end, is speaking

when it was fleeing toward the city

its face was toward the city], and therefore this is not an aveida.

And likewise, what we asked from the beginning, which implies that

grazing

among the vineyards is an aveida,

but the end, which implies that

the latter clause indicates that

grazing

among the vineyards is not an aveida—

this too is not difficult.

Because

here—

with the loss of its body; here—

with the loss of land.

And the Gemara explains its words:

When it states

at the beginning that

“grazing on the road is not an aveida,”

which implies,

“but grazing among the vineyards”—

is an aveida,

it is speaking

of the loss of land.

For the cow damages and harms the vineyards.

And when it states

at the end that

“running among the vineyards is an aveida,”

which implies,

“but grazing among the vineyards”—

is not an aveida,

it is speaking

of the loss of its body

of the cow.

For

then, if it

is running among the vineyards—

it is damaged

its body is damaged],

but if it

grazing

is grazing among the vineyards—

it is not damaged.

And we raise an objection:

And when it is

when it is

grazing among the vineyards, although it is not damaged,

and there is no loss of its body, nevertheless

let it be inferred

that he should be obligated to restore it

because of the loss of land,

for it is damaging the vineyards?

And we answer: It is speaking

of a

vineyard

belonging to a gentile,

whose rescue one is not obligated to undertake.

And we object:

And

still,

let it be inferred because of the loss of its body, for perhaps they will kill it

perhaps the owners of the vineyard will kill it when they see that it is damaging it]!?

And we answer: It is speaking

of a place where they warn and then kill

a place where they first warn the owner of the cow, and only afterward, if the warning is ineffective, kill it].

And we object:

And perhaps

it has already

been warned

when it entered the vineyard another time, and now, if he does not return it, they will kill it?

And we answer:

If it had been warned, and

nevertheless

the owners did not take care of it,

the owners,

it is certainly an intentionally lost object,

and one is not obligated to restore it.

We learned in our Mishna:

“He returned it and it fled; he returned it and it fled, etc.”

Even four or five times, he is obligated to return it, etc.

A certain one of the Sages said to Rava: Say

that the meaning of

“return”

is that he must return it

one time

once], and from what is written

“you shall return them,”

we learn that he must return it one more time, that is—

two times.

But from where do we know that he must return it even four or five times?

He said to him:

The derivation is not from the extra occurrence of “you shall return them,” but the expression

“return”—

implies even one hundred times.

And that which is written

“you shall return them”

is expounded for this teaching:

I have only

that restoration is considered restoration

only

when he returned the lost object

to his house

of the owner of the lost object.

But if he returned it

to his garden or to his ruin

of the owner—

from where

do we know that even in such a case it is considered restoration?

The Torah says, “you shall return them,”

which implies—

in any event.

Even to his garden or his ruin, it is restoration.

And we consider this:

What are the circumstances

when he returned it to his garden or his ruin?

If

he returned it in such a manner

that it is guarded

that it is preserved] there—

it is obvious,

for this is restoration!

If it is not guarded—

why

is it considered restoration?

And the Gemara explains:

Actually,

it is speaking

where it is guarded, and this teaches us

the verse “you shall return them,”

that

one may return it to the garden of the owner of the lost object even without his knowledge,

and we do not require the owners’ knowledge.

There is no need to inform him: I returned your cow to you, which I found lost, and from now on guard it.

And this is

the opinion of

Rabbi Elazar, who said: Everything,

all those who return objects to their owners— a thief, a robber, and the four custodians—

require the owners’ knowledge,

to inform him that they returned them to him, so that he will guard them. And if they did not inform him, and they were stolen or died, those who returned them are liable for them.

For since the owner knew that the animal had left his possession, but did not know that they subsequently returned it to him, he did not take care to guard it, and did not feed it.

Except for the restoration of a lost object,

where there is no need to inform the owner that he returned it to him, because

the Torah included many restorations,

even such a restoration, where he did not inform him. For it is stated: “You shall return them.”

A certain one of the Sages said to Rava, with regard to the dispatching of the bird, concerning which it is stated:

“You shall surely dispatch,” say: “Dispatch”

implies

one time; “you shall dispatch”—

two times,

and he should not be obligated in the dispatching of the bird more than twice!?

But we learned in the Mishna that if he dispatched it and it returned, even four or five times, he is obligated to dispatch it!

He said to him: “Dispatch”—

implies even one hundred times.

And from what is stated

“you shall dispatch”

we expound as follows:

I have only

that he is obligated to dispatch the mother

only

when he wishes to take it

for an optional matter,

to eat it. But if he needs it

for a mitzva matter,

such as to purify a leper, for which two birds are required,

from where

do we know that he is forbidden to take the mother for this purpose when it is upon the young?

The Torah says, “you shall dispatch”—

in any event.

A certain one of the Sages said to Rava:

It is written: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall surely rebuke your fellow, and you shall not bear sin because of him.”

And say

that

“rebuke”

implies

one time; “you shall surely rebuke”—

two times?

He said to him: “Rebuke”—

implies even one hundred times.

And from what is stated

“you shall surely rebuke”

we expound:

I have only

that he must rebuke

the teacher to the student.

But that

a student

must rebuke

his teacher—

from where

do we know this?

The Torah says, “You shall surely rebuke,” in any event.

And from what is stated, “When you see the donkey of your enemy lying under its burden, and you refrain from abandoning it,”

“you shall surely abandon it with him,”

we expound as follows:

I have only

that one must help unload a donkey that falls beneath its burden

only when

its

owner

of the donkey is

with it.

But

when its owner is not with it—

from where

do we know that he must unload it alone?

The Torah says, “you shall surely abandon it”—

in any event.

And likewise we expound what is stated concerning loading the donkey: “You shall not see the donkey of your brother or his ox fallen on the road, and ignore them,”

“you shall surely raise it with him”:

I have only

when

its owner is with it.

When

its owner is not with it—

from where

do we know that he must load it?

The Torah says, “you shall surely raise it”—

in any event.

And

we object:

Why was it necessary to write unloading, and why was it necessary to write loading,

for seemingly it would have been sufficient to write one of them, and we would have learned the other from it?

And the Gemara explains:

They are necessary. For if the Merciful One had written

only the mitzva of

unloading, I might have said

that there is a mitzva specifically to unload

because there is the suffering of living creatures,

for the donkey is collapsing beneath its burden,

and there is

also

financial loss

to its owner, for the donkey is being damaged.

But loading, where there is no suffering of living creatures and there is no financial loss,

for the donkey is not being damaged, and there is only a loss of time to its owner—

say

that he

will not

be obligated; therefore the Torah also wrote the mitzva of loading.

And if it had informed us

only of the mitzva of

loading,

we would have thought that he is obligated specifically to load

because

he is not obligated to load without payment, but only

for payment

as there is an authority below who holds this].

But unloading, which

he is obligated to perform even

without payment,

were it not that the Torah explicitly wrote that he is obligated,

say

that he

will not

be obligated!

Therefore

it is necessary

to write both matters.

And we object:

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who

disagreed with the Sages and

said

that

even loading is

without payment, what can be said?

Why did the Torah not write only the mitzva of loading, from which we could have learned the mitzva of unloading!

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Shimon—

the verses are not conclusive.

That is, Rabbi Shimon holds that we cannot determine from the wording of the verse “you shall surely abandon it” and “you shall surely raise it” which one speaks of unloading and which of loading. Therefore, if only one verse had been written, we would have said that it refers to unloading, for it is more reasonable that he is obligated in it, since it involves the suffering of living creatures and financial loss; and we would not have known that he is also obligated in loading. Therefore both verses were written.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Why do I need to write these two—

unloading and loading,

and why do I need to write

also

lost property?

It would have been enough to write one of them, and we would know the general rule, since all of them are warnings concerning the property of Jews!

The Gemara explains: all of them

are necessary

to be written.

Because

if the Torah had written

only

these two,

unloading and loading, we would have thought that the Torah obligates a person only in these cases,

because the owner's distress

the distress of the owner, who is standing there and cannot unload or load

— exists,

and

the animal's distress also exists

(and the animal is also suffering).

But in the case of lost property, although the owner's distress

indeed

exists,

but

the animal's distress does not exist

—

one might say that he is not obligated.

Therefore, the Torah wrote the law of returning lost property.

And if it had taught us

only the law of returning

lost property,

we would have thought that a person is obligated only in this case,

because its owner is not with it

(as its owner is not there and cannot take care of returning it).