Bava Kamma 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

And a creditor

is entitled to collect only

from intermediate-quality land,

and therefore, certainly, the treasurer likewise does not collect in such a case from the highest-quality land.

And if you would say,

you might say:

Rabbi Akiva holds

that

every

creditor

also

has his claim collected

from the highest-quality land,

and therefore one can derive by a kal va-chomer from unconsecrated property to consecrated property that the treasurer should collect from the highest-quality land,

even if we say this, the difficulty still remains, for

there is a basis for refuting

the kal va-chomer:

What is the basis for the creditor

who is an ordinary person? It is reasonable that he should collect his debt from the highest-quality land,

since his legal power is stronger

than that of an ordinary creditor

with regard to torts,

as the injured party collects highest-quality land,

whereas with regard to consecrated property, its legal power is weaker with regard to torts,

as consecrated property collects nothing for damages caused to it. If so, this is not a kal va-chomer that consecrated property should collect its debt from the highest-quality land.

Therefore the Gemara establishes

that in fact

the case

is one in which our ox gored an ox belonging to consecrated property,

and Rabbi Akiva is indeed speaking of damages caused by goring, in a case where our ox—[belonging to an ordinary person]—gored an ox belonging to consecrated property.

And

as for

what is difficult for you,

namely,

“The Merciful One said ‘the ox of his fellow,’ and not ‘an ox

belonging to consecrated property,’”

and it should therefore have been entirely exempt, since the Torah excludes one who gores an ox belonging to consecrated property, this can be resolved as follows:

Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

who interprets the meaning of the verse differently, as follows:

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: In the case of an ox belonging to consecrated property that gored an ox belonging to an ordinary person, it is exempt

from paying for the damage it caused. But

in the case of an ox belonging to an ordinary person that gored an ox belonging to consecrated property,

whether

the

goring ox is

innocent, or whether

it is

forewarned,

it pays consecrated property

full damages.

For this is how he expounds the Torah’s exclusion: The Torah stated the distinction between an innocent ox and a forewarned ox only with regard to “the ox of his fellow”—that an innocent ox pays half-damages—but not with regard to an ox belonging to consecrated property. Rather, one who damages an ox belonging to consecrated property pays full damages even if the damaging ox was innocent.

With regard to these payments, Rabbi Akiva said that consecrated property collects the value of its ox that was damaged from the highest-quality land among the properties of the one who caused the damage, by a kal va-chomer from one who damages an ordinary person’s property, who pays him from the highest-quality land. But the Gemara asks:

If so,

if Rabbi Akiva’s statement is understood to mean that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, then with regard to the dispute between

Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva, from where is it established that they disagree about whether one assesses the highest-quality land of the injured party and the inferior-quality land of the one who caused the damage?

From where do we know that they disagreed in a case where the injured party’s highest-quality land was equivalent to the damager’s inferior-quality land, and that according to Rabbi Yishmael one assesses the injured party’s property, so that the damager may give his inferior-quality land, which is equivalent to the injured party’s highest-quality land, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that one assesses the damager’s property, and he must therefore give the highest-quality land among his possessions?

Perhaps everyone assesses the injured party’s property,

perhaps this is not the point of their disagreement, and Rabbi Akiva also holds that one assesses the injured party’s property; and when he said that the payment is collected “from the highest-quality land,” he meant the highest-quality land of the injured party.

And here,

they disagreed only with regard to the kal va-chomer concerning consecrated property, in the case of an ordinary person’s ox that gored an ox belonging to consecrated property, and

they disagree about the dispute between Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya and the Rabbis.

Rabbi Akiva holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

who says that even an innocent ox pays full damages,

and Rabbi Yishmael holds in accordance with the Rabbis,

who exempt it entirely.

For Rabbi Akiva heard Rabbi Yishmael referring only to damages involving ordinary property, while exempting damages involving consecrated property; Rabbi Akiva therefore set out to disagree with him.

The Gemara answers: If it is as you say, that they disagreed only with regard to consecrated property,

then what is the meaning of

the expression

“The verse did not come”

that Rabbi Akiva stated? Its meaning apparently is that the verse did not say this, but rather something else. This indicates that he disagreed with Rabbi Yishmael also with regard to the interpretation of the verse concerning the best land.

The Gemara presents an additional proof:

And furthermore, what is the kal va-chomer concerning consecrated property!?

If Rabbi Akiva’s statement, “The verse came only to establish that damages are collected from the highest-quality land,” refers to the injured party’s highest-quality land and not the damager’s, then his statement emerges as a leniency. For in a case where the damager’s inferior-quality land is equivalent to the injured party’s highest-quality land, it is sufficient for the damager to give him the inferior-quality land. Accordingly, the continuation, “and it is a kal va-chomer with regard to consecrated property,” would mean that it is all the more so a leniency with regard to consecrated property, which likewise pays only from the injured party’s best land. But according to Rabbi Akiva, the law concerning consecrated property is more stringent, since even an innocent ox pays full damages. How, then, can it be said that there is an all the more so inference to a leniency?

The Gemara presents an additional proof from an explicit beraita:

And furthermore, Rav Ashi said: It was taught explicitly in a beraita,

it is stated explicitly in this manner in a beraita:

As it was taught: When the Torah said [Exodus 22:4],

“He shall pay from the best of his field and the best of his vineyard,”

it means

the best of the field of the injured party and the best of the vineyard of the injured party; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

The Torah’s intention is not the best land of the injured party, but rather

the best of the field of the damager and the best of the vineyard of the damager.

Thus, it is explicit that Rabbi Akiva’s intention is the damager’s best land, and that in this matter too he disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael.

Abaye posed a difficulty to Rava:

He raised an apparent contradiction between the verses concerning the obligation to pay damages from the best land:

On the one hand,

it is written: “He shall pay from the best of his field and the best of his vineyard” [Exodus 22:4].

The Torah thus stated:

“The best,” yes,

if the damager wishes to pay from his land, he may pay only from land that is of the best quality [the highest-quality land],

but anything else, no.

If he wishes to pay with other land that is not of the best quality, he may not do so.

Yet, on the other hand,

it was taught

in a beraita: With regard to a pit it is stated, “The owner of the pit shall pay; he shall return

[yeshiv]

money to its owner” [Exodus 21:34]. The word “return” is superfluous, since “shall pay” is already stated, and it would have been sufficient to say: “The owner of the pit shall pay money to its owner.” Rather, the superfluous word comes

to include an item of monetary value,

namely, all forms of repayment [payment], so that the damager may pay for the damage even with an object worth money,

and even with bran.

Thus, one may pay even with bran, and not specifically from the best land.

The Gemara answers:

It is not difficult.

There is no contradiction.

For

here,

in the verse “he shall return,” from which we learned in the beraita that he may pay even with bran, the case is one in which the damager pays

willingly,

when the damager did not force the injured party to litigate with him and bring a claim against him in court. Whereas

here,

with regard to “the best of his field,” as stated by the Torah, the case is one in which the damager pays

against his will,

because he refused to pay willingly, and instead forced the injured party to sue him in court. In such a case, the Torah stated that he must pay specifically from the best of his field.

The Gemara brings proof for the answer:

Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, said: It is also precise.

What we answered—that “the best of his field” applies only when he refuses to pay willingly—is also precise from the wording of the verse, for it is written: “The best of his field

he shall pay,”

which implies that he shall pay

against his will,

Abaye said to him:

This is not a proof, because

is it written

[does it say]

“it shall be paid”!?

Had it been written “it shall be paid,” it would indeed have implied “against his will,” since it would mean that he is not the one paying; rather, the court descends upon his property and pays the injured party against the damager’s will. But it was not stated that way. Rather,

“he shall pay” is written,

which implies that he is the one who pays,

and

it also

implies

willingly, so there is no proof from the wording of the verse.

and there is no proof from the wording of the verse.

Rather, said Abaye:

The contradiction can be resolved

according to the master,

in the manner in which Rabba explained the following beraita:

As it is taught

in a beraita:

If one had houses

fields and vineyards

worth two hundred zuz,

and he cannot find

a buyer

to sell them to

him, and he needs money for his subsistence. One who has two hundred zuz is not considered poor, and he is prohibited from taking from the poor tithe. But if he has less than two hundred zuz, even one zuz less, he may take from the poor tithe at one time even one thousand zuz. The beraita is speaking of a case in which he has property worth two hundred zuz, but in reality he cannot find a buyer who will give him money for the property, and the law is:

they provide him with poor tithe up to half.

They give him up to one hundred zuz from the poor tithe, which is half of two hundred zuz, and he will sell his property at a low price. Since land and houses will never become less expensive by more than half their value [which is one hundred zuz], he will have two hundred zuz in his possession.

And the master raised this objection,

Rabba asked:

What are the circumstances,

how is the beraita speaking?

If the land of everyone became less expensive,

if it is speaking of a case in which the value of everyone’s land [the fields] declined,

and his too declined along with it,

the value of his land also declined like everyone else’s, and now it is not worth two hundred zuz, why do they give him only up to half?

They could even give him much more,

they could give him more than one hundred, as is the law with regard to a poor person, to whom they give even goods worth one thousand zuz at one time,

for the land of everyone else also became less expensive,

since all the land became less valuable, and the value of his land likewise declined, so now he is poor.

And

rather,

if it is speaking

of a case in which the land of everyone else became more expensive,

the value of everyone else’s land remained high as it had been,

and

only

his land, because he is entering and leaving for money, became less expensive,

only his land became less expensive, because when people see that he needs money [going in and out in order to obtain money] and is under pressure to sell his property, they are unwilling to pay more than its value, namely, less than two hundred zuz.