Bava Kamma 75a — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Rabbi Joshua

was standing outside the court

[he was standing]; the court was not sitting, and it was not a place where the court sat, but he admitted it to him in the marketplace.

The Gemara raises an objection:

But it was taught

in another

beraita:

Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Joshua:

“There is nothing in your words, for you have already admitted,”

and it implies: and from then on witnesses will no longer help you— and

is it not

that these two beraitot represent a dispute:

it is a dispute between tannaim

who dispute Rav’s ruling!?

d.

This tanna—

of the first beraita—

who said: “

for you no longer have witnesses,”

holds: one who admits to a fine, and afterward witnesses come,

he is

liable.

And this tanna

of the second beraita—

who said: “

for you have already admitted,”

holds: one who admits to a fine, and afterward witnesses come,

he is

exempt.

And we reject this:

No—

not as you explained their dispute, that they disagreed concerning Rav’s ruling; rather, it should be said:

everyone agrees: one who admits to a fine, and afterward witnesses come,

he is

exempt!

And it is concerning this that they

disagree,

as follows:

This tanna—

of the first beraita—

who said: “

for you no longer have witnesses,”

holds:

Rabban Gamliel’s admission

was outside the court; therefore it does not exempt him, and if witnesses come, he will be liable.

and therefore it does not exempt him; and if witnesses come, he will be liable.

And this tanna—

of the second beraita—

who said: “

for you have already admitted,”

holds:

Rabban Gamliel’s admission

was inside the court, and it exempts him even when witnesses subsequently come.

and it exempts him even if witnesses subsequently come.

It was stated:

It was stated:

one who admits to a fine, and afterward witnesses come,

there was a dispute concerning it between Rav and Shmuel:

Rav said: exempt; and Shmuel said: liable.

Rava bar Ahilai said: What is Rav’s reason,

who holds that one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come is exempt?

Because it is stated: “If the theft is surely found in his hand, from an ox to a donkey to a sheep, living animals, he shall pay double.” Therefore the Torah repeated the wording and said: “

If the theft is surely found,”

to teach us: if

the theft is found

that he stole

through witnesses,

then

you shall find it before judges,

who will obligate him;

excluding one who incriminates himself,

for the court does not obligate him on his own statement to pay the double payment, which is a fine—and behold:

why do I need

this verse!?

From “

which the judges shall condemn

God”

it follows [we can derive it]!? For it implies: the judges [the court] shall condemn him, excluding one who incriminates himself, who does not become liable on the basis of his admission.

суд, осудят его; значит, исключается тот, кто обвиняет самого себя и не становится обязанным на основании своего признания.

Rather, certainly the verse taught us this law also through the repetition “If the theft is surely found,” to teach us: even if witnesses came after he admitted, since it was first found not through witnesses, you shall no longer find it before judges—

Thus

you may infer: one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come,

he is

exempt.

And Shmuel—

who disagrees and holds that one who admits to a fine is exempt only as long as witnesses have not come, but if witnesses came, he is liable—

will say to you

to explain the verse “If the theft is surely found”:

That

repetition of the wording—“If the theft is surely found”— -

is needed for

explaining the details of the double-payment obligation of

the thief himself,

for we knew that he is liable to double payment only from this verse; and had the verse not said “If the theft is surely found,” I would have obligated the thief himself only concerning the living animals mentioned in the verse. Therefore the verse said “If the theft is surely found”: these are two general categories, and we place the particular examples alongside them, and we learn: anything movable whose body has monetary value, the thief is liable for it to pay double—

as the tanna of the school of Hezekiah

—at the beginning of the chapter, 64a—who derives from “If the theft is surely found” the law of the thief himself and the details of his laws.

Rav raised an objection to Shmuel:

The thief saw

the

witnesses who were approaching and about to arrive

at the court to testify against him that he had stolen and slaughtered or sold,

and

he admitted before they testified and

said

the thief to the court: “

I stole, but I did not slaughter or sell”:

The thief

pays only the principal,

which is money; but he does not pay the double payment, even though witnesses came and testified, since he admitted to a fine and was exempt. Consequently, he also does not pay for the slaughter, concerning which they testified against him, even though he did not admit to it, because the Torah stated an obligation concerning the thief only as “four or five”: namely, double payment for the theft and four or five for the slaughter; and anyone who does not pay double payment for the theft does not pay for the slaughter either.

We have therefore learned: one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come is exempt. This is difficult for Shmuel!?

He said to him

Shmuel said to Rav, resolving his difficulty from the beraita:

Here,

in the beraita,

what are we dealing with? For example, the witnesses turned back

and afterward did not testify concerning the theft, but only concerning the slaughter.

Rav returned and challenged him:

But from what the latter clause teaches

of that same beraita:

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon says: let

those

witnesses come and testify

before the court, and they will obligate him also for the theft.

By inference,

it is proven

that the first tanna holds: no,

the witnesses should come and testify concerning the theft; and because he admitted, it is explicitly established that the first tanna holds like Rav!?

Shmuel said to him

to Rav: Even if it is as you say, is there not

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon, who stands with me

[is Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon not of my opinion]!? If so,

I am stating my position in accordance with Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara explains:

According to

the position of

Shmuel, it is certainly a dispute between tannaim—there is no doubt that tannaim disputed whether or not the law is in accordance with his position, for the first tanna certainly does not hold like him.

there is no doubt that tannaim disagreed whether or not to follow his position, since the first tanna certainly does not hold like him.

But

according to

the position of

Rav, may one say

that it is necessary to say

that it is a dispute between tannaim, who disagreed according to his position, and that Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon does not hold like him? Or perhaps there is reason to say that he too agrees with Rav’s position?

то есть что они спорили относительно его мнения, а Рабби Элазар, сын Рабби Шимона, с ним не согласен? Или, возможно, есть основание сказать, что и он согласен с мнением Рава?

Rav will say to you:

It is not a dispute between tannaim. Rather,

I am stating my position even according to Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon,

because

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon said that only in that case

that “the witnesses should come and testify,” even though he first admitted to the fine,

because

the beraita is dealing with a case in which “he saw witnesses approaching and about to arrive,” and this admission does not exempt him, because he did not admit of his own accord, but

he admitted because of the fear of the witnesses

[because of fear of the witnesses]—

But here,

in the dispute between Shmuel and me,

where he admitted of his own accord,

in such a case

even Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon agrees

that the witnesses should not come and testify, because he was already exempted by his admission, in accordance with my position.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rav’s statement is reasonable,

meaning: even Rav said that one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses come is exempt only

when he says: “

I stole,”

and witnesses came that he stole,

and then indeed he is

exempt.

for he has rendered himself liable

to

himself

through his admission, in any event,

for the principal

which is money, and his admission renders him liable for it; and such an admission has the power to exempt him.

But if he said: “

I did not steal,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole, and he returned and said: “

I slaughtered and sold,”

and witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered and sold,

then he is

liable

for the payments of four and five on the basis of the witnesses.

For he exempted himself from anything

through this admission; that is to say: this one did not come to render himself liable at all, for he knew that one who admits to a fine is exempt; and whenever he did not render himself liable through the admission that he admitted, such an admission has no power to exempt him.

Rava said

to him

Rava

to Rav Hamnuna:

You have cut down the elders of the house of Rav

you have distressed, angered, and wronged all the members of the yeshiva of the beit-midrash, by saying before them a matter that is not so, with its answer alongside it; for I have proof that this is not the explanation of Rav’s words, and it is:

For, behold, Rabban Gamliel

who admitted concerning the blinding of Tavi’s eye,

was one who exempted himself from anything,

for there is no monetary liability in this at all—

and he says

astonished]

Rav Hisda to Rav Huna—

who exempted, in the name of Rav, one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses came—from Rabbi Yehoshua, who did not exempt Rabban Gamliel even when witnesses would come!

And

do you not see that

he did not answer him

Rav Huna: Rav said only this concerning one who rendered himself liable, but not concerning one who admits to blinding the eye of his slave, who exempts himself from anything?

It is thus proven from Rav Huna that he understood in Rav’s words that Rav exempts even in this manner, and he certainly knew well what Rav had said.

It was also stated:

we found another amora who agrees with Rav Hamnuna concerning the basic law:

for

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who says: “

I stole,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole,

he is

exempt

from the double payment,

for he rendered himself liable for the principal,

and such an admission exempts him.

But

if

he said: “

I did not steal,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole; and he returned and said: “

I slaughtered and sold,”

and witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered and sold,

then he is

liable

on the basis of the witnesses,

for he exempted himself from anything.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna and the beraita also indicate this

[one should infer from the Mishna and the beraita according to this approach], and this is from our Mishna, and from the beraita of “He saw witnesses approaching and coming”:

And Rav Ashi specifies:

the Mishna,

namely, from that

which we learned

in our Mishna:

If he stole on the basis of two [witnesses], and slaughtered and sold on the basis of one witness, or on the basis of his own [admission],

then he

pays the double payment, but does not pay the payments of four and five.

But apparently one could raise the difficulty:

why do I need it to teach “

he stole on the basis of two [witnesses]”?

But since the double payment for theft is also a fine, and one does not become liable through an admission, if so, let the tannai teach us that an admission—and all the more so one witness—are not effective concerning theft; and let him teach as follows:

if he stole and slaughtered and sold on the basis of one witness or on the basis of his own [admission], he pays only the principal,

and he is not liable even for the double payment!?