Bava Metzia 31a (לא.) — the Talmud in English

It was taught likewise: If one found a cloak and a hatchet

or a hatchet]

on a public thoroughfare [a road paved for public use],

and a cow was running between the vineyards—

this is an item subject to return.

But if he found

a cloak beside a fence, a hatchet beside a fence, or a cow grazing,

and it was not running,

between the vineyards—

this is not an item subject to return,

since it is customary for their owners to leave them in this manner intentionally.

But if he saw the cow

for three consecutive days—

this is an item subject to return.

If one saw water rushing toward

his fellow’s field, and if it were not stopped, it would flood the field,

he must erect a barrier before it

so that it does not enter the field, since this case too involves the mitzva of returning a lost item.

Rava said:

It is written concerning the mitzva of returning a lost item:

“For every lost item of your brother,”

which indicates

that the loss of land is included as well.

That is, damage to land is also included in the category of lost items, and one is obligated to prevent it.

Rav Ḥananya said to Rava: There is a beraita that supports you: “If one saw water rushing toward”—

“he must erect a barrier before it.”

And it proves that the obligation to return a lost item applies even to land, since he was obligated to erect a barrier before the water so that it would not destroy his fellow’s land.

Rava said to him:

If it is on account of this,

do not support me.

For it is possible to say that

here, with what are we dealing?—

with a case in which there are sheaves

in the field. The obligation to save them is not due to the damage to the land, but because of the need to save the sheaves; and it is this case that the verse comes to include.

The Gemara asks:

If there are sheaves, what is the point of saying this?

In what way does this loss differ from any other lost item, and why is it necessary to include it from the verse “for every...”?

The Gemara explains:

No, it is necessary;

we are dealing with a case

in which there are

in the field

sheaves

attached to the ground,

which still require

still

the ground. What might you have said? Since they still require the ground—

they are considered like the body of the ground [they are regarded as part of the land itself, and there would be no obligation to return them];

the verse teaches us that this is not so,

through its inclusion, and one is obligated to return them .

We learned in our Mishna:

“If one found a donkey or a cow, etc.”

The matter itself is difficult!

You said

at the beginning:

“If one found a donkey and a cow grazing on the road”—

“this is not an item subject to return.”

This indicates that it is specifically when he found them

grazing on the road,

where there are two favorable factors: One, that it is grazing and not running; and furthermore, even if it were running, it would not be damaged, since it is not running between the vineyards—

only in such a case is it not an item subject to return.

This indicates,

but

if he found a cow that

was running on the road, and

likewise if he found a cow that

was grazing between the vineyards,

where there is one favorable factor—either that it is on the road and not between the vineyards, or that it is grazing and not running—and, on the other hand, there is one unfavorable factor—

it is an item subject to return!

Come and say the latter clause: “If the donkey’s utensils were overturned, or a cow was running between the vineyards”—

“this is an item subject to return!”

This indicates that specifically when it is

running between the vineyards,

where there are two unfavorable factors, both that it is running and that it is between the vineyards—

only then is it an item subject to return.

But if it is

running on the road or grazing between the vineyards,

where there is only one unfavorable factor—

this is not an item subject to return!

Abaye said:

The essential distinction is between running and grazing; it makes no difference whether it is on the road or between the vineyards. And the tanna formulated his words in accordance with the expression

“Its fellow will testify concerning it”

its counterpart will testify concerning it. That is, the first and latter clauses of our Mishna testify concerning one another:

The tanna

in the first clause stated

“grazing on the road, which is not an item subject to return,”

and from this we learn that

the same law applies to one grazing between the vineyards,

that this is not an item subject to return.

And likewise

the tanna

in the latter clause stated

“running between the vineyards”—

“which is an item subject to return,”

and from this we learn that

the same law applies to one running on the road,

since this too is an item subject to return .

Rava said to him: If

the tanna formulated it this way because of

“Its fellow will testify concerning it,”

and the rule is that anything grazing is not an item subject to return, whereas anything running is an item subject to return, then

let him state the easier case,

let the tanna state the less obvious matter,

and

we will know that

all the more so the more obvious matter:

Let him state

in the latter clause

“running on the road,”

for even in such a case

it is an item subject to return,

and we will know that

all the more so when it is running between the vineyards,

since it is damaged by the vines!

And

likewise

let him state

in the first clause

“grazing between the vineyards, which is not an item subject to return,”

even though at times it is also damaged by the vines when grazing there,

and

we will know that

all the more so when it is grazing on the road,

where it is not damaged, it is not an item subject to return!

Rather, Rava said:

As for what we asked from the first clause, which indicates that

running

on the road is an item subject to return,

whereas

the latter clause indicates that

running

on the road is not an item subject to return—

this is not difficult.

Because

this case,

the first clause, is referring to a cow

whose face is toward the field [the face of the running cow is toward the field],

and therefore it is an item subject to return.

Whereas

this case,

the latter clause, is referring to a cow

whose face is toward the town [its face is toward the town],

and therefore it is not an item subject to return.

Likewise, as for what we asked from the first clause, which indicates that

grazing

between the vineyards is an item subject to return,

whereas

the latter clause indicates that

grazing

between the vineyards is not an item subject to return—

this too is not difficult.

Because

here it is a case of—

loss of the animal itself, whereas here it is a case of—

loss of land.

The Gemara explains its words:

When it states

in the first clause that

grazing on the road is not an item subject to return,

which indicates that

grazing between the vineyards—

is an item subject to return,

it is referring

to the loss of land.

For the cow causes loss and damage to the vineyards .

And when it states

in the latter clause that

running between the vineyards is an item subject to return,

which indicates that

grazing between the vineyards—

is not an item subject to return,

it is referring

to the loss

of the cow itself.

For

then, if it is

running between the vineyards—

its body is damaged [its body deteriorates],

whereas if it is

grazing

between the vineyards—

its body does not deteriorate.

The Gemara asks:

But

when it is

grazing between the vineyards, granted that its body does not deteriorate,

and there is no loss of the animal itself; nevertheless,

let us derive that it should be obligated to return it

by reason of

the loss of land,

since it damages the vineyards?

And we answer: It is referring to a

vineyard

belonging to a gentile,

whose preservation one is not obligated to undertake.

The Gemara asks:

But

still,

let us derive that it is an item subject to return because of the loss of the animal itself, for perhaps they will kill it —!?

And we answer: It is referring

to a place where they first issue a warning and then kill .

The Gemara asks:

But perhaps

they already

warned it when it entered the vineyard on a previous occasion,

and now, if he does not return it, they will kill it?

And we answer:

If they warned it, and

nevertheless

the owners

did not take care of it,

it is certainly a knowingly abandoned loss,

and one is not obligated to return it.

We learned in our Mishna:

“If he returned it and it ran away, if he returned it and it ran away, etc.,”

even four or five times, he is obligated to return it, etc.

One of the Sages said to Rava: Say

that the meaning of

“return” is that one must return it

once , and from the fact that it is written

“you shall return them,”

we will derive that one must return it one additional time, namely—

twice.

But from where do we know that one must return it even four or five times?

He said to him:

The derivation is not from the superfluous wording “you shall return them”; rather, the wording

“return”—

indicates even one hundred times .

And that which is written

“you shall return them”

is expounded for the following derivation:

I know only that it is considered a return

—

when he returned the lost item

to the house

of the owner of the lost item.

But if he returned it

to the owner’s garden or ruin

of the owner—

from where

do we know that even in such a case it is considered a return?

The verse states, “You shall return them,”

which indicates—

in any case.

Thus, returning it to his garden or ruin is also considered a return.

We inquire concerning this:

What are the circumstances

in which he returned it to his garden or ruin?

If

he returned it in a manner

that it is guarded there—

it is obvious

that this is a return!

If it is not guarded—

why

is it considered a return?

The Gemara explains:

Actually,

we are dealing with a case

in which it is guarded; and this is what the verse “you shall return them” teaches us:

that one may return it to the owner’s garden

even without his knowledge, and

the owner’s awareness is not required.

One need not inform him: “I returned your cow to you, having found it lost; from now on, take care of it.”

And this is in accordance with

the view of

Rabbi Elazar, who said: All

those who return objects to their owners—the thief, the robber, and the four custodians—

require the owner’s awareness

to inform him that they returned them, so that he will guard them. And if they did not inform him, and the objects were stolen or died, those who returned them are liable for them.

For once the owner knew that the animal had left his possession, but did not know that it had subsequently been returned to him, he would not take care to guard it or feed it.

Except for returning a lost item,

for one need not inform the owner that he returned it to him, because

the Torah included many forms of returning a lost item,

including such a return, where he did not inform him. As it is stated: “You shall return them.”

That Sage said to Rava concerning the mitzva of sending away the mother bird, as it is stated:

“You shall surely send away”—say: “Send away”

indicates

once, while “you shall surely send away”

indicates twice,

and one should not be obligated in the mitzva of sending away the mother bird more than twice!?

But we learned in the Mishna that if he sent it away and it returned, even four or five times, he is obligated to send it away!

He said to him: “Send away”—

indicates even one hundred times.

And from that which is stated

“you shall surely send away,”

we derive as follows:

I know only that he is obligated to send away the mother

when he wishes to take it

for a discretionary purpose.

To eat it. But if he needs it

for a mitzva purpose,

such as to purify a leper, for which two birds are required,

from where

do we know that it is forbidden for him to take the mother together with the young for this purpose?

The verse states, “You shall surely send away”—

in any case.

One of the Sages said to Rava:

It is written: “You shall not hate your brother in your heart; you shall surely rebuke your fellow, and do not bear a sin because of him.”

And say

that

“You shall rebuke”

indicates

once, while “you shall surely rebuke”

indicates twice?

He said to him: “You shall rebuke”—

indicates even one hundred times .

And from that which is stated

“You shall surely rebuke,”

we derive:

I know only

that one must rebuke

a teacher rebuking a student.

But that a

student

must rebuke

a teacher—

from where

do we know?

The verse states, “You shall surely rebuke,” in any case .

And from that which is stated: “When you see the donkey of one who hates you lying under its burden, and you would refrain from helping it,

you shall surely help him,”

we derive as follows:

I know only that one must help unload a donkey that has fallen beneath its burden

when

its owner

the owner of the donkey

is with it.

But when

its owner is not with it—

from where

do we know that one must unload it alone?

The verse states, “You shall surely help”—

in any case.

And likewise we derive the following from what is stated concerning loading a donkey: “You shall not see your brother’s donkey or ox fallen on the road and conceal yourself from them;

you shall surely raise it together with him”:

I know only that this applies when

its owner is with it.

When

its owner is not with it—

from where

do we know that one must load it?

The verse states, “You shall surely raise it”—

in any case.

And

we ask:

Why is it necessary for the Torah to write the mitzva of unloading, and why is it necessary for it to write the mitzva of loading?

Apparently, it would have sufficed to write one of them, and we would have learned the other from it.

The Gemara explains:

Both are necessary. For had the Torah written

only the mitzva of

unloading, I would have said that there is a mitzva specifically to unload

because there is suffering of living creatures,

since the donkey is collapsing beneath its burden,

and there is also

financial loss

to its owner, since the donkey is being harmed.

But as for loading, where there is neither suffering of living creatures nor financial loss,

since the donkey is not being harmed and there is only a loss of time for its owner—

say

that

he should

not be obligated; therefore, the Torah also wrote the mitzva of loading.

And had it informed us

only of the mitzva of

loading,

we would have thought that one is obligated specifically to load,

because

he is not obligated to load for free, but only

for payment [there is an authority below who holds this view].

But as for unloading, which

one is obligated to perform even

without payment,

were it not that the Torah explicitly wrote that he is obligated—

say

that

he

should not be obligated!

Therefore,

it is necessary

to write both matters.

The Gemara asks:

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who

disagreed with the Sages and

said that

even loading is—

without payment, what can be said?

Why did the Torah not write only the mitzva of loading, from which we could have learned the mitzva of unloading?

And we answer:

According to Rabbi Shimon—

the verses cannot be identified conclusively.

That is, Rabbi Shimon maintains that from the wording of the verses “you shall surely help” and “you shall surely raise it,” we cannot determine which one speaks of unloading and which of loading. Therefore, if only one verse had been written, we would have said that it referred to unloading, for it is more reasonable that one is obligated in it, since it involves suffering of living creatures and financial loss, and we would not have known that one is obligated even in loading. Therefore, both verses were written.

And we ask:

Why do I need Scripture to write these two,

unloading and loading,

and why do I need Scripture to write

also

the return of a lost object?

It would have sufficed for us to write one of them, and we would know the general principle, since all of them are directives concerning property belonging to Jews!

The Gemara explains: All of them

are necessary

to be written.

Because

if the Torah had written

only

these two,

unloading and loading, we would have thought that the Torah obligated one specifically in this case

because the owner’s distress

the distress of the owner who is standing there, unable to unload or load,

exists,

and

its distress also exists [

and the animal too experiences distress].

But in the case of a lost object, although its owner’s distress

indeed

exists,

nevertheless,

its own distress does not exist—

—

one might say that he is not obligated

to return it. Therefore, the Torah wrote the law of returning a lost object.

And had it informed us

only of the law of returning

a lost object,

we would have thought that one is obligated specifically in this case,

because its owner is not with it [

for its owner is not there and cannot attend to returning it].