Bava Metzia 113b — the Talmud in English

And we reject this:

No,

the beraita expanded the law so that

the agent of the court

shall be

like

the law of the

lender:

just as the lender is not permitted to enter the borrower’s house, so the agent of the court is not permitted [to enter],

and this is what the verse is saying: “Outside you shall stand”—you and the man, the agent of the court. “And the one to whom you lend”—the borrower—is the one who shall bring the pledge out to you, outside.

Come and hear

a proof from a beraita, in which we learned:

It is written [Exodus 22]: “

If you take your fellow’s garment as a pledge,

you shall return it to him by the setting of the sun.” We find that it is permitted to take the borrower’s garment as a pledge, on condition that he return it at night,

the verse is speaking of the agent of the court.

You say that the verse is speaking of the agent of the court; or is it only speaking of a creditor

who comes to take a pledge from the borrower?

When it says [Deuteronomy 24], “

‘You shall not enter his house to take his pledge,’

the creditor is referred to,

and he has already been prohibited from approaching the borrower’s house.

What, then, do I establish ‘If you take your fellow’s garment as a pledge,’

necessarily

as referring to the agent of the court

who comes to take a pledge from the borrower;

the verse is speaking [of him].

And it follows that the agent of the court is permitted to take the borrower’s pledge, since the ordinary meaning of taking a pledge is against the will of the person from whom it is taken. If so, we find a proof that the agent of the court enters the borrower’s house in order to take his pledge, and this is unlike Samuel.

And we conclude: The matter concerning which Samuel said that the agent of the court is forbidden to enter the borrower’s house

is a dispute among the tannaim

[and is the subject of a dispute].

For it was taught: An agent of the court who came to take a pledge

from the borrower

may not enter his house to take the pledge; rather, he stands outside, and the other brings out a pledge for him, as it is stated [A0037][Deuteronomy 24]

[Deuteronomy 24],

“Outside you shall stand, and the man.”

It is evident that we expound the verse in accordance with Samuel: The word “and the man” continues the law of the lender—“Outside you shall stand,” the lender and likewise the man, the agent of the court; both of them shall stand outside, and the borrower shall bring the pledge out to you.

And another [teaching] was taught: A creditor who came to take a pledge

from the borrower

may not enter his house to take the pledge; rather, he stands outside, and the other enters and brings out his pledge for him, as it is stated, ‘Outside you shall stand.’

But

if

an agent of the court came to take a pledge, he enters his house and takes a pledge from him.

For we expound the verse in this manner: “Outside you shall stand”—you, the lender; but “the man,” the agent of the court, and “the one to whom you lend,” the borrower, brings out the pledge for you.

And it follows that the agent of the court is permitted to enter the borrower’s house, and concerning this the Torah says: “If you take your fellow’s garment as a pledge” through the agent of the court, “you shall return it to him by the setting of the sun.”

And the beraita continues and says:

And

the agent of the court who comes to take a pledge

may not take objects with which food is prepared,

as it is stated: “He shall not take as a pledge the upper millstone or the lower millstone, for he takes a person’s life.” The Sages expounded from the end of the verse, “for he takes a person’s life,” to include every utensil used for preparing food, which it is forbidden to take as a pledge.

According to the Rambam and the Shita, it appears that this refers to an agent of the court; but the Rosh, in the name of Rabbenu Tam, explained that from here onward it refers to a lender who comes to collect. See the following note. And he gives,

leaving the borrower

a bed

on which to eat,

and a bed

for sleeping.

And

he leaves him

a mattress,

a woolen covering for a bed,

for

a borrower who was

wealthy

and was accustomed to a comfortable mattress,

and he leaves

a bed

for eating,

and a bed

for sleeping,

and a mat

made of reeds

for a poor person,

who is accustomed to sleeping on reeds.

This is because it is necessary “to make an arrangement for the debtor,” that is, to leave the debtor the things that he needs for his livelihood.

And the Sages learned the law of making an arrangement for a debtor from Arakhin,

where one accepts upon himself to give the valuation of himself to the Temple treasury, but does not have enough to pay according to his valuation. It is stated in the Torah: “But if he is too poor for your valuation, then he shall be placed before the koen, and the koen shall value him.” The Sages expounded the wording “But if he is too poor for your valuation”—“keep him alive from your valuation”: The koen must leave the one being valued what he needs for his livelihood. And since it is also stated concerning a debtor, “If your brother becomes poor,” the Sages expounded that also for a debtor an arrangement is made and what he needs for his livelihood is left to him.

It follows from this that what they said, that a bed and a mattress are left, is learned from what is stated concerning valuations, “keep him alive from your valuation”: The lender too is obligated to keep the borrower alive.

And if so, only

for him,

for the debtor himself, are items left.

But not for his wife, nor for his sons and daughters,

because the lender is not obligated to keep the members of the borrower’s household alive.

And the beraita concludes:

Just as an arrangement is made for a debtor,

when they come to collect from his property,

so an arrangement is made in valuations,

when the one being valued does not have enough to pay what he undertook to pay.

And we question:

“To which side is this directed?”

We have stated here the reverse of the truth! For

the primary law of making an arrangement is written concerning valuations,

and from valuations it is learned by a gezerah shavah that an arrangement is also made for a debtor.

Rather, say

this

instead: Just as an arrangement is made in valuations, so an arrangement is made for a debtor.

The Master said: He gives a bed and a bed and a mattress to a wealthy person, and a bed and a bed and a mat to a poor person.

And we inquire about this:

To whom

are the two beds given?

If you say, to his wife and to his sons and daughters, you already said: for him

an arrangement is made,

but not for his wife and for his sons and daughters!

Rather,

necessarily,

both and both,

this one and that one, the two beds, are left

for him.

And we question:

Why do I need two?

Why is one bed not sufficient for him?

And we answer:

One is for eating on it,

he sits on it while eating,

and one is for sleeping

on it,

on it,

and one bed is not sufficient for sleeping and eating on it.

In accordance with what Samuel said, for Samuel said: For every illness

every type of illness,

I know its remedy,

I know how to find a cure for it,

except for these three,

apart from three illnesses caused by the following circumstances:

a.

One who eats a bitter date

a bitter date

on an empty stomach,

before he has tasted anything.

b.

And one who ties wet flax

a wet cotton garment

around his loins

and becomes chilled from it.

c.

And one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits,

one who eats bread and does not walk four cubits after eating it, and for this reason two beds are left for the borrower, so that if he wishes to sleep after eating, he will have to get up and walk to the second bed designated for sleeping, and will not be endangered by eating without walking afterward. A tanna taught before Rav Nahman:

Just as an arrangement is made in valuations, so an arrangement is made for a debtor.

He said to him

Rav Nahman:

Now that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that if thirty days have passed from the time of repayment,

we sell it,

the pledge, and do not return the borrower’s pillow and plowshare, should it be difficult: Is it possible that

we make an arrangement for him

the borrower!? For we even sell him the utensils he uses and needs.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rav Nahman:

Do we sell it

as Rav Nahman said?

But we learned: He returns the pillow at night and the plowshare during the day.

This implies that the lender always takes the pillow during the day and returns it at night, and that the borrower’s property is not sold. Necessarily, the first tanna disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and holds that an arrangement is indeed made for a debtor.

And the Gemara explains:

The tanna

that is, the amora who taught this beraita before Rav Nahman,

taught it in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.

And therefore

this is what he said to him

Rav Nahman: How is it possible to teach as you have taught, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says, “Just as an arrangement is made in valuations, so an arrangement is made for a debtor”?

It is understandable according to the first tanna that an arrangement is made for a debtor. But

now, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

who says that if thirty days have passed from the time of the claim,

we sell it

the borrower’s pledge, and the lender collects the debt from its proceeds, how is it possible to say that

we make an arrangement for him?

For we learned: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says,

if the borrower did not pay his debt when the time for repayment arrived,

even for the

borrower

himself he returns it only until thirty days,

but

from then onward, he sells it through the court.

And

we challenge Rav Nahman, who holds that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel no arrangement is made for a debtor.

From where

do we know that when Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says

“we sell entirely”

the borrower’s pledge

he means

that he holds that no arrangement is made for a debtor?

Perhaps

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

is saying this:

If the borrower gave him a silk garment as a pledge and the time for repayment of the debt arrived,

until thirty days,

if the borrower pays his debt,

he returns to him

the pledged silk garment to the borrower

as it is.

From then onward,

if after thirty days he does not repay the debt, when the borrower needs the garment and the lender would have to return it, the lender does not return his silk garment to him, but

he returns to him

a simple woolen garment,

according to what is suitable for him—

according to the borrower’s dignity—

and we sell what is not suitable for him,

the silk garment, since he is not required to walk specifically in a silk garment; and the lender takes the difference between the silk garment and the wool garment toward his debt.

It follows that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel too holds that an arrangement is made for a debtor. If so, from where did Rav Nahman derive that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel no arrangement is made?

And we answer:

If it could enter your mind

that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds this view,

that an arrangement is made for a debtor according to what he needs for his livelihood, the court would not have the possibility of selling part of his property to repay the debt,

because

there is nothing that is not suitable for him!

There is no object among his possessions that is unsuitable for him, and therefore it would be impossible to exchange his silk garment for a wool garment.

For Abaye said: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, Rabbi Shimon, Rabbi Yishmael, and Rabbi Akiva—all of them hold: All Jews are royal persons!

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel—

for we learned:

One may not move on Shabbat

neither lupine,

a type of legume,

nor mustard,

because they are not fit for human consumption.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel permits moving

the

lupine, because it is food for ravens,

and Jews are royal persons, and it is customary for royal persons to raise ravens for amusement.

Rabbi Shimon—

for we learned: Royal persons may anoint their wounds on Shabbat with rose oil, since it is their practice to anoint themselves with it on weekdays. Rabbi Shimon says: All Jews are royal persons,

and it is permitted for every person to anoint his wound with rose oil.

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva—

for it was taught: If they were owed one thousand zuz by someone, and

he

was wearing a garment worth one hundred maneh, they strip it from him and dress him in a garment suitable for him.

And from the difference between the expensive garment and the inexpensive garment, they pay the lender his debt.

And a tanna taught in the name of Rabbi Yishmael, and a tanna taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva:

They do not strip his garment from him, because

all Jews are fit for that garment,

worth one hundred maneh, since the children of Israel are royal persons.

For this reason Rav Nahman said that according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel it is impossible that an arrangement is made for a debtor, since if they had to make an arrangement for him, there would be nothing unsuitable for him. Rather, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel certainly holds that until thirty days from the date of repayment they return to him his silk garment, and after thirty days they sell it entirely and return nothing to him, because no arrangement is made for a debtor.

And

we ask:

According to what initially entered our minds, that

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held that the lender

gives him

the borrower

what is suitable for him,

a garment or utensil suitable for him,

and we sell what is not suitable for him,

with the lender taking the difference toward repayment of the debt,

it is understandable

if the lender took as a pledge

a pillow and a mattress,

it can be said that the borrower does not need a superior pillow and mattress, and

what is suitable for him

is a pillow of lower quality than the one he had, and thus the lender profits from the difference

between them,

between the expensive pillow and the inexpensive pillow that he returns to the borrower.

But

if he took a plowshare as a pledge,

a plowshare—for what is it suitable!?

There is no such thing as a more expensive or less expensive plowshare, and consequently the lender derives no benefit from selling it.

Rava bar Rabba said:

Here we are dealing with

a silver plowshare,

made of silver, which the lender can sell; and when the borrower needs a plowshare, he gives him a wooden plowshare, while the lender takes the difference between them toward repayment of the debt.

Rav Haga raised an objection:

According to those tannaim who say that if the borrower was wearing a garment worth one hundred maneh, they do not remove it from him because all Jews are royal persons,

let the lender say to him

the borrower:

“It is not upon me that you are dependent!”

Your livelihood is no more incumbent upon me than upon any other person, and since you are wearing an expensive garment, sell it and give me its value against the debt.

And even though all Israel are sons of kings and are worthy of expensive garments, nevertheless, the lender is not obligated to see to it that the expensive garment remain in the borrower's possession more than any other person's,