Bava Metzia 100b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection: The first objection regarding

a garment

has still not been resolved,

because what he claimed, the other did not admit to him, and what the other admitted to him, he did not claim;

for a small garment is not part of a large garment.

And they answer:

As Rav Pappa said

below to resolve a similar objection, the case is one

of garments sewn together.

Here too,

the same answer can be given: The case is one

of garments sewn together.

Sometimes two complete small garments are taken and sewn together to make a large garment. When one claims the large garment, the other admits to part of the claim, saying that he sold him only part of the garment, namely, the small garment. This is therefore an admission concerning the same type of item as the claim.

But

Rabbi Hoshaya objects

to Shmuel’s resolution:

Is it a garment that the Mishna mentions? It mentions a slave! [The Mishna does not mention a garment; it mentions a slave.] Therefore, the case cannot be explained as referring to a garment.

Therefore, the case cannot be explained as referring to a garment.

Rather, Rabbi Hoshaya said:

The Mishna is referring to a case

where he claimed a slave together with his garment, and a field together with its sheaves.

The Mishna stated the primary claim—the claim concerning the slave. Since, in addition, there is a claim and a partial admission concerning a garment, and an oath is imposed concerning a garment, the seller must also swear concerning the slave, by means of extending the oath to an additional matter.

And they raise an objection:

And still

in the case of

a garment, what he claimed, the other did not admit to him, and what the other admitted to him, he did not claim!

Rav Pappa said: The case is one of garments sewn together.

This resolution, according to Rabbi Hoshaya, is the same as the resolution according to Shmuel.

Rav Sheshet objects

to Rabbi Hoshaya’s resolution: Why did the Mishna discuss slaves and fields, when the oath is required only because of the garment and the sheaves? Is it possible that the Mishna

comes to teach us the rule of extending an oath

that is stated in another Mishna

once again?

таннай пришел сообщить его] еще раз?

But

we already learned

in the chapter “The Woman Is Acquired” [Kiddushin 26a] that

movable property causes land

to be included in the oath imposed concerning it!

If a lender lends money to another person and the borrower has no means to repay, the lender may collect the debt from the borrower’s land that he sold after the loan, but not from movable property that he sold. Therefore, land is called “property subject to responsibility,” while movable property is called “property not subject to responsibility.”

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: Whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, who says: A slave is considered like movable property.

The Mishna follows Rabbi Meir, who holds that a slave has the status of movable property, and that one swears concerning slaves. This resolves the third objection.

And they raise an objection:

And still, what he claimed, the other did not admit to him, and what the other admitted to him, he did not claim!

The first objection therefore remains.

And they answer:

He holds—

the tannaitic Sage of our Mishna—

in accordance with Rabban Gamliel,

who disagrees with this rule.

As we learned:

[Shevuot 38b]

If one claimed wheat from another and the other admitted owing him barley—

he is exempt

from the oath.

Rabban Gamliel obligates him.

And they raise an objection:

Still, this is a case of “Here it is,”

and the second objection has not been resolved.

Rava said

the following resolution according to Rav Sheshet: The Mishna is referring to a case in which the seller cannot say, “Here it is,” such as

a slave whose hand has been severed,

and the seller must pay the purchaser the value of the hand.

The same applies to

a field in which

the seller

dug pits, ditches, and caves

and damaged the field.

And they raise an objection: How could Rav Sheshet have established the Mishna according to Rabbi Meir, who says that a slave has the status of movable property?

But regarding Rabbi Meir, have we not heard the opposite from him!

[Rabbi Meir says the opposite:] A slave does not have the status of movable property with regard to the laws of robbery.

One who robs movable property and it changes acquires it, because a robber acquires an object through a change made to it.

For example, if someone robs wood and makes vessels from it, the vessels belong to the robber, and the robber must pay the victim the value of the wood [Bava Kamma 93b].

This law does not apply to land or slaves, because the Sages derive through the general-specific-general principle [Bava Kamma 117b], using the same method by which they derive from the verses that one does not swear concerning land or slaves, that there is no robbery of land or slaves, and a change does not enable one to acquire them.

But the tannaitic Sage who disagrees there and holds that there is robbery of slaves also holds that one swears concerning them.

As we learned

in Tractate Bava Kamma [96b]:

If one robs an animal and it grows old, or slaves and they grow old—

he pays according to the value at the time of the robbery,

since he acquired the animal or the slave through the change, and he must pay the value of the object he robbed, according to its value at the time of the robbery.

Rabbi Meir says: With regard to slaves, he says to him: “Here is yours before you,”

because slaves are not subject to robbery, and he did not acquire them through a change.

This indicates that according to Rabbi Meir the status of slaves is not that of movable property, contrary to Rav Sheshet’s statement! The Gemara explains:

This is not difficult,

because Rav Sheshet read the Mishna

in accordance with the version that Rabba bar Avuha altered and taught,

and he recited it as follows:

Rabbi Meir says: He pays according to the value at the time of the robbery.

And the Sages say: With regard to slaves, he says to him: “Here is yours before you.”

According to this version, Rabbi Meir holds that a slave has the status of movable property.

Rather,

the difficulty is as follows: Even if we say that Rabbi Meir holds that a slave has the status of movable property,

from where do we know that Rabbi Meir compares land to a slave,

[from where does Rav Sheshet know that Rabbi Meir equates land with a slave?]

Just as one swears concerning a slave

concerning it,

so too, one swears concerning land. Perhaps

one swears concerning a slave,

but not concerning land

according to Rabbi Meir. If so, it is impossible to establish the Mishna, which says that one also swears concerning land, according to Rabbi Meir.

And they answer:

Do not entertain this possibility,

[do not let this thought enter your mind,] because there is a beraita indicating that Rabbi Meir holds that land also has the status of movable property.

As it is taught in a beraita: If one exchanges a cow for a donkey and it gives birth, and likewise, if one sells his maidservant and she gives birth,

one says: “It gave birth while in my possession,”

that it gave birth,

and the other remains silent—

the one who says that it gave birth while in his possession is entitled to it,

whether he is the seller or the purchaser, because the other’s silence is considered an admission.

If one says: “I do not know,” and the other says: “I do not know”—

they divide

the disputed item, in accordance with the opinion of Sumakhos.

If one says: “It gave birth while in my possession,” and the other says: “It gave birth while in my possession,”

the seller is one who partially admits, since he admits that the cow belongs to the purchaser. Therefore,

the seller must swear that it gave birth while in his possession, because

all those who take oaths prescribed by the Torah swear but do not pay, the statement of Rabbi

Meir.

The Torah states, with regard to the oath of bailees: “And its owner shall accept it, and he shall not pay” (Exodus 22:10). The Sages derive from here that the person who would otherwise have to pay swears, but the person who takes the item does not swear.

For example, if one claims that another owes him one hundred dinars, and a single witness testifies in his favor, the defendant must take a Torah-mandated oath denying the witness’s testimony, and he is exempt from payment, since the claimant has neither a document nor two witnesses.

By contrast, if one claims that another owes him one hundred dinars and he has a promissory note, while the defendant claims that he already repaid the debt and brings one witness who testifies that he repaid it, the claimant does not have to take a Torah-mandated oath that the debt was not repaid. He collects the debt because he has a promissory note.

In the case of one who exchanges a cow for a donkey and it gives birth, the seller is required to give the offspring, and he is included among those who are obligated by the Torah to swear and thereby be exempted from payment.

And the Sages say: One does not swear concerning either slaves or land,

and therefore, in the case of one who exchanges a cow for a donkey, the owner of the cow must swear, but in the case of one who sells his maidservant, the seller does not swear.

And we infer:

Is it not implied that Rabbi Meir holds that one swears

concerning land? Since the Sages knew that Rabbi Meir held this, they had to state that one does not swear concerning land.

And they reject this inference:

From where

[do you know] that the Sages said that one does not swear concerning land because, according to Rabbi Meir, one does swear concerning it?

Perhaps they said it in the following manner: “Just as you admitted to us concerning land,

[just as you agree with us concerning land,]

admit to us also concerning slaves,”

because slaves were compared to land, as it is stated: “And you shall take them as an inheritance for your sons after you, to inherit them as a possession” (Leviticus 25:46); Scripture compared them to an ancestral field. [Kiddushin 22b]

The Gemara now brings proof that according to Rabbi Meir one does not swear concerning land, and the statement of the Sages in the aforementioned beraita must be explained as the Gemara just rejected it.

Come and hear, as we learned:

[Shevuot 42b]

Rabbi Meir says: There are objects that have the status of land

because they are attached to the land,

but

in truth

do not

have the status of land.

And the Sages do not agree with him,

as they hold that these objects have the status of land.

The Mishna explains:

How so?

If one claims from another, saying:

“I gave you ten grapevines laden

with grapes

for safekeeping,”

and the grapes were damaged because you were negligent with them,

and the other says:

Those grapevines

were only five.

Rabbi Meir obligates him

to take an oath.

And the Sages say: Anything attached to the land has the status of land,

and one does not swear concerning land.

And Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said

in explanation of this Mishna:

The issue between them is grapes that are ready to be picked

[the tannaitic Sages disagree concerning grapes that are ready to be picked],

as one Sage holds

[Rabbi Meir holds:] These grapes

are considered as though they had already been picked,

since they no longer require the land, and they have the status of movable property.

And the other holds: They are not considered as though they had already been picked,

since they are attached and have the status of land.

This proves that Rabbi Meir holds that one does not swear concerning land. The entire dispute concerns only whether one swears concerning produce that is ready to be detached; but concerning the land itself, all opinions agree that one does not swear.

This rejects Rav Sheshet’s resolution, which established the Mishna according to Rabbi Meir, since even Rabbi Meir agrees that one does not swear concerning land.

And we conclude:

Rather, in fact,

the Mishna must be explained

according to Rabbi Hoshaya,

as referring to a case in which there is an additional claim concerning the slave’s garment, and because of that claim the seller also swears concerning the slave.

And what is difficult for you [

and what was difficult: that it is not necessary to innovate a law

obligating

the movable property to make the land subject to an oath over it, for this is a Mishna in Tractate Kiddushin.

The answer is:

It was necessary [

our Mishna needs to teach that one swears over the garment of a slave and over the sheaves of a field. For]

it might have entered your mind to say [

there was room to say]:

the garment of a slave

is ancillary to the slave, and

is considered like a slave

over which one does not swear, and likewise

the sheaves of a field are considered like the field.

It teaches us

that this is not so.

The Gemara earlier brought a beraita that details the laws that apply when one exchanges a cow for a donkey and it gave birth.

And we learned in the beraita:

This one says: “I do not know,” and this one says: “I do not know”—

they divide.

And the Gemara explains:

Who is this?

It is the opinion of Sumakhos,

who says: “Money that is subject to doubt”—

they divide it.

But the Gemara raises an objection:

Come and hear the latter clause,

and see whether it can accord with the opinion of Sumakhos.

For we learned in the latter clause:

This one says: “It is in my possession,” and this one says: “It is in my possession”—

the seller must swear that it gave birth while in his possession.

Indeed, according to Rava, the latter clause can accord with Sumakhos, because Sumakhos concedes in a case of certain claim and certain claim that the one who seeks to take property from his fellow bears the burden of proof,

but it is difficult

for Rabba bar Rav Huna, who said: “Yes, Sumakhos said [that this applies] even in a case of certain claim and certain claim”.

If so,

why must the seller swear?

For

“they divide” should have been required!

And we answer:

Sumakhos concedes where there is a Torah-level oath

imposed upon the one in possession, that division is not carried out.

And

the beraita is speaking in a case

where he cut off

the seller

its hand

of the maidservant, and he cannot say, “Here it is,”

as Rava

who explained the Mishna in this manner.

Mishna:

The previous Mishna spoke of cases in which we have doubt concerning the money, and the law is that they divide it.

This Mishna speaks of two cases in which the law of division is discussed, and the reason for the division is not because of doubt.

One who sells his olive trees for timber,

Reuben sold Simeon olive trees on the condition that Simeon would cut them down and use them for fuel.

Simeon left them in the ground,

and

in the meantime

they made

the trees fruit.

If the trees produced poor olives that produce

less than a quarter

of oil

per se’a

of olives,

these belong to

Simeon,

the owner of the olives.

And if they

produced a quarter per se’a, this one says: “My olives” [

my olive trees that I purchased]

grew

the fruit.

And this one says: “My land grew

the fruit”—

they divide,

because both of them have a share in these fruits.

The Gemara explains why the law is not so in a case where they produced less than a quarter.

Simeon had olive trees in his field, and

a river swept away his olives

and uprooted them with their roots,

and the river placed them

in

the field of

Reuben,

his fellow,

and they took root there and produced fruit.

This one says: “My olives”

that were uprooted

grew

the fruit.

And this one says: “My land grew

them”—

they divide,

because both of them have a share in the improvement.

Gemara:

We learned in our Mishna: One who sells his olive trees for timber, and they produced less than a quarter per se’a, these belong to the owner of the olives. If they produced a quarter per se’a—they divide.

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances? [

How is the Mishna speaking?]

If he said to him

the seller to the purchaser when he sold it

Cut down

the trees

immediately,

then

even

if the olives produced

less than a quarter, also

they belong

to the owner of the land

alone, since even the trees were not sold to the purchaser except for the right to cut them down, and the improvement of the trees does not belong to him!

If he said to him

the seller to the purchaser:

Whenever you want, cut down, [

whenever you wish, cut down] then

even

if the trees produced

a quarter, also

the law is that they belong

to the owner of the olives, since he received explicit permission to leave the olives, and certainly the sale includes also the improvement that came from the land!

And the Gemara establishes the Mishna as follows:

It is necessary

only

but

if he said to him

the seller

without specification,

and did not state that he was giving him permission to leave the trees, but nevertheless he has permission to leave them.

Therefore, if the trees produced

less than a quarter,

the seller certainly already relinquished his claim to them, for concerning less than a quarter

people are not particular.

And if they produced

a quarter, people are particular

about them, and since the seller can claim, “My land grew [them], and I did not sell you the power of the improvement that came from the land,” the law is that they divide.