Bava Kamma 86a — the Talmud in English

And

so too,

if one injures another person on Yom Kippur

even if he inflicted an open wound upon him

he is liable for all of them

—damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation. Even though he becomes liable to receive karet, he is not exempt from paying, since there is no court-imposed death penalty for performing labor on Yom Kippur.

This phrase, “he did not inflict

an injury

upon him,”

which is taught in the first clause of the Mishna,

what are the circumstances?

How is this case understood?

Is it not referring, for example, to a case where he struck his hand and it will eventually recover,

and

even so

it teaches: He is liable for all of them

—with “damage” included. Learn from this that when the temporary loss of use of a limb lowers its monetary value, although the limb will eventually recover, the offender pays “damage,” and not only “loss of livelihood.”

We reject this:

the Sages say

the members of the academy:

Here we are dealing with a case where he deafened him but did not inflict an open wound upon him,

and in this manner he is obligated to pay him for damage, pain, medical expenses, and humiliation.

We challenge this:

but

he

Rabba said: One who deafens his father

—that is, one who struck his father and made him deaf—

is executed, because deafening cannot occur

in the ear

without an open wound,

because

a drop of blood

a drop of blood

fell into his ear

—into his ear.

If so, it is impossible to explain the first clause of the Mishna as referring to a case where he deafened him, since if he deafened him, there is also an open wound!

It necessarily follows that “he did not inflict an open wound upon him” refers to a case where he struck his hand and it will eventually recover. And you can therefore learn from it that he pays damage when the temporary injury lowers the hand’s monetary value.

We reject this:

rather, here we are dealing with a case where he shaved him,

and thereby reduced his monetary value without inflicting an open wound.

The Gemara asks: If

he shaved him,

then

it will grow back

—it will eventually grow and return—

and this is precisely the question we raised.

What is the difference between a hand that became paralyzed but will eventually recover and hair that was shaved off but will eventually grow back? Let us resolve Rabba’s question from here!

We reject this:

the Sages say

the members of the academy:

Here we are dealing with a case where he applied a depilatory substance to him

—a substance that removes hair—

that does not grow back

—the hair does not return and grow.

The Gemara explains how all five types of payment can apply in such a case:

Damage: Since this is a defect, it reduces his monetary value.

Pain —

for example,

he has fissures

cracks and depressions

on his head,

and those fissures cause him pain

—he suffers pain in those depressions because of the harsh substance.

Medical expenses —

because he requires treatment

for the pain that the substance causes in the depressions.

Loss of livelihood —

for example,

he was

the injured person

a performer who danced in taverns and needed to display his face on his head, but he could not display it because of the fissures.

He was accustomed to dance in shops and display various comic expressions with his face, as clowns do, but because of the depressions he cannot do so until he recovers. Even though he was not prevented from performing other labor, he is given this payment for loss of livelihood, since this particular activity was his trade.

Humiliation —

there is no greater humiliation than this,

to be bald without hair.

What was a question for Rabba was obvious to Abaye in one direction and to Rava in the other direction.

That is, Rabba was uncertain whether one pays damage when the temporary injury lowers the person’s monetary value, whereas Abaye had no doubt and held simply that he pays damage, while Rava had no doubt and held that he pays only loss of livelihood. The Gemara proceeds to explain:

It was stated: If he struck his hand, it became paralyzed, and it will eventually recover —

Abaye said:

Since its value has now been reduced,

he gives him the greater loss-of-livelihood payment

damage

and

also

the lesser loss-of-livelihood payment.

That is, loss of livelihood is assessed according to the work of a person who cannot perform labor with his hand. Although, once he recovers, he will be fit for every type of labor, since he has been paid the value of his hand, he is not paid according to the earnings of a fully capable person, but according to the earnings of a person whose hand is unfit for labor.

And Rava said: He does not give him “

damage”

but only the value of his loss of livelihood,

until his hand returns to its former state. Since he has not paid him the value of his hand, he gives him loss of livelihood

for each and every day

as laborers are hired in the marketplace, and not merely the wage of a watchman of squash fields.

It was stated: If one cuts off the hand of another person’s Hebrew slave,

the slave remains permanently disabled, and his master completely loses the labor that he performed when he was physically whole; during the period of his illness, the master also loses the labor that the slave will be capable of performing after he recovers.

Abaye said: He gives the greater loss-of-livelihood payment

the value of his hand

to the slave,

because the slave’s body has declined in value, and it is to him that the offender must pay the damage. But the offender does not pay the master for the labor that the slave can no longer perform as he did previously.

And

he likewise gives

the lesser loss-of-livelihood payment

at the rate of a watchman of squash fields for all the days that he is bedridden

to the master

for the labor of the slave that the master loses during this period.

Rava said: Between the “greater loss-of-livelihood payment” [damage] and the “lesser loss-of-livelihood payment” [the wage of a watchman of squash fields],

Both “great loss of livelihood” [damage] and “minor loss of livelihood” [the wage of a cucumber watcher]

all of it is given to the slave

since he is the injured party,

and with it

the slave

should purchase land, while the master eats

the

produce

of the land throughout the period that the slave works for him, until he goes free.

The Gemara explains:

It is obvious

—this is obvious—where

the slave’s value was reduced for himself but was not reduced for his master

—the slave’s value declined because he became disabled, but he was not prevented from performing his labor—

what are the circumstances?

For example,

he cut off

cut

the tip of his ear

his ear

or the tip of his nostril. In such a case, it is obvious that

In such a case it is obvious that

everything belongs to him,

because the master suffered no loss.

The slave’s value was reduced

by the injury, for himself, and

for his master

as well—for example, he cut off his hand. This is

the dispute between Abaye and Rava:

According to Abaye, the greater loss-of-livelihood payment goes to the master and the lesser payment goes to the slave; according to Rava, everything goes to the slave, who purchases land with it and the master eats the produce.

We learned in the Mishna:

Humiliation —

everything depends on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated.

The Gemara explains:

Whose opinion is expressed in the Mishna?

According to whose opinion was our Mishna taught?

It is not Rabbi Meir’s

opinion,

and it is not Rabbi Yehuda’s

opinion,

but

it was taught according to the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon.

It was taught in accordance with his opinion.

As it is taught

in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna:

And all of them,

whether wealthy or poor people who humiliated them, the poor person is not assessed according to his poverty, to reduce the payment, nor is the wealthy person assessed according to his wealth, to increase the payment, but

we view them as though they were free people

and not slaves, who are not wealthy but rather

have lost their possessions,

and they are not assessed at a lower value than this. Everyone is considered equal in this regard,

for

they

are the descendants of

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Judah says:

not all are equal concerning the matter of humiliation, but

the great

is assessed

according to his greatness, and

the humiliation of

the small

is assessed

according to his smallness.

Rabbi Shimon says:

each one is not assessed according to what he is; rather,

the rich are regarded

in order to assess their humiliation

as though they were free men who had gone down from their property;

the poor

are assessed

as the lowest among them

among the poor, and leniently, since he is poor, his humiliation is lighter than that of a rich person.

Now, whose is

the Mishna?

If it is Rabbi Meir,

it says הרי

the Mishna teaches: Everything is according to the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated,

and each and every one is assessed according to what he is,

and

if according to the view of

Rabbi Meir, they are all one with one another

all are equal!?

And if

you say it is

Rabbi Judah,

it says הרי

the Mishna teaches

below, on page b:

One who humiliates a blind person is liable, whereas Rabbi Judah says

a blind person has no humiliation!?

Rather, is it not so

that you are compelled to say:

it is Rabbi Shimon.

And we reject this:

You may even say

you can say

it is Rabbi Judah, because

when

Rabbi Judah said: A blind person has no humiliation,

that is

to take from him, meaning that if the blind person humiliated others, money is not taken out of him, and Rabbi Judah derives this from verses

below.

But to give to him,

that is, to obligate one who humiliated him,

we give to him,

and the Mishna that teaches: One who humiliates a blind person is liable, works out well even according to Rabbi Judah. And our Mishna too, which teaches: Everything is according to the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated, can also be established according to Rabbi Judah.

And we respond:

And

it is nevertheless impossible to establish our Mishna according to Rabbi Judah, for

since the latter clause teaches

of the Mishna on page b:

One who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, and a sleeping person who humiliates is exempt, and it does not teach

also: One who humiliates a blind person is liable,

and a blind person who humiliates is exempt,

by inference

the tanna of our Mishna holds

it makes no difference this way or that way,

and there is no distinction between one who humiliates a blind person and a blind person who humiliates; in both cases he is liable. If so, the Mishna is not according to Rabbi Judah.

Rather, it is clear

a clear and evident matter:

the Mishna is Rabbi Shimon's,

and not Rabbi Meir's, and not Rabbi Judah's.

The Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna for that which the Sages taught in a beraita

who is the tanna who taught the following beraita?

A person who

intended to humiliate the small and

did not

humiliate

him, but

the great, he gives the great

who was humiliated the amount of

the value of the humiliation of

the

small

whom he had thought to humiliate.

A person who intended

to humiliate a slave and humiliated a free man

in his place,

gives that

person, the

free man,

the amount of

the value of the humiliation of the slave

whom he had thought to humiliate.

Whose is

the Mishna? It cannot be established

not

according to

Rabbi Meir, nor

according to

Rabbi Judah, nor

according to

Rabbi Shimon!?

And we explain the difficulty:

It enters your mind

that what is

“small”

that it teaches means

small in property

poor, and what is

“great”

that it teaches means

great in property

rich.

If so, according to whom should this beraita be established?

If it is Rabbi Meir,

the tanna of the beraita, it is impossible to say so, for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Meir:

they are all one with one another

all are equal in the payment of their humiliation, whereas the beraita makes clear that there are “the value of the humiliation of the great” and “the value of the humiliation of the small”!?

And if it is Rabbi Judah,

the tanna of the beraita, this too is impossible to say, for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Judah [page 87a]:

slaves have no humiliation, whereas the beraita makes clear that there is “the value of the humiliation of a slave”!?

whereas the beraita indicates that there is “the monetary value of the humiliation of a slave”!?

And if

the tanna of the beraita is

Rabbi Shimon,

this too is difficult: for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Shimon:

If he intended to humiliate this one and humiliated that one, he is exempt.

And we explain:

What is the reason?

That is, from where do we know that Rabbi Shimon exempts one who humiliates in this case?

As with killing

homicide:

just as in killing

according to Rabbi Shimon he is not liable

until he intends for him, as it is written

Deuteronomy 19:11:

“and he lay in wait for him and rose up against him

and struck him mortally and he died,” and Rabbi Shimon expounds: “and he lay in wait for him” —

until he intends for him.

Humiliation too

according to Rabbi Shimon he is not liable

until

he intends for him, as it is written

Deuteronomy 25:11: “When men fight together, a man and his brother, and the wife of one approaches to rescue her husband from the hand of the one striking him,

and she sends forth her hand and grasps his genitals.”

And here too Rabbi Shimon will expound: “his genitals” —

until he intends for him.

If so, according to whose view should we establish the beraita? For it cannot be established according to Rabbi Meir or according to Rabbi Judah, and not even according to Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon exempts one who intended to humiliate this one and humiliated that one, whereas the beraita obligates!?

And we answer:

In fact

the tanna of the beraita

is Rabbi Judah

indeed,

and when Rabbi Judah says: Slaves have no humiliation,

it is not because slaves are not subject to humiliation, but because by a scriptural decree one who humiliates slaves is exempt, and it is unnecessary

to give them

the value of their humiliation [as he derives below, on page 88a].

But

Rabbi Judah agrees that they have humiliation, and with regard to

assessing

and evaluating the humiliation of the slave, in order to give it to the free man,

we assess him,

how much this slave [whom he intended to humiliate] would agree to have this humiliation done to him, and that assessment they give to the free man whom he humiliated.

And if you wish, say: You may even say

the tanna of the beraita is

Rabbi Meir, because

when

do you think

to explain

“great”

as

“great in property,” “small” as “small in property”,

as it entered your mind?

No,

that is not so; rather,

“great” means

truly great

in age,

and “small” means

truly small,

and one who humiliates the great is not similar to one who humiliates the small. Therefore, if he intended to humiliate the small and humiliated the great, he does not give him the value of the humiliation of the great, but the value of the humiliation of the small.

And we challenge this:

And

is

a small person subject to humiliation!?

Is he not lacking the understanding to be humiliated!?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed there is a small person who is subject to humiliation,

as Rav Pappa said

to explain another beraita, below on the page: humiliation applies to a small person

whom they embarrass and he is embarrassed

who is distressed when they mention to him something concerning which he is embarrassed.

Here too

it is so in the beraita concerning one who intended to humiliate this one and humiliated that one.