Bava Kamma 91b (צא:) — the Talmud in English

And it teaches

in the Mishna:

“One who injures himself, although he is not permitted to do so, is exempt,”

This implies that it is also forbidden to shame oneself! And we answer:

This is what

Rabbi Akiva

is saying to him: “It is not necessary to state this with regard to shame, since a person is permitted to shame himself;

therefore, it is clear that one who shames him is liable to pay, even though he, too, shamed himself.

Rather, even with regard to injury

and damage,

for a person is not permitted to injure himself,

nevertheless,

others who injured him

cannot exempt themselves by saying: Since he, too, violated a prohibition and injured himself, why should we be liable for what we did to him? Rather—

they are liable

to pay him for his injury.

And we question this:

A

re

you saying that a person is not permitted to injure himself!?

A person who swore to do something and did not fulfill his oath is liable to bring a sin-offering. As it is stated [Leviticus 5:4–6]: “Or if a person swears, expressing with his lips to do harm or to do good, whatever a person expresses in an oath, and it is hidden from him, and he knows of it, then he is guilty. And he shall bring his guilt-offering to the Lord for the sin that he committed, a female from the flock, a ewe or a female goat, as a sin-offering; and the kohen shall atone for him for his sin.”

A

nd

it is taught

in a beraita:

One might

say: A person who

swore to do harm to himself [

to do something harmful to himself]

but did not do so—would he be exempt

from a sin-offering for his oath?

The verse teaches

[this matter is learned from the words of the verse]:

“To do harm or to do good.”

The verse equates doing harm with doing good.

Just as doing good

mentioned by the verse, when one swears to benefit himself, refers to a benefit that is

permitted,

so too, doing harm

mentioned by the verse refers to

permitted

harm, and the verse is not speaking of prohibited harm.

I will bring

We can learn from here that one who

swore to do harm to himself but did not do so

is liable, since a person has the right to harm himself.

The following difficulty must now be raised: This beraita explicitly indicates that a person is permitted to harm himself, whereas the Mishna states that a person is forbidden to injure himself!?

Said [

he answered]

Shmuel:

The beraita’s statement that a person is permitted to harm himself is not referring to a person who injures and damages his body. Rather, it is referring

t

o a person who swore and said:

“I will fast,”

and there is no prohibition against fasting.

We question this: The continuation of the beraita compares one who swears to harm himself with one who swears to harm others. And if swearing to harm himself means swearing to fast,

similarly [

in a comparable manner],

with regard to harming others,

this would mean

making them fast.

Others—

who could make them fast!?

Fasting depends on the will of the one who fasts, so how can one person make others fast!?

And we answer:

Yes!

A person does have the ability to make others fast,

by locking them in a room [

when he confines them in a room] without food, so that they cannot eat, and consequently they are fasting.

A

nd we refute this: It is impossible to interpret “harming others” as making them fast, since

t

he

same beraita

teaches:

What is “harming others”?—

One who said:

“I will strike

a

certain person and crush his skull.”

And just as “harming others” refers to injuring, striking, and crushing the skull, and not to fasting, so too, “harming oneself” refers to injury. But according to the Mishna, a person is forbidden to injure himself; how then does the beraita say that a person is permitted to injure himself!?

And we conclude:

Rather,

it is taught as a dispute between

tann

m,

aim,

and there is one who says:

A person is not permitted to injure himself,

and this is the view of our Mishna.

And there is one who says: A person is permitted to injure himself,

and this is the view of the beraita.

The Gemara discusses this:

Who

is the

tanna whom you have heard say: ‘A person is not permitted to injure himself’?

If you say [

if it is said]:

It is this tanna

of the following beraita,

as it is taught: “But your blood, belonging to your souls, I will demand” [

Genesis 9:5],

Rabbi Elazar says: ‘From your souls’—

from one who kills himself,

I will demand your blood.

And it is stated: Just as it is forbidden for a person to kill himself, as Rabbi Elazar expounded, so too it is forbidden for a person to injure and harm himself.

And we reject this:

But perhaps

Rabbi Elazar holds that a person is permitted to injure himself, while

killing is different,

since murder is more serious than ordinary striking and injury.

The question remains: Who is the tanna who says that a person is not permitted to injure himself?

Rather,

one must say:

It is this tanna

of the following beraita

who

is the source:

The Torah states [Leviticus 18:3], “You shall not follow their statutes”—that is, you shall not follow the ways of the gentiles. Therefore, it is forbidden to act in the manner of the Amorites. As it is taught: “One rends his garment over the dead, and this is not among the ways of the Amorites,”

that is, it is permitted to rend one’s garment over the dead, and this does not violate the prohibition against following the ways of the Amorites, because he does so out of grief; “the ways of the Amorites” are practices they performed for licentiousness or idolatry.

Rabbi Elazar said: “I heard

from my teachers

that one who rends excessively over the dead

is flogged because of ‘Do not destroy.’”

A

nd if Rabbi Elazar prohibited rending and damaging his garment,

all the more so

is it forbidden to injure his

body.

A

nd we reject this: It is not proof, since

perhaps

rending

garments is different, because the loss

and damage

is irreversible,

and one cannot prove from here that it is forbidden to injure and wound oneself, since a wound can heal.

As in the case of Rabbi Yohanan, who called his garments “those that honor him” [

Rabbi Yohanan referred to his garments as “those that honor him”].

And Rav Hisda, when he walked among the thorn bushes and the shrubs

would lift his garments [

when he walked among thorns, he lifted his garments so that they would not tear], but he was not concerned that his body might be scratched and wounded.

For

he said: “This,

the wound on my body,

will heal

and recover,

whereas this,

the tear in the garment,

will not heal.”

And we conclude:

Rather,

the tanna who holds that a person is not permitted to injure himself

is this tanna:

As it is taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Elazar HaKappar, son of Rabbi, said:

What is the meaning

of the verse in the passage concerning a nazirite [Numbers 6:11]:

“And he shall make atonement for him for what he sinned against the soul”—and for which soul did this person sin!?

Rather—

because he caused himself distress by abstaining from wine,

and therefore he is called “a sinner.”

A

nd from here we learn that a person is forbidden to cause himself distress, for

these words

are learned through

a kal va-chomer.

They are derived as follows:

And if this

nazirite,

who caused himself no distress

except by abstaining

from wine, is called “a sinner,” one who causes himself distress

in

every regard,

all the more so

is he called “a sinner.”

We learned in the Mishna:

And one who cuts down his fellow’s saplings

although he is not permitted to do so is exempt; others are liable.

Rabba bar bar Hana taught

a beraita

before Rav:

One who says to his fellow:

“You killed my ox,”

or

“You cut down my saplings,”

and demands that he pay for the damage.

The damager says: I will not pay you, because

you told me to kill it [

the ox], or

you told me to cut it down [

the tree]; he is

exempt,

since he caused the damage with the owner’s permission.

Rav said to him,

to Rabba bar bar Hana:

“If so,

if your statement is correct,

you leave no possibility for people to live [

you leave people no way to make a living],

for is he really entitled

to say, ‘You told me to cause the damage’!?”

Rabba bar bar Hana said to him,

to Rav:

“Shall I remove it,”

that is, should I set this beraita aside and no longer teach it, since its words are unintelligible!?

Rav said to him:

Rav:

“No,”

do not remove it. Rather,

interpret

and explain

your Mishna,

your beraita,

as referring to an ox

that had killed,

and to a tree

that leans over a public thoroughfare, so that one fears it may fall on someone and kill him, and likewise to an ashera tree, which must be cut down and discarded; therefore,

it

t

is destined to be cut down.

And we question this:

If so,

since the ox is destined to be killed and the tree to be cut down,

what is the owner claiming against him,

and what is he demanding from him!? The one who killed the ox or cut down the tree acted properly and correctly!?

And we explain:

He said to him,

the claimant said:

“I wanted to perform this mitzva,

and one who snatches a mitzva from another is obligated to compensate him.

As it is taught

in a beraita: It is stated concerning the mitzva of covering the blood [Leviticus 17:13]: “He shall pour out its blood [through slaughter] and cover it with earth,” and we expound:

“He shall pour out”—

“and cover”: The one who poured out

the blood has merited the mitzva, and he

shall cover

the blood with earth.

And there was an incident involving one who slaughtered, and his fellow came first and covered

his blood with earth,

and Rabban Gamliel obligated him to give

the slaughterer

ten gold coins,

as compensation for snatching his mitzva from him.

The Torah states [Deuteronomy 20:19–20]: “When you besiege a city for many days, making war against it to capture it, you shall not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them, for you may eat from it, and you shall not cut it down; for is the tree of the field a person, to come under siege before you? Only a tree that you know is not a tree for food, it you may destroy and cut down, and you may build a siege against the city that is waging war against you until it falls.”

Rav said: A date palm that yields a kav [

a palm tree that produces dates in the measure of one kav every year ] is considered a “food tree,” and

it is forbidden to cut it down,

even though it does not produce a great quantity of fruit; but if it produces less than a kav per year, it is permitted to cut it down.

The Gemara raises an objection

from a Mishna [Shevi’it 4:10]:

“How much must an olive tree produce before one may not cut it down” [

how much fruit must an olive tree bear for it to be forbidden to cut it down] because of “You shall not destroy its trees by wielding an axe against them, for you may eat from it, and you shall not cut it down”?

A quarter

of a kav of olives. And why did Rav say that the measure for the prohibition is a kav of fruit!?

And we answer:

The olives are different, as they are significant

more than other trees. Therefore, if an olive tree bears a reva of a kav, it is forbidden to cut it down; but in the case of a date palm, anything that does not bear a kav may be cut down.

Rabbi Ḥanina said:

The prohibition against cutting down fruit trees is a severe prohibition, and

Shibhat Bari did not die

[that is, he did not pass away]

except

[that was his name]

because

of the fact that

he cut down a fig tree before its time

[before its time], when it was still bearing fruit.

Ravina said: And if it was

the tree

worth more as timber, it is permitted

to cut it down. That is, if the tree's logs are worth more for construction than the value of the tree's fruit, it is permitted to cut it down, because the Torah prohibited cutting down a fruit tree only as an act of wanton destruction, but when there is a benefit in cutting down the tree, it is permitted to cut it down.

It was taught likewise

in accordance with Ravina's statement: It is written: “Only the tree that you know is not a fruit tree, that you may destroy and cut down.” The verse is redundant, for it could have written, “Only that which is not a fruit tree”; the verse lengthened its wording only for the purpose of exposition.

And this is how we interpret the verse:

“Only the tree that you know”—

this is a fruit tree,

and even it may be cut down for the needs of the siege.

“For it is not a fruit tree”—

this is a non-fruit-bearing tree

that it is permitted to cut down.

And if you ask:

But since in the end we include everything,

since even a fruit tree may be cut down because of the siege, if so,

what does the verse mean by saying: “For it is not a fruit tree”!?

That is, why did the verse mention cutting down a non-fruit-bearing tree, if even a fruit tree may be cut down? It follows by means of a kal va-chomer, and we therefore know on our own that a non-fruit-bearing tree may be cut down!?

Your answer is: The verse mentioned a non-fruit-bearing tree only in order to teach us

to precede

the cutting down of a

non-fruit-bearing

tree to that of a

fruit tree.

For indeed, if near the siege you know of only a fruit tree, you are permitted to cut it down; but if there is a non-fruit-bearing tree there, you must cut it down, and not the fruit tree.