Bava Metzia 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

And we explain: These two questions

are one

[one question],

for they have one underlying reason!

Because of one reason, Rabbi Elazar had to state both points.

For since Rabbi Elazar says that the dispute applies when the debtor does not admit the debt, he explains it in this manner.

That is, since this is so, Rabbi Elazar had to say that one does not collect even from unencumbered property. For the borrower completely denies the loan.

And since he had to conclude by saying: “But when the debtor admits the debt, everyone agrees that he returns it,” Rabbi Elazar therefore said that we are not concerned about repayment or collusion.

For if there were such a concern, even when both parties admit the debt, he should not return it.

And now the Gemara returns to explain the questions from the beraita.

A refutation of Shmuel on two counts:

First,

one question,

as

in the question that we raised against

Rabbi Elazar. For

Shmuel as well

establishes the Mishna as referring to a case where the debtor does not admit the debt ,

and if so, according to Rabbi Meir, a document that contains no lien does not allow collection even from unencumbered property. Yet in the beraita we learned that one collects from unencumbered property!

And one more—

for Shmuel says: If one found a document of acquisition in the marketplace,

he returns it to its owners, and we are not concerned about repayment,

even when the borrower does not admit the debt. For if he had repaid him, he would have immediately torn up the document.

And

a refutation

of his words from the beraita,

which states here: Even though both parties admit the debt—

he does not return it to either of them. Thus,

it is evident from here that

we are concerned about repayment. And all the more so here,

in our Mishna,

where the borrower does not admit the debt, we should be concerned about repayment!

This question is not difficult for Rabbi Elazar, because according to his view, when the debtor does not admit the debt, no document that could be used for collection is returned. And what Rabbi Meir said in our Mishna, that it is returned, is because it is impossible to collect with this document even from unencumbered property .

Shmuel said: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis,

who say that a document that contains no lien allows collection even from encumbered property —

Because

they maintain

that when a document comes before us in which

a lien

was not written, we say that this is a

mistake

of the

scribe,

who erred and did not write a lien in the document. But certainly the lender intended to lend only with a lien, for no person throws away his money for nothing .

Rava bar Eiti said to Rav Idi bar Avin: Did Shmuel really say this?

But Shmuel said:

When one sells a field to another and comes to the scribe to have a deed of sale written for him, then with regard to

appreciation, enhancement, and the lien,

that is, acceptance of liability for the sale—so that if the seller’s creditor comes and seizes the land, the purchaser collects the principal [this is “the lien”] and also the appreciation added to the land before the creditor seized it [this is “appreciation”], from the seller’s best property [this is “enhancement”] —the scribe

must

have the

seller consulted

as to whether he indeed accepts these terms.

For there is one person who sells without any liability at all. Another sells with liability, but does not accept liability even for the appreciation. Another accepts liability for that as well, but not to pay from his best property, only from intermediate-quality property.

It is evident from here that it is possible that the scribe who wrote the document did not accept liability, and we do not say that this was a scribal error!

Shall we say that the one who says this,

in Shmuel’s name, that liability is a scribal error,

does not say that,

that appreciation, enhancement, and the lien require consultation, but rather one amora said this in his name and another amora said the opposite!?

And we reject this:

It is not difficult. Here,

what Shmuel said, that liability is a scribal error, refers

to a loan document, for a person does not give money for nothing

[a person does not give his money for free]. Therefore, it is inconceivable that one would lend money without liability, since the borrower might sell his property, leaving the lender with no means of collecting his debt.

Whereas

here,

what Shmuel said, that appreciation, enhancement, and the lien require consultation, refers

to a sale, for

it is indeed possible that a creditor will come and seize the land, but nevertheless

a person may purchase land for a single day

[a person may purchase land even for one day], since it is possible that it will not be seized from him at all. And even if the land is ultimately seized from him, in the meantime, until it is seized, he consumes its produce.

As in that

[case in which we find that this is what happened],

when Avuh bar Ihi bought an upper story from his sister

[he bought a second-floor apartment from his sister].

A creditor came and seized it from him

[he seized the upper story from Avuh bar Ihi].

Avuh bar Ihi came

to

Mar Shmuel.

He said to him

Shmuel: Did

your sister write

for you

liability

in the document?

He said to him: No.

He said to him: If so, go in peace

[go in peace], for you have no claim whatsoever concerning the upper story.

Avuh bar Ihi said to him

:

But are you not the one who said

[but you are the one who says] that

liability is a scribal error!

He said to him: That applies—

to loan documents. But with regard to documents of sale—

no. For a person may purchase land for a single day,

as explained.

Abaye said: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon with liability, and Reuven’s creditor came and seized it from him

[and seized the field from Shimon],

it is the law that Reuven may come and litigate with him

[Reuven may come and litigate with that creditor] , for he can say to him: “I repaid you!” Or he can say to him: “I have another claim against you, and I am withholding this debt against that claim.”

And

although for the moment he seemingly has no standing in the matter, since the field is not being seized from him, nevertheless

the creditor cannot

say

to him

Reuven:

You are not a litigant of mine;

after all, I am taking nothing from you, but from Shimon. And if you have a claim against me, bring an action against me in court!

Because

Reuven says to him

:

What you take from him

will ultimately be claimed from me

[what you take from him now, he will then claim from me], since I sold him the field with liability.

Some say: Even if

he sold the field to Shimon

without liability as well,

Reuven may still stand against the creditor in court, because

he says to him

the creditor: If you seize the field from Shimon, even though he cannot then collect from me, nevertheless he will be angry with me, and

I do not want Shimon to have a grievance against me.

And Abaye said: If Reuven sold a field to Shimon without liability, and claimants arose against it

[those who challenge his ownership], and Shimon now wishes to withdraw from the sale, the law is as follows: