Bava Metzia 116a — the Talmud in English

It is superfluous,

and it serves as a source for the prohibition concerning the other utensils used for food preparation, and

since it is superfluous

and contains an additional use for learning,

cast it away,

remove also

a

chisel

and a plowshare,

but here

with regard to the Passover offering, the verse

“except roasted over fire” is not superfluous,

for it is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: When there is

a person

in

the mitzva of

“Arise, eat roasted,”

on the night of Passover, only then is he

in

the prohibition of

“Do not eat

of it

raw.”

But

when he is not in “Arise, eat roasted,”

when day has dawned, again he

does not

transgress

“Do not eat raw.”

And since it is not superfluous to derive another prohibition from it, but only the time at which one transgresses the prohibition “Do not eat of it raw,” he no longer transgresses on account of “except roasted over fire,” because it is a prohibition comprising several matters.

A beraita was taught in accordance with Rav Yehuda,

who said: One who takes the pledge of a millstone does not receive lashes on account of “for he takes a person’s life as a pledge.”

For it was taught:

If one takes as a pledge a pair

of

scribes’ scissors,

which are made of two blades, each blade having use in itself as a knife, while when they are joined as scissors the work is done by the two together—for they are two utensils through which one task is performed, like a millstone and its upper stone.

And

likewise, one who takes as a pledge two cows bound together with the

yoke,

the plow’s yoke

of

the

cows, is liable for two.

For regarding each utensil by itself it is said: “for he takes a person’s life as a pledge.”

But if he took as a pledge

this by

itself,

and

that

by

itself,

he is liable for only one.

And

likewise

another beraita was taught: If one takes as a pledge a pair of scribes’ scissors and a yoke of cows, one might have thought that he should be liable for only one,

on account of “for he takes a person’s life as a pledge.”

The verse states: “You shall not take as a pledge a millstone or an upper stone”; just as a millstone and an upper stone are distinctive, two utensils that perform one task, and one is liable for this,

for the millstone

by itself, and for this,

for the upper stone

by itself,

so too, for all things that are two distinctive utensils and perform one task, one is liable for this by itself and for that by itself.

Since it derives the matter from a millstone and its upper stone, conclude from it that one who takes a millstone and its upper stone together receives only two sets of lashes and not three, in accordance with Rav Yehuda.

An incident involving

a certain man,

who had lent money to his fellow,

who took as a pledge a butcher’s knife,

which he took as a pledge, a butcher’s knife, from

the

borrower,

his fellow.

He came

the injured party

before Abaye,

and sued the one who had taken the pledge because he had taken from him a utensil used for food preparation.

He said to him

Abaye said to the one who had taken the pledge:

Go, return it,

go and return this knife to the borrower, because

it is a utensil with which food is prepared,

and come, arise

and come to sue him

in court concerning it,

and the court will send an agent to take a pledge from him.

Rava said: It is not necessary

for the lender

to stand in court concerning it

to prove that he had lent it to him; rather, if the one who took the pledge wishes,

he may claim,

to sue without the need for evidence,

up to the amount of their value,

up to the value of the knife,

because at the time when he took the knife’s owner’s property as a pledge, there were no witnesses to the taking of the knife. Since the lender could have lied and said, “It is purchased by me,” he is also believed to sue the borrower up to the value of the knife, and it is as though he had acquired the pledge.

And we raise an objection:

But Abaye,

does he really

not have that reasoning

that one who seizes an object from his fellow acquires it, by virtue of the fact that he could have said, “It is purchased by me,” and does not need to bring evidence for this?

What is different from that incident involving the goats that ate husked barley,

the incident involving the goats of a certain person, which ate another person’s husked barley,

in Nehardea, and the owner of the husked barley came

the owner of the barley

and seized them

those goats as a pledge, until their owner would pay him the value of the damage caused by the barley,

and

when the owner of the goats came to pay for what they had eaten,

he claimed

the owner of the barley claimed that the goats had eaten

a great deal,

more than the value of the goats, and he sued the owner of the goats to pay the entire damage, without bringing evidence that they had eaten as he said.

And the father of Samuel said: He may

the owner of the barley

claim

that they had eaten only

up to the amount of their value

of the goats, and he is believed without evidence, since he is holding the goats, and he could have said, “They are purchased by me.” But for more than the value of the goats, he is not believed to extract payment from the owner of the goats without evidence. And it is proven that even the father of Samuel held in accordance with Rava: one who is holding an object and can say concerning it, “It is purchased by me,” does not need to bring evidence up to its value. And why does Abaye disagree with this?

And we answer:

There,

with goats that ate husked barley,

it is not something that people make use of to lend or rent,

people do not ordinarily lend or rent goats, and therefore the one holding them has the right to say: If the goats are in my possession, they must have been purchased by me,

and even if he did not make this claim, he has a migo that he could have said, “They are purchased by me.” Therefore he is considered to be holding the pledge, and he may extract from the owner of the goats up to their value.

But

here,

one who takes as a pledge a butcher’s knife:

is it something

that people make use of to lend or rent?

People ordinarily lend their knives, and therefore it is impossible to say, “There is a migo: if he wished, he could have said, ‘It is purchased by me,’” since it is possible that it is in his possession only as a loan.

And likewise we find

that Rav Huna bar Avin sent: Things that are made

to be lent or rented,

and someone came and took possession of them

and said, “They are purchased by me,” he is not believed,

for it is possible to claim “It is purchased by me” only concerning something that is not made to be lent or rented.

And we raise an objection: Does

Rava

himself

not have this reasoning,

to distinguish between things made to be lent or rented and things not made for this?

But

there was an incident in which witnesses came and testified that there were objects in the possession of orphans that were in their possession unlawfully, and the orphans said, “They are lent to us; when we finish using them, we will return them to their owners,”

and Rava extracted

took out

a pair of wool-shearers,

scissors for shearing wool,

and an aggada book from

those

orphans,

because once the owners brought witnesses that the scissors and books had belonged to them, the orphans could no longer say, “They are lent to us,” since

with things made to be lent or rented,

it is impossible to say, “They are purchased by me.”

Rava could say to you: This too

a butcher’s knife,

since

the knife is liable to

become nicked, people are particular and do not lend it,

and consequently the knife becomes like something not made to be lent, and the one holding it is believed to say: If the knife is in my possession, it is certainly purchased by me.

We have returned to you: The chapter “The One Who Receives a Field from His Fellow.”

Opening according to the introduction of the Meiri

All this is as an introduction to the first chapter of tractate Bava Batra, adjacent to it, after it, which discusses the laws of neighbors.

This chapter was taught in tractate Bava Metzia because there became interwoven in it the matter of the wage of a hired worker.

Most of the chapter revolves around five matters.

The first:

Disputes arising on account of a house and an upper story that collapsed, both of them or one of them, and the like.

The second:

Disputes arising on account of something falling from a person’s domain into the public domain, or into his neighbor’s domain, and the collapse causes damage: in which manner he is liable for its damage, and in which manner he is exempt.

The third:

The law of payment of the wage of a hired worker: whether the employer may pay him with whatever he wishes, or specifically with money, as he stipulated.

The fourth:

In which manner it is permitted to use the public domain even though damage comes to those in the public domain from his use.

The fifth:

A domain that is in doubt between two people, whether it belongs to this one or to that one, and plants grew in it: which of them acquires those plants.