Bava Metzia 108a (קח.) — the Talmud in English

And if not, they would not be able to proceed!

If those boatmen would in any event have to cross to the opposite bank of the river, since they could not pull the boat along my side of the river because farther along that bank there were the gentile’s trees, then they would derive no benefit from cutting down my trees. For why would they return to my side rather than continue pulling the boat along the opposite bank?

Rabba bar Rav Naḥman was traveling in a boat,

he was journeying by boat,

and he saw a certain forest,

a forest

that stood on the riverbank,

planted on the riverbank and causing harm to the public.

He said to them,

to those who were with him: This forest,

whose is it,

who is its owner?

They said to him: It belongs to Rabba bar Rav Huna.

Rabba bar Rav Naḥman said

concerning this: This is what is stated

“And the hand of the officers and officials was foremost in this trespass.”

Rabba bar Rav Naḥman did not know that Rabba bar Rav Huna’s reason for not cutting it down was that farther along the riverbank there were fields belonging to gentiles, who did not want their trees cut down; therefore, he was not obligated to cut down the trees on the riverbank.

Rabba bar Rav Naḥman said to them,

to his attendants:

Cut them down, cut them down,

the trees that obstruct the public!

Rabba bar Rav Huna came

to his field,

and found that it had been cut down.

He said: Whoever cut it down,

my field,

may his branches be cut down!

May his branches be cut down. His intention was that the sons of the one who cut it down should die.

They said: Throughout all the years of Rabba bar Rav Huna, no offspring survived Rabba bar Rav Naḥman!

Rav Yehuda said: Everyone is obligated

to assist in building

the city gate,

the city gate,

even orphans;

money is collected from them for the construction of a gate and wall for the city.

But Torah scholars do not

assist or pay for matters intended for protection.

What is the reason?

Because

Torah scholars do not require protection,

as their Torah protects them, as it is written: “When you lie down, it shall watch over you.” Therefore, they have no need for a wall and gate for protection.

But

for digging the well,

digging a spring for drinking, money is collected from everyone,

even from Torah scholars,

as this serves everyone’s needs.

And we said

that Torah scholars are obligated to assist in digging a spring

only

when money is collected for the digging

and not when the work is performed by the entire populace,

meaning that all the residents of the city do not go out to dig the spring themselves.

But when all the residents of the city go out

to work as a populace, they do not

go out to dig together with them,

as Torah scholars are not fit to go out as part of the populace,

because this is degrading for them, and they are exempt.

Rav Yehuda said:

A river flows and irrigates fields. Some fields are situated upstream and receive the spring water first, while others are farther along, downstream, and the water reaches them only after the upper fields have been irrigated.

If stones fell into the river in the section belonging to the upper fields, reducing the flow of its water, and it is necessary

to dig,

to dig out its channel anew,

the river,

and clean it and remove the stones that fell into it, it is legally proper that

the lower ones,

those situated downstream, should

assist the upper ones

in repairing the riverbed. For the lower ones benefit from repairing the river, since its flow will thereby increase and more water will reach them.

But if the flow of the river was obstructed in the section belonging to the lower ones, and they wish to remove the obstruction so that the river can continue flowing, and so that the water will not remain in their domain and destroy their crops, then

the upper ones,

those whose fields are upstream,

do not assist the lower ones,

because it is preferable for the upper ones that the obstruction remain at the lower section, slowing the river’s flow, so that the water will remain in their domain longer. And since the upper ones gain nothing from removing the obstruction in the lower section, they are exempt from assisting them.

And all this applies to a river flowing between fields, which benefits both the upper and the lower fields,

but the opposite is the case with rainwater,

rainwater flowing through a channel down the city, which is of no use either to the residents of the upper part of the city or to those in the lower part. Therefore, if the channel is obstructed near those living in the upper part of the city, those living below, downstream, are not obligated to assist the upper ones in removing the obstruction, since the lower ones derive no benefit from opening the channel. Therefore, they are exempt from assisting.

But if the channel is obstructed in the section belonging to the lower ones, and the water may rise over the banks of the channel and damage the entire city, both lower and upper sections, the upper ones are obligated to assist the lower ones in opening the channel so that the water can flow out.

It was also taught likewise: Five gardens,

one above the other,

which draw water from one spring, and the spring was damaged

in the domain of the uppermost garden, and the water stopped flowing to all of them,

they all repair it together with the uppermost one.

But if the spring was damaged in the domain of the lowest one, those above it are not obligated to assist it.

The lowest one is consequently repaired together with all of them,

with every field above it in whose domain the spring was damaged.

And

if the spring was damaged in its own domain, it

repairs it for itself.

And likewise, five courtyards,

one above the other,

whose water was discharged

foul water

into a single sewer, and the sewer became blocked

below, and all of them could be harmed if the water remained in their domains,

they all repair it together with the lowest one.

But if it became blocked in the domain of the uppermost courtyard, those below it are not obligated to assist it, since they do not benefit from opening the flow of the sewer beyond the upper courtyard.

The uppermost one consequently repairs it together with all of them

when the blockage is below it,

and

if it is blocked in its own domain, it

repairs it for itself,

and no one assists it.

Shmuel said:

In the time of the Persians, it was customary that all ownerless lands were hefker, and anyone who wished to seize and possess them was permitted to do so, provided that he paid a tax to the king. Therefore,

one who takes possession of the riverbank,

the riverbank, the place where boats dock, thereby taking possession at the expense of the public,

is brazen,

it is brazen, because by taking possession of the riverbank he harms the public by preventing them from using it,

but we do not remove him,

since according to the local custom

he

acquired the field lawfully.

But nowadays,

now,

when the Persians write

to one who comes to purchase a field on the riverbank:

“Acquire for yourself

the field

until

the middle of the river, to the place where

the water reaches the necks of the horses,”

to the depth where a horse stands with its neck in the water—if one person came and acquired the land on the riverbank but did not use the place required by the public, so as not to harm them, and another came and wished to take possession of that place required by the public,

we also remove him,

for we say to him: The first purchaser already acquired this place; he simply does not use it so as not to harm the public, and no other person can now take possession of it.

The Law of Bar Matzra

One who owns land adjacent to another person’s land, which has been put up for sale, has, by virtue of being a neighbor, precedence in purchasing that land. He is called a bar matzra, the son of the same boundary—that is, the same boundary separating the two fields.

And if it has already been sold to another person, the bar matzra has the power to compel him to sell him the field under the law of bar matzra.

This right of the adjacent owner to precede everyone else was derived by the Sages from that which is written [Deuteronomy 6:18]: “And you shall do what is upright and good.” Since the adjacent owner benefits from having the field next to his own in his possession, while the other purchaser can find another field, the Sages instituted that where one person benefits and the other suffers no loss, it is “upright and good” that the adjacent owner should have precedence in purchasing the field.

Rav Yehuda said that Rav said:

a.

One who takes possession

of an ownerless field situated

between

the fields of two brothers, and from that point onward he is obligated to pay a tax to the king on that land.

And

likewise, if there was an ownerless field

between

the fields of two

partners,

and they too wished to take possession of it, or alternatively to compel the one who had taken possession of it to sell it to them, so that their fields would be adjacent to one another, they do not have precedence in that field under the law of bar matzra. This is because the one who took possession of it cannot find another ownerless field. The law of precedence was instituted for the adjacent owner only when another person comes to purchase a field adjacent to his boundary, since, if he wishes, the other can purchase a similar field elsewhere; but in the case of an ownerless field, the one who took possession of it has acquired it.

Nevertheless,

he is brazen,

because he caused a separation between brothers or between partners. However,

removing him

from the field,

we do not remove him.

And Rav Naḥman said: We also remove him,

because he acted improperly by taking possession between brothers, but not on account of the law of bar matzra.

b.

And if

the owners of the fields surrounding the ownerless field are not brothers or partners, and they say to the one who took possession of it: We precede you

under the law of bar matzra,

and you were forbidden to acquire the ownerless field before us,

we do not remove him,

because the law of bar matzra does not apply to an ownerless field, and whoever comes first to acquire it

has acquired it.

The scholars of Nehardea say: Even

with regard to an ownerless field that is not surrounded by brothers, the law of

bar matzra applies,

and

we remove him

the one who took possession of it,

because it is stated [Deuteronomy

6:]

“And you shall do what is upright and good in the eyes of the Lord.”

c.

A field that was put up for sale,

and a purchaser came

who wished to buy it

and consulted him,

asking the adjacent owner whether he intended to exercise his right and purchase the land next to his own,

and he said to him

the adjacent owner: I do not intend to purchase it. The purchaser said: If so,

I will go and purchase it for myself,

and afterward you will not be able to take it from me,

and he said to him

the adjacent owner:

Go and purchase it,

and I will not take it from you—the law is that the purchaser has acquired the field, and the adjacent owner has no claim against him under the law of bar matzra.

And now the question arises: Does the

purchaser

need

to acquire it from him,

to purchase from the adjacent owner the right of precedence that he has in the land,

or not,

and even if he did not transfer his right to him, since the adjacent owner waived his right to be the first to purchase the land, it belongs to the purchaser?

Ravina said:

The

purchaser does not need to acquire it from him,

from the adjacent owner.

And the scholars of Nehardea say: He needs to acquire it from him.

And the halakha is: He needs to acquire it from him.

Now that you have said

that the halakha follows the scholars of Nehardea, that the

purchaser needs

to

acquire it from him,

the adjacent owner’s right,

if he did not acquire it from him,

and the purchaser bought that field directly from the seller, since the adjacent owner’s right of precedence remained in his possession, the purchaser is considered his agent in every respect, like one who purchases a field for another without that person’s knowledge.

Therefore, if the land

increased in value,

became more expensive,

and

likewise if its price became

cheaper,

we say that the change in price occurred

in his domain,

the adjacent owner’s domain. When he comes to take the field from the purchaser under the law of bar matzra, he will pay him what the purchaser paid when he bought it from the seller.

And likewise, if the purchaser

bought

the field

for one hundred, while it was worth

its true value was

two hundred,

it turns out that the seller discounted the field’s price for him. The purchaser says to the adjacent owner: Had you come to purchase it, you would have had to pay two hundred. Now I purchased it for one hundred, and you come to take it from me; you must pay the price you would have paid the seller had you purchased it from him, and I am owed two hundred.

We examine: If

the seller of the field

discounted it for everyone,

meaning that he reduced the price for all his purchasers,

and sells

it for one hundred

and not for two hundred, the law is that he gives him

the adjacent owner gives the purchaser

one hundred and takes it from him

the field; he is not required to give him the field’s true value, but only what the purchaser paid, and the adjacent owner gives him that amount.

But if

the seller of the field

did not

discount the price for the other customers, and discounted it only for the purchaser of this field adjacent to the boundary,

he gives him

the adjacent owner gives the purchaser

two hundred

according to the field’s value,

and takes it from him.

The reason is that if the adjacent owner had purchased it from the original owners, he would have paid them two hundred; therefore, now too, when he purchases it from the purchaser, he pays him two hundred.

The Gemara now brings several laws concerning bar matzra:

If he bought,

if the purchaser bought the field

for two hundred, while it was worth

only

one hundred,

because the owner sold it to him at an inflated price, and the purchaser claimed to the adjacent owner: When you take the field from me, you must pay me what I paid the seller, since I became your agent and purchased it for you for two hundred,

it was thought,

the members of the בית-מדרש thought, that

the adjacent owner could say to him:

I

sent you to improve matters for me,

to purchase it at a good price,

and not to worsen them for me,

and whatever you paid beyond the field’s value was on your own account; I will pay you only one hundred.

Mar Kashisha, son of Rav Ḥisda, said to Rav Ashi: This is what the scholars of Neharde’a said in the name of Rav Naḥman: There is no overreaching with regard to land.

And if so, the price of two hundred for land worth only one hundred is also considered the price of the land, and the adjacent landowner must pay the buyer the entire two hundred.

He sold him

the owner of the field sold the buyer

a measure of land

a plot of land

in the midst of his property,

so that there was no field surrounding that plot except the seller’s field, and the law of bar metzra does not apply to it, because the seller’s fields that remained surrounding it are the fields adjoining it, and not the neighbors,

we see

we see that the seller and the buyer did not do this deceptively, in order to circumvent the law of bar metzra. Therefore,

if

the land that he sold

is superior-quality

relative to the other fields surrounding it, and likewise,

if it is inferior-quality,

while the other fields are superior to it, then it is customary to sell such a field on its own, in the midst of the seller’s fields, and there is no reason to suspect deception. Therefore,

the sale is a valid sale.