Bava Metzia 106a — the Talmud in English

d. And if you should say that if a barren field had interrupted the field, we would have said: Had it been sown with grain, it too would have been blighted, and it would be a regional calamity, the question remains: If he sowed between his blighted field and the other blighted fields

alfalfa, and it was not blighted,

and it was not struck by blight? ")

what?

Do we say: Had they sown grain there, it would have been blighted, and it would be a regional calamity; or perhaps, since the alfalfa was not blighted, it is not called a regional calamity.

e. And if you should say that alfalfa that was not blighted does not interrupt between the fields, and we say that had they sown grain, it would have been blighted, and it would be a regional calamity, perhaps specifically with regard to alfalfa, which is not included in grain but is animal fodder, is it possible to say that the decree of the calamity was imposed only upon it, but had they sown grain there, it would have been blighted.

But if he interrupted between the fields

another seed,

which is fit for human consumption, and it was not blighted,

what?

Do we say: Had he sown grain, it would have been blighted, and there is here a regional calamity. Or perhaps, since there is seed between the fields that was not blighted, the blight surrounding it is not considered a regional calamity.

ו. And if you should say that another seed does not interrupt, for we say that had they sown grain in its place, it would have been blighted, and it would be a regional calamity, the blight of

whea

t

with regard to barley,

for example, where the tenant’s field and the surrounding fields, which were blighted, were wheat fields, and barley grew between them, which was not blighted,

is the status of the barley

like another seed,

and it does not interrupt between the fields, and the blight is called a regional calamity?

Or

perhaps, barley is

not

like another seed, but they are one species, and since that species was not blighted, there is no regional calamity.

z.

And likewise, if the fields of

the entire world were all stricken with blight, and his

was stricken

with yellowing,

that the grain dried up.

Alternatively, if the entire world was stricken with yellowing, and his with blight, what?

And we conclude:

teyku.

He said to him

the owner of the field to the tenant,

“Sow wheat!” And he went and sowed barley, and

he is permitted to do so, provided that in the end he gives what he became obligated to give the owner of the house,

and the majority of the valley was blighted, and this barley of his was also blighted,

which he sowed against the owner’s wishes,

what?

Do we say that

the tenant

said: “Had

I sown

the wheat, it too would have been blighted,”

and if so, now too, when I sowed it with barley, the blight occurred because of a regional calamity, and I will deduct for you from my rent.

Or perhaps, he can say to him

the lessor:

“Had you sown wheat

as I requested, the field would not have been blighted, for I prayed for the success of the wheat in my field, and

it would have been fulfilled for me

the words of the verse [Job 22]:

‘You shall decree a matter, and it shall be established for you.’

But now that you sowed barley, my prayer was not accepted, for I prayed for wheat and not for barley.”

And we conclude:

It is reasonable that he said to him: “Had you sown wheat, ‘You shall decree a matter, and it shall be established for you, and light shall shine upon your ways’ would have been fulfilled for me,”

and the tenant cannot deduct for him from his rent.

All the lessor’s fields were blighted

that were located elsewhere,

and this one too was blighted,

that field in the tenant’s possession

along with them, and

on the other hand

the majority of the valley was not blighted,

and only this field was blighted among all the fields of the valley,

what?

Do we say: Since the majority of the valley was not blighted, he cannot

the tenant say: This is a regional calamity. And consequently he does not

deduct for him

from what he became obligated to give the lessor.

Or perhaps, since all his fields were blighted

of the lessor that were elsewhere,

he can say to him

the tenant,

“This

blight that occurred in this field

is because of your lot”

[because of you]

“it is!”

And the proof is

that all your fields were blighted,

and your fortune caused it. And therefore I will deduct for you from what I stipulated to give at the end of the rental period.

And we conclude:

It is reasonable

that the tenant cannot say to the lessor: Your fortune caused it, for all your fields were blighted. Because

he said to him

the lessor to the tenant: On the contrary,

“If it is because of my lot,

that my fortune is what causes the blight, it is reasonable that

a little would have remained for me,

and Heaven would not have decreed that I lose all my property,

as it is written

[Jeremiah 22]:

‘For we have remained few from the many.’”

Necessarily, that field which was rented to you is the one that Heaven left for me, and it was blighted only because of you. For the other fields were certainly blighted because of me, and if so, this field is the only one concerning which it is possible to attribute that it was the one left for me as a remnant. And from here there is proof that your fortune caused it, and because of you it was blighted; therefore you must pay me everything that you became obligated to pay for the rental.

All the tenant’s fields were blighted

wherever they are,

and the

also

majority

of the fields

of

that

valley,

in the same area in which he rented the field,

was also blighted,

the rented field

along with them, what?

Do we say: Since the majority of the valley was blighted,

this is a regional calamity, and

he deducts for him

the tenant from the rental payment.

Or perhaps, since all his fields were blighted

of the tenant himself,

he can say to him

the lessor: Even though the entire valley was blighted, the field that I rented to you was blighted

because of your lot,

your fortune is what caused it.

And we conclude:

It is reasonable that he said to him

the lessor to the tenant,

“It is because of your lot,

your fortune caused it! For it is more reasonable to say that the tenant’s fortune caused his fields to be blighted wherever they are than to say that the fortune of this valley caused it.”

And we challenge:

And why? Here too, let him say to him

the tenant:

“If it is because of my lot

that all my fields wherever they are were blighted, it is reasonable that

a little would have remained for me,

that a little of them would have remained unblighted,

so that it would have been fulfilled for me

[Jeremiah 42]:

‘For we have remained few from the many.’”

Necessarily, this is the field that Heavens left in my possession, for the other fields were certainly caused by my fortune, and only with regard to this one is it possible to attribute that your fortune caused it; whereas on account of my fortune, the field would not have been blighted. And since your fortune caused it, I will deduct for you from my rent.

And we answer: Because

he said to him

the lessor to the tenant:

“Had you been worthy,

had you been worthy

for something to remain for you, something of your own would have remained for you,

from your own property, and they would not have left in your possession a field that is merely rented to you.

And since this is so, it is possible to attribute that all the fields were blighted because of you, including this field, and you are not worthy that a little from the many should be left for you. Therefore you cannot deduct from the rental payment.

One who sells his field while the Jubilee is in force does not sell him the substance of the land, but only its produce, and the price of the field is calculated according to the number of crops from which the buyer will benefit until the Jubilee year.

And if the seller wishes to redeem the field from the buyer before the Jubilee year, he is permitted to do so, provided that two years have passed from the day of the sale, as it is stated: “For according to the number of years of crops he shall sell to you.”

The meitivi

from that which we learned in tractate Arakhin [29b]: If

one of the first

two years in the buyer’s possession was

a year of blight and yellowing,

and he ate from the produce for only one year,

or

one of the two years was a

seventh

[shemita] year, and he was required to make the field ownerless,

or the years were like the two years of Elijah,

when rain did not fall in them and produce did not grow,

it does not count for him

the buyer

in the count

of the two years, and the former owner of the field cannot redeem it until two years have passed in which the buyer eats the produce of the field. As it is stated, “According to the number of years of crops,” which indicates that the buyer must have two years of produce.

And the Gemara proves:

It teaches

in the beraita

“blight and yellowing,” analogous to years

like the two years of

Elijah.

Just as the two years of Elijah had no produce at all, so too here,

with blight and yellowing, the case is one

where there was no produce at all.

But

if the produce was blighted only in the buyer’s field,

when there is produce

elsewhere,

it counts for him,

the buyer: A year of produce counts for him toward the two years, and he cannot say, “I did not eat produce for two years,” for we say to him: Your fortune caused it,

and we do not say that it is a regional calamity,

and therefore the seller can redeem it after two years.

And this proves contrary to what we said: If the fields of that city or the four fields surrounding the rented field were damaged, the tenant can say that it is a regional calamity, and he deducts from his rent for the owner; yet there are other places in the world where there is produce, and it is implied by the beraita that if there is produce elsewhere, the seller can say, “Your fortune caused it.”

And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is different there,

with regard to one who buys a field while the Jubilee is in force,

for the verse says

[Leviticus 25]:

“According to the number of years of crops he shall sell to you,”

and we expound: The field must be in the buyer’s possession for

years in which there is produce,

somewhere

in the world.

And we refute:

Rav Ashi said to Rav Kahana:

According to you, that there is a distinction between years in which there is produce somewhere in the world and years in which there is no produce throughout the entire world,

from now then,

if one of the first two years in the buyer’s possession was a year of

the seventh year, it should count for him,

as though he used it for two years,

for there is produce in the Diaspora.

But it is stated explicitly in the Mishna that a seventh year does not count for him among the first two years.

And we answer:

He said to him

Rav Kahana: It is different with

the seventh year,

for it is

a royal expropriation!

For the King nullified it from being sown, and it is as though it is not in his possession; therefore it does not count for him toward the two years.

One who consecrates his ancestral field, which he inherited from his forefathers [which passes by inheritance since the division of the land among the tribes], immediately after the Jubilee year has ended, its value is according to “the seed of a ḥomer of barley” [a beit kor] at fifty silver shekels. And if he comes to redeem it after the first year, the Torah establishes its redemption money according to the years remaining until the Jubilee, deducting for each passing year the measure of one sela and one pundeyon.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina:

According to you, that you said that a seventh year is not considered a year of produce for the buyer because it is a royal expropriation,

from now then,

one who consecrates his ancestral field, and several years pass, including a shemita year, and he wishes to redeem it, shall we say that the

seventh year will not count for him in the deduction,

so that nothing will be deducted for it from the redemption money, since it was not fit for use during that year?

Therefore we learned: “He gives one sela and one pundeyon for each year!”

And it is implied that the seventh year too deducts from the value of the field.

He said to him

Ravina:

It is different there

with regard to one who consecrates an ancestral field,

for it is fit,

for the field is fit even in the seventh year

to spread fruit on it,

to spread fruit on it for drying. And since the consecrated property can use the field for some use, the redeemer deducts the field’s deduction for that year, because with regard to the redemption of an ancestral field from consecrated property, the verse did not say “two years of produce.” This is not so with regard to a buyer who bought a field and the seller comes to redeem it: It is stated concerning the redemption of a field “two years of produce”; the field must be in the buyer’s possession for at least two years of produce, and the seventh year is not a year of produce, and therefore it does not count for him.

Shmuel said: This that we learned in the Mishna, that when a field was blighted during a regional calamity, the tenant deducts from his rent for the lessor,

it was taught only when he sowed it

and it sprouted, and

the tenant

afterward

afterward

a locust ate it.

But

if he

did not sow it at all,

and the country was stricken,

not

will the tenant be able to say: Had I sown it, it would have been blighted, and therefore I will deduct for you from what I became obligated to pay, because

the lessor said to him

:

“Had you sown it,

it would not have been blighted, for

it would have been

would have been

fulfilled for me

[Psalms 37]

‘They will not be ashamed in a time of trouble, and in days of famine they will be satisfied.’”

And although all the fields surrounding it were blighted, my field could have been saved from the blight outside the way of nature. Therefore the tenant must give him, from elsewhere, according to what they agreed between them.

Rav Sheshet raised an objection

from the Mishna, for we learned:

A shepherd who was shepherding

the animals of others for payment,

and left his flock

in a field without supervision,

and came to the city, and a wolf came and tore apart, and a lion came and trampled—

Since a paid guardian is liable for theft and loss and exempt from unavoidable accidents, therefore

we do not say, “Had he been there,

certainly

he would have rescued them,”

for perhaps he would not have been able to rescue them, and it would be an unavoidable accident.

Rather, we assess him: If

he

could have rescued them, he is liable; but if not,

that he could not have rescued them,

he is exempt,

because it is an unavoidable accident.

And Rav Sheshet argues:

And why

is he exempt if he could not have rescued them?

Let the owner of the animal say to him

the guardian:

“Had you been

if you had remained

there

and had not abandoned the flock,

it would have been

would have been

fulfilled for me

[I Samuel 17]

‘Both the lion and

the bear your servant struck down,’”

and you would have had the strength to rescue my animals in a manner beyond nature.

And the Gemara answers:

Because he said to him

the shepherd,

“Had you been worthy

if you truly had been worthy

for a miracle to occur for you,

then even after I did not guard properly,

it would have been

worthy for

a miracle to occur for you like that of Rabbi Ḥanina ben Dosa, when goats brought bears impaled upon their horns,

for his goats brought bears with the bears stuck upon the goats’ horns.

And since a miracle did not occur, and the animals were eaten, if they assessed that the shepherd could not have rescued them, he is exempt; and we do not say: Had he been there, a miracle would have occurred.