Bava Kamma 83b (פג:) — the Talmud in English

A person

who injures his fellow,

is liable

to pay him payments

for it,

for having injured him,

because of

five matters:

1. He is liable

for

payment of

damage,

as it is stated [Exodus 21:24]: “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot.” It will be explained below that the verse does not mean the actual removal of a limb; rather, the person who injured him gives him the value of his eye or tooth.

2.

For pain,

as it is stated [ibid., verse 25]: “A burn for a burn, a wound for a wound, a bruise for a bruise.” Here too, he does not cause him pain in the place where he caused him pain; rather, he pays him the value of the pain, as the Mishna explains below.

3.

For healing

[the cost of his medical treatment].

4.

For loss of livelihood,

namely, the money he loses because of his illness, since he cannot engage in labor while he is ill, until he recovers from the injury.

The payments for healing and loss of livelihood are learned from what is stated [ibid. 18–19]: “And when men quarrel, and one strikes his fellow with a stone or with his fist, and he does not die but falls into bed; if he rises and walks outside upon his support, then the one who struck him shall be absolved; only he shall give for his loss of livelihood, and he shall surely provide for his healing.”

5.

And for humiliation,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25:11–12]: “When men fight together, one with his brother, and the wife of one approaches to save her husband from the hand of the one striking him, and she sends forth her hand and grasps his genitals” [thereby humiliating him]. “Then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall not pity her.” The Sages received that her hand is not literally cut off; rather, she pays him the money due for his humiliation.

The Mishna now details how each of the five payments for one who injures his fellow is assessed.

1.

For damage, how

is it assessed? If he

blinded

his eye

of his fellow, or

cut off his hand,

or

broke his leg.

We do not say: We assess how much this person would wish to receive in order to undergo such an injury,

but

we view him as though he were a slave

sold in the market, and assess

[evaluate]

how much he was worth

[before the injury],

and how much he is worth

now, and he pays him the difference between the two.

2. Pain,

how is it assessed? If he

burned him

[gave him a burn]

with a red-hot spit,

or

struck him

with a nail

and thereby caused him pain,

and even

if he did so

on his fingernail,

which is

a place where it does not cause

[where the blow does not cause]

a bruise,

and it turns out that there is no “damage” here, but only “pain,” he is nevertheless liable to pay him for his pain.

And how much must he pay him?

They assess [evaluate]

how much a person

who is

like him

[similar to him]

would wish to receive

money in order

to suffer in this manner.

For there is one who is delicate and pampered, and his pain is great, while there is another who is not so sensitive, and his pain is slight. Therefore, they assess a person similar to the injured party, and he gives him the value of his pain.

It now follows that they assess how much money a person like him would demand if they wished to cause him pain in exchange for payment. In the Gemara [85a] the matter will be explained.

For one person may be delicate and pampered, and his pain is great, while another person may not be as sensitive, and his pain is slight. Therefore, we assess the amount according to a person similar to the injured party, and he gives him the monetary value of his pain.

It now appears that we assess how much money a person similar to him would ask for if someone wished to cause him pain in exchange for payment; and the Gemara [85a] will explain this matter.

3.

Healing:

what is its law?

If

he struck him, he is liable to heal him.

And if

growths appeared on him,

at the place of the blow,

growths

[white blisters, pus], then

if they arose because of the blow,

they

are liable

and the one who injured him must heal him, even if they appeared only after some time and not specifically at the time of the blow. But if the growths appeared on him

not because of the blow,

for example, he was negligent with regard to himself and violated the physician’s instructions,

he is exempt,

and the one who injured him is not liable for this treatment.

And even if

it healed

the wound,

and

afterward it

reopened

[the wound opened again and returned to its former state], he must return and heal him.

And even if

it healed

the wound

and reopened

a second time,

he must heal him,

because we attribute everything to the first blow, and it had still not healed completely.

But if

it healed

the wound and recovered

completely,

and illness again appeared in that place,

he is not liable to heal him,

because we do not attribute the illness that appeared again to the continuation of the first wound; rather, it is considered an injury in its own right, and therefore the one who caused the original injury is not responsible for it.

4. How is the payment for

loss of livelihood assessed?

We do not say: Since, before he was injured, he was capable of performing difficult labor, for which he received high wages, he should therefore be paid, throughout all the days of his illness until the wound heals, as though he had been prevented from performing that important labor.

Rather,

we view him as though he were a watchman guarding gourds

from being stolen, which is easy labor and for which the wages are low. Since now he cannot even perform this labor, the one who injured him must pay him for the loss of these low earnings during his illness.

The reason that he is not paid the full wages for the work to which he was accustomed is

that he

indeed

has already been paid the value of his hand and the value of his leg

through payment for his damage. That payment includes the injured party’s loss from being unable to earn at the occupation to which he was accustomed. Since in his present condition, lacking a hand, he is fit only to guard gourds, and during his illness, until the wound heals, he cannot even perform this light work but must remain at home, the one who injured him must pay him for each day of his illness an amount equal to the wages of a watchman guarding gourds.

5. How is

humiliation assessed?

It all depends on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated. For the humiliation caused by an insignificant and lowly person is greater than that caused by a more important person, and the humiliation of an important person whom they humiliated is greater than that of an ordinary person who was humiliated. They assess how much a person like him would wish to receive in order to suffer this humiliation from the person who humiliated him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “For damage, how is it assessed? We view him as though he were a slave sold in the market, and assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth now” [and he gives him the difference between their values]. And we challenge this:

Why

does he pay him money? Did

“an eye for an eye,” says the Merciful One

[Exodus 21:24];

say

that the verse should be understood literally, and they should remove his

actual eye

as punishment for removing the injured party’s eye?!

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to interpret “an eye for an eye” as referring to an actual eye.

As it is taught

in a beraita:

Could it be

[that we say]:

If he blinded his eye

—his eye is blinded; if he severed his hand

—his hand is severed; if he broke his leg

—his leg is broken!?

The verse states

[the matter is to be learned from the words of the verse, which the Gemara cites below]: It says

“one who strikes a person,” and

it says

“one who strikes an animal,”

and you derive a gzera shava, “striking”–“striking”:

Just as

with regard to

“one who strikes an animal,”

the verse speaks

of

the matter of

payments,

and not of the punishment of “a blow for a blow,”

so too

the obligation of “an eye for an eye” that the Torah stated concerning a person who

strikes

[injures] another

person

is stated only

with regard to

the matter of

monetary payments

, and not with regard to actually removing an eye.

And if you wish

[to say]

to say

: This is not a proof, and it can be rejected [as the Gemara explains below].

I can learn this law from another source:

For it says

[Numbers 35:31]:

“You shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death,

for he shall surely be put to death,” which implies that only

for the life of a murderer

[who killed a person]

may you not take a ransom,

but rather “he shall surely be put to death” literally;

but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not grow back.

That is, instead of removing his eye, money is taken from him as a “ransom” .

And the Gemara asks:

Which “striking”?

From which word do we derive the gzera shava, “striking”

–“striking”?

If you say

[if it is said] from what is written [Leviticus 24:21]: "

and

one who strikes an animal shall pay for it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death", to say: Just as the “striking” stated with regard to an animal entails paying money, so too the “striking” stated with regard to a person entails paying money.

,” this teaches: Just as the “one who strikes” stated with regard to an animal pays money, so too the “one who strikes” stated with regard to a person pays money.

This cannot be said, for

that “

strikes a person”

concerns execution

and is

written

with regard to one who strikes his father and mother , as it is written [Exodus 21:15], “And one who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death.” Since it concerns an obligation of death, there is no payment there.

And we conclude:

Rather, from here: “

and

one who strikes the life of an animal shall pay for it; a life for a life

” [Leviticus 24:18],

and adjacent to it

[verse 19]: “

And if a man gives a blemish to his fellow, as he did, so shall it be done to him.”

” .

And we ask: If you learn it from here, a difficulty arises: In

this

verse, it

is not “striking”

that is written, but “giving.” How can we derive a gzera shava, “striking”

–“striking”?

And we answer:

We are saying “striking”

–“striking,”

that is, although the same word is not stated in both places, nevertheless this gzera shava can be derived from one to the other, since the meanings are equivalent—this is “striking” and that is “striking.”

And this is how we derive it:

Just as the “striking” stated with regard to an animal

[“one who strikes an animal shall pay for it”]

is for payments, so too the “striking” stated with regard to a person

[“and if a man gives a blemish to his fellow”]

is for payments.

And we challenge this:

But it is written

[there, verse 17]:

“And if a man strikes any human life, he shall surely be put to death,”

and this verse does not speak of a murderer who is liable for execution; rather, it concerns one who strikes and injures a limb, as it says afterward [there, verse 20], “an eye for an eye.” Since it is written “he shall surely be put to death,” it implies that they take that limb from him and the limb dies. If so, learn from it: an eye for an eye—literally!?

And we answer: What does “he shall surely be put to death” mean?

With

payments of

money.

And we ask:

From where

[do you know]

that it concerns money

the verse “And if a man strikes any human life”

—say that it concerns actual death

, meaning, “he shall surely be put to death”—the limb!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

that the verse means literal death. There are two proofs for this:

One: for the injurer who strikes a person is compared

to one who strikes a person

“to

“

one who strikes the life of an animal”

[there, verse 18]. Just as striking an animal is for payments, so too striking a person is for payments.

And furthermore,

it

is written afterward

[there, verse 20]:

“As he gave a blemish to a person, so shall it be given to him,” and learn from this

that “he shall surely be put to death” is

with money.

And the Gemara asks:

And what is the meaning of “and if you wish to say”

that the tanna said, since his words imply that it is possible to respond to this derivation and reject it—and how can this derivation from the gzera shava of “striking”–“striking” be rejected!?

The Gemara explains:

There is another difficulty

for him,

the tanna: What did you see

[what did you see]

that you derive from “one who strikes an animal”; let us derive from “one who strikes a person”!

That is, from where do you know to derive a gzera shava, “striking”–“striking,” concerning one who injures a person from one who strikes an animal, and say that he pays money and his eye is not removed?

On the contrary, let us derive the “striking” of “And if a man gives a blemish to his fellow” from the “striking” of “one who strikes a person shall be put to death,” and say: Just as “one who strikes a person shall be put to death” means that he is literally put to death, so too, “if he gives a blemish to his fellow, as he did, so shall it be done to him”—he gives an actual blemish to him!?

They said

[the members of the academy asked]: Why did the tanna think that it was appropriate to derive from “one who strikes a person”!?

On the contrary,

we derive

[it is appropriate to derive]

damages

[“if he gives a blemish to his fellow”]

from damages

[“one who strikes an animal”]

and we do not derive damages from execution

[“one who strikes a person shall be put to death”]!?

And we explain:

On the contrary, we derive

[it is appropriate to derive] one who injures

a person from

“one who strikes”

a person

, and we do not derive

one who injures

a person from

“one who strikes”

an animal

. Therefore the tanna thought that one should say: an eye for an eye literally. And he was left with the question: From where do we know that he pays only money!?

And

this is what is meant by the phrase

in the beraita:

if you wish to refute

the derivation from the gzera shava of “striking

striking,”

behold, it says:

“You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death, for he shall surely be put to death”

For the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not regenerate.

And we challenge this:

But

if

this

verse of

“You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer,”

comes only to exclude limbs,

and to teach that for an injury one takes “ransom,” meaning monetary payment.

But

this

verse

is needed for what the Merciful One said:

if, at the time that he killed the person and became liable for death, he also damaged his property,

you shall not impose two punishments upon him

that is:

you shall not collect

[you shall take]

money from him

for the damage

and put him to death

for his murder.

That is: This verse comes to teach us that he is not put to death while also paying money. How, then, can it also be used to derive the law concerning liability for monetary payment for an injury!?

And we answer:

This

—this law, that he is not put to death while also paying—

from

the verse

“according to his wickedness”

is derived:

[one punishment]

you may hold him liable for, but you may not hold him liable for two wickednesses

[two punishments—death and money]. If so, what does “You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer” come to teach? For the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs.

And we challenge this:

But it is still needed

[we still need the verse]

for what the Merciful One said: You shall not take money

from the murderer

and exempt him

from death; and since the essential teaching of the verse is itself a novel law, from where do we know that it may be used to derive another law that is not explicit in it!?

And we answer: If the verse came only to teach us this law,

then the Merciful One should have written

only

“You shall not take a ransom from one who is guilty of death.”

“For the life of a murderer,”

which the verse added,

why do I need it!?

Rather,

infer from this

this also from this verse:

For the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not regenerate.

Since they are not a “life,” you may take “ransom” for them.

And we wonder:

But since it is written, “You shall not take a ransom,”

and we learned from this that one who injures another pays money, what need is there for the gzera shava of

“striking

“striking,”

They said

[the members of the academy replied]:

If it were from this

verse concerning ransom,

I might have said:

the matter depends on the will of the injured party the matter is determined:

if he wishes,

if the injured party desires it,

let him give his eye

[let him give his eye to be blinded],

and if he wishes, let him give the value of his eye.

It comes to teach us

that we derive

from the case of an animal: just as “one who strikes an animal”

is stated

with regard to payment

and not with regard to injuring one of the limbs of the one who struck it,

so too, “one who strikes a person” is stated with regard to payment

and

not with regard to injury.

The Gemara now brings several tannaitic interpretations that “an eye for an eye” means monetary payment:

1.

It was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Dostai ben Yehuda says: “An eye for an eye,”

which the verse stated, means payments of

money;

that is what they are.

You say: monetary payment, or perhaps it means

[perhaps we should interpret it as]

an actual eye!?

You can say

[you must say]: It is impossible to interpret “an eye for an eye” as an actual eye, because

if one person’s eye was large and the other person’s eye was small, how can I apply to it: “an eye for an eye”!?

That is: If the eye of the one who caused the injury is not equal to the eye of the injured party, it is impossible to fulfill “an eye for an eye”—an eye in place of an eye—for if the eye of the one who caused the injury is superior and you remove his eye, it turns out that you injured him more than he injured his fellow.

And if the eye of the one who caused the injury is inferior to the eye of the injured party, it turns out that you did not injure and damage him to the same extent that he injured and damaged his fellow!?

And if you would say

[and if you were to say]:

in any such

[such a case], indeed,

he takes money from him,

and they do not blind his eye.

This too cannot be said, for according to your words it follows that two people who performed the same act receive different punishments: one blinded his fellow’s eye, and they blind his eye; the other blinded his fellow’s eye, and they collect money from him.

But

the Torah said

[Leviticus 24:22]:

“There shall be one law for you,”

that is,

one law that is equal for all of you,

and it is impossible to judge one person through his money and the other through his body.

If so, it necessarily follows: “An eye for an eye” means money for every person, both when the eyes of the injured party and of the one who caused the injury are unequal and when they are equal.

They said

[the members of the academy asked]: This is no proof, for

what difficulty

is this!?

Perhaps

[we may say]: Even though one person’s eye is large and the other person’s eye is small, both possess “the power of sight,”

sight

[the power of sight]

he takes from him

the Merciful One said that he should take sight from him.

And thus we have fulfilled “an eye for an eye”—literally—in every person!?

For if you do not say this,

and say that we follow the “large” and “small” in the physical body.