Bava Metzia 116a (קטז.) — the Talmud in English

It is superfluous,

and it serves as a source for the prohibition against taking other implements used in the preparation of food, and

since it is superfluous

and can be used to derive an additional teaching,

discard it,

take it also as referring to

a

one who takes

a millstone and its upper millstone,

But here,

with regard to the Paschal offering, the verse

“except roasted over fire” is not superfluous,

as it is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: When a person is subject

to the

m

mitzva of

“Rise, eat roasted,”

on the night of Passover, only then is he

subject to the

prohibition of

“Do not eat

of it

raw.”

But

when he is not subject to “Rise, eat roasted,”

once day has dawned, he

is not

liable for

“Do not eat it raw.”

And since it is not superfluous for deriving another prohibition, but only specifies the time at which one transgresses the prohibition of “Do not eat of it raw,” one is not again liable for “except roasted over fire,” because that would be a prohibition whose general wording encompasses several acts.

A beraita was taught in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yehuda,

who said: One who takes a millstone does not receive lashes on account of the verse “for he takes a person’s life as collateral.”

As it was taught in a beraita:

If one takes a pair

of

shears,

which are made of two blades, each blade having an independent use as a knife, while when joined together as shears the work is performed by both of them—these are two implements whose work is performed by both, like a millstone and its upper millstone.

And

likewise, one who takes two oxen tied together with the

yoke,

the plow’s yoke

of

the

oxen, is liable to two lashes.

For the verse “for he takes a person’s life as collateral” is stated with regard to each implement independently.

But if he took

this

by

itself, and

itself,

this

by

itself, he is liable only once .

And

likewise,

another beraita was taught: If one takes a pair of shears and a yoke of oxen, one might have thought that he should be liable only once,

on account of “for he takes a person’s life as collateral.”

The verse therefore states: “One shall not take a millstone or its upper millstone as collateral.” Just as a millstone and its upper millstone are distinct, two implements that perform one task, and one is liable for this,

for the millstone

by itself, and for this,

for the upper millstone,

by itself,

so too, with regard to all objects that are two distinct implements and perform one task, one is liable for this one by itself and for that one by itself.

Since it derives the law from a millstone and its upper millstone, conclude from it that one who takes a millstone and its upper millstone together receives only two sets of lashes and not three, in accordance with Rav Yehuda .

An incident occurred involving

a certain man

who had lent money to another,

who took a butcher’s knife as collateral

and accepted it as collateral

f

from

his fellow.

The borrower

came

before Abaye

and sued the lender for taking an implement used in the preparation of food from him.

He said to him,

Abaye said to the lender:

Go and return it,

go and return this knife to the borrower, because

it is an implement used in the preparation of food,

and come, arise

and come to sue him

in court concerning it,

and the court will send an agent to take collateral from him.

Rava said: It is unnecessary

for the lender

to stand in judgment concerning it

to prove that he had indeed lent him the money. Rather, if the lender wishes, he

can claim

and demand payment without the need for proof

up to the amount of its value,

up to the value of the knife,

because at the time he took the knife’s owner’s property as collateral, there were no witnesses to his taking the knife. Since the lender could have lied and said, “It was purchased by me,” he is also deemed credible in demanding from the borrower up to the value of the knife, and he is considered as though he had acquired the collateral.

And we raise an objection:

And Abaye,

does he not also hold

that principle

that one who takes an object from another acquires it, based on the fact that he could have said, “It was purchased by me,” and need not bring proof of this?

What is different from that incident involving goats that ate husked barley,

the incident involving one person’s goats that ate another person’s husked barley

in Nehardea, when the owner of the barley came

the owner of the barley

and seized them

taking those goats as collateral until their owner paid him the value of the barley damage?

And

when the owner of the goats came to pay for what they had eaten,

the owner of the barley claimed

that the goats had eaten

a great deal,

more than the value of the goats, and he sued the owner of the goats to pay the entire damage without bringing proof that they had eaten as he claimed.

And Avuh of Shmuel said: The owner of the barley can

the owner of the barley

claim

that the goats had eaten only

up to their value

and he is deemed credible without proof, since he is in possession of the goats and could have said, “They were purchased by me.” But with regard to more than the value of the goats, he is not deemed credible to extract payment from the owner of the goats without proof. It is evident that Avuh of Shmuel also held in accordance with Rava: One who is in possession of an object and could say of it, “It was purchased by me,” need not bring proof up to its value. But why does Abaye disagree with this?

And we answer:

There,

with regard to the goats that ate husked barley,

it is not an object that people customarily lend or rent,

people do not generally lend or rent out goats. Therefore, the person in possession has the right to say: If the goats are in my possession, they must necessarily have been purchased by me.

And even if he did not make this claim, he has a migo, since he could have said, “They were purchased by me.” Therefore, he is considered to be in possession of the collateral, and he can extract payment from the owner of the goats up to their value.

But

here,

with regard to one who takes a butcher’s knife as collateral,

it is an object

that people customarily lend or rent,

people customarily lend their knives. Therefore, it is impossible to say, “There is a migo: Had he wished, he could have said, ‘It was purchased by me,’” since it is possible that he possesses it merely as a borrower.

And likewise we find

that Rav Huna bar Avin sent a ruling: Objects customarily

lent or rented,

and someone came and took possession of them

and said, “They were purchased by me,” he is not deemed credible,

since one can claim “It was purchased by me” only with regard to an object that is not customarily lent or rented.

And we raise an objection: Is

Rava

himself

not of this opinion,

that one distinguishes between objects customarily lent or rented and those not customarily used for that purpose?

But

there was an incident in which witnesses came and testified that orphans had in their possession objects that were unlawfully in their possession, and the orphans said that the objects had been lent to them and that when they finished using them they would return them to their owners.

And Rava removed

and took

a pair of wool-shearing scissors

and

a book of aggada f

from

those orphans,

because once the owners had brought witnesses that the scissors and books belonged to them, the orphans could no longer say, “They were lent to us,” since

with regard to objects customarily lent or rented,

one cannot say, “They were purchased by me.”

Rava can say to you: This one as well,

a butcher’s knife,

since

the knife is liable to

become nicked, people are particular and do not lend it,

and it consequently becomes an object that is not customarily lent. The person in possession is therefore deemed credible to say: If the knife is in my possession, it certainly was purchased by me.

We shall return to you, chapter “The One Who Accepts a Field.”

Introduction based on the introduction of the Meiri

All this serves as an introduction to the first chapter of tractate Bava Batra, which follows this chapter and discusses the laws governing neighbors.

This chapter was taught in tractate Bava Metzia because it became connected there with the matter of the wages of a hired worker.

Most of the chapter revolves around five matters.

The first:

Disputes arising when a house and an upper story collapse, whether both or only one of them, and similar cases.

The second:

Disputes arising when something falls from a person’s domain into the public domain or into his neighbor’s domain, and the fallen debris causes damage: in which circumstances he is liable for the damage and in which he is exempt.

The third:

The law concerning payment of the wages of a hired worker: can the employer pay him with whatever he wishes, or specifically with money, as he stipulated?

The fourth:

In which circumstances one is permitted to use the public domain even though his use causes damage to those who pass through the public domain.

The fifth:

A domain whose ownership is uncertain between two people, whether it belongs to one or the other, and plants grew there: which of them acquires those plants?