Bava Kamma 9b — the Talmud in English

If you say that this means a person must spend one-third of his assets in order to fulfill a mitzva, such as taking a lulav, wearing ritual fringes, or writing a Torah scroll, and the like,

and then

if so,

it follows that

if three mitzvot happen to come his way, he would have to spend all his assets!

If three mitzvot happened to come his way, he would have to spend all his assets. This is not reasonable.

Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: The matter concerns enhancement of a mitzva—

up to one-third of the mitzva.

Rav Huna’s intention is regarding enhancement of a mitzva: If a person comes to spend money for a mitzva and finds a more superior item at an additional one-third of the price, he must add the money and purchase the superior item. For example, one who purchases a Torah scroll, if he finds a more superior scroll, he should add one-third of the price and purchase the superior one. The Gemara is uncertain how this one-third is to be measured:

Rav Ashi raised a question:

This one-third that he must add—does it mean

one-third from within

[from within], meaning one-third of the amount offered for the ordinary item, which he adds for the superior item? For example, if the ordinary item was offered to him for six dinars, he adds one-third of the price, which is two dinars, and purchases the superior item for eight.

Or one-third from outside

[from outside], meaning that the amount is divided into two parts and an additional third part is added, so that the one-third is one-third of the final amount; that is, he purchases it for nine dinars.

The Gemara’s conclusion is:

The question remains unresolved!

The uncertainty remains without a ruling.

In the West, in the Land of Israel, they said in the name of Rabbi Zeira,

in the Land of Israel [which is west of Babylonia], they taught the following in the name of Rabbi Zeira:

Up to one-third,

the amount that one adds for enhancement of a mitzva, is

from his own funds;

he will not receive reward for it in this world; rather, his reward is reserved for the World to Come, as it is stated, “Today, to perform them” [Deuteronomy 6], and they expound: “Today is for performing them, but today is not for receiving their reward”; the reward will be received in the future. But whatever he adds

from this point onward,

more than one-third, is

from the funds of the Holy One, blessed be He;

the Holy One, blessed be He, will repay him for this during his lifetime.

Mishna:

Our Mishna teaches how and under what circumstances a person becomes liable for damage caused by his property, for which property that he damaged he is liable, and in what location:

a.

For anything that I was responsible for guarding,

anything that I was obligated to guard so that it would not cause damage,

“I rendered its damage possible.”

If I did not guard it properly and it caused damage, I am considered to have made the damage possible and prepared the conditions for it; therefore, I am liable. b.

If I rendered part of its damage possible,

even if I made possible and prepared only part of the damage, nevertheless

I am liable for payment of its damage;

I become liable to pay for the damage,

as though I had rendered all of its damage possible,

as though I had made the entire damage possible [and the Gemara will explain in what circumstances this applies].

c. The one who causes damage is liable only if he damaged

property that is not subject to the law of sacrilege,

the law of sacrilege,

me’ila,

that is, ordinary property. But one who damages consecrated property is exempt from payment, as we expound the phrase “the ox of his fellow”—and not an ox belonging to the Temple treasury [above, 6b].

d. There is an obligation to pay damages only for damage to

property belonging to members of the covenant,

that is, property belonging to Jews, and not to gentiles. If he damages a gentile’s property, he is exempt [as will be stated below in the Mishna, 37b].

e. Likewise, one is liable only for damaging

property that is privately owned,

that has an owner, excluding ownerless property [and the Gemara will explain what the Mishna is teaching by this statement].

f.

And

the obligation applies

in every place

where his property damages the property of another,

except in premises designated for the one who caused the damage;

if the ox that suffered the damage entered the premises of the one who caused the damage, the latter can say to the owner of the damaged ox: What is your ox doing on my premises?

g.

And in premises belonging to both the one who suffered the damage and the one who caused it.

A courtyard in which both the one who caused the damage and the one who suffered it have permission to be present [the Gemara will explain this].

h. And

when it caused damage, the one who caused the damage is liable [

liable]

to pay

the

payments for

the

damage—

from the best of the land!

from the choicest property among his assets.

Gemara:

The Gemara cites a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, that explains the first principle in the Mishna:

The Sages taught in a beraita:

Regarding what we learned: “

For anything that I was responsible for guarding, I rendered its damage possible,”

how so?

In what circumstances does this apply?

For example,

an ox and a pit [

or a pit], that were in a person’s possession,

which he handed over to

the care of a

deaf-mute

or

an intellectually disabled person or a minor,

who lack legal understanding [and one cannot rely on them to guard the ox or pit so that they will not cause damage],

and

the ox or pit

caused damage, he is liable

the owner of the ox or pit

to pay.

This is not so with fire,

for if a person had fire in his possession, handed it over to a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor, and the fire caused damage, the person who handed them the fire is exempt from payment.

The Gemara discusses the difference between fire and an ox and a pit, and the circumstances under discussion:

what are we dealing with?

What type of ox and pit are being discussed?

If you say that we are dealing with a tied ox and a covered pit,

if we say that the case is one in which he handed over to the deaf-mute a tied ox, which is guarded from causing damage, and likewise a covered pit, into which it is impossible to fall,

then correspondingly, with regard to fire,

the comparable case concerning fire would be one in which he handed over guarded fire, namely

a coal,

which does not burn on its own without being fanned. If so, the following difficulty arises:

What is different here, and what is different here?

Why should the law of the ox and pit differ from the law of fire? Since the ox and pit that he handed to the deaf-mute were guarded, he should be exempt in the case of the ox and pit, just as he is exempt in the case of fire.

Rather,

certainly, the case concerns potentially damaging items that are not guarded, namely

an untied ox,

which is not tied,

and an uncovered pit,

and therefore one who hands them over to a deaf-mute is liable. And

correspondingly, with regard to fire,

the comparable case concerning fire must be one in which he handed over unguarded fire, namely

a flame [

a burning coal].

But this too is difficult. Can one say in such a case

“This is not so with fire,” meaning that he is exempt? But

we learned in a later Mishna [59b]: “One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute, an intellectually disabled person, or a minor is exempt by human law,” and

Reish Lakish said in the name [

in the name of]

of Chizkiya: “They taught

in the Mishna that he is exempt by human law

only

when

he handed to

the deaf-mute

a coal, and

the deaf-mute

fanned

the fire until it caused damage.

But

if he handed the deaf-mute

a flame

and it caused damage,

he is liable.

What is the reason?

Because

the potential for damage is certain!

Since the flame is ready and prepared to cause damage, it is considered his damaging agent, like his ox.

And if so, the beraita certainly is not speaking of a case in which he handed over unguarded potentially damaging items. The question therefore returns: What type of potentially damaging items is being discussed?

The Gemara answers:

Actually,

the beraita is speaking

of a tied ox and a covered pit,

which are guarded from causing damage.

And correspondingly, with regard to fire,

the comparable case concerning fire is guarded fire, namely

a coal.

And as for what you said,

and the difficulty you raised:

“What is different here”

that he is liable,

“and what is different here”

that he is exempt—there is indeed a basis for distinguishing between them. An ox and a pit, even if they are not handed over to a deaf-mute, are not considered properly guarded, because

an ox

that is tied

is accustomed to breaking loose,

to undo its own tie; and likewise, the cover of

a pit is accustomed to falling off

on its own. Since their initial guarding was not proper, even when he handed them over to a deaf-mute, and the deaf-mute undid the ox’s ties or removed the cover of the pit, the person who handed them over is liable. But

a coal,

by itself is not likely to cause damage, because

the more one leaves it alone, the more it dies down and goes out.

If one leaves the coal as it is, it gradually extinguishes itself and is not considered a damaging agent. Therefore, he cannot be held liable for handing it to a deaf-mute, since he was not required to anticipate that the deaf-mute would fan the coal and cause damage.

But the Gemara still asks:

And

And according to

Rabbi Yochanan, who says

who explains the later Mishna, “One who sends a fire by the hand of a deaf-mute is exempt by human law,” to mean that

even if he handed

the deaf-mute

a flame, he is also

exempt.

According to him, the statement in the beraita, “This is not so with fire,” means that he is exempt even if he handed him a flame. And

correspondingly, here,

the comparable case concerning an ox and a pit must involve an ox and pit that are not guarded, namely

an untied ox and an uncovered pit.

If so, an explanation is still needed:

“What is different here,”

with regard to an ox and a pit, where if he handed them to a deaf-mute he is liable,

“and what is different here,”

with regard to fire, where if he handed it to a deaf-mute he is exempt?

And the Gemara answers: Indeed, it is speaking of a permitted ox, an uncovered pit, and a flame, and nevertheless there is a distinction between them, for

there,

in the case of fire,

it is the deaf-mute’s grasp that causes it,

the deaf-mute’s taking hold of the fire is what caused the damage, since he took it and carried it to the stack, which was burned, and had it not been for the deaf-mute, the damage would not have occurred. But

here,

in the case of an ox and a pit,

it is not the deaf-mute’s grasp that causes it,

the deaf-mute’s taking hold did not cause the damage, for the ox went by itself and caused damage, and likewise the pit caused damage on its own, and even had it not been for the deaf-mute, the damage would have occurred; therefore, the owner of the ox and the owner of the pit are liable.

And following the beraita that teaches a stringency in the case of an ox and a pit over fire, the Gemara brings a beraita dealing with the differences in the stringencies that exist among the avot:

The Sages taught: There is a stringency in the case of an ox over a pit,

there is a stringency in the case of an ox [namely, horn] that does not exist in a pit, and conversely: there is

a stringency in the case of a pit over an ox.

And the beraita explains:

The stringency in the case of an ox over a pit:

a.

That the ox

that has become forewarned and killed a person

pays

its owner

the ransom.

b.

And

likewise

is liable for the thirty of a slave.

For if an ox killed a slave, its owner pays thirty shekels to the slave’s master.

c. And likewise, if the ox killed a person and

its verdict was concluded

for death,

it is forbidden

this ox

for benefit.

d.

And

there is also the stringency in it that

its manner is to go and cause damage.

Which is not so in the case of a pit.

For the owner of the pit is exempt from the ransom and from the thirty of a slave, since a pit is exempt for the death of a person, as we expound: “And an ox fell there,” “ox” and not “person". And likewise, it is not the manner of a pit to go and cause damage.

The stringency in the case of a pit over an ox

a.

That the pit is from the beginning of its making intended for damage,

from the beginning of its making it stands ready and prepared to cause damage.

b.

And

likewise

forewarned

it

from its beginning

to pay full damage.

Which is not so in the case of an ox,

which does not stand ready to cause damage at the beginning of its making, and at first [when it is innocent] it pays only half-damage.