Bava Metzia 113b (קיג:) — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

No,

the beraita expanded the law so that

the agent of the court

shall be

like

the law of the

lender:

just as the lender may not enter the borrower’s house, so too the agent of the court may not enter,

And this is what the verse is saying: “You shall stand outside”—you and the man, the agent of the court. “And the man whom you are pressing”—the borrower—is the one who will bring the pledge outside to you.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita, in which we learned:

It is written [Exodus 22]: “

If you take your fellow’s garment as collateral,

you shall return it to him before sunset.” We find that it is permitted to take the borrower’s garment as collateral, provided that it is returned at night,

The verse is speaking of the agent of the court.

You say that the verse is speaking of the agent of the court; or perhaps it is speaking only of a creditor

who comes to take collateral from the borrower,

When it says [Deuteronomy 24], “

You shall not enter his house to take his pledge,

the creditor is being addressed,”

and he has already been prohibited from approaching the borrower’s house.

What, then, do I establish from the verse, “If you take your fellow’s garment as collateral”?

It must be

the agent of the court

who comes to take collateral from the borrower—

the verse is speaking of him,

This indicates that the agent of the court is permitted to take the borrower’s pledge, since the ordinary meaning of taking collateral is that it is done against the owner’s will. If so, we have a proof that the agent of the court enters the borrower’s house to take the pledge, contrary to Shmuel.

And we conclude: The statement of Shmuel that the agent of the court may not enter the borrower’s house is

a dispute among the tannaim

—it is the subject of a dispute!

As it was taught: An agent of the court who comes to take collateral

from the borrower

may not enter his house to take the pledge. Rather, he stands outside, and the other brings out a pledge for him, as it is stated:

[Deuteronomy 24],

“You shall stand outside, and the man.”

This proves that we interpret the verse in accordance with Shmuel: the words “and the man” continue the law of the lender—“you shall stand outside,” the lender and also the man, the agent of the court, both shall stand outside, and the borrower shall bring the pledge outside to you.

And another beraita was taught: A creditor who comes to take collateral

from the borrower

may not enter his house to take the pledge. Rather, he stands outside, and the other enters and brings out his pledge for him, as it is stated: “You shall stand outside.”

But

if

an agent of the court comes to take collateral, he enters his house and takes the pledge.

For we interpret the verse as follows: “You shall stand outside”—you, the lender. But “the man,” the agent of the court, and “the man whom you are pressing,” the borrower, brings the pledge out to you.

This indicates that the agent of the court is permitted to enter the borrower’s house, and concerning this the Torah says: “If you take your fellow’s garment as collateral” through the agent of the court, “you shall return it to him before sunset.”

And the beraita continues:

And

the agent of the court who comes to take collateral

may not take utensils used to prepare food,

as it is stated: “He shall not take the millstone or the upper millstone as collateral, for he takes a person’s life.” The Sages expounded the conclusion of the verse—“for he takes a person’s life”—to include every utensil used to prepare food, which may not be taken as collateral.

And he gives

leaves the borrower

one bed

on which to eat,

and one bed

for sleeping.

And

he leaves him

a felt mattress,

a felt covering for a bed,

for

a borrower who was

wealthy

and accustomed to a comfortable mattress,

and he leaves

a bed

for eating,

and a bed

for sleeping,

and a reed mat

a mattress made of reeds

for a poor man,

who is accustomed to sleeping on reeds.

This is because one must “make arrangements for the debtor”—that is, leave the debtor the things he needs for his livelihood.

The Sages derived the law of making arrangements for a debtor from the laws of Arakhin,

A person who undertakes to give the value assigned to him to the Temple, but does not have the means to pay his full assessed value, is addressed by the Torah: “But if he is too poor for your valuation, then he shall be presented before the priest, and the priest shall value him.” The Sages expounded the phrase “But if he is too poor for your valuation” as meaning: Sustain him from his valuation. That is, the priest must leave the person making the valuation enough for his livelihood. And since, with regard to a debtor as well, it is stated: “When your brother becomes poor,” the Sages derived that arrangements are likewise made for a debtor, leaving him enough for his livelihood.

It follows that what they said—that a bed and a mattress are left for him—is derived from the statement concerning Arakhin, “Sustain him from his valuation”: The lender too is obligated to sustain the borrower.

If so, only

for him,

the debtor himself, are items left.

But not for his wife, nor for his sons and daughters,

because the lender is not obligated to sustain the borrower’s household.

And the beraita concludes:

Just as arrangements are made for a debtor,

when his property is being seized to collect the debt,

so arrangements are made in the laws of Arakhin,

when the person making the valuation does not have enough to pay what he undertook to give.

And we ask:

In which direction is this going?

We have stated the opposite here! For

the principal law of making arrangements is written with regard to Arakhin,

and from Arakhin we derive by a gezera shava that arrangements are also made for a debtor.

Rather, say

this

instead: Just as arrangements are made in the laws of Arakhin, so arrangements are made for a debtor.

The Master said: He gives one bed and one bed and a mattress to a wealthy man, and one bed and one bed and a reed mat to a poor man.

And we inquire:

For whom

are the two beds given?

If you say they are for his wife, his sons, and his daughters, but you said that arrangements are made for him

the debtor,

but not for his wife, his sons, and his daughters!

Rather,

necessarily,

both this and that,

both beds, are left

for him.

And we ask:

Why do I need two?

Why is one bed not sufficient for him?

And we answer:

One is for eating on,

he sits on it while eating,

and one is for sleeping on,

he sleeps

on it,

for one bed is insufficient for both sleeping and eating.

In accordance with the statement of Shmuel, for Shmuel said: For every ailment

every type of illness

I know its remedy,

I know how to find a cure for it,

except for these three,

apart from three illnesses caused by the following:

a.

One who eats a bitter date

a bitter date

on an empty stomach,

before tasting anything.

b.

And one who ties wet linen

a wet cotton garment

around his loins

and becomes chilled as a result.

c.

And one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits,

one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits after eating it ; therefore, two beds are left for the borrower, so that if he wishes to sleep after eating, he will have to get up and walk to the second bed designated for sleeping, and will not be endangered by eating without walking afterward.

A tanna taught before Rav Naḥman: Just as arrangements are made in the laws of Arakhin, so arrangements are made for a debtor.

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman:

Now that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said that if thirty days have passed from the due date,

we sell it,

the pledge, and do not return the pillow and the plowshare to him, can it be that

arrangements are made for him

the borrower!? After all, even his household utensils that he needs are sold.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Naḥman:

Do we sell it

as Rav Naḥman said?

But we learned: He returns the pillow at night and the plowshare by day.

This indicates that the lender always takes the pillow by day and returns it at night, and that the borrower’s property is not sold. It must be that the first tanna disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and maintains that arrangements are indeed made for a debtor.

And the Gemara explains:

The tanna,

that amora who taught this beraita before Rav Naḥman,

taught it in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

Therefore,

this is what he said to him:

Rav Naḥman said: How could one teach this according to your statement—that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says, “Just as arrangements are made in the laws of Arakhin, so arrangements are made for a debtor”?

According to the first tanna, it is understandable that arrangements are made for a debtor. But

now, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who says that if thirty days have passed from the date the debt was claimed,

we sell

the borrower’s pledge, and the lender collects the debt from its proceeds, how can it be said that

arrangements are made for him?

For we learned: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says,

if the borrower did not pay his debt when it became due,

even for the

borrower

himself he returns it only for thirty days,

but

from then onward, he sells it through the court.

And

we challenge Rav Naḥman, who maintains that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel no arrangements are made for a debtor.

From where do you know that when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says

that after thirty days from the date the debt was claimed,

it is sold entirely,

the borrower’s pledge,

he means

that no arrangements are made for a debtor?

Perhaps

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

is saying this:

The borrower gave a silk cloak as a pledge, and the time for repayment of the debt arrived.

For thirty days,

if the borrower pays his debt,

he returns to him

the pledged silk garment to the borrower

as it is.

From then onward,

if he does not repay the debt after thirty days, when the borrower needs the cloak and the lender would otherwise have to return it, the lender does not return his silk cloak; rather,

he returns to him

a simple woolen cloak,

according to what is appropriate for him

according to the borrower’s dignity,

and we sell what is not appropriate for him,

the silk cloak, since he is not required to walk specifically in a silk cloak, and the lender takes the difference between the silk cloak and the woolen cloak toward the debt.

It follows that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel too maintains that arrangements are made for a debtor. If so, from where did Rav Naḥman derive that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel no arrangements are made?

And we answer:

If it could enter your mind

that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds this opinion,

that arrangements are made for a debtor sufficient for his livelihood, the court would have had no possibility of selling part of his property to repay the debt,

because

there is nothing that is not appropriate for him!

There is no item among his possessions that is not suitable for him, and therefore it would be impossible to exchange his silk cloak for a woolen cloak.

For Abaye said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Akiva all maintain: All Jews are royal persons!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

as we learned:

One may not move on Shabbat

either lupine,

a type of legume,

or mustard,

because they are not fit for human consumption.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving

the

lupine, because it is food for ravens,

and Jews are royal persons, and it is customary for royalty to raise ravens for amusement.

Rabbi Shimon—

as we learned: Royal persons may apply rose oil to their wounds on Shabbat, since it is their practice to apply it during the week. Rabbi Shimon says: All Jews are royal persons,

and it is permitted for everyone to apply rose oil to his wound.

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva—

as it was taught: If a person owed them one thousand dinars and

he

was wearing a cloak worth one hundred maneh, they strip it from him and dress him in a cloak appropriate for him.

The difference between the expensive garment and the inexpensive garment is used to pay the lender’s debt.

And a tanna taught in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and a tanna taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

They do not strip his cloak from him, because

all Jews are fit for that cloak,

worth one hundred maneh, since the Jewish people are royal persons.

For this reason Rav Naḥman said that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it is impossible that arrangements are made for a debtor, for if arrangements had to be made for him, there would be nothing unsuitable for him. Rather, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel certainly maintains that for thirty days from the due date, his silk cloak is returned to him, but after thirty days it is sold entirely, and nothing is returned to him, because no arrangements are made for a debtor.

And

we challenge this:

According to what we initially understood, that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel maintained that the lender

gives him

the borrower

what is appropriate for him,

a garment or utensil suitable for him,

and we sell what is not appropriate for him,

and the lender takes the difference toward repayment of the debt,

it is understandable

if the lender took as collateral

a pillow and a mattress,

for one can say that the borrower does not need a high-quality pillow and mattress, and

what is appropriate for him

is a lower-quality pillow than the one he had; thus the lender profits from the difference

between them,

between the expensive pillow and the inexpensive one that he returns to the borrower.

But

if he took a plowshare as collateral,

a plowshare—for what is it suitable!?

There is no such thing as a more expensive or less expensive plowshare, and consequently its sale provides no benefit to the lender.

Rava bar Rabba said:

Here we are dealing with

a silver plowshare,

which the lender can sell; and when the borrower needs a plowshare, he gives him a wooden plowshare, while the lender takes the difference between them toward repayment of the debt.

Rav Ḥagga raised an objection:

According to those tannaim who say that if the borrower was wearing a cloak worth one hundred maneh, it is not removed from him because all Jews are royal persons,

let the lender say to him,

the borrower,

“Your sustenance is not my responsibility!”

Your livelihood is no more my responsibility than that of anyone else. Since you are wearing an expensive garment, sell it and give me its value against the debt.

And although all Israel are children of kings and are deserving of expensive garments, nevertheless, the lender is not obligated to ensure that the expensive garment remains in the borrower’s possession any longer than it would remain in anyone else’s possession,