Bava Kamma 91b — the Talmud in English

And it teaches

in the Mishna:

“One who injures himself, even though he is not permitted [to do so], is exempt,”

it follows that even embarrassing oneself is forbidden!? And we answer:

This is what he is saying to him

Rabbi Akiva:

“It is not necessary [to state this] with regard to embarrassment, for a person is permitted to embarrass himself,”

and therefore it is clear that one who embarrasses him becomes liable to pay, even though he also embarrassed himself.

“Rather, even [with regard to] injury

and damage,

for a person is not permitted to injure himself,

nevertheless

others who injured him

cannot exempt themselves and say: If he too transgressed a prohibition and injured himself, why are we made liable for what we injured him with? Rather—

they are liable

to pay him for his injury.”

And we wonder:

“And

is it the case that

a person is not permitted to injure himself!?”

A person who swore to do something and did not fulfill his oath is liable to bring a sin-offering. As it is stated [Leviticus 5:4–6]: “Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips to do evil or to do good, whatever a person expresses in an oath, and it was hidden from him, and he knew and became guilty. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord for the sin that he committed, a female from the flock, a ewe or a she-goat, for a sin-offering; and the priest shall atone for him for his sin.”

And

it

is taught

in a beraita:

Could it be

that a person who

swore to do evil to himself

[to do harm to himself]

and did not do so would be exempt

from the offering for an oath?

The verse teaches

[this matter is to be learned from the words of the verse]:

“To do evil or to do good.”

The verse equates doing evil with doing good.

Just as doing good

that the verse speaks of, when one swears to do good for himself, is an act of

permission,

so too doing evil

of which the verse speaks is an act of

permission

that the verse is speaking of, and not an act of prohibited harm.

“I will bring,”

it is to be learned from here that one who

swore to do evil to himself and did not do evil

is liable, since a person has permission to do evil to himself.

And now there is a difficulty: This beraita explicitly states that a person is permitted to do evil to himself, whereas in the Mishna it is stated that a person is forbidden to injure himself!?

Said

[he answered]

Shmuel:

What we learned in the beraita, that a person is permitted to do evil to himself, is not referring to a person who injures and damages his body, but rather

to

a person who swore and said:

“I will sit in a fast,”

and there is no prohibition against sitting in a fast.

And we wonder: Behold, later in the beraita it compares one who swore to do evil to himself with one who swore to do evil to others. And if swearing to do evil to himself means swearing to sit in a fast,

similarly

[in a comparable manner],

with regard to doing evil to others,

that would mean

to make them sit in a fast.

“Others”—

who can make them sit in a fast!?

For a fast depends on the decision of the one fasting, and how can a person make others sit in a fast!?

And we answer:

Yes!

It is in a person’s power to make others sit in a fast,

for he can lock them in a room

[when he closes them in a room] without food, and they will be unable to eat, and consequently they will be sitting in a fast.

And

we challenge: It is impossible to explain “doing evil to others” through a fast, for

it

is

taught

in that same beraita:

“What is ‘doing evil to others’?”

One who said:

“I will strike

so-and-so

and split his skull.”

And just as “doing evil to others” is through injury, striking, and splitting the skull, and not through a fast, so too “doing evil to himself” is through injury; yet according to the Mishna a person is forbidden to injure himself, whereas the beraita says that a person is permitted to injure himself!?

And we conclude:

Rather,

it is stated as a dispute among

the tannaim

;

it is

taught [in accordance with two opinions]:

there is one who says: A person is not permitted to injure himself,

and this is the view of our Mishna.

And there is one who says: A person is permitted to injure himself,

and this is the view of the beraita.

And the Gemara discusses:

Who

is he, the

tanna whom you know to have said: ‘A person is not permitted to injure himself?’

If you say

[if it is said]:

This tanna

of the beraita below

is he, as it is taught: “But for your lifeblood, of your souls, I will require an accounting,”

[Genesis 9:5],

Rabbi Elazar says: ‘From your souls’—

from one who kills himself—

I will require an accounting for your blood.

And it is said: Just as it is forbidden for a person to kill himself, as Rabbi Elazar expounded, so it is forbidden for a person to injure and damage himself.

And we reject this:

Perhaps,

perhaps Rabbi Elazar holds that a person is permitted to injure himself, but

killing is different,

for murder is more severe than ordinary striking and injury.

And again it is necessary to discuss who is the tanna who says: A person is not permitted to injure himself?

Rather,

it may be said:

This tanna

of the beraita below

is he:

It is stated in the Torah [Leviticus 18:3]: “And you shall not follow their statutes.” That is, do not follow the ways of the gentiles. Therefore, it is forbidden to act according to the practice of the Amorites.

For it is taught: “They tear garments for the dead, and this is not among the ways of the Amorites,”

that is, it is permitted to tear one’s garments for the dead, and this does not involve following the ways of the Amorites, because he does so on account of his grief, whereas the “ways of the Amorites” are what the Amorites used to do for licentiousness or idolatry.

Rabbi Elazar said: “I heard

from my teachers

that one who tears for the dead excessively

is flogged on account of ‘Do not destroy.’”

And

if Rabbi Elazar forbade tearing and damaging his garment,

all the more so

it is forbidden to injure

his body.

And

we reject this: It is not a proof, because

perhaps

tearing

garments is different, since it is a loss

and damage

that does not return,

and one cannot prove from here that it is forbidden to injure and wound oneself, an injury that is capable of healing.

For it is like Rabbi Yohanan, who called garments “those that honor him”

[Rabbi Yohanan used to call his garments: “those that honor him”].

And Rav Chisda, when he would walk among thorns and thorn bushes,

would lift his garments

[when he walked among thorns, he would lift his garments so that they would not tear], and he was not concerned lest his body be scratched and wounded.

For he

said: “This

wound in my body

will grow a healing scab

and heal,

but this,

the tear in the garment,

will not grow a healing scab.”

And we conclude:

Rather,

the tanna who holds that a person is not permitted to injure himself,

this tanna is he:

For it is taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar HaKappar son of Rabbi said:

What is the meaning of

in the passage concerning the nazirite [Numbers 6:11]:

“And he shall make atonement for him for what he sinned against the soul”—and for which soul did this one sin!?

Rather—

because he caused himself distress by abstaining from wine,

and therefore he is called “a sinner.”

And

from here we learn that it is forbidden for a person to cause himself distress, for

these matters

are learned by

a kal va-chomer:

They are derived as follows:

And what of this one,

the nazirite,

who did not cause

himself distress

except through wine, and is called a “sinner”; one who causes

himself distress

through every matter,

all the more so

is he called a “sinner.”

We learned in the Mishna: And

one who cuts down his fellow’s saplings

even though he is not permitted [to do so] is exempt; others are liable.

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana taught

a beraita

before Rav:

One who says to his fellow:

“You killed my ox,”

or

“You cut down my saplings,”

and demands that he pay him for his damage.

And the damager says: I will not pay you, because

“You told me to kill it”

[the ox], or

“You told me to cut it down”

[the tree], he is

exempt,

since he caused damage with the owner’s permission.

Rav said to him

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana:

“If so,

if it is as you say,

you have left no life for the creature

[you leave people no possibility of living],

for is everything in his power

to say, ‘You told me to cause damage’!?”

Rabbah bar bar Ḥana said to him

Rav:

“Shall I erase it,”

should I remove this beraita and no longer teach it, since its words are incomprehensible!?

Rav said to him

Rav:

“No,”

do not erase it, but

translate

and explain

your Mishna,

your beraita,

with regard to an ox

that had killed,

which was destined to be killed, and with regard to a tree

that leaned toward the public domain, and he feared lest the tree fall upon a person and kill him, and likewise with regard to an ashera tree, which must be cut down and cast away; therefore

it

is

destined to be cut down.”

And we wonder:

“If so,

since the ox is destined to be killed and the tree to be cut down,

what is he claiming against him

the owner of the ox and the tree, and what is he demanding from him!? After all, the one who killed and the one who cut down acted properly and correctly”!?

And we explain:

For he says to him,

the claimant:

“I wanted to perform this mitzva,”

and one who snatches a mitzva from his fellow is obligated to compensate him.

For it is taught

in a beraita: It is stated concerning the mitzva of covering the blood [Leviticus 17:13]: “He shall pour out its blood [after slaughter] and cover it with earth,” and we expound:

“He shall pour out”—

“and he shall cover”: the one who poured out

the blood has acquired the mitzva, and he

shall cover

the blood with earth.

And it happened that one man slaughtered, and his fellow came first and covered

his blood with earth,

and Rabban Gamaliel obligated him to give him

the slaughterer

ten gold coins,

compensation for having snatched his mitzva from him.

It is stated in the Torah [Deuteronomy 20:19–20]: “When you besiege a city for many days, waging war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an ax against them, for from it you shall eat, and you shall not cut it down; for is the tree of the field a person, to come before you in the siege? Only a tree that you know is not a food tree, it you may destroy and cut down, and you shall build a siege-work against the city that makes war with you, until it falls.”

Rav said: A date palm that produces a kav

[a date tree that produces dates in the measure of one kav each year ] is a “food tree,” and

it is forbidden to cut it down,

even though it does not produce very many fruits; but if it produces less than a kav per year, it is permitted to cut it down.

He raised an objection

from a Mishna [Sheviit 4:10]:

“How much must an olive tree have before one may not cut it down”

[how many fruits must the olive tree produce, so that it is forbidden to cut it down] because of “You shall not destroy its trees by wielding an ax against them, for from it you shall eat, and you shall not cut it down”?

A quarter

of a kav of olives. And what is the reason that Rav said that the measure of the prohibition is a kav of fruit!?

And we answer:

the olives are different, for they are important

than other trees; therefore, if the olive tree bears a quarter-kav, it is forbidden to cut it down, but with a date palm anything that does not bear a kav, it is permitted to cut it down from it.

Rabbi Hanina said:

The prohibition against cutting down fruit trees is a severe prohibition, and

did not die

deceased

Shivhat Bari

that was his name,

but

because

he cut down a fig tree before its time

before its time, when it was still bearing fruit.

Ravina said: And if it was

the tree

valuable for its wood, it is permitted

to cut it down. That is to say, if the beams of the tree are worth more for construction than the value of the tree’s fruit, it is permitted to cut it down, because the Torah prohibited cutting down a fruit tree only as an act of destruction, but when there is a benefit in cutting down the tree, it is permitted to cut it down.

It was taught likewise

in accordance with the words of Ravina: It is written, “Only the tree that you know is not a fruit tree, you may destroy and cut down,” and it is a superfluous verse, for it should have written, “Only that which is not a fruit tree,” and Scripture lengthened its wording only for an exposition.

And thus we interpret the verse:

“Only the tree that you know” —

this is a fruit tree,

and even it is permitted to cut down for the needs of the siege.

“For it is not a fruit tree” —

this is a barren tree

which it is permitted to cut down.

And if you ask:

But since in the end we include every thing,

for even a fruit tree is permitted to be cut down because of the siege, then

what does the verse state: “For it is not a fruit tree”!?

That is to say, why was the cutting down of a barren tree mentioned in the verse, if it is permitted to cut down even a fruit tree? For it is a kal va-chomer, and we know by ourselves that it is possible to cut down a barren tree!?

Your answer: Scripture did not mention a barren tree except to teach us

to precede

the cutting down of a

barren tree before the

fruit

tree.

For indeed, if you know of no tree near the siege except a fruit tree, you may cut it down; but if there is a barren tree there, you must cut it down and not the fruit tree.