Bava Metzia 2a (ב.) — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the Sugya of “Two Hold” We find numerous divergent halakhot concerning how one must act or rule when there is uncertainty regarding an object or property—who its owner is. There are uncertainties in which the ruling is “They shall divide” as in our Mishna, and there are cases in which the halakha is ruled as follows: “The one who seeks to take property from another”, “upon him is the burden of proof.” Likewise, there are uncertainties in which the ruling is “Whoever prevails has the stronger claim,” and there are cases in which the ruling is “It shall remain deposited until Elijah comes.” Below, the distinction between the various types of uncertainty will be explained according to the approaches of the Rishonim, and through this the law of the Mishna will also be explained. As stated, our Mishna deals with “property of uncertain ownership,” concerning which the ruling is division. A “ The one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof” The reason for the law, and its definition: removal from “ possession,” in a matter concerning which there is uncertainty; the view of Sumakhos and the reason for Sumakhos Every object found in a person’s possession is presumed with certainty to be his. Therefore, when another person comes and claims the object from him, asserting that it belongs to him, then, so long as the claimant does not prove with clear evidence before the court that the object is his, he cannot remove the object from the hands of the one who is “in possession” of it. This is because we have an established presumption that everything in a person’s possession belongs to him; therefore, it is certain that the object belongs to the possessor! Even if the claimant brings witnesses that the object was his in the past, the possessor can say: Indeed, the object was yours in the past, but you sold it to me or gave it to me as a gift! Regarding the definition of this presumption, there are those who maintain that it is “a presumption that clarifies the matter”: His possession of the object constitutes certain evidence that the object is his. The language of the Gemara below [3a] likewise proves this, where it says, “We are witnesses” [that what he has possession of is his]. This implies that this clarification has the status of testimony, and is therefore a certain clarification. However, there are those who maintain that this presumption does not constitute a certain determination that the object belongs to the one who possesses it. Rather, the matter remains uncertain; nevertheless, the law is that the object is not removed from the one who possesses it. This is like the ordinary presumption of monetary possession, under which property is not removed from the one who possesses it, as we shall explain below. We find another instance in which the law “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof” is stated even where no one is in possession of the object. This is when it is clear to us that before the uncertainty arose, the object belonged to one of them. The law is that it is not removed from him, since it is presumed to be in the possession of the original owner, and the burden of proof rests upon the other party. N ‘ Possession’ in a case of uncertainty] There is another case in which the ruling is “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof,” even though we know with certainty that the possessor’s possession of the object does not indicate that he owns it. [For example: when an animal belonging to an Israelite gives birth to a firstborn animal, it must be given to a kohen. If the offspring is of uncertain firstborn status, it need not be given to the kohen, since the Israelite, in whose domain the offspring was born, is in possession of it, and “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof.” In this case, it is clear that the Israelite’s possession does not indicate ownership, since the uncertainty is whether the offspring is a firstborn. Nevertheless, even in this case the kohen is considered the one “who seeks to take property from another,” since in practice the Israelite is in possession of the object; therefore, the kohen must bring proof.] The Gemara disputes the source of this law. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani derives it from a verse. Rav Ashi maintains that it is derived from the reasoning, “One who suffers pain goes to the physician.” Just as it is simple reasoning that one who suffers pain goes to a physician, so it is simple reasoning that a claimant cannot remove an object or money from the one who possesses it merely because of uncertainty! This presumption—whether it is derived from a verse or from reasoning—does not clarify the uncertainty. Rather, its significance is that when there is uncertainty, the money cannot be removed from the possessor. Why There Is No Concern of Theft in Possession Regarding the fundamental law that we explained—that even where there is no certain presumption, the rule is nevertheless “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof”—a difficulty arises: Since it is not certain that the object belongs to him, there is seemingly a doubt concerning theft, and in a matter of Torah law one must rule stringently in a case of uncertainty. How, then, may the possessor use the object? Some explain that since it has been ruled that the object is not removed from him, we treat him, for all the laws of the Torah, as though it were his! Although it is not certainly his, nevertheless the Torah prohibited theft only where, according to monetary law, it has been ruled that the object is not his. But if, according to monetary law, it has been ruled that the object is his—even if the ruling resulted from uncertainty—there is no concern of theft. The Netivot HaMishpat wrote a different reason The View of Sumakhos Although we said that if an object is in the possession of one of the parties under litigation, the claimant must bring proof, this applies specifically to an uncertainty that arose only because of their claims, that is, where, without the claims of the litigants, there would be no uncertainty before us. But where there is derara demamona—that is, even if the litigants make no claims at all, there would still be an uncertainty before us [for example, when one exchanges a cow for a donkey and the cow gives birth, but it is unknown whether the cow gave birth before or after the exchange, since if she gave birth after the exchange, the offspring belongs to the owner of the donkey—in this case, the claims of the litigants are not needed to create the uncertainty, since even without their claims there is a clear uncertainty before us]—in this case Sumakhos and the Sages dispute the matter. The Sages maintain that even in this case, “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof,” while Sumakhos maintains] that in this case “they shall divide”! The Rishonim dispute the view of Sumakhos. Rabbi Yaakov Tam maintains [as cited in Tosafot below, 100a, s.v. “Ha Mani,” and likewise in other Rishonim] that even where the defendant is actually in possession, the object is removed from him and they divide it. But Rashbam [there, and likewise many other Rishonim] maintains that all of Sumakhos’s statements were made only where the object under discussion is standing in a marsh and the defendant is not in possession of it, but has the presumption of the original owner; in this case, they divide it. However, if the defendant is in possession of it, Sumakhos concedes that in this case we apply the rule “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof.” Tosafot add that according to Rashbam, who maintains that Sumakhos concedes in the case of a possessor that “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof,” this applies specifically when the defendant makes a definite claim. But if the defendant makes an uncertain claim, then even if he is in possession, the object is removed from him and they divide it. The Reason for Sumakhos’s View Regarding Sumakhos’s reasoning, Tosafot [Bava Metzia 97b] wrote that he does not dispute the concept of a presumption concerning money. Rather, he maintains that money placed in doubt is considered as though both parties are in possession of it, and when both parties are in possession of it, even the Sages agree that they divide it [as in our Mishna; see below. The Gemara disputes the view of Sumakhos. Some maintain that Sumakhos stated his position only when the claimant says, “I am certain that the object is mine,” while the defendant makes only an uncertain claim. But when both the defendant and the claimant make definite claims, he concedes to the Sages that “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof.” Others maintain that even when both parties make definite claims, Sumakhos said that they divide it. B ‘ Whoever prevails has the stronger claim’ We find this law in the Gemara, Bava Batra [34b], concerning a boat that was standing at sea. Two people came, each claiming that it was his, asserting that he had inherited it from his father. The Gemara ruled there: “Whoever prevails has the stronger claim.” The meaning of this law is that the court withdraws from the boat, and whoever prevails over the other by force or through evidence is the one who acquires the boat. [There, it is impossible to rule, “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof,” since neither of them is in possession of the boat, and there is no “one who seeks to take property from another.” However, where one of the parties is in possession of the object, we no longer say “whoever prevails has the stronger claim”; rather, we say, “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof.”] The reason for this law of “whoever prevails has the stronger claim” is explained by the Rosh in our sugya: One whose object it is will devote himself to ensuring that his property remains in his possession. This law of “whoever prevails has the stronger claim” applies only where there is no derara demamona—that is, where the entire uncertainty arose only because of their claims. But if there is an uncertainty before the court even without their claims, we do not say, “whoever prevails has the stronger claim.” It is known that the following question has been raised Is “whoever prevails has the stronger claim” a halakhic ruling that whoever prevails over the other and takes possession of the object thereby becomes its owner? According to this possibility, once one of them has taken possession of the object, the other can no longer return and take it from him. For at the moment the first one took possession of the object, it was ruled that the object was his, and it can no longer be removed from him. [The Rosh likewise wrote in Bava Batra, chapter 3, section 22, that the second party cannot return and take it from him.] However, this law can be interpreted differently: There is no “ruling” here that whoever takes possession of the object thereby owns it. Rather, the court withdraws from adjudicating this matter, and consequently whoever prevails has the stronger claim. According to this, even after one party has taken possession, the other can still return and take it from him, since there is no “ruling” that the boat belongs to the possessor. [This is likewise the method of Tosafot below, page 6a, s.v. “But here,” who maintain that the second party can return and take it.] Where both parties are in possession of the object whose ownership is uncertain, we do not say, “whoever prevails has the stronger claim.” As will be explained below, section D.’ C ‘ It shall remain deposited until Elijah comes’ There are uncertainties in which the ruling is that neither of the parties under litigation receives the object or money; rather, it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes! An example of this is two people who deposited money with one person: One deposited one hundred dinars [one hundred zuz], and the other deposited two hundred. After some time, when they came to take their deposits, each claimed that he had deposited the two hundred, while the depositary did not remember who had deposited one hundred and who had deposited two hundred. The tannaim disputed the matter. The Sages maintain that each receives one hundred [since it is certain that each of them deposited this amount], while the third hundred, concerning which there is uncertainty, shall remain deposited until Elijah comes and declares whose it is. Rabbi Yosei maintains that all the money shall remain deposited until Elijah comes. It is explained in the sugya below [3a] that according to the Sages, this law applies only where “division cannot be true,” such as in the case of the third hundred, which certainly belongs to one of them and cannot belong to both. But where division could be true [for example, two people holding a cloak, where it is possible that both lifted the cloak together and the cloak in fact belongs to both of them], in this case we do not say, “It shall remain deposited until Elijah comes”; rather, we say, “They shall divide.” According to Rabbi Yosei, this law applies specifically where one of the parties under litigation is certainly deceitful, such as in the case of the two who deposited money, where one of them is certainly deceitful, since only one deposited two hundred. In this case we say, “It shall remain deposited until Elijah comes.” But where there is no certainly deceitful party [for example, two people holding a cloak: It is possible that they lifted it together, and each believes that he lifted it first, and therefore claims, “It is all mine,” without intending to deceive] the law is that they divide! Why We Do Not Say “Whoever Prevails Has the Stronger Claim” Regarding the law that “it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes,” the Rishonim raised the difficulty: Why do we not say in this case, “whoever prevails has the stronger claim”? Tosafot wrote in Bava Batra [33b, s.v. “That one”] that the law “whoever prevails has the stronger claim” applies only where the object is in a place of ownerlessness and is not located within anyone’s domain. But if the object is located within a person’s domain, the object is no longer removed in order to apply “whoever prevails has the stronger claim.” Therefore, in the case of the third hundred, where the money is in the custody of the guardian, the money is not removed from his domain in order to apply “whoever prevails has the stronger claim”! D ‘ They shall divide’ Explanation of the law—the form of possession—the reason for the division—why we do not say “whoever prevails has the stronger claim”—why we do not say “it shall remain deposited.” This law is explained in our Mishna: Two people holding a cloak, each claiming, “It is all mine”—they shall divide it with an oath. Rashi and Tosafot explained that the reason for the division is that both are in possession of it and their strength with regard to the cloak is equal. The nature of this possession and the definition of the division will be explained below. The Form of Possession It is explained in the Gemara below [7a] that if each one was actually holding half of the cloak, they would not need to take an oath. Even without an oath, the other could not claim from him the half that he holds, since “the one who seeks to take property from another, upon him is the burden of proof”! The reason that our Mishna states that they must take an oath is that neither is actually holding half of the cloak; rather, each is holding an edge of the cloak. Since both are holding an edge of the cloak, they divide it with an oath. The Reason for the Division – And Its Definition The later authorities devoted extensive discussion to the reason for the division in our Mishna: Is it because, as a result of this possession—each holding the edge of the cloak—each is considered to be in possession of half the cloak, and therefore they divide it? For if each were actually holding half of the cloak, we would certainly presume that each was the owner of half, since “whatever is in a person’s possession is presumed to be his” [as we explained above, section A]. Similarly, when two people hold the edge of a cloak, it is as though each is actually holding half the cloak, and we certainly presume that each is the owner of half the cloak— However, it is possible to say that as a result of this possession, each is considered as though he were in possession of the entire cloak. The reason for the division is that since both are in possession of the entire cloak, the ruling, by way of compromise, is that they divide it. According to this possibility, the division in our Mishna is not a certain division, but a division due to uncertainty. Many of the later authorities precisely inferred from the words of Tosafot [2a, s.v. veyachloku] that their grasp is considered as though each one were actually holding half of the garment, and that this division is not due to compromise, but is the law itself. Since each one is holding part of the garment, the presumption is that whatever is in a person’s possession belongs to him. As Tosafot wrote in their wording: “For it is considered as though he certainly has half of it, since we are witnesses that whatever this one is holding belongs to him.” Indeed, this is the meaning of the Gemara below, 3a, where the Gemara explains that in our Mishna we are witnesses that each one has half of the garment. This wording implies that each one has complete possession of half the garment, and therefore we are witnesses that each one owns half the garment. [This is also what the Tashbetz wrote, part I, section 74, in explaining the words of the Gemara]. However, the Shita Mekubetzet [below, 6a] cites some who explain that the statement in the Gemara, “we are witnesses,” is not meant literally. Likewise, the Shakh, section 75, explains that the statement in the Gemara, “we are witnesses,” does not mean that we are witnesses that each one is holding half the garment. Rather, the Gemara means that after the court ruled that they must divide it, we are witnesses that each one owns half the garment by virtue of the court’s ruling; but before the court’s ruling, there is no clear situation before us in which each one has half. According to him, there is no proof from the words of the Gemara for the position of Tosafot. In the novellae of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, section 4, he raised an objection to the words of Tosafot: Although the fact that both are holding the edge of the garment indicates that each one has ownership of the garment, how do we know that each one has half? Perhaps one has three-quarters and the other one-quarter, for even in that case the one who has one-quarter would be holding the edge of the garment to prove his ownership. He raised further objections to this approach; see there for his explanation. - Regarding this fundamental inquiry—whether, in the case of two people holding a garment, each one is considered to be holding the entire garment or half the garment—see Kovetz Shiurim, part II, section 9, at length. [There he proved that Tosafot’s position is that each one is holding half, as we have explained]. Why, in the case of two people holding a garment, do we not say: “The stronger one prevails”? Tosafot [2a, s.v. veyachloku] asked: Why, when two people are holding a garment and each one claims, “It is all mine,” is the ruling, “They shall divide it”? Whereas in Bava Batra, in the case of the boat, when each one claimed, “It is all mine,” the ruling is, “The stronger one prevails.” [As we brought above, section 2]. Tosafot answered that the cases are not comparable. In the case of a boat standing at sea, neither one has possession of it, and therefore the ruling is, “The stronger one prevails.” But in the case of two people holding a garment, each one is holding part of the garment; and when there is one who is holding property, we do not say, “The stronger one prevails.” Rather, each one receives what he is holding. As for why, in the case of two people holding a garment, we do not say, “Let it remain”—see the Gemara below, 3a, which gives two distinctions between the dispute of Rabbi Yosei and the Sages concerning a third maneh, where the ruling is, “Let it remain,” and the case of two people holding a garment. See there carefully, in note 8, regarding the case in which “one says, ‘I wove it,’ and the other says, ‘I wove it.’” Mishna:

Two

people who came to court before a court, when both of them

are holding

a garment,

and each one claims ownership of it:

This one,

one of them,

says:

The entire garment is mine, because

I found it,

and I lifted it before you lifted it.

And

if

this one,

the other,

says:

The entire garment is mine, because

I

am the one who

found it

and lifted it first, and you snatched it from my hand after I had acquired it. Likewise, if two people came before a court while holding one garment—

this one says, “It is all mine,”

because I purchased it from the seller,

and this one says, “It is all mine,”

I am the one who purchased it, and you snatched it from my hand after I had purchased it—

they shall divide the garment between them, with an oath. Therefore—

This one shall take an oath that he has no less than half of it.

He must swear that he has a share in this garment, and that this ownership is, at the very least, ownership of half the garment,

and this one shall take an oath that he has no less

than half of it—

and they shall divide it!

However, if

one says, “It is all mine,” and the other says, “Half of it is mine,”—

since the dispute between them concerns only half a garment, because the one who says, “Half of it is mine,” concedes that the remaining half belongs to the one who says, “It is all mine,” it follows that their dispute concerns only half the garment. Therefore, they must divide the half over which they are disputing.

And for this reason,

the one who says, “It is all mine,”

who takes three-quarters of the garment [the half that is not disputed certainly belongs to him, and he also takes half of the disputed half—one-quarter—by virtue of “they shall divide it”],

shall take an oath that he has no less than three parts,

meaning that at least three-quarters of the garment belong to him,

and the one who says, “Half of it is mine,” shall take an oath that he has no less than one-quarter,

meaning that at least one-quarter of the garment belongs to him.

After the oath:

this one,

the one who says, “It is all mine,”

takes

three parts

of the garment [the undisputed half, as well as the quarter that he receives by virtue of “they shall divide it,” which was ruled concerning the other half of the garment],

and this one,

the one who says, “Half of it is mine,”

takes one-quarter,

which is half of the half of the garment that he claimed.

If two people were riding on an animal, or if one was riding

on the animal

and one was leading

the animal, without riding on it,

this one says

the animal

is all mine, and this one says

the animal

is all mine—

this one shall take an oath that he has no less than half of it, and this one shall take an oath that he has no less than half of it—

and they shall divide it!

This law is similar to the first law in the Mishna. The Gemara will explain what the Mishna teaches us by this example beyond what it teaches in the first clause.

The Mishna adds another law:

When they acknowledge

that each one has half the garment,

or if they have witnesses

that each one is entitled to half the garment,—

they divide it without an oath.

The Gemara will explain what the novelty of this is. Is it not obvious that if there is no dispute between them, or if there are witnesses, an oath is unnecessary?

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

Why do I need the tanna to teach,

why did the tanna need to repeat and state in the Mishna both

“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’”

and

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine’”?

Let him teach one,

it would have been sufficient for him to teach only one of the two examples!?

And we answer:

It teaches one case!

These are not two separate examples; rather, it is one case in which

this one

says, “I found it, and

therefore

it is all mine,” and this one says, “I found it, and

therefore

it is all mine.”

And we object: If there is indeed only one claim here, why does the Mishna repeat its wording: “I found it, and it is all mine”?

Let it teach, “I found it,”

the tanna should have stated only what he claims—“I found it”—and

we would know,

and we would consequently know

that he

claims

“It is all mine.”

For if he found the garment, it is certainly his.

And we answer:

If the tanna had taught,

if the tanna had stated only

“I found it”

[without “it is all mine”],

I might have said,

I might have said:

What does “I found it”

mean? The one who claims, “I found it,” does not intend to say that he found it and performed an act of acquisition with it; rather, he intends to say

“I saw it,”

only, and did not perform an act of acquisition with it. And if the Mishna had been stated in this manner, we would have learned from it that

although it did not come into his possession,

the garment did not come into his possession and he did not perform an act of acquisition with it, nevertheless

by mere sight he acquires it.

Therefore

it taught, “It is all mine,”

for this wording implies that he claims that the garment belongs to him with complete certainty, because he performed an act of acquisition with it, teaching us

that through sight one does not acquire it!

And we object:

Can you really say

how can you say that it could have occurred to us to interpret the intent of the Mishna in this way, and to say

what does “I found it”

mean? “I saw it”

alone, without an act of acquisition!?

But

after all,

Ravnai said

elsewhere that the meaning of the word

“and you find it”—“it came into his possession,” is implied,

meaning that it came into his actual possession, that is, he performed an act of acquisition with it, and did not acquire it through mere sight.

Ravnai’s statement was made with regard to the verse concerning the returning of a lost object [Deuteronomy 22:3]: “And so shall you do with his donkey, and so shall you do with his garment, and so shall you do with every lost object of your brother that is lost from him and you find it. You may not hide yourself.”

In tractate Bava Kamma [113b], the Gemara expounds from this verse that there is no obligation to return a gentile’s lost object to him, since it says, “with every lost object of your brother,” teaching that you return a lost object only to your brother, but you do not return it to a Canaanite!

The Gemara there asks: From where do we know that the verse came to exclude the obligation to return a gentile’s lost object? Perhaps the exclusion expressed by “your brother” merely teaches that one need not trouble himself to lift a gentile’s lost object in order to return it to him; but if the lost object has already come into the possession of a Jew, perhaps he is obligated to return it to him!?

Ravnai answers that this verse, which excludes a gentile, must be speaking of a lost object that has already come into his possession. For it says there, “and you find it,” and the meaning of this word is “it came into his possession”—the lost object has already come into his possession. Since the gentile is excluded by this verse, it necessarily follows that even if a gentile’s lost object comes into his possession, he need not return it to him.

We learn from Ravnai’s words that the meaning of the word “finding” is something that has already come into his possession. If so, it is difficult: How could the Mishna’s statement, “I found it,” have been interpreted as meaning “I saw it,” but it did not come into my possession?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed,

“and you find it”

in the verse,

as stated in the verse,

means that it came into his possession!

Its meaning is that the lost object has already come into his possession [as Ravnai said].

However,

the

tanna

in our Mishna, had he not added and said, “It is all mine,” we would have said that when he said, “I found it,” he meant, “I saw it.” Although in the language of the Torah the meaning of “finding” is that it has already come into his possession, nevertheless we would say that the tanna

used ordinary language

and not the language of the Torah, and that many people who see a lost object immediately refer to it, from the moment they see it, by the name “a found object.”

Therefore, we would interpret the Mishna as follows:

Once he saw it, he said, “I found it,”

since he saw the lost object, he claims, “I found it,”

and although it did not come into his possession,

it did not come into his possession and he performed no act of acquisition with it, nevertheless

through mere sight,

without an act of acquisition—

he acquires it!

For this reason

teach

the tanna added and stated in his words

“It is all mine,”

to teach you that

mere seeing does not acquire it!

And we challenge this:

let him teach

only

“It is all mine,” and there would be no need to state, “I found it”?

Why did the Mishna not state only “It is all mine,” in which case there would be no need also to teach “I found it” [for if it had stated only “It is all mine,” we would not have mistakenly said that his intention was that he acquired it through seeing without an act of acquisition, because the expression “It is all mine” means that the object is mine with complete possession, through acquisition ].

And we answer:

If he had taught “It is all mine,”

but the tanna had not taught “I found it,”

I would have thought

that

in general,

everywhere

that it teaches “I found it,”

where the Mishna uses the language of finding, this does not mean a complete act of acquisition; rather,

mere seeing acquires it,

and there is no need to perform a complete act of acquisition with regard to a found object—

For this reason

he taught

the tanna in our Mishna

“I found it,”

and then he taught,

and repeated once more,

“It is all mine,”

for this expression reveals that the intention of “I found it” is “I acquired it,” and not merely “I saw it.”

From the superfluous wording of the Mishna we learn,

from the repetition of the wording in the Mishna, through which we learned that “I found it” means “I acquired it through a complete act of acquisition,” we learn that wherever the wording of “finding” is stated in the Mishnayot, the intention is not merely seeing, but an actual act of acquisition. Since

seeing

alone

does not acquire it,

the found object has still not been acquired through this.

The Gemara explained above that what we learned in the Mishna—“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it’; this one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine’”—does not constitute two cases. Rather, it is one case, in which one claims, “I found it, and it is all mine.”

And we challenge this:

Can you really say

that it is possible to say that

one case is taught

and that there are not two separate cases, but rather one case in which one claims, “I found it, and it is all mine”—

But “this one and this one” is taught,

as in the first clause we learned with the wording

“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’”

and likewise, with regard to “It is all mine,” we learned with the wording

“This one”

“says, ‘It is all mine,’ and so on,

which indicates that this is an additional clause in the Mishna. For if it were a continuation of the claim “I found it,” the tanna should not have added the word “this,” but should have written: “This one says, ‘I found it, and it is all mine.’” And since it is written, “This one says, ‘It is all mine,’” it indicates that this is an additional case, and not a continuation of the case of one who says, “I found it.”

And for this reason the Gemara rejects the possibility that this is one case, concluding that they are two separate cases ! —

Rav Pappa said—and some say Rav Shimi bar Ashi, and some say,

there are those who attribute this statement to

Kadei

the name of a Sage —

The first clause,

which states, “This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’” speaks

of a found object,

as they are arguing with each other over who found the object first —

and the latter clause,

which states, “This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine,’” speaks

of a purchase and sale,

as they are arguing with each other over who purchased the object.

And it is necessary —

the tanna had to state the law both with regard to a found object and with regard to a purchase and sale, and we could not have derived one case from the other.