Bava Kamma 76a (עו.) — the Talmud in English

And they pay

the payment of the double,”

that is, the amount completing the “double payment”—namely, only the second half of the double payment, which is a penalty—and they came to obligate him before he stood trial.

We learned in the Mishna:

“One who stole an animal and consecrated it, and afterward slaughtered or sold it,”

pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

The members of the academy said

to raise a difficulty:

Granted with regard to the slaughter,

that he slaughtered it after he had already consecrated it, it is indeed understandable that

the thief is not liable

to pay the owners, because

when he slaughtered it, he slaughtered a consecrated animal [that is, he slaughtered an animal belonging to the Temple treasury] ,

that is, he slaughtered an animal belonging to the Temple treasury] ,

and not that of its owner

from whom it had been stolen,

did he slaughter [that is, he did not slaughter the owner’s animal],

and therefore he is exempt for the slaughter.

But

with regard to the act of

consecration

itself, concerning the very act of consecration that the thief performed,

should he not be liable

for the fourfold or fivefold payment on account of “selling” it to the Temple treasury!? For:

What difference is there if he sold it

the thief

to an ordinary person,

for which he is liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment, and

what difference is there if he sold it

the thief

to Heaven

when he consecrated it!? He should likewise be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.

And we answer: Our Mishna is dealing with a case where the thief consecrated the animal as a consecration for the fulfillment of his vow, such that if the consecrated animal were lost, the thief would be liable for it.

And whose opinion is this?

It is the opinion of our Mishna?

It is that of Rabbi Shimon, who says:

Consecrated animals for which

the owners who consecrate them

are liable

that if they are stolen or lost, they must bring others in their place, as in a case where they consecrated them for a vow they had made: “It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering”—

It is still

standing in the authority of its owner [as though it still belonged to the owners],

for “an item that causes monetary liability is considered money”—that is, whenever the absence of an object would cause a person to incur monetary liability, while its presence prevents him from incurring monetary liability, it is considered as though it were that person’s property.

And therefore, the thief is not liable for the consecration that he performed, for the animal still remains in the authority of the thief who consecrated it, since he is liable for it.

And we challenge this answer: At the end of our Mishna we learned: “Rabbi Shimon says, and so on.” If so:

From the fact that the latter clause

of our Mishna

is Rabbi Shimon’s,

as he disagrees with the first tanna concerning the law of one who steals consecrated property, who is exempt according to the first tanna, while according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable, as will be explained below.

It follows that

the first clause is not Rabbi Shimon’s

opinion!? For if it were, just as the latter clause states, “Rabbi Shimon says,” the tanna should likewise have mentioned his name in the first clause, in the law of “one who stole and consecrated”!?

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara offers another explanation of why he is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment on account of the act of consecration:

Here—

in our Mishna—

with what are we dealing? With

a case in which the thief consecrated the animal as

lesser sanctity,

such as a peace-offering,

and

our Mishna

is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili,

whose opinion it is,

who says: Lesser sanctity is the property of the owners, and in the authority of

the thief

it remains

[the consecrated animal remains], and this is not a sale.

The Gemara objects:

But

when the thief consecrated the animal as

most sacred sanctity,

such as a burnt-offering,

what

will be the law—according to your answer—that the thief

pays the fourfold or fivefold payment,

because the consecration is considered a sale!?

If so, this is difficult:

Rather than the first clause teaching

the Mishna above, on page 70a, which presents similar cases in which he is nevertheless liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment:

“One who stole and slaughtered, and afterward consecrated”

therefore

pays the fourfold or fivefold payment;

this clause was taught there in contrast to what we learned in our Mishna: One who stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered, does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Thus, according to your words, it should be difficult:

Let the tanna distinguish

and

teach it with regard to that very case,

that is, let the tanna state the case in which he is liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment even though he consecrated it, in the same case mentioned in our Mishna, namely, where the slaughter did not precede the consecration; and let him teach as follows:

“When are these words applicable”—that if he stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered or sold the animal, he is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment—

with regard to lesser sanctity; but with regard to most sacred sanctity

he

therefore

pays the fourfold or fivefold payment,

even though the slaughter did not precede the consecration, because the consecration itself is considered a sale, rendering him liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Yet the Mishna implies that one cannot find a case in which the consecration preceded the slaughter and he would be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara retracts, and

actually

our Mishna deals with every case:

It makes no difference

whether the thief consecrated it as

most sacred sanctity, and it makes no difference

whether the thief consecrated it as

lesser sanctity,

provided that he consecrated it with bodily sanctity for the altar—

And as for what is difficult for you:

why should he not be liable for the consecration itself? For

what difference is there if the thief sold it

to an ordinary person,

what difference is there if the thief sold it

to Heaven!?

This is not difficult:

This is not difficult:

For when

he sold it

the thief

to an ordinary person, initially—at first, before the thief consecrated it—

the ox was called:

“Reuven’s ox,”

[the thief’s ox],

and

if

now—after the thief sold it—

it is called:

“Shimon’s ox,”

the purchaser.

But when

he sold it

the thief

to Heaven,

that is, when he consecrated it as an offering for the altar,

initially—before he sold it—

it was

“Reuven’s ox,”

belonging to the thief; that is, the ox was called by the thief’s name,

and

even

now—after the thief consecrated it—

the name

“Reuven’s ox”

still remains upon it, the thief’s, for it is called “the offering of so-and-so.”

And therefore this is not a “sale” for which he becomes liable.

We learned in the Mishna: One who stole and consecrated an animal, and afterward slaughtered or sold it, pays the double payment but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rabbi Shimon says:

With regard to consecrated animals for which he is liable, he pays the fourfold or fivefold payment; and with regard to consecrated animals for which he is not liable, he is exempt.

The members of the academy said

who had initially understood the explanation of our Mishna to be that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first tanna, who exempts one who “stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered” from the fourfold or fivefold payment; and this is what they said:

The first tanna holds: A thief who consecrates an animal and afterward slaughters it is not liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment, neither for the consecration itself nor for the slaughter. Rabbi Shimon, however, holds that he is liable for the consecration itself when he consecrated an animal for which he is liable, but not when he consecrated an animal for which he is not liable—

And therefore the members of the academy were perplexed:

Granted [although]

Rabbi Shimon holds: “What difference is there if he sold it to an ordinary person, what difference is there if he sold it to Heaven,”

and for that reason he holds him liable for consecration as for a sale, nevertheless it is difficult:

Rabbi Shimon should have made the opposite distinction!

He should have stated as follows:

If the thief consecrated it as

consecrated animals for which he is liable,

he

is exempt,

because “an item that causes monetary liability is considered money,” and it follows

that it has still not left [it has not yet left]

the animal

his authority,

that of the thief.

But if the thief consecrated it as

consecrated animals for which he is not liable,

he

is liable

for the fourfold or fivefold payment, because

he removes it from his authority

[the thief removed it from his authority].

The members of the academy said

in explaining our Mishna that Rabbi Shimon does not intend to disagree with the ruling of the first tanna mentioned in our Mishna. Rather,

Rabbi Shimon is referring to another matter,

[to another law omitted by our Mishna from the words of the first tanna; it is concerning this that Rabbi Shimon disagrees].

And the Mishna is incomplete,

and this is what it teaches,

and this is how one should revise our Mishna:

One who steals

an animal

after the thief

and slaughters it,

pays the fourfold or fivefold payment,

because it is stated: “And one who steals from the house of the man—if the thief is found, he shall pay double,” but not from the house of the thief; and if there is no double payment, there is no fourfold or fivefold payment.

And likewise,

one who

steals consecrated property from the house of the owners

and slaughters it is

exempt. What is the reason? We apply to him

[I apply to him the verse]:

“And one who steals from the house of the man,”

“if the thief is found, he shall pay double,” which implies:

but not

from the house of the Temple treasury,

and if there is no double payment, there is no fourfold or fivefold payment.

Rabbi Shimon says:

one who steals

sacrificial animals that

the owners

are responsible to replace and

slaughters them,

is liable.

And

what is the reason? We can apply to him

“and he steals from the house of the man”

, because “something that causes a monetary loss is considered money.”

But

one who steals only sacrificial animals

that

the owners

are not responsible to replace

is

exempt,

because

we cannot apply to him:

“and he steals from the house of the man.”

A. The words of the Gemara were explained according to their plain sense. But in "Torat Chaim" the difficulty was raised: why does the Gemara not say in its usual fashion, "chasuri michasra vehachi katani"!? And further, why did the Gemara bring in general the law "ein hagonev achar haganav" here!? According to his answer one must interpret [see his wording there, which he wrote with a slight change, and the Talmud needs study], that the Gemara adds nothing to the Mishnah, but the Gemara's intent is to say that Rabbi Shimon in our Mishnah is referring to the words of the first Tanna in the first Mishnah of the tractate, where we taught there: "ein hagonev achar haganav meshalem t'shla'ei kafal, v'lo hatovach v'lo hamokher achar haganav meshalem t'shla'ei arba'ah v'chamisha", and the reason is because it says: "ugonev mibeyt ha'ish", and as this reason is explained in the Gemara above (62b), that for this reason the thief is not held liable from the thief— to the thief. to the thief. And it is thereby clear according to the first Tanna's view that although the theft being in the thief's possession is a "thing that causes monetary value"—since thereby he is freed from his obligation to the owners—nevertheless he is exempt, and one does not say "a thing that causes monetary value is like money itself," and it is read there "and steals from a man's house"; and if so the law is that the thief of kedashim for which the owners are liable is not liable, one reason covers both, and on this Rabbi Shimon parts company and obligates in the case of kedashim for which they are liable, and likewise regarding a thief from the thief. and see in Likkutim the new to Ra'aq A, who wondered: why did Rabbi Shimon not differentiate in our baraita also concerning a thief from the thief, since that too causes monetary value!? And by this explanation it is resolved]. B. The Tosafot explained [at the top of the folio] that we were not compelled to explain our Mishnah in this way, but rather according to what Rabbi Yochanan explained above (62b), that "a thief who dedicated" means: the thief dedicated the animal himself; ;

The Gemara raises an objection against Rabbi Shimon, who held one liable for stealing consecrated animals from the owners’ premises and slaughtering them:

Granted,

for

we have heard Rabbi Shimon

say:

“An unfit slaughtering

that does not render the animal fit to eat, such as one who slaughters a tereifa, which is forbidden to eat,

is not called slaughtering

or slaughter for any purpose—and

sacrificial animals

that are slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard are

also

an unfit slaughtering

indeed,

since animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard are forbidden to eat. If so, why does Rabbi Shimon hold him liable for slaughtering them?

When Rav Dimi arrived

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

to explain in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan:

He [Rav Dimi] is referring to the Mishnah above (58a): "He who slaughtered and it was found to be a tereifah, the slaughterer regarding chullin in the courtyard pays fourfold and fivefold; Rabbi Shimon exempts in both cases", and Rabbi Shimon's reason is because "it is a shechita that is not valid", and likewise in Chullin (62b) Rabbi Shimon exempts the slaughterer when a tereifah was found, from the law "you shall not slaughter it with its mother on one day".

What are we dealing with here, in our Mishna?

With one who slaughters unblemished animals inside

the Temple courtyard,

for the sake of the owners,

and we are not dealing with animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara asks:

But

if the thief slaughtered the animal for the sake of the owners, this is as though

the principal

of the theft

returned to the owners

before the court brought him to trial, in which case he is not liable.

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Avin said:

What are we dealing with here? It is a case in which

he

slaughtered them inside for the sake of the owners, but

the blood was spilled

after the slaughtering, and the principal did not return to the owners, since they achieve atonement only through the sprinkling of the blood. Although the sacrificial animals are not permitted to be eaten until the blood is sprinkled, nevertheless this is a “fit slaughtering,” because Rabbi Shimon holds: “Anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though its blood has been sprinkled,” as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

When Ravin arrived

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yoḥanan—

to explain Rabbi Shimon’s position in our Mishna, in a manner different from what Rav Dimi said in his name: What are we dealing with here, in our Mishna?

With one who slaughters unblemished animals inside, not for the sake of the owners,

so the offering did not fulfill the owners’ obligation, and this is not considered “the principal returned to the owners.”