Bava Kamma 83b — the Talmud in English

A person

who injures his fellow,

is liable

to pay him payments

upon him,

for having injured him,

on account of

five matters:

A. He is liable

for

payment of the

damage,

as it is stated [Exodus 21:24]: “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot.” And it will be explained below that the verse does not mean the actual removal of a limb, but that the one who injures him gives him the value of his eye and his tooth.

B.

For pain,

as it is stated [there, verse 25]: “Burning for burning, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.” Here too, they do not cause him pain in the place corresponding to what he caused pain; rather, he pays the value of the pain, as the Mishna explains below.

C.

For healing [the cost of his medical treatment].

D.

For

loss of working time,

which is the money he loses because of his illness, since he cannot engage in work while he is ill, until he recovers from the injury.

The payments for healing and loss of working time are learned from what is stated [there, 18–19]: “And when men quarrel, and one strikes his fellow with a stone or with a fist, and he does not die but falls into bed. If he rises and walks about outside upon his support, then the one who struck him shall be clear; only he shall give for his loss of working time, and he shall surely cause him to be healed.”

E.

And for humiliation,

as it is stated [Deuteronomy 25:11–12]: “When men fight together, a man and his brother, and the wife of one draws near to rescue her husband from the hand of the one striking him, and she sends forth her hand and grasps his private parts.” [And she humiliated him by this.] “Then you shall cut off her hand; your eye shall not have pity,” and the Sages received that her hand is not actually cut off; rather, she pays him the cost of his humiliation.

And now the Mishna specifies how each one of the five payments of one who injures his fellow is assessed.

A.

With regard to damage, how

do they assess it? If he

blinded his

eye

of his fellow, or

cut off his hand,

or

broke his leg.

We do not say: We see how much this person would wish to take in order that they injure him in this manner,

but

we regard him as though he were a slave

sold in the market, and assess

[value]

how much he was worth

[before the injury],

and how much he is worth

now, and he pays him the difference between the two.

. B.

Pain,

how do they assess it? If he

burned

[made a burn on him]

with a skewer

glowing,

or

struck him

with a nail,

and thereby caused him pain,

and even

if he did so

on his fingernail,

which is

a place where it does not make

[where the blow does not make]

a bruise,

and it turns out that there is no “damage” here, but only “pain,” he is nevertheless liable to pay him for his pain. And how much shall he pay him?

They assess

[estimate]

how much a person

who is

like this

[similar to him]

would wish to take

money in order

to suffer in this manner, for there is a person who is tender and delicate and his pain is great, and there is a person who is not so sensitive and his pain is slight. Therefore, they assess a person similar to the injured party, and he gives him the cost of his pain.

And now it follows that they assess how much money a person similar to him would request if they wished to cause him pain in exchange for payment, and in the Gemara [85a]

the matter will be explained.

C.

Healing,

what is its law?

If he

struck him, he is liable to heal him.

And if

growths appeared on him,

in the place of the blow,

growths

[white blisters, pus], then

if they appeared because of the blow,

they appeared, he

is liable

to heal him, even if they appeared on him after some time, and not specifically at the time of the blow, but if the growths appeared on him

not because of the blow,

such as he was negligent with himself and violated the physician’s instructions,

he is exempt,

and the one who injured him is not liable for this healing.

And even if

it healed,

the wound recovered,

and

afterward it

opened again

[the wound reopened and returned to its former state], he is liable to return and heal him.

And even if

it healed,

the wound,

and opened again

a second time, he

is liable to heal him,

for we attribute everything to the first blow, and it has still not healed completely.

But if

it healed,

the wound and recovered

completely,

and illness appeared again in that place, he

is not liable to heal him,

for we do not attribute the illness that appeared again to being a continuation of the first wound; rather, it is like a wound in its own right, and therefore the responsibility of the one who injured him does not apply to it.

D. How do they assess the payment for

loss of working time?

We do not say: Since, before he was injured, he was fit to perform heavy work, whose pay is great, therefore he shall pay him, throughout all the days of his illness until the wound closes, as though he had deprived him of that important work.

Rather,

we regard him as though he were a guard of cucumbers

so that they should not be stolen, which is easy work and whose pay is small. And since now he cannot perform even this work, the one who injured him is liable to pay him for the loss of this small earning during the time of his illness.

The reason that he does not pay him the full wage for the work to which he was accustomed is

that

he

has already given him the value of his hand and the value of his leg

in what he paid for his damage, and included in this payment is the injured party’s loss, that he will not be able to earn from the work to which he was accustomed. And since in his present condition, when he has no hand, he is fit only to guard cucumbers, while during his illness, until the wound closes, he cannot perform even this easy work, but sits in his house, the one who injured him is liable to pay him for each day of his illness an amount equal to the wage of a cucumber guard.

E. How do they assess

humiliation? Everything depends on the one who humiliates and the one who is humiliated.

For a lowly and inferior person who humiliated someone, his humiliation is greater than that of a more important person who humiliated someone, and an important person whom they humiliated has greater humiliation than an average person who was humiliated. And they assess how much a person similar to him would wish to take in order to suffer this humiliation from that person who humiliated him.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “With regard to damage, how, etc.? We regard him as though he were a slave sold in the market, and assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth.” [And he gives him the difference in the money between them.] And we challenge:

Why

does he pay him money? Does not

“eye for eye” the Merciful One said

[Exodus 21:24]?

Say

the verse according to its plain meaning, and they shall remove for him

an actual eye

as punishment for removing the injured party’s eye!?

And we answer:

It does not enter your mind

to interpret “an eye for an eye” as an actual eye.

For it was taught

in a beraita:

It could be

[that it is said]:

He blinded his eye

—he blinds his eye; he cut off his hand

—he cuts off his hand; he broke his leg

—he breaks his leg!?

The verse states

[this matter is to be learned from the words of Scripture, which the Gemara brings below]: It says

“one who strikes a person”

and it says

“one who strikes an animal”

, and you derive a gezerah shavah, “striking”—“striking”:

Just as

in

“one who strikes an animal,”

Scripture speaks

of

the matter of

payments,

and not of the punishment of “a blow for a blow,”

so

the obligation of “an eye for an eye” that the Torah stated concerning a person who

strikes

[wounds]

a person

[another] is stated only

for

the matter of

monetary payments

and not for the matter of actually removing an eye.

And if you wish

[to say]

to say

: This is no proof, and it can be rejected [as the Gemara explains below].

I can learn this law from another place:

for it says

[Numbers 35:31], “

You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death,

for he shall surely be put to death,” implying specifically

for the life of a murderer

[who killed a person]

you may not take a ransom,

but “he shall surely be put to death” literally,

but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not grow back.

That is, instead of removing his eye, money is taken from him by way of a “ransom.”

And the Gemara discusses:

Which “striking”?

From which word do we learn the derivation of the gezerah shavah, “striking” —“

striking”?

If you say

[if it is said]: From what is written [Leviticus 24:21]: "

and

one who strikes an animal shall pay it, and one who strikes a person shall be put to death", to say: Just as “striking” that is stated concerning an animal means that he pays money, so too “striking” that is stated concerning a person means that he pays money.

,” this teaches: Just as the “one who strikes” stated with regard to an animal pays money, so too the “one who strikes” stated with regard to a person pays money.

This cannot be said, for

that “

one who strikes a person” is

in execution

that it is

written

, for Scripture spoke of one who strikes his father and mother , and it is written [Exodus 21:15], “One who strikes his father and his mother shall surely be put to death.” Since it speaks of an obligation of death, there are no payments there.

And we conclude:

Rather, from here: “

and

one who strikes the life of an animal shall pay it, a life for a life

” [Leviticus 24:18],

and adjacent to it

[there, verse 19]: “

And when a man gives a blemish to his fellow, as he did, so shall it be done to him.”

” .

And we ask: If you learn from here, a difficulty arises: for in

this

verse

it is not “striking”

that is written, but “giving,” and how do we learn a gezerah shavah, “striking” —“striking”!?

–“striking”?

And we answer:

We say “striking”

—“striking,”

that is, even though the same word was not stated in the two places, nevertheless it is possible to learn this gezerah shavah from one to the other, since the meaning of the matters is equal—this is “striking” and this is “striking.”

And this is how we learn it:

Just as the “striking” stated concerning an animal

[“one who strikes an animal shall pay it”]

is for payments, so too the “striking” stated concerning a person

[“and when a man gives a blemish to his fellow”]

is for payments.

And we challenge:

But it is written

[there, verse 17]:

“And a man, when he strikes any human life, shall surely be put to death,”

and this verse does not speak of a murderer who is liable for death, but of one who strikes and wounds a limb, as it is stated below [there, verse 20], “an eye for an eye.” And since “he shall be put to death” is written, it implies that they take that limb from him and the limb dies; if so, learn from it: an eye for an eye—literally!?

And we answer: What is “he shall be put to death”?

By

payments of

money.

And we ask:

From where

[do you know]

that in money

the verse “And a man, when he strikes any human life” speaks

? Perhaps it is actual death

—that is, “he shall surely be put to death,” the limb!?

And we answer:

It does not enter your mind

that the verse means actual death. And there are two proofs for this:

First, for one who wounds and strikes a person is compared

to

“

and

one who strikes the life of an animal”

[there, verse 18], and just as one who strikes an animal is for payments, so too one who strikes a person.

And further,

it is

written afterward

[there, verse 20]:

“As he gives a blemish upon a person, so shall it be given upon him,” and learn from it

that “he shall be put to death” is in

money.

And the Gemara discusses:

And what is “and if you wish to say”

that the tanna said, for it is implied from his words that it is possible to answer against this derivation and reject it; but how is it possible to reject this derivation from the gezerah shavah of “striking”—“striking”!?

And the Gemara explains:

There is still a difficulty

for him,

the tanna: What did you see

[what did you see]

that you learned from “one who strikes an animal”; let him learn from “one who strikes a person”!?

That is, from where do you know to learn a gezerah shavah, “striking”—“striking,” one who wounds a person from one who strikes an animal, and to say that he pays money and they do not remove his eye?

On the contrary, let us learn the “striking” of “And when a man gives a blemish to his fellow” from the “striking” of “one who strikes a person shall be put to death,” and say: Just as “one who strikes a person shall be put to death”—he is put to death literally, so too “when he gives a blemish to his fellow, as he did, so shall it be done to him”—he gives an actual blemish!?

The members of the academy said

[they asked]: Why did the tanna think that it is proper to learn from “one who strikes a person”!?

On the contrary,

we judge

[it is proper to judge]

damages

[“when he gives a blemish to his fellow”]

from damages

[“one who strikes an animal”]

and we do not judge damages from death

[“one who strikes a person shall be put to death”]!?

And we explain:

On the contrary, we judge

[it is proper to judge] one who wounds

a person from

“striking”

a person,

and we do not judge

one who wounds

a person from

“striking”

an animal. Therefore the tanna thought that one should say: an eye for an eye literally; and he was troubled: from where do we know that he pays only money!?

.” Therefore, the tanna thought that one should say: “An eye for an eye” means an actual eye. His difficulty was only: From where do we know that he pays money?

And

this is what it means that it teaches

in the beraita:

if you wish to say

to reject the derivation from the gzera shava “striking” \- “

striking,”

for it says: “

You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of death, for he shall surely be put to death” —

for the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not grow back.

And we challenge this:

and

for

this

verse of “

You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer,”

comes to exclude limbs,

and to teach that for an injury one takes “ransom,” which is a monetary payment.

But

this

verse

is needed for what the Merciful One said: if, at the time when he killed the person and became liable for death, he also damaged his property,

if, at the time that he killed a person and became liable to death, he also damaged his property,

you shall not impose two [punishments] upon him

[do not punish him with two punishments], namely:

you shall not collect

[charge]

money from him

for the damage

and kill him

for his murder.

That is: this verse came to teach us that he is not executed and made to pay money; so how is it possible to learn from it also concerning liability for monetary payments for an injury!?

And we answer:

this —

this rule, that he is not executed and made to pay —

from

the verse of “

according to his guilt”

is derived: one guilt

[one punishment]

you impose upon him, but you do not impose two guilts upon him

[two punishments — death and money]. If so, what does “You shall not take a ransom for the life of a murderer” teach us? For the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs.

And we challenge this:

it is still needed for him

[we still need the verse]

because the Merciful One says: you shall not collect money

from the murderer

and exempt him

from death; and since the essential point of the verse is a novelty, from where do we know to learn from it another rule that is not explicit in it!?

And we answer: if the verse came only to teach us this rule,

then let the Merciful One write

only

“You shall not take a ransom for one who is guilty of death.” “

For the life of a murderer”

which the verse added —

why do I need it!?

Rather,

learn from it

also from this verse:

for the life of a murderer you may not take a ransom, but you may take a ransom for limbs that do not grow back.

Since they are not a “life,” you may take a “ransom” for them.

And we wonder:

and since it is written “you shall not take a ransom”

and we learned from this that one who injures pays money, what do I need the gzera shava of

“striking —

“striking” for!?

They said

[the members of the academy answered]:

if from this

verse of ransom,

I might have thought:

it depends on the will of the one who injures the matter:

if he wishes

if it is the desire of the one who injures

let him give his eye

[let him give his eye to be blinded],

and if he wishes, let him give the value of his eye.

It teaches us:

that we derive

from [the case of] an animal: just as “one who strikes an animal”

is stated

for payment

and not for injuring one of the limbs of the one who struck it,

so “one who strikes a person” is stated for payment

,

and not for injury.

Now the Gemara brings several interpretations of the tannaim that “an eye for an eye” means money:

a.

It was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Dostai ben Yehudah says: “An eye for an eye”

which the verse stated, are payments of

money

.

You say: money, or perhaps it is only

[perhaps we should interpret it as]

an actual eye!?

You have said

[you must say]: it is impossible to interpret “an eye for an eye” as an actual eye, because

if this one’s eye was large and that one’s eye was small, how do I apply to it: “an eye for an eye”!?

That is: if the eye of the one who injured is not equal to the eye of the injured person, it is impossible to fulfill “an eye for”—in place of—“an eye,” for if the eye of the one who injured is superior and you remove his eye, it turns out that you injured him more than he injured him.

And if the eye of the one who injured is inferior to the eye of the injured person, it turns out that you did not injure and damage him as he injured and damaged his fellow!?

And if you should say

[and if you say]:

in every such case

[in such a case] indeed

he takes money from him,

and they do not blind his eye.

This too cannot be said, for according to your words it turns out that two people who performed the same act receive different punishments: one blinded his fellow’s eye—and they blind his eye; the other blinded his fellow’s eye—and they collect money from him.

But

the Torah said

[Leviticus 24:22]:

“One judgment shall be yours”

that is,

a judgment equal for all of you,

and it is impossible to judge one through his money and the other through his body.

If so, necessarily: “an eye for an eye”—money, for every person, both when the eyes of the injured person and the one who injured are not equal and when they are equal.

They said

[the members of the academy asked]: this is no proof, for

what difficulty

is this!?

Perhaps

[we should say]: even though this one’s eye is large and that one’s eye is small, both have “the power of sight,”

light

[the power of sight]

he takes from him —

the Merciful One said: let him take light from him.

And it turns out that in every person we have fulfilled “an eye for an eye”—literally!?

For if you do not say this,

and say: we follow “large” and “small” in the body.