Bava Kamma 76a — the Talmud in English

And they pay

the payment of the double",

that is: the portion completing the “double payment,” namely only the second half of the double, which is a penalty, and they came to obligate him for it before he stood trial.

We learned in the Mishna:

“He stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered or sold,”

he pays the double payment and does not pay the fourfold and fivefold payment.

They said

the members of the academy to raise a difficulty:

Granted, with regard to the slaughtering

that he slaughtered after he had already consecrated it, it is indeed understandable that

the thief is not obligated

to pay the owners, because

when he slaughtered, he slaughtered a consecrated animal [that is, he slaughtered one belonging to the consecration] ,

and not

that of its owner

from whom it had been stolen

did he slaughter [that is, the thief did not slaughter the owner’s animal],

and therefore he is exempt for the slaughtering.

But what of the

act of

consecration

itself, concerning the very act of consecration that the thief performed,

let him be obligated

to pay the fourfold and fivefold payment because of “selling” to the consecration!? For

what difference is there whether he sold it

the thief

to an ordinary person,

for which he is obligated to pay the fourfold and fivefold payment, or

whether he sold it

the thief

to Heaven, when he consecrated it!? He should likewise be obligated to pay the fourfold and fivefold payment.

when he consecrated it? He should likewise be liable for the fourfold or fivefold payment.

And we answer: Our Mishna is dealing with a case in which the thief consecrated this consecration for the payment of his vow, so that if the consecrated animal were lost, the thief would be obligated to assume responsibility for it—and

whose opinion is this

the opinion of our Mishna?

It is Rabbi Shimon’s, who says:

Consecrated animals for which

the owners who consecrate them

are responsible,

so that if they are stolen or lost, one is obligated to bring others in their place, as when they consecrated them for a vow that they vowed: “An offering is incumbent upon me”—

It is still

standing in its owner’s domain [as though it still belonged to the owners],

for “an object that causes monetary liability is considered money” means: anyone to whom the nonexistence of the object would cause a monetary obligation, while its existence prevents a monetary obligation to him, it is as though it were that person’s money.

And therefore: the thief is not liable for the consecration that he consecrated, for it is still standing in the domain of the thief who consecrated it, since he is responsible for it.

And the Gemara challenges this answer: At the end of our Mishna we also learned: "Rabbi Shimon says, and so on." If so,

But from the latter clause

of our Mishna

being Rabbi Shimon’s,

for at the end of our Mishna we learned: “Rabbi Shimon says, etc.,” and he disagreed with the law of one who steals consecrated property, who is exempt according to the first tanna, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon he is liable, as will be explained below.

It therefore follows that

the first clause is not Rabbi Shimon’s

opinion!? For if it were so, just as in the latter clause we learned: “Rabbi Shimon says,” so the tanna should have mentioned his name in the first clause, in the law of “he stole and consecrated”!?

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara explains differently why he is not liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment for the act of consecration:

Here—

in our Mishna—

with what are we dealing? With

a case in which the thief consecrated the animal for

lesser sanctity,

such as for peace offerings,

and

our Mishna

is according to Rabbi Yosei the Galilean,

and that is its opinion,

who says: Lesser sanctity is the property of the owners, and in the domain of

the thief

do the consecrated animals stand [that is, they remain],

and this is not a sale.

The Gemara objects:

But

when the thief consecrated the animal for

most sacred offerings,

such as a burnt offering,

what

will the law be—according to your answer—that the thief

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment,

because the consecration is considered a sale!?

But if so, the following difficulty arises:

Rather than teaching in the first clause,

the Mishna above, on page 70a, which taught cases similar to our Mishna in which, nevertheless, he is liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment:

“He stole and slaughtered, and afterward consecrated,”

he

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment;

and this clause was taught there corresponding to what we learned in our Mishna: “He stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered,” he does not pay the fourfold and fivefold payment.

Thus, according to your words, the difficulty is:

let the tanna distinguish

the tanna

and teach it in that case itself,

that is: let the tanna state the case in which he is liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment even though he consecrated it, in the same case that he teaches in our Mishna, namely, in a case where the slaughtering did not precede the consecration; and let him teach as follows:

“When do these words apply”—

that if he stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered or sold, he is exempt from the fourfold and fivefold payment—

with regard to lesser sanctity, but with regard to most sacred offerings

he

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment,

even though the slaughtering did not precede the consecration, because the consecration itself is like a sale, making him liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment.

But from the Mishna it appears that one cannot find a case in which the consecration preceded the slaughtering and he is liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment.

Rather,

on the basis of this difficulty the Gemara retracts, and

in every case

our Mishna deals with every possibility:

it makes no difference

whether the thief consecrated it for

most sacred offerings, and it makes no difference

whether the thief consecrated it for

lesser sanctity,

provided that he consecrated it with bodily sanctity for the altar—

And as for what is difficult for you:

why should he not be liable for the consecration itself? For

And if this is difficult to you:

Why should he not be liable for the consecration itself, for

what difference is there whether the thief sold it

to an ordinary person,

or whether the thief sold it to Heaven!?

This is not difficult:

For when

he sold it

the thief

to an ordinary person, originally—

at first, before the thief consecrated it—the ox was called: “

Reuven’s ox” [that is, his ox]

the thief’s,

but

if

now—

after the thief sold it—it is called: “

Shimon’s ox,”

the purchaser’s.

But when

he sold it

the thief

to Heaven,

that is, when he consecrated it as an offering for the altar,

originally—

before he sold it—“

Reuven’s ox”

was the thief’s; that is, the ox was called by the thief’s name,

and

even

now—

after the thief consecrated it—the name

“Reuven’s ox”

the thief’s remains upon it, for it is called: “So-and-so’s offering.”

And therefore this is not a “sale” for which he should be liable.

We learned in the Mishna: He stole and consecrated, and afterward slaughtered or sold, he pays the double payment, and does not pay the fourfold and fivefold payment.

Rabbi Shimon says:

For consecrated animals for which he is responsible, he pays the fourfold and fivefold payment; and for consecrated animals for which he is not responsible, he is exempt:

The members of the academy said

who had thought that the interpretation of our Mishna was that Rabbi Shimon disagreed with the first tanna, who exempts one who “stole and consecrated and afterward slaughtered” from the fourfold and fivefold payment; and this means:

The first tanna holds: A thief who consecrates and afterward slaughters is not liable for the fourfold and fivefold payment either for the consecration itself or for the slaughtering; whereas Rabbi Shimon holds: He should be liable for the consecration itself when he consecrated offerings for which he is responsible, but not when he consecrated offerings for which he is not responsible—

Therefore, the members of the academy raised the following difficulty:

Granted [

Even though Rabbi Shimon holds: What difference is there whether he sold it to an ordinary person or whether he sold it to Heaven,

and for this reason he makes him liable for consecration as for a sale, nevertheless the following difficulty arises:

He ought to have said the opposite

for Rabbi Shimon to distinguish!? He should have said as follows:

If the thief consecrated it as

consecrated property for which he is responsible,

he

is exempt,

because “an object that causes monetary liability is considered money,” and it follows

that it has still not left

the animal

his domain,

the thief’s.

But if the thief consecrated it as

consecrated property for which he is not responsible,

he

is liable

for the fourfold and fivefold payment, because

they remove it from his domain [the thief removed it from his domain].

the thief removed it from his possession].

The members of the academy said

to interpret our Mishna that Rabbi Shimon’s intention is not to disagree with the law of the first tanna mentioned in our Mishna, but rather

Rabbi Shimon is referring to another matter, [to another law that our Mishna omitted from the words of the first tanna; it is concerning this that Rabbi Shimon disagrees].

he is addressing another law omitted by the Mishna from the words of the first tanna; it is this law with which Rabbi Shimon disagrees].

And it is deficient, and it is deficient;

and this is what it teaches,

and thus you should recite our Mishna:

One who steals

an animal

after the thief

and slaughters it

pays the fourfold and fivefold payment,

because it is stated: “And one who steals from the house of the man—if the thief is found, he shall pay double,” but not from the house of the thief; and if there is no double payment, there is no fourfold and fivefold payment.

And likewise,

one who

steals consecrated property from the house of the owners,

and slaughters it,

is exempt. What is the reason? “We read in it” [I apply to him the verse]: “

I read this verse as applying to him]:

And one who steals from the house of the man

—if the thief is found, he shall pay double,” which implies:

and not

from the house of the consecration,

and if there is no double payment, there is no fourfold and fivefold payment.

Rabbi Shimon says:

one who steals

consecrated animals for which

the owners

are responsible—if he slaughters them, he is

therefore

liable.

And

what is the reason? We can apply to him

“and steals from the house of the man”:

because “an item that causes a monetary loss to be avoided is considered like money.”

But

only one who steals consecrated animals

for which

the owners

are not responsible—

he is therefore

exempt,

because

we cannot apply to him

“and steals from the house of the man.”

And the Gemara raises an objection to Rabbi Shimon, who held liable one who stole consecrated animals from the owners’ possession and slaughtered them:

after all,

for

we have heard Rabbi Shimon

say:

“An unfit slaughtering

by which the animal cannot be eaten,” such as slaughtering an animal that is trefa and therefore forbidden to eat,

is not called slaughtering

or slaughter for any purpose—and

consecrated animals

that were slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard are

also

“an unfit slaughtering,”

it is, because animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard are forbidden to eat. If so, why does Rabbi Shimon hold him liable for slaughtering them?

When

Rav Dimi came,

when Rav Dimi came from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan:

What is the case under discussion in our Mishna?

It is one who slaughters unblemished animals inside

the Temple courtyard,

for the sake of the owners,

and we are not discussing animals slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard.

The Gemara is astonished:

But

if the thief slaughtered the animal for the sake of the owners, this is like the

principal having returned

of the stolen property

to the owners

before the court brought him to trial, in which case he is not liable.

Rabbi Yitzhak bar Avin said:

What is the case under discussion here? For example,

when

he slaughtered them inside for the sake of the owners, but

the blood was spilled

after the slaughtering, so the principal did not return to the owners, since they achieve atonement only through the sprinkling of the blood. Although consecrated animals become permitted to be eaten only through the sprinkling of the blood, nevertheless this is a “fit slaughtering,” because Rabbi Shimon holds: “Anything destined to have its blood sprinkled is considered as though its blood had already been sprinkled,” as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

When Ravin came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said

in the name of

Rabbi Yohanan—

to explain Rabbi Shimon’s position in our Mishna in a different manner from what Rav Dimi said in his name: What is the case under discussion in our Mishna?

It is one who slaughters unblemished animals inside, not for the sake of the owners,

so the offering did not count for the owners as fulfilling their obligation, and this is not considered “the principal having returned to the owners.”