Bava Kamma 86a (פו.) — the Talmud in English

And

so:

one who injures another on Yom Kippur

even if he inflicted a wound upon him

is liable for all of them

—damage, pain, medical expenses, loss of livelihood, and humiliation—and although he incurs liability for karet, he is not exempt from payment, since there is no court-imposed death penalty for performing labor on Yom Kippur.

This phrase, “he did not inflict

a

wound,”

which is taught in the first clause,

what are the circumstances

[i.e., how is this case understood]?

Is it not referring, for example, to a case where he struck him on the hand and it is destined to recover,

and

even so

it teaches: He is liable for all of them,

with “damage” included. Infer from here that in a case of temporary disability that diminishes a person’s monetary value but is destined to recover, he pays “damage,” and not merely “loss of livelihood.”

And we reject this:

They say,

the members of the academy:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he deafened him but did not inflict a wound upon him,

and in this manner he is liable to pay him for damage, pain, medical expenses, and humiliation.

And we challenge this:

But

he

said: “One who deafens his father”

[i.e., one who struck his father and made him deaf]

is executed, because deafening is impossible

in the ear

without a wound,

since

a drop of blood

[a drop of blood]

fell into his ear

[into his ear].

If so, it is impossible to explain the first clause of the Mishna as referring to a case where he deafened him, because if he deafened him, there is also a wound!?

It must be, then, that “he did not inflict a wound”—what are the circumstances? For example, he struck him on the hand and it is destined to recover. And infer from here that he pays “damage” in a case of temporary disability that diminishes a person’s monetary value.

And we reject this:

Rather, here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he shaved him,

thereby diminishing his monetary value without inflicting a wound.

And we wonder: If he

shaved him,

then

it will grow back

[his hair will eventually grow back],

and that is precisely our dilemma:

what is the difference between a hand that withered and is destined to recover and shaving whose hair is destined to grow back? Resolve from here Rabbi’s dilemma!?

And we reject this:

They say,

the members of the academy:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he applied depilatory powder to him,

[a substance that removes the hair]

that does not grow back

[the hair does not return and grow].

And we explain how it is possible to find the five forms of payment in such a case:

Damage—for it is a disfigurement and diminishes his monetary value.

Pain—

for example,

he has scabs

[cracked lesions—pockmarks]

on his head,

and the scabs hurt him

[he suffers pain in those lesions because of the harsh substance].

Medical expenses—

for he requires treatment

for the pain caused by the substance to the lesions.

Loss of livelihood—

for example,

the injured person was

accustomed to

dancing in shops, displaying various comic performances with his head, but he cannot display them because of the scabs.

[He was accustomed to dance in shops and display various amusing acts with his head, as jesters do, but because of the lesions he cannot do so until he recovers.] Although he has not been prevented from other labor, he pays him for this loss of livelihood, since this is the person’s particular trade.

Humiliation—

there is no greater humiliation than this,

to be bald without hair.

And what was a dilemma for Rabbi was obvious to Abaye in one direction and to Rava in the opposite direction.

That is, Rabbi was uncertain whether he pays damage in a case of “temporary disability that diminishes a person’s monetary value”; Abaye and Rava had no uncertainty about the matter. To Abaye, one side was obvious—that he pays him damage—whereas to Rava the other side was obvious—that he pays only for loss of livelihood. The Gemara proceeds to explain:

It was stated: If he struck him on the hand and it withered, but it is destined to recover—

Abaye said:

Since its value has now diminished,

he gives him great loss of livelihood

[damage]

and

also

minor loss of livelihood,

that is, “loss of livelihood” is assessed according to the trade of a person who does not work with his hands. Although, when he recovers, he will be fit for every labor, since he paid him the monetary value of his hand, he does not pay him the value of the labor of a fully able person, but rather the value of the labor of a person whose hand is unfit for labor.

And Rava said: He does not give him “

damage”

but only the monetary value of his loss of livelihood,

until his hand returns to its former state. Since he has not paid him the monetary value of his hand, he gives him loss of livelihood

for each and every day

[as laborers are hired in the marketplace], and not merely the wage of a cucumber watcher.

It was stated: One who cuts off the hand of another’s Hebrew slave,

with the result that the slave remains permanently disfigured, while his master loses entirely the labor he performed when he was whole, and during his illness the master also loses the labor of which he will be capable after he recovers.

Abaye said: He gives him “great loss of livelihood”

[the monetary value of his hand ]

to the slave,

since the slave’s body has diminished in value, and he is the one to whom the injurer must pay the damage; but the injurer does not pay the master for the labor that the slave can no longer perform as he did previously.

And

so he gives

minor loss of livelihood

[the wage of a cucumber watcher for all the days that he is confined to bed]

to the master

for the labor of the slave that the master loses during this period.

Rava said:

Both “great loss of livelihood” [damage] and “minor loss of livelihood” [the wage of a cucumber watcher]

are all given to the slave

since he is the injured party,

and with it

the slave

will purchase land, and the master will consume

the

produce

of the land throughout the entire period during which the slave is to work, until he is emancipated.

And we explain:

It is obvious

[this is self-evident], where

the diminution was for himself but not for his master

[the slave’s value fell because he became disfigured, but he was not prevented from his labor]. And

what are the circumstances?

For example,

he cut off

[cut]

the tip of his ear

[his ear]

or the tip of his nostril.

In such a case it is obvious that

everything goes to himself,

because the master loses nothing.

The diminution

of the slave’s value was caused by the injury with regard to himself, and also

with regard to his master,

for example, he cut off his hand. This is

the dispute between Abaye and Rava:

According to Abaye, the master receives the great loss of livelihood and the slave receives the minor loss of livelihood; according to Rava, everything goes to the slave, who purchases land with it and the master consumes the produce.

We learned in the Mishna:

Humiliation—

everything depends on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated.

And we explain:

Whose opinion is the Mishna?

According to whose view was our Mishna taught?

It is not Rabbi Meir,

nor

Rabbi Yehuda;

rather,

it is

according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon.

It was taught in accordance with his opinion.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

And all of them,

whether rich or poor who were humiliated, are not assessed according to the poverty of the poor person, to be lenient, nor according to the wealth of the rich person, to be stringent, but

we view them as though they were freemen

and not slaves, who are not wealthy but

have lost their possessions,

and they are not assessed at less than that; everyone is equal in this matter,

for

they

are descendants of

Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

These are

the words of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

not everyone is assessed in the same manner with regard to this matter. Rather, the humiliation of

the prominent person

is assessed

according to his prominence, and the humiliation of

the

less prominent person

is assessed

according to his lesser status.

Rabbi Shimon says:

each person is not assessed according to his actual status. Rather,

the wealthy are viewed

in order to assess their humiliation

as though they were free people who had lost their possessions;

the poor

are assessed

as the least among them [the poor], and leniently, for since he is poor, his humiliation is less than that of a wealthy person.

Now, whose view does the Mishna follow?

If it is Rabbi Meir’s,

the Mishna

states:

“Everything is according to the status of the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated,”

and each one is assessed according to his status.

If,

according to

Rabbi Meir,

they are all equal to one another [they are all equal]!?

everyone is equal, then why does the Mishna say this?

And if

you would say that it follows

Rabbi Yehuda’s

view, the Mishna

states [below, on the next side]:

“One who humiliates a blind person is liable, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says:

A blind person has no humiliation!?”

a blind person is not subject to humiliation!?

Rather, it must be

that

it follows Rabbi Shimon’s view.

And we reject this:

You may even say [you can say] that it follows

you can say that

Rabbi Yehuda’s

view, because

when Rabbi Yehuda said: A blind person has no humiliation,

he meant

to collect from him—that is, if a blind person humiliates others, money is not collected from him. And Rabbi Yehuda derives this from verses [below].

below.

But with regard to giving to him,

that is, obligating one who humiliated him,

we give it to him,

and the Mishna that states, “One who humiliates a blind person is liable,” can be explained well even according to Rabbi Yehuda. Likewise, our Mishna, which states, “Everything is according to the status of the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated,” can also be established according to Rabbi Yehuda.

And we answer:

But

it is impossible to establish our Mishna according to Rabbi Yehuda, for

since it states in the latter clause [of the Mishna, on the next side]:

“One who humiliates a sleeping person is liable, and a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt,”

but it does not also state:

“One who humiliates a blind person is liable, and

a blind person who humiliates another is exempt,”

it follows that

the tanna of the Mishna

makes no distinction between this case and that case: there is no distinction between one who humiliates a blind person and a blind person who humiliates another; in both cases he is liable. If so, the Mishna does not follow Rabbi Yehuda.

there is no distinction between one who humiliates a blind person and a blind person who humiliates another; in both cases he is liable. Therefore, the Mishna is not according to Rabbi Yehuda.

Rather, it is clear [it is a clear and evident matter]:

this is the clear and evident conclusion:

the Mishna follows Rabbi Shimon’s view,

and not Rabbi Meir’s or Rabbi Yehuda’s.

The Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna of this teaching that the Sages taught [who is the tanna who taught the following beraita]?

who is the tanna who taught the following beraita?

A person who

intended to humiliate a minor but

did not

humiliate

him, but

humiliated an adult, gives the adult

who was humiliated an amount equal to

the monetary value of the humiliation of the

the

minor

whom he had intended to humiliate.

A person who intended

to humiliate a slave but humiliated a free person

in his place

gives the

person, the

free person

an amount equal to

the monetary value of the humiliation of the slave

whom he had intended to humiliate.

Whose view is this?

The Mishna cannot be established

either

according to

Rabbi Meir, nor

according to

Rabbi Yehuda, nor

according to

Rabbi Shimon!?

We explain the question:

It might have entered your mind that the meaning of

that what is meant by

“minor”

as stated here is

a minor in possessions [a poor person], and the meaning of

a poor person, and what is meant by

“adult”

as stated here is

an adult in possessions [a wealthy person].

a wealthy person.

If so, according to whose view should this beraita be established?

If it follows Rabbi Meir,

who is the tanna of the beraita, this cannot be said, for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Meir:

they are all equal to one another [they are all equal] with regard to payment for their humiliation, whereas the beraita indicates that there is “the monetary value of the humiliation of an adult” and “the monetary value of the humiliation of a minor”!?

everyone is equal in their payment for humiliation, whereas the beraita indicates that there is “the monetary value of the humiliation of an adult” and “the monetary value of the humiliation of a minor”!?

And if it follows Rabbi Yehuda,

who is the tanna of the beraita, this too cannot be said, for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Yehuda [87a]:

slaves have no humiliation, whereas the beraita indicates that there is “the monetary value of the humiliation of a slave”!?

whereas the beraita indicates that there is “the monetary value of the humiliation of a slave”!?

And if the tanna of the beraita is

the tanna of the beraita is

Rabbi Shimon,

this too is difficult, for

he

indeed

said,

Rabbi Shimon:

If he intended to humiliate one person but humiliated another, he is exempt.

We explain:

What is the reason?

That is, from where do we know that Rabbi Shimon exempts one who humiliates in this case?

As with killing: [homicide]

Homicide.

just as with killing,

according to Rabbi Shimon, he is not liable

until he intends for him, as it is written

[Deuteronomy 19:11]:

“But if a man hates his neighbor, and lies in wait for him and rises against him

and strikes him mortally so that he dies,” and Rabbi Shimon interprets: “and lies in wait for him”—

until he intends for him.

The same applies to humiliation:

according to Rabbi Shimon, he is not liable

until

he intends for him, as it is written

[Deuteronomy 25:11]: “When men fight together, one with the other, and the wife of one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of the one striking him,

and she extends her hand and grasps his private parts.”

And here too Rabbi Shimon will expound: “his private parts”—

until he intends for him.

If so, according to whose view should we establish the beraita? It cannot be established according to Rabbi Meir or Rabbi Yehuda, nor according to Rabbi Shimon, since Rabbi Shimon exempts one who intended to humiliate one person but humiliated another, whereas the beraita declares him liable!?

And we answer:

Actually [indeed],

the tanna of the beraita is

Rabbi Yehuda

who is its tanna.

And when Rabbi Yehuda says: Slaves have no humiliation,

it is not because slaves are incapable of experiencing humiliation. Rather, by a scriptural decree, one who humiliates slaves is exempt, and he need not

give them [give them] the monetary value of their humiliation [as he will derive below, 88a].

the value of their humiliation [as Rabbi Yehuda derives below, 88a].

But

Rabbi Yehuda agrees that they do experience humiliation. And with regard

to assessing

and evaluating the humiliation of the slave, in order to give the free person

we assess them—

how much this slave [whom he intended to humiliate] would agree to be paid in order to have this humiliation inflicted upon him. And that assessment is given to the free person whom he humiliated.

And if you wish, say: You may even say

that the tanna of the beraita is

Rabbi Meir,

because

do you think

that it should be interpreted as follows:

“adult”—

an adult in possessions; “minor”—

a minor in possessions,

as it might have entered your mind?

No,

that is not the meaning. Rather,

“adult”—

an actual adult [in age],

in age,

and “minor”—

an actual minor.

One who humiliates an adult is not comparable to one who humiliates a minor. Therefore, if he intended to humiliate the minor but humiliated the adult, he does not give him the monetary value of the adult’s humiliation, but rather the monetary value of the minor’s humiliation.

And we challenge this:

But

is a

minor capable of humiliation!?

Is he not lacking the awareness necessary to experience humiliation!?

And we answer:

Yes,

indeed, there is a minor who is capable of experiencing humiliation,

as Rav Pappa said

in explaining another beraita [below, on the next side]: A minor is subject to humiliation

when he is embarrassed and does feel embarrassed [when he is distressed when something of which he is ashamed is mentioned to him].

who feels distress when something about which he is ashamed is mentioned to him.

Here too,

the same applies to the beraita concerning one who intended to humiliate one person but humiliated another.