Bava Metzia 2a — the Talmud in English

Introduction to the Sugya of "Two Hold It We find many and varied halakhot concerning how one should act or decide when there is uncertainty regarding an object, or property, as to who its owner is. There are uncertainties regarding which the ruling is decided as “They shall divide it” as in our Mishna], and there are cases regarding which the g a lakha is decided as “The one who takes out from his fellow”, “upon him is the proof”. Likewise, there are uncertainties regarding which the ruling is “Whoever is stronger prevails”, and there are cases regarding which it is decided “It shall remain deposited until Elijah comes”. Below, the distinction between the types of uncertainties according to the methods of the Rishonim will be explained, and through this the law of the Mishna will also be explained. As stated, our Mishna deals with a “monetary uncertainty,” regarding which the ruling is division. A “ The one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof” Reason for the law, and the definition of taking out from“ one who is holding,” in a matter that is uncertainly taken out; the view of Sumchos: the reason of Sumchos Every object found in a person’s possession is presumed certainly to be his. Therefore, when another person comes and claims the object from him, asserting that it is his, as long as the claimant does not prove with clear evidence before the court that the object is his, he cannot take the object from the hand of the one who is “holding” it, since we have an established presumption that whatever is under a person’s hand is his; therefore, certainly the object belongs to the one holding it! Even if the claimant brings witnesses that the object was his in the past, the one holding it can say: Indeed, the object was yours in the past, but you sold it to me, or you gave it to me as a gift! Regarding the definition of this presumption, there are those who maintain] that it is a “clarifying presumption,” for his possession of the object constitutes certain proof that the object is his. This is likewise demonstrated by the wording of the Gemara below [3a], “We are witnesses” that what he is holding is his—and it implies that this clarification has the status of testimony, and this is certain clarification. But there are those who maintain that this presumption does not constitute a certain decision that the object belongs to the one holding it; rather, it remains uncertain, and nevertheless the law is that the object is not taken from the person holding it. This is like an ordinary monetary presumption, from which the object held is not taken, as we shall explain below. We find another place where the law “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof” is stated, even where he is not holding the object. This is where it is clear to us that before the uncertainty arose, the object belonged to one of them; the law is that it is not taken from him, since he has the presumption of the “original owner,” and upon his fellow is the proof. N ‘ Holding’ in an uncertainty] There is another place where “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof” is decided, even though it is certain to us that the possession of the holder of the object does not indicate his ownership. [ An example of this is when an animal gives birth to a firstborn offspring belonging to an Israelite, for it is given to a priest. If the offspring is an uncertain firstborn, he does not have to give it to a priest, since the Israelite, in whose domain the offspring was born, is holding the offspring, and “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof.” In this case, it is clear that the Israelite’s possession does not indicate his ownership, since the uncertainty is whether it is a firstborn, and nevertheless even in this case the priest is considered “the one who takes out from his fellow,” since in practice the Israelite is holding the object; therefore, the priest must bring proof]. The Gemara disputed] what the source of this law is. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani derives it from a verse. But Rav Ashi maintains that it is derived from the reasoning, “One who is pained by pain goes to the physician.” Just as it is simple reasoning that one who is in pain goes to a physician, so it is simple reasoning that a claimant cannot take the object or the money from the one holding it on account of an uncertainty! And this presumption [whether it is derived from the verse or whether it is derived from reasoning] is not a clarifying presumption of the uncertainty; rather, its meaning is that in a state of uncertainty it is impossible to take the money from the one holding it. Why There Is No Concern of Theft in Holding Regarding the fundamental law we explained—that even where there is no certain presumption, nevertheless the law is “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof”—one must ask: Since the object is not certainly his, there is here an uncertainty of theft, and an uncertainty concerning a Torah prohibition is treated stringently; so how can the one holding it use the object? Some have explained that since it has been decided that the object is not taken from him, we judge him for all the laws of the Torah as though it were his! And although it is not certainly his, nevertheless the Torah prohibited theft only when, according to the monetary laws, it has been decided that the object is not his; but if according to the monetary laws it has been decided that the object is his [even though the decision was due to an uncertainty], there is no concern of theft. The Netivot Ha-Mishpat wrote another reason: Although it is uncertain whether the object is his, nevertheless there is no prohibition of theft here, because the Torah prohibited only certain theft and not doubtful theft! He added there in the Netivot Ha-Mishpat that where it is clear that the uncertainty will never be clarified, the one holding it acquires the object with certainty, since even if the object belongs to the claimant, he has already despaired of it. The View of Sumchos Although we said that if the object is held in the hand of one of the litigants, the claimant must bring proof, this is specifically in an uncertainty that arose only because of their claims]. That is, where without the claims of the litigants there is no uncertainty before us. But where there is derara de-mamona, that is, where even if the litigants make no claim at all there would be an uncertainty before us [an example of this is one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, and the cow gives birth, and it is not known whether the cow gave birth before the exchange or after the exchange, for if it gave birth after the exchange, the offspring belongs to the owner of the donkey—in this case there is no need for their claims to create the uncertainty, since even without their claims there is a clear uncertainty before us], in this case Sumchos and the Sages disputed: the view of the Sages is that even in this case “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof,” while Sumchos maintains] that in this case “they shall divide it”! The Rishonim disputed the view of Sumchos. Rabbi Yehuda maintains [cited in Tosafot below, 100a, s.v. “Who is this,” and so it is in other Rishonim] that even where the defendant is actually holding the object, it is taken from him and they divide it. But Rashbam [there, and many other Rishonim likewise maintain] holds that all the words of Sumchos were stated only where the object under discussion is standing in the marsh, and the defendant is not holding it, but has the presumption of the original owner; in this case they divide it. But if the defendant is holding it, Sumchos concedes that in this case we say “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof.” Tosafot add that according to Rashbam, who maintains that Sumchos concedes in the case of one who is holding it that “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof,” this applies specifically if the defendant claims with certainty; but if the defendant claims uncertainty, even if he is holding it, it is taken from him and they divide it. The Reason of Sumchos Regarding the reason of Sumchos, Tosafot [Bava Metzia 97b] wrote that he does not dispute the concept of a monetary presumption; rather, he maintains that money placed in an uncertainty is as though both of them are holding it, and when both of them are holding it, even according to the Sages they divide it [as in our Mishna; see below]. The Gemara disputed] the view of Sumchos. There are those who maintain that Sumchos stated his words only when the claimant claims, “I know with certainty that the object is mine,” and the defendant claims only uncertainty; but when both the defendant and the claimant claim with certainty, he concedes to the Sages that “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof.” And there are those who maintain that even when both claim with certainty, Sumchos said that they shall divide it. B ‘ Whoever Is Stronger Prevails’ We find this law in the Gemara, Bava Batra [34b], concerning a ship that was standing at sea, when two people came and each claimed that it was his, asserting that he had inherited it from his father. It was decided there in the Gemara: “Whoever is stronger prevails.” The explanation of this law is that the court withdraws its hands from the ship, and whoever is stronger than his fellow by force or by proofs] is the one who acquires the ship. [And there it is impossible to decide “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof,” since neither of them is holding the ship, and there is no “one who takes out from his fellow” here—but where one of the sides is holding the object, we no longer say “whoever is stronger prevails,” but rather “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof.”] The reason for this law of “whoever is stronger prevails” is explained by the Rosh in our sugya: one whose the object is truly his risks himself to establish what is his in his possession. This law of “whoever is stronger prevails” is stated only where there is no derara de-mamona, that is, where the entire uncertainty was created only because of their claims; but if there is an uncertainty before the court even without their claims, we do not say “whoever is stronger prevails.” It is known that it is possible to investigate] whether “whoever is stronger prevails” is a halakhic decision that whoever prevails over his fellow and takes possession of the object, the object is his! According to this side, after one of them has taken possession of the object, his fellow can no longer return and take possession of it from him. For at the moment the first one took possession of the object, it was decided that the object is his, and it is no longer possible to take it from him. [And so the Rosh wrote, Bava Batra, chapter 3, section 22, that the second cannot return and take possession of it from him]— But it is possible to explain this law differently: there is no “decision” here that whoever takes possession of the object, it is his. Rather, the court withdraws its hands from adjudicating this matter, and consequently whoever is stronger prevails. According to this, even if one has taken possession, his fellow can still take possession back from him, since there is no “decision” here that the ship belongs to the one who took possession. [And this is the method of Tosafot below, folio 6a, s.v. “But here,” that the second can return and take possession.] Where both sides are holding the object about which there is uncertainty, we do not say “whoever is stronger prevails” as will be explained below, section D. C ‘ It Shall Remain Deposited Until Elijah Comes’ There are uncertainties regarding which it is decided that neither of the litigants receives the object or the money, and it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes! An example of this is two people who deposited [money] with one person: one deposited one hundred zuz [one maneh], and the other deposited two hundred; after some time, when they came to take the deposit, each one claimed that he had deposited the two hundred, while the depositary did not remember who had deposited the one hundred and who had deposited the two hundred—the Tannaim disputed this]. The view of the Sages is that each one receives one maneh [for this sum was certainly deposited by each of them], while the third maneh, regarding which there is uncertainty, shall remain deposited until Elijah comes and says whose it is. The view of Rabbi Yosei is that all the money shall remain deposited until Elijah comes. It is explained in the sugya below [3a] that according to the Sages this law applies only where “the division cannot be true,” such as with the third maneh, which certainly belongs to one of them and cannot belong to both]. But where the division can be true [an example of this is two holding a garment, for it is possible that both lifted the garment together, and in truth the garment belongs to both of them], in this case we do not say “it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes,” but rather “they shall divide it.” According to Rabbi Yosei, this law applies specifically where one of the litigants is certainly deceitful, such as concerning the two who deposited, where one of them is certainly deceitful, since only one deposited two hundred—in this case we say “it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes.” But where there is no certain deceitful person [an example of this is two holding a garment, for it is possible that both lifted it together and each thinks that he lifted it first, and therefore claims, “It is all mine,” but does not intend to deceive] the law is that they shall divide it! Why Do We Not Say ‘ Whoever Is Stronger Prevails’ Regarding this law, that “it shall remain deposited until Elijah comes,” the Rishonim raised the difficulty: why do we not say here, “whoever is stronger prevails”? Tosafot wrote in Bava Batra [33b, s.v. “That one”] that the law of “whoever is stronger prevails” applies only where the object is located in a place that is ownerless and is not under a person’s authority. But if the object is under a person’s authority, the object is no longer taken in order to apply to it “whoever is stronger prevails.” Therefore, in the case of the third maneh, where the money is with the guardian, the money is no longer taken from his authority in order to make whoever is stronger prevail! D ‘ They Shall Divide It’ Explanation of the law—the form of the possession—the reason for the division—why we do not say “whoever is stronger prevails”—why we do not say “it shall remain deposited.” This law is explained in our Mishna: two who are holding a garment, and each one claims, “It is all mine”—they shall divide it with an oath. Rashi and Tosafot explained that the reason for the division is that both of them are holding it and their strength in the garment is equal—and the nature of this possession and the definition of the division will be explained below. The Form of the Possession It is explained in the Gemara below [7a] that if each one of them were actually holding half of the garment, they would not need to take an oath. For even if he did not take an oath, his fellow could not claim from him the half that he is holding, since “the one who takes out from his fellow, upon him is the proof”! And that which is explained in our Mishna, that they must take an oath, is because neither of them is actually holding half of the garment; rather, each one is holding the edge of the garment, and since both of them are holding the edge of the garment, they shall divide it with an oath. The Reason for the Division — and Its Definition The later authorities extensively investigated what the reason for the division in our Mishna is: whether, because of this possession by which they hold the edge of the garment, each one is considered as holding half a garment and therefore they divide it. For if each one were actually holding half a garment, we would certainly presume that each one owns half, for “whatever is under a person’s hand is his” [as we explained above, section A]. So too, when two hold the edge of a garment, it is as though each one is actually holding half the garment, and we certainly presume that each one owns half a garment.— But it is possible to say that each one, because of this possession of his, is considered as though he is holding the whole garment. The reason for the division is that since both of them are holding the entire garment, it is decided as a compromise that they shall divide it. According to this side, the division in our Mishna is not a certain division, but rather a division due to uncertainty. And many of the later authorities precisely inferred from the words of Tosafot [2a, s.v. “and they shall divide”] that their grasp is considered as though each one is actually grasping half of the cloak, and this division is not on account of compromise, but is from the essential law, for since each one is grasping half of the cloak—what is under a person’s hand is presumed to be his . And as Tosafot wrote in their wording: “for it is considered as though he certainly has half of it, since we bear witness that whatever this one is grasping is his.” And in truth, this is the meaning of the Gemara below, 3a, where it is explained in the Gemara that in our Mishna “we bear witness” [we are witnesses] that each one has half of the cloak. From this wording it is implied that each one has complete possession of half a cloak, and therefore we are witnesses that each of them owns half a cloak. [And so wrote the Tashbetz, Part I, section 74, in explaining the words of the Gemara]. However, in the Shita Mekubetzet [below, 6a] it brought that there are those who explain that what is written in the Gemara, “we bear witness,” is not דווקא. And likewise, in the Shakh, section 75, it is explained that what is written in the Gemara, “we bear witness,” does not mean that we are witnesses that each one is holding half of the cloak; rather, the Gemara’s intention is that after the court ruled for them the law of division, we are witnesses that each one owns half of the cloak by virtue of the court’s ruling. But before the ruling there is no clear situation before us in which each one has half. According to his words, there is no proof from the words of the Gemara for the position of Tosafot. And in the novellae of the gaon Rabbi Shimon Shkop, section 4, he raised an objection against the words of Tosafot: although the grasp of both of them at the edge of the cloak indicates that each one has ownership in the cloak, from where do we know that each one of them has half? Perhaps one has three quarters and the other one quarter, for even in this case, the one who has a quarter would be grasping the edge of the cloak to prove his ownership. And he raised other objections against this approach; see there what he explained. - And concerning the essence of this inquiry—whether, when two are holding a cloak, each one is considered to be holding the entire cloak or half a cloak—see Kovetz Shiurim, Part II, section 9, at length. [And there he proved that the opinion of Tosafot is that each one is holding half, as we explained]. Why, when two are holding a cloak, do we not say “whoever is stronger prevails”? Tosafot [2a], s.v. “and they shall divide,” asked why, when two are holding a cloak and each one claims, “It is all mine,” the ruling is “they shall divide.” Whereas in Bava Batra, concerning the boat, when each one claimed, “It is all mine,” the ruling is “whoever is stronger prevails.” [And as we brought above, section 2]. Tosafot answered that there is no comparison between the cases. For a boat standing in the sea is not in anyone’s possession, and therefore the ruling is, “whoever is stronger prevails.” But when two are holding a cloak, each one of them is holding part of the cloak, and in a case where there is a holder, we do not say, “whoever is stronger prevails”; rather, each one of them receives what he is holding. And concerning why, when two are holding a cloak, we do not say, “Let it remain” (yehei munah), see in the Gemara below, 3a, two distinctions between the dispute of Rabbi Yosei and the Sages concerning the third maneh, where the ruling is “Let it remain,” and the case of two holding a cloak. And see there carefully, in note 8, concerning, “This one says, ‘I wove it,’ and that one says, ‘I wove it.’” Mishna:

Two

people who came to litigate before the court, when both of them

are holding

a cloak,

and each one claims ownership of it:

This one,

one of them,

says:

the entire cloak is mine, because

I found it,

I lifted it before you lifted it.

And

if

this one,

the second,

says:

the entire cloak is mine, because

I

am the one who

found it

and lifted it first, and you snatched it from my hand after I acquired it. And likewise, if two people came before the court while holding one cloak,

this one says, “It is all mine,”

that I bought it from the seller,

and this one says, “It is all mine,”

I am the one who bought it, and you snatched it from my hand after I bought it—

They shall divide the cloak between them, with an oath. And therefore—

This one shall swear that he has no less than half of it.

He must swear that he has a share in this cloak, and that this ownership of his is, at the least, over half a cloak,

and this one shall swear that he has no less

than half of it—

and they shall divide!

However, if

this one says, “It is all mine,” and this one says, “Half of it is mine”—

since the dispute between them concerns only half a cloak, for the one who says, “Half of it is mine,” acknowledges that the remaining half belongs to the one who says, “It is all mine,” it follows that their dispute concerns only half a cloak; therefore, they must divide that half concerning which they are disputing.

And for this reason,

the one who says, “It is all mine,”

who takes three quarters of the cloak [the half concerning which there are no opposing claims certainly belongs to him, and in addition he takes half of the half [a quarter] concerning which they dispute, by virtue of the law of “they shall divide”],

shall swear that he has no less than three parts of it,

that is, that at least three quarters of the cloak are his,

and the one who says, “Half of it is mine,” shall swear that he has no less than a quarter,

that at least a quarter of the cloak is his.

And after the oath:

this one

who says, “It is all mine,”

takes

three parts

of the cloak [the half concerning which there are no opposing claims, and likewise the quarter that he receives by virtue of “they shall divide,” which was ruled concerning the other half of the cloak],

and this one

who says, “Half of it is mine,”

takes a quarter,

which is half of the half of the cloak that he claimed.

If two were riding upon an animal, or if one was riding

on the animal

and one was leading

the animal and was not riding upon it,

this one says

the animal

is all mine, and this one says

the animal

is all mine—

this one shall swear that he has no less than half of it, and this one shall swear that he has no less than half of it—

and they shall divide!

[This law is similar to the first law of the Mishna, and in the Gemara it will be explained what the Mishna innovates for us in this example beyond the first clause].

And the Mishna adds another law:

When they acknowledge

that each one of them has half a cloak,

or when they have witnesses

that each one of them is entitled to half a cloak —

they divide without an oath.

And in the Gemara it will be explained what the innovation here is. Is it not obvious that if there is no dispute between them, or if there are witnesses, there is no need for an oath?!

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

Why must the tanna teach,

why did the tanna need to repeat and state in the Mishna both,

“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’”

and also

“This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine’”?

Let him teach one,

it would have been sufficient for him to state only one example of the two?!

And we answer:

One it teaches!

There are not two separate examples here, but rather one case in which

this one

says, “I found it,” and

therefore

“It is all mine,” and this one says, “I found it,” and

therefore

“It is all mine.”

And we object: If indeed there is only one claim here, why did the Mishna repeat its wording, “I found it, and it is all mine”?

And let him teach, “I found it,”

the tanna should have stated only what he claims, “I found it,” and

we would know,

and we would consequently know

that he

claims

“It is all mine.”

For if he found the cloak, certainly it is his.

And we answer:

If the tanna had taught,

if the tanna had stated

“I found it”

alone [without “it is all mine”],

I would have said,

I would have said:

What is the meaning of “I found it”?

The one claiming, “I found it,” does not intend to say that he found it and performed an act of acquisition with it; rather, he intends to say—

“I saw it,”

alone, and did not perform an act of acquisition with it. And if this is what had been stated in the Mishna, we would have learned from it that

even though it did not come into his possession,

that the cloak did not reach his hand and he did not perform an act of acquisition with it, nevertheless,

by mere seeing he acquires.

Therefore

he taught, “It is all mine,”

for from this wording it is implied that he claims that the cloak is his with complete force, because he performed an act of acquisition with it, to teach us—

that by seeing, he does not acquire!

And we object:

Can you really say,

how can you say that it was possible to entertain interpreting the intention of the Mishna in this manner, and to say,

“What is the meaning of ‘I found it’”—

“I saw it”

alone, without an act of acquisition?!

But,

for

Ravnai said,

elsewhere, that the meaning of the word

“and you find it” is that it came into his possession,

that it actually reached his hand, meaning that he performed an act of acquisition with it, and not that he acquired it by mere seeing.

The words of Ravnai were stated concerning what is written in the passage regarding returning a lost object [Deuteronomy 22:3]: “And so shall you do with his donkey, and so shall you do with his garment, and so shall you do with every lost object of your brother that is lost from him, and you find it. You may not hide yourself.”

And in tractate Bava Kamma [113b], the Gemara expounds from this verse that there is no obligation to return a gentile’s lost object to him, for it is stated, “with every lost object of your brother,” teaching us that you return only your brother’s lost object, but you do not return it to a Canaanite!

The Gemara asks there: From where do we know that the verse came to exclude that one should not return a gentile’s lost object to him? Perhaps the exclusion of “your brother” comes only to say that there is no need to trouble oneself to lift a gentile’s lost object in order to return it to him; but if the lost object has already come into the Israelite’s possession, perhaps he is obligated to return it to him?!

Ravnai answers this: Necessarily, this verse that excludes a gentile speaks of a lost object that has already come into his possession. For it is stated there, “and you find it,” and the meaning of this word is that it came into his possession, that the lost object has already reached his hand. And since the gentile is excluded by this verse, necessarily, even if a gentile’s lost object came into his possession, he need not return it to him.

We learn from the words of Ravnai that the meaning of the word “finding” is something that has already come into his possession. If so, it is difficult: how could it have been possible to interpret the intention of the Mishna, which said, “I found it,” as meaning, “I saw it,” but it did not come into my possession?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed,

“and you find it”

of the verse,

which is stated in the verse—

means that it came into his possession!

Its meaning is that the lost object has already reached his hand [as Ravnai said].

However,

the

tanna

in our Mishna, if he had not added and said, “It is all mine,” we would have said that what he said, “I found it,” means, “I saw it.” And although in the language of the Torah “finding” means that it has already reached his possession, nevertheless we would have said that the tanna

adopted ordinary language [

he adopted the language of the world] and not the language of the Torah, and many people who saw a lost object immediately call it, from the moment of seeing, by the name “finding.”

Therefore, we would have interpreted the Mishna as follows:

Since he saw it, he said, “I found it,”

since he saw the lost object, he claims, “I found it,”

and even though it did not come into his possession,

that it did not reach his hand and he did not perform an act of acquisition with it, nevertheless,

by mere seeing,

without an act of acquisition—

he acquires!

For this reason

teach

the tanna added and repeated in his words

“It is all mine,”

to teach you

that mere seeing does not acquire it!

And we raise an objection:

But let him teach

only

“It is all mine,” and there is no need for “I found it”?

Why did the Mishna say only “It is all mine,” and there is no further need to repeat also “I found it” [for if it had written only “It is all mine,” we would not err to say that his intention was that he acquired it through seeing without an act of acquisition, because the expression “It is all mine” signifies that this object is mine with complete possession, through acquisition].

And we answer:

If it taught “It is all mine,”

and the tanna had not repeated “I found it,”

I would have said

that

in general,

everywhere

that it teaches “I found it,”

wherever the Mishna teaches the expression “finding,” the intention is not complete acquisition, but

mere seeing acquires it,

and it is not necessary to perform a complete act of acquisition with a found object—

For this reason

the tanna taught,

the tanna repeated in our Mishna

“I found it,”

and then the tanna taught again,

and repeated once more

“It is all mine,”

for this expression reveals that the intention of “I found it” is “I acquired it,” and not merely “I saw it.”

From the extra wording of the Mishna we learn,

from the repetition of the wording in the Mishna, through which we learned that “I found it” means “I acquired it through a complete act of acquisition,” we learn that everywhere that the wording “finding” is stated in the Mishnayot, the intention is not mere seeing, but an actual act of acquisition. Since

seeing

alone

does not acquire,

the found object is still not acquired through this.

The Gemara explained above that what we learned in the Mishna—“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it’; this one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine’”—these are not two cases, but one case in which one claims, “I found it, and it is all mine.”

And we raise an objection:

Can you really say

how is it possible to say that

one case is taught

and there are not two separate cases, but one case in which one claims, “I found it, and it is all mine”—

but it teaches “this one and this one”?

For in the first clause we learned in the wording

“This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’”

and also concerning “It is all mine” we learned in the wording

“This one”

“says, ‘It is all mine,’ etc.,”

and it implies that this is an additional part of the Mishna, for if it were a continuation of the claim “I found it,” the tanna should not have added the word “this one,” but should have written, “This one says, ‘I found it, and it is all mine.’” And since it is written, “This one says, ‘It is all mine,’” it implies that it is an additional case, and not a continuation of the case of “This one says, ‘I found it.’”

And for this reason the Gemara rejects that this is one case; rather, they are two separate cases ! —

Rav Pappa said, and some say Rav Shimi bar Ashi, and some say,

and there are those who attribute this statement to

Kedei

[a sage’s name] —

The first clause,

in which it is said, “This one says, ‘I found it,’ and this one says, ‘I found it,’” speaks

of a found object,

where they are disputing between themselves who found the object first—

and the latter clause,

in which it is said, “This one says, ‘It is all mine,’ and this one says, ‘It is all mine,’” speaks

of a purchase and sale,

where they are disputing between themselves who purchased the object.

And it is necessary—

and it was necessary for the tanna to teach its law both with regard to a found object and with regard to a purchase and sale, and we could not learn one case from the other.