Bava Kamma 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

If you say that it means a third of his estate,

if we interpret this as meaning that a person must spend a third of his assets for the fulfillment of a mitzva, such as a lulav, tzitzit, or a Torah scroll, and the like,

then from now on,

if so, since for one mitzva he must spend a third of his assets, it follows that

if three mitzvot happen to come his way, he must give up his entire estate!

If three mitzvot happen to come his way, he must spend all his assets. And this is not reasonable.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: With regard to the enhancement of a mitzva—

up to a third of the mitzva.

Rav Huna’s intention concerns the enhancement of a mitzva: If one is going to spend money for a mitzva and finds a more choice item for an additional third of the price, he must add the money and purchase the enhanced item. For example, if one purchases a Torah scroll, if he finds a more choice scroll, he should add a third of the price and purchase the enhanced one. The Gemara is uncertain how to measure the third:

Rav Ashi raised a question:

This third that he must add: Does it mean

a third from within

[from the inside], that is, a third of the sum he was offered for the ordinary item, which he adds to the enhanced item? For example, if he was offered the ordinary item for six dinars, he adds a third of the price—two dinars—and purchases the enhanced item for eight.

Or a third from without

[from the outside], meaning that the sum is divided into two parts and another, third part is added, so that the third is one third of the final sum; that is, he purchases it for nine dinars.

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

Teyku!

The uncertainty remains in place without a ruling.

In the West they said in the name of Rabbi Zeira:

In Eretz Yisrael [which lies to the west of Babylonia], they taught the following in the name of Rabbi Zeira:

Up to a third,

the addition that one makes for the enhancement of a mitzva

is from his own resources;

he will not receive reward for it in this world, but his reward is reserved for him in the World-to-Come, as it is stated, “Today, to perform them” [Deuteronomy 7], and they expound: “but not today to receive their reward”; rather, this will occur in the future. But whatever he adds

from that point onward,

beyond a third, is

from the Holy One, blessed be He;

the Holy One, blessed be He, will repay him for this during his lifetime.

Mishna:

Our Mishna teaches how, and in what manner, a person becomes liable for damage caused by his property; for which property that caused damage he is liable, and in which location:

a.

With regard to everything for which I am responsible to guard,

everything that I am obligated to guard so that it will not cause damage,

I have made its damage possible.

If I did not guard it properly and it caused damage, I am considered to have enabled and prepared the damage, and therefore I am liable. b.

If I prepared part of its damage,

even if I enabled and prepared only part of the damage,

I am liable for payment of its damage,

I become liable to pay for the damage,

as though I had prepared all of its damage,

as though I had enabled and prepared the entire damage [the Gemara will explain in what case this is said].

c. The one who causes damage is liable only if he damaged

property that is not subject to

the law of

sacrilege,

namely, ordinary property. But one who damages consecrated property is exempt from payment, as we expound: “An ox belonging to his fellow,” and not an ox belonging to the consecrated [above, 6b].

d. Payment for damages is imposed only for damage to

property belonging to members of the covenant,

belonging to Jews, and not to a gentile. If one damages the property of a gentile, he is exempt [as stated below, in the Mishna on 37b].

e. Likewise, only one who damages

property that is privately owned

is liable, meaning property that has an owner, excluding ownerless property [the Gemara will explain what novel point the Mishna teaches with this statement].

f.

And

the liability applies

in every place

where his property damages his fellow’s property,

except for a domain designated for the damager,

for if the damaged ox entered the damager’s domain, the damager can say to the injured party: What is your ox doing in my domain?

g.

And a domain belonging to the injured party and the damager.

A courtyard to which both the damager and the injured party have access [the Gemara will explain].

h. And

when it causes damage, the damager is liable

[liable]

to pay

the

payments

for the

damage—

from the best of the land!

From the choicest property in his possessions.

Gemara:

The Gemara cites a beraita that explains the first general principle in the Mishna:

The Sages taught:

This is what we learned:

“With regard to everything for which I am responsible to guard, I have made its damage possible,”

how?

In what manner does this apply?

For example,

an ox and a pit

[or a pit] that were in a person’s possession,

which he entrusted to the

hands of a

deaf-mute

or

an imbecile or a minor,

who lack legal understanding [and cannot be relied upon to guard the ox or the pit so that they will not cause damage],

and

the ox or the pit

caused damage, the owner is liable

the owner of the ox or pit

to pay.

This is not so with regard to fire,

for if a person had fire in his possession and entrusted it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, and the fire caused damage, the person who entrusted them with the fire is exempt from payment.

The Gemara discusses the difference between fire and an ox and a pit, and the circumstances under discussion:

In what case are we dealing?

Which ox and pit are being discussed?

If you say it concerns a tied ox and a covered pit,

if we say that the case concerns one who entrusted to a deaf-mute a tied ox, which is protected from causing damage, and likewise a covered pit, into which it is impossible to fall,

then with regard to fire likewise,

and similarly, in the case of fire, he entrusted him with protected fire, namely,

a coal,

which does not burn on its own without being fanned, then the following difficulty arises:

What is different here, and what is different here?

Why is the law of the ox and pit different from the law of fire? Since the ox and pit that he entrusted to the deaf-mute were protected, he should be exempt in the case of the ox and pit just as he is exempt in the case of fire.

Rather,

certainly, the case concerns sources of damage that are not protected, namely,

an untied ox,

which is not tied,

and an uncovered pit,

and therefore one who entrusts them to a deaf-mute is liable. And

with regard to fire likewise,

similarly, in the case of fire we must say that he entrusted him with unprotected fire, namely,

a flame

[a fanned coal].

But this too is perplexing. Can one say in such a case

“This is not so with regard to fire,” meaning that he is exempt? But

we learned in a later Mishna [59b]: “One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is exempt under human law,” and

Reish Lakish said in the name

[in the name of]

of Hizkiya: It was taught

in the Mishna that he is exempt under human law

only

when

he entrusted him with

a deaf-mute

a coal, and

the deaf-mute

fanned it

until the fire caused damage.

But

if he entrusted the deaf-mute with

a flame

and it caused damage through it,

he is liable.

What is the reason?

Because

the damage is clearly certain!

Since the flame is ready and liable to cause damage, it is considered his source of damage, like his ox.

If so, the beraita certainly is not speaking of a case in which he entrusted him with unprotected sources of damage. The question therefore returns: With what sources of damage are we dealing?

The Gemara answers:

Actually,

the beraita is speaking

of a tied ox and a covered pit,

which are protected from causing damage.

And with regard to fire likewise,

similarly, in the case of fire it concerns protected fire, namely,

a coal.

And when you said,

and when you raised the difficulty:

What is different here

that he is liable

and what is different here

that he is exempt, there is a proper distinction between them, because the ox and the pit, even if he did not entrust them to a deaf-mute, are not considered properly protected, since

an ox

that is tied

is accustomed to breaking loose,

to undoing its fastening on its own, and likewise the cover of the

pit is accustomed to falling off,

to falling away by itself. Since their protection was not initially adequate, even when he entrusted them to a deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute released the ox’s bonds or removed the cover of the pit, the one who entrusted them is liable. But

a coal,

in and of itself, is not liable to cause damage, because

whenever one leaves it, it gradually dies down and goes away.

If one leaves the coal as it is, it gradually extinguishes itself and is not considered a source of damage. Therefore, he cannot be held liable for entrusting it to a deaf-mute, because he was not required to anticipate that the deaf-mute would fan the coal and cause damage.

But the Gemara still asks:

And

according to

Rabbi Yohanan, who said,

explaining the statement of the later Mishna, “One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute is exempt under human law,” that

even if he entrusted him with

a deaf-mute

a flame, he is also

exempt.

According to him, the statement in the beraita, “This is not so with regard to fire,” means that he is exempt even if he entrusted him with a flame. And

similarly here,

and likewise, in the case of the ox and pit, the discussion concerns an ox and pit that are not protected, namely,

an untied ox and an uncovered pit.

If so, the matter still requires explanation:

What is different here,

in the case of the ox and pit, where if he entrusted them to a deaf-mute he is liable,

and what is different here,

in the case of fire, where if he entrusted it to a deaf-mute he is exempt?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, the cases involve a permitted ox, an uncovered pit, and a flame, and nevertheless a distinction can be made between them, because

there

in the case of fire,

it is the deaf-mute’s grasp that causes it,

as the deaf-mute’s holding of the fire is what caused the damage, since he took it and carried it to the stack that was burned, and had it not been for the deaf-mute, the damage would not have occurred. But

here,

in the case of an ox and a pit,

it is not the deaf-mute’s grasp that causes it;

the deaf-mute’s holding did not cause the damage, for the ox went on its own and caused damage, and likewise the pit caused damage by itself; moreover, even without the deaf-mute the damage would have occurred. Therefore, the owner of the ox and the owner of the pit are liable.

Following the beraita that teaches a stringency with regard to an ox over fire, the Gemara cites a beraita dealing with the differences among the stringencies of the primary categories:

The Sages taught: There is a stringency with regard to an ox over a pit,

there is a stringency with regard to an ox [meaning keren, which is not found in a pit, and conversely: there is

a stringency with regard to a pit over an ox.

And the beraita explains:

The stringency with regard to an ox over a pit:

a.

An ox

that has been established as dangerous and killed a person,

its owner pays

the owner

the ransom.

b.

And

likewise, he is

liable for the thirty [shekels] for a slave.

If an ox killed a slave, the owner of the ox pays thirty shekels to the slave’s master.

c. Likewise, if the ox killed a person and

its verdict was finalized

for execution,

it is forbidden

to derive

benefit from this ox.

d.

And

there is an additional stringency in that

it is in its nature to go about and cause damage.

This is not so with regard to a pit.

For the owner of a pit is exempt from the ransom and from the thirty [shekels] for a slave, because the owner of a pit is exempt for the death of a person, as we derive: “And an ox shall fall there”—an “ox,” but not a “person.” Likewise, it is not in the nature of a pit to go about and cause damage.

The stringency with regard to a pit over an ox

a.

For a pit is intended from the outset of its creation to cause damage,

as from the moment it is created, it stands ready to cause damage.

b.

And

likewise,

it is established as dangerous

and

from the outset

it pays full damages.

This is not so with regard to an ox,

which does not stand ready to cause damage from the outset of its creation, and at first [when it is still innocuous] pays only half-damages.