Bava Metzia 106a (קו.) — the Talmud in English

d. And if you should say that if a fallow field separates the field, we would say: Had grain been sown there, it too would have been blighted, and this would be a regional calamity, the question may be raised: If he sowed

alfalfa,

and it was not blighted,

what is the halakha?

Do we say that had grain been sown there it would have been blighted, and this is a regional calamity? Or perhaps, since the alfalfa was not blighted, the blight is not considered a regional calamity?

e. And if you should say that alfalfa that was not blighted does not separate the fields, and we say that had grain been sown there it would have been blighted and this would be a regional calamity, perhaps this applies specifically to alfalfa, which is not included among grain but is animal fodder; it is therefore possible to say that the decree of calamity was imposed only upon it, whereas had grain been sown there, it would have been blighted.

But if

another crop separated the fields,

one fit for human consumption, and it was not blighted,

what is the halakha?

Do we say that had grain been sown there it would have been blighted, and there is a regional calamity? Or perhaps, since there is a crop between the fields that was not blighted, the blight surrounding it is not considered a regional calamity?

v. And if you should say that another crop does not separate the fields, since we say that had grain been sown in its place it would have been blighted and this would have been a regional calamity, the blight of

wheat

in relation to

barley,

for example, where the lessee’s field and the surrounding fields, which were blighted, were planted with wheat, while barley grew between them and was not blighted—

is the barley considered

like another crop,

and does not separate the fields, so that the blight is called a regional calamity?

Or

perhaps barley is

not

like another crop, but is considered one species with wheat, and since that species was not blighted, there is no regional calamity.

z.

And likewise, if

the entire world was blighted, and his

field was stricken

by yellowing,

meaning that the grain dried out.

Alternatively, if the entire world was stricken by yellowing, while his field was blighted, what is the halakha?

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

The owner of the field said

to the lessee:

“Sow wheat!” And he went and sowed barley, and

he is permitted to do so, provided that in the end he gives the owner whatever he had undertaken to provide,

and most of the valley was blighted, and this barley of his was also blighted,

which he had sown against the owner’s wishes—

what is the halakha?

Do we say that

the lessee can say to him:

“Had

I sown

wheat, it too would have been blighted;

and therefore, now that I sowed barley, the blight occurred because of a regional calamity, and I deduct this amount from the rent that I owe you”?

Or perhaps the lessor can say to him:

The lessor can say:

“Had you sown wheat

as I requested, the field would not have been blighted, for I prayed for the success of the wheat in my field, and

the verse would have been fulfilled for me,

as it is written [Job 22]:

“You shall decree a matter, and it shall be established for you.”

But now that you sowed barley, my prayer was not accepted, since I prayed for wheat and not for barley.”

And we conclude:

It is reasonable that he can say to him: “Had you sown wheat, the verse would have been fulfilled for me: ‘You shall decree a matter, and it shall be established for you, and light shall shine upon your ways,’”

and the lessee cannot deduct anything from the rent.

All the lessor’s fields were blighted

that were located elsewhere,

and this one was also blighted

the field in the lessee’s possession,

along with them, and

on the other hand,

most of the valley was not blighted,

and only this field was blighted among all the fields of the valley—

what is the halakha?

Do we say that since most of the valley was not blighted, the

lessee cannot say that this is a regional calamity? And consequently, he cannot

deduct for him

from what he had undertaken to pay the lessor.

Or perhaps, since all the lessor’s fields

located elsewhere

were blighted, he can say to him

the lessee can say to the lessor:

“This

blight that occurred in this field

is because of your portion

[because of you]

!

The proof is

that all your fields were blighted,

and it was your fortune that caused it. Therefore, I will deduct from what I agreed to give you at the end of the lease.”

And we conclude:

It is reasonable

that the lessee cannot say to the lessor, “It was your fortune that caused it,” because all the lessor’s fields were blighted. This is because

the lessor can say to him

the lessee: “On the contrary,

if it was because of my portion,

if it was my fortune that caused the blight, it is reasonable that

a little would have remained for me,

and Heaven would not have decreed that I lose all my possessions,

as it is written

[Jeremiah 22]:

‘For we have remained few of the many.’”

It necessarily follows that the field leased to you is the one that Heaven left for me, and it was blighted only because of you. For the other fields were certainly blighted because of me; thus, this field is the only one that can be presumed to be the one that remained for me as a remnant. This proves that your fortune caused it and that it was blighted because of you. Therefore, you must pay me everything that you undertook to pay for the lease.

All the lessee’s fields were blighted

wherever they were,

and

also

most

of the fields

of

that

valley

in the area where he leased the field,

and this one was also blighted

the leased field

along with them—what is the halakha?

Do we say that since most of the valley was blighted,

this is a regional calamity, and

he deducts for him

the lessee deducts from the rental payment?

Or perhaps, since all the lessee’s fields

belonging to the lessee himself

were blighted, the lessor can say to him:

Even though the entire valley was blighted, the field that I leased to you was blighted

because of your portion;

your fortune caused it.

And we conclude:

It is reasonable that he can say to him

the lessor can say to the lessee:

“It was because of your portion;

your fortune caused it! For it is more reasonable to say that the lessee’s fortune caused his fields to be blighted wherever they were than to say that the fortune of this valley caused it.”

And we challenge this:

Why? Here too, let him say to him

the lessee can say to the lessor:

“If it was because of my portion

that all my fields were blighted wherever they were, it is reasonable that

a little would have remained for me,

that a small portion would have remained unblighted,

and the verse would have been fulfilled for me

[Jeremiah 42]:

‘For we have remained few of the many.’”

It necessarily follows that this is the field that Heaven left in my possession, for the other fields were certainly blighted because of my fortune, and only with regard to this one can it be attributed to your fortune. Had it been due to my fortune, this field would not have been blighted; and since your fortune caused it, I will deduct from your rent.

And we answer: This is because

the lessor can say to him

the lessor can say to the lessee:

“Had you been worthy,

had you been deserving

of having something remain for you, something of your own would have remained for you,

from your own property; they would not have left you a field that is merely leased to you.”

Since this is so, it can be attributed to you that all the fields were blighted, including this field. You are not worthy of having a little remain for you from the many; therefore, you cannot deduct from the rent.

One who sells his field while the Jubilee is in force does not sell the land itself, but only its produce; the price of the field is calculated according to the number of crops from which the purchaser will benefit until the Jubilee year.

If the seller wishes to redeem the field from the purchaser before the Jubilee year, he may do so, provided that two years have passed from the day of the sale, as it is stated: “According to the number of years of crops shall he sell to you.”

He raises an objection

from that which we learned in tractate Arakhin [29b]: If

one of

the first two years in the purchaser’s possession was

a year of blight and yellowing,

and he partook of the produce for only one year,

or

one of the two years was a

Shemita

[shemita year], during which he was required to declare the field ownerless,

or the years were like the two years of Elijah,

during which no rain fell and no produce grew,

it does not count

for the purchaser

in the tally

of the two years, and the former owner cannot redeem it until two years have passed during which the purchaser has partaken of the field’s produce. As it is stated: “According to the number of years of crops,” indicating that the purchaser must have two years of produce.

And the Gemara proves:

It teaches

in the beraita

“blight and yellowing” as analogous to the years

like the two years of

Elijah.

Just as in the years of Elijah there was no produce at all, so too here,

with regard to blight and yellowing, the case is one

in which there was no produce at all.

But

if the produce was blighted only in the purchaser’s field,

so that there is produce

elsewhere,

it counts for him;

the year counts for the purchaser as a year of produce toward the two years, and he cannot say, “I did not partake of two years of produce,” for we say to him: Your fortune caused it.

And we do not say that it is a regional calamity,

and therefore the seller may redeem it after two years.

This appears to contradict what we said: If the fields of that town or the four fields surrounding the leased field were damaged, the lessee can say that it is a regional calamity and deduct from the rent owed to the owner. Yet there are other places in the world where there is produce, whereas the beraita implies that if there is produce elsewhere, the seller can say, “Your fortune caused it.”

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The case there is different,

with regard to one who purchases a field while the Jubilee is in force,

as the verse states

[Leviticus 25]:

“According to the number of years of crops shall he sell to you,”

and we derive: The field must be in the purchaser’s possession for

years in which there is produce,

somewhere

in the world.

And we challenge this:

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

According to your statement, that there is a distinction between years in which there is produce somewhere in the world and years in which there is no produce anywhere in the world,

if that is so,

if one of the first two years in the purchaser’s possession was a

Shemita year, it should count for him,

as though he had used it for two years,

since there is produce outside Eretz Yisrael.

Yet the Mishna explicitly states that a Shemita year does not count for him among the first two years.

And we answer:

Rav Kahana said to him:

Shemita is different,

for

it is

an expropriation by the King!

The King has nullified its cultivation, and it is as though it is not in his possession; therefore, it does not count toward the two years.

One who consecrates his ancestral field, which he inherited from his forefathers [and which has been inherited since the division of the Land among the tribes], immediately after the Jubilee year has ended, its value is calculated according to “the amount of seed of a homer of barley” [a beit kor], at fifty silver shekels. If he comes to redeem it after the first year, the Torah establishes the redemption payment according to the years remaining until the Jubilee, deducting for each year that passes one sela and one pundeyon.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

According to your statement, that you said a Shemita year is not considered a year of produce for the purchaser because it is an expropriation by the King,

if that is so,

with regard to one who consecrates his ancestral field, and several years pass, including a Shemita year, and he wishes to redeem it, shall we say that the

Shemita year will not count in the deduction,

so that nothing is deducted from its redemption price on its account, since it was not fit for use during that year?

But we learned: “He gives a sela and a pundeyon for each year”!

This implies that even the Shemita year deducts from the value of the field.

He said to him,

Ravina said:

The case there is different,

with regard to one who consecrates an ancestral field,

as it is fit

for the field remains suitable even during the Shemita year

for spreading produce on it,

to spread produce on it for drying. Since the Temple treasury can make some use of the field, the redeemer deducts the deduction for that year. For with regard to the redemption of an ancestral field from the Temple treasury, the verse does not say “two years of produce.” In contrast, with regard to a purchaser who bought a field and whose seller comes to redeem it, the verse concerning the redemption of a field says “two years of produce”: The field must be in the purchaser’s possession for at least two years of produce, and a Shemita year is not a year of produce; therefore, it does not count for him.

Shmuel said:

This is what we learned in the Mishna, that when a field is blighted as part of a regional calamity, the lessee deducts from the rent owed to the lessor:

They taught this only when he sowed it

the lessee

and it sprouted, and

afterward

a locust devoured it.

But

if he

did not sow it at all,

and the region was stricken,

he may not

say: “Had I sown it, it would have been blighted, and therefore I will deduct from what I undertook to pay you,” because

the lessor can say to him:

The lessor can say:

“Had you sown it,

it would not have been blighted, for

the verse would have been

fulfilled for me

in

the verse [Psalms 37]:

“They shall not be ashamed in the time of trouble, and in the days of famine they shall be satisfied.”

And although all the surrounding fields were blighted, my field could have been saved from the blight in a manner beyond the laws of nature. Therefore, the lessee must provide him with the amount they agreed upon, from another source.

Rav Sheshet raises an objection

from the Mishna, as we learned:

A shepherd who was shepherding

the animals of others for payment

and left his flock

in a field without supervision,

and came to the city, and a wolf came and snatched them, or a lion came and mauled them—

since a paid bailee is liable for theft and loss but exempt from unavoidable accidents, therefore,

we do not say, “Had he been there,

he certainly

would have rescued them,”

for perhaps he would not have been able to rescue them, and it would be an unavoidable accident.

Rather, we assess him: If

he

could have rescued them, he is liable; but if not,

if he could not have rescued them,

he is exempt,

because it is an unavoidable accident.

And Rav Sheshet argues:

Why,

if he could not have rescued them, is he exempt?

Let the owner say to

the bailee:

“Had you been

if you had remained

there

and had not abandoned the flock,

the verse would have been

fulfilled for me

in

the verse [I Samuel 17]:

“Both the lion and

the bear your servant struck,”

and you would have had the strength to save my animals in a manner beyond the laws of nature.

And the Gemara answers:

Because

the shepherd can say to him:

“Had you been worthy,

if you were truly deserving

of a miracle being performed for you,

then even after I failed to guard properly,

it would have been

appropriate for

a miracle to be performed for you, as for Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa, whose goats brought bears impaled on their horns,

for his goats brought bears with the bears’ bodies stuck upon the goats’ horns.

Since no miracle was performed and the animals were eaten, if it is assessed that the shepherd could not have rescued them, he is exempt; we do not say, “Had he been there, a miracle would have been performed.”