Bava Kamma 7a — the Talmud in English

and a creditor

after all, his law is to collect only

from intermediate-quality land,

and therefore certainly the treasurer likewise does not collect in such a manner from the best-quality land.

And if you would say,

you might say,

Rabbi Akiva held

that

every

creditor

also

his law is

[to collect] from the best-quality land,

and therefore one can derive by a kal va-chomer from unconsecrated property to consecrated property that the treasurer should collect from the best-quality land,

after all, even if we say so, it is still difficult, for

there is room to refute

the kal va-chomer:

What is there about a creditor,

an unconsecrated one, that it is logical that he should collect his debt from the best-quality land?

For his power is superior

in the case of an unconsecrated creditor

with regard to torts,

for the injured party takes best-quality land,

can you say the same concerning consecrated property, whose power is impaired with regard to torts,

for consecrated property takes nothing for its damages? And if so, this is not a kal va-chomer that consecrated property should collect its debt from the best-quality land.

And therefore the Gemara establishes [the matter]:

always

it is speaking

of our ox goring an ox of consecrated property,

and Rabbi Akiva is indeed speaking about damages caused by goring, and in a situation in which our ox [of an unconsecrated person] gored an ox of consecrated property.

And

as for

what is difficult for you,

after all,

“the ox of his fellow,” the Merciful One said, and not “an ox

of consecrated property,”

and it should have been entirely exempt, because the Torah excludes one who gores an ox of consecrated property, one can answer:

Rabbi Akiva held like Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

who interprets the meaning of the verse differently, as follows:

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: An ox of consecrated property that gored an ox of an unconsecrated person is exempt

—the consecrated property is exempt from paying for its damage. But

an ox of an unconsecrated person that gored an ox of consecrated property,

then

whether

the goring ox is

innocent, and whether

it is

forewarned,

it pays the consecrated property

full damages.

For this is how he expounds the exclusion of the Torah: only concerning “the ox of his fellow” did the Torah state the distinction between an innocent ox and a forewarned one [that an innocent ox pays half-damages], but not concerning an ox of consecrated property; rather, one who damages an ox of consecrated property, even if the damaging ox was innocent, pays full damages.

And concerning these payments Rabbi Akiva said that consecrated property collects the amount of the value of its ox that was damaged from the best-quality land among the properties of the damager, by a kal va-chomer from a damager who is an unconsecrated person, who pays him from the best-quality land. But the Gemara asks:

If so,

if it is explained in Rabbi Akiva’s words that he holds like Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, then the dispute between

Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva—how do we know that they disagree concerning the best-quality land of the injured party and the inferior-quality land of the damager?

From where do we know that they disagreed in a case in which the best-quality land of the injured party is equal to the inferior-quality land of the damager, and according to Rabbi Ishmael one assesses [the payment] from that of the injured party, and therefore the damager can give his inferior-quality land, which is equal to the best-quality land of the injured party, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that we assess from that of the damager, and he must give the best-quality land among his properties?

Perhaps everyone assesses from the property of the injured party,

perhaps they did not disagree about this, and Rabbi Akiva too holds that we assess from the property of the injured party; and “to collect from the best-quality land,” which he said, refers to the best-quality land of the injured party,

and here

they disagree only concerning the “kal va-chomer for consecrated property,” in the case of an unconsecrated ox that gored an ox of consecrated property, and

they disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and the Rabbis.

Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

who says that even an innocent ox pays full damages,

and Rabbi Ishmael holds like the Rabbis,

who exempt entirely.

For Rabbi Akiva heard Rabbi Ishmael, who was referring only to damages caused to an unconsecrated person, but concerning damages caused to consecrated property he exempted; therefore he came out to disagree.

And the Gemara answers: If it is as you say, that they disagreed only concerning consecrated property,

if so, what is

the meaning of the expression

“the verse did not come”

that Rabbi Akiva said? For its meaning implies that the verse did not say so, but rather otherwise. And it implies that he disagreed with Rabbi Ishmael also in the interpretation of the verse concerning the best-quality land.

And the Gemara brings an additional proof:

And furthermore, what is the kal va-chomer for consecrated property!?

If what Rabbi Akiva said, “the verse came only to collect for damages from the best-quality land,” refers to the best-quality land of the injured party and not that of the damager, then it turns out that his words come to agree in a lenient direction; for in such a case, when the inferior-quality land of the damager is like the best-quality land of the injured party, it is sufficient that the damager give from the inferior-quality land. Accordingly, the continuation, “and a kal va-chomer for consecrated property,” is explained as follows: concerning consecrated property, all the more so one should be lenient with it, so that it too pays only from the best-quality land of the injured party. But according to Rabbi Akiva, consecrated property is more stringent, since even an innocent ox pays full damages; so how can it be said, “all the more so,” in a lenient direction?

And the Gemara brings an additional proof from an explicit beraita:

And furthermore, Rav Ashi said: It was explicitly taught in a beraita,

it is explicitly stated thus in a beraita:

As it was taught: What the Torah said [Exodus 22,

“He shall pay from the best of his field and from the best of his vineyard

” means

the best of the field of the injured party, and the best of the vineyard of the injured party; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

the Torah’s intention is not the best-quality land of the injured party, but rather

the best of the field of the damager and the best of the vineyard of the damager.

It is explicit that Rabbi Akiva’s intention is the best-quality land of the damager, and that he disagreed with Rabbi Ishmael in this as well.

Abaye posed it to Rava,

he raised to him an apparent contradiction between the verses concerning the obligation to pay damages from the best-quality land:

On the one hand,

it is written, “He shall pay from the best of his field and from the best of his vineyard,” [

Exodus 22:4], which means that the Torah said

“the best,” yes,

if the damager comes to pay from his lands, he may pay specifically from land that is the best-quality land [the best-quality land],

but from anything else, no.

If he wishes to pay from other land that is not best-quality land, he cannot do so.

But on the other hand,

and it was taught in a beraita:

concerning a pit it is stated: “The owner of the pit shall pay; money

he shall return

to its owner” [Exodus 21:34]. And the word “he shall return” is superfluous, for “he shall pay” is already stated, and it would have been sufficient to say, “The owner of the pit shall pay money to its owner.” Rather, the superfluous verse comes

to include money’s equivalent,

that is, all forms of repayment [payments], so that the damager can pay his damage even with an object worth monetary value,

and even with bran.

It follows that one may pay even with bran, and not specifically from the best-quality land.

And the Gemara answers:

It is not difficult.

This is not a contradiction.

For

here,

in the verse “he shall return,” from which we learned in the beraita that he pays even with bran, it is speaking when the damager pays

voluntarily,

when the damager did not trouble the injured party to litigate with him and cry out against him in court. Whereas

here,

in “the best of his field,” which the Torah stated, it is speaking when the damager pays

against his will,

for he refused to pay voluntarily, and the injured party troubled himself to sue him in court. And in such a situation the Torah said that he must pay specifically from the best of his field.

And the Gemara brings proof for the answer:

Ulla son of Rav Ilai said: It is also precise,

what we answered, that “the best of his field” is stated only when he refuses to pay voluntarily, is also precise from the wording of the verse, for it is written, “the best of his field

he shall pay,”

which implies: he shall pay

against his will,

Abaye said to him:

This is not a proof, because

is it written

[is it written]

“it shall be paid”!?

For had “it shall be paid” been written, its meaning would indeed have been “against his will,” since it would imply that he is not the payer, but that the court descends to his properties and pays the injured party against the will of the damager. But it was not stated so; rather,

“he shall pay” is written,

and this implies that he is the one who pays,

and

also

voluntarily

is implied,

and there is no proof from the wording of the verse.

Rather, said Abaye:

The contradiction can be resolved

as the master said,

in the manner in which Rabbah explained the following beraita:

For it was taught

in a beraita:

If he had houses

fields and vineyards

worth two hundred zuz,

and he cannot find

a buyer

to sell them to

and he needs money for his livelihood. One who has two hundred zuz is not considered poor, and he is forbidden to take from the poor tithe. But if he has less than two hundred zuz, even one zuz less, he may take at one time from the poor tithe even one thousand zuz. And the beraita is speaking of a case in which he has property worth two hundred zuz, but in actuality he cannot find a buyer who will give him money for the property, and the law is:

they feed him from the poor tithe until half.

They give him up to one hundred zuz from the poor tithe, which is half of two hundred zuz, and he will sell his property at a low price. And since land and houses will never become cheaper by more than half their value [which is one hundred zuz], he will have two hundred zuz in his possession.

And the master examined it,

Rabbah asked:

What are the circumstances,

how is the beraita speaking?

If everyone’s land became cheaper,

if it is speaking of a case in which the value of everyone’s land [the fields] became cheaper,

and his too became cheaper along with them,

the value of his land also became cheaper like everyone else’s, and now it is not worth two hundred zuz, why do they give him only up to half? After all,

they may give him much more as well,

they may give him more than one hundred, as the law concerning a poor person, to whom they give even property worth one thousand zuz at one time,

for everyone’s became cheaper as well,

for all the land became cheaper and its value decreased, and likewise the value of his land decreased, and now he is poor.

And

rather,

if it is speaking

that everyone’s land became expensive,

the value of everyone’s land remained expensive as it had been,

and

only

his land, since he goes in and out for money, became cheaper,

only his land became cheaper, because since people see that he is in need of money [going in and out in order to obtain money] and is pressed to sell his property, they are unwilling to pay except less than its value, that is, less than two hundred zuz.