Bava Kamma 75a (עה.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Rabbi Yehoshua

was standing outside the court

[he was standing]; the court was not sitting, nor was this a place where the court sat. Rather, he acknowledged his liability to him in the marketplace.

The Gemara raises an objection:

but wasn’t it taught

in another

beraita:

Rabban Gamliel said to Rabbi Yehoshua:

There is nothing to your words, for you have already admitted

and it implies: witnesses will no longer help you —and

what, is it not

that these two beraitot disagree, and

it is a dispute between tannaim

who disagree concerning Rav’s ruling!?

d.

This tanna—

of the first beraita—

who said: “

for you no longer have witnesses,”

holds that if one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive

he is

liable.

And this tanna

of the second beraita—

who said: “

for you have already admitted,”

holds that if one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive

he is

exempt.

And we reject this:

No;

not as you explained their dispute, that they disagree concerning Rav’s ruling. Rather, one must say:

everyone agrees that if one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive

he is

exempt!

And here

is where they

disagree:

This tanna—

of the first beraita—

who said: “

for you no longer have witnesses,”

holds that

Rabban Gamliel’s admission

was outside the court,

and therefore it does not exempt him; and if witnesses come, he will be liable.

And this tanna—

of the second beraita—

who said: “

for you have already admitted,”

holds that

Rabban Gamliel’s admission

was in court,

and it exempts him even if witnesses subsequently come.

It was stated:

A

person who admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive—

Rav and Shmuel disagreed concerning this:

Rav said: He is exempt; and Shmuel said: He is liable.

Rava bar Ahilai said: What is Rav’s reason,

who holds that if one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive, he is exempt?

Because it is stated: “If the theft shall surely be found in his possession, whether it be ox, or donkey, or sheep, alive, he shall pay double.” Therefore the Torah repeated the phrase and said: “

If the theft shall surely be found,”

to teach us: If

the theft shall surely be found

that he stole

through witnesses,

then

it shall surely be found by the judges

who will obligate him,

excluding one who incriminates himself,

for the court does not obligate him on the basis of his own statement to pay the double payment, which is a fine. But

why do I need

this verse!?

From “

whom the judges

will condemn”

it follows [the matter can be derived from it]!? For it implies that the judges [the court] will condemn him, excluding one who incriminates himself, who does not become liable on the basis of his admission.

Rather, it is certainly for this reason that Scripture taught us this law also through the repetition “If the theft shall surely be found,” to teach us: Even if witnesses came after he admitted, since it was initially found without witnesses, it will no longer be found by the judges—

This

proves that if one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive,

he is

exempt.

And Shmuel—

who disagrees and holds that one who admits to liability for a fine is exempt only as long as witnesses have not arrived, but if witnesses arrive he is liable—

can say

to explain the verse “If the theft shall surely be found”:

That

repetition of the wording—“If the theft shall surely be found”— -

is needed to

explain the details of the double-payment obligation of

the thief himself,

for we would know that he is liable for double payment only from this verse. Were it not for the verse’s saying “If the theft shall surely be found,” I would obligate the thief himself only for the animals mentioned in the verse. Therefore the verse said “If the theft shall surely be found,” which consists of two general statements, and we place the particulars alongside them between the two general statements. Thus we know that for anything movable and itself of monetary value, a thief is liable to pay double—and

as the tanna of the school of Hezekiah

taught—at the beginning of the chapter, on page 64a: We derive from “If the theft shall surely be found” the law of the thief himself and the details of its laws.

Rav challenged Shmuel:

Look,

the thief

saw witnesses approaching

the court to testify against him that he had stolen and slaughtered or sold the animal,

and

he admitted before they testified and

said

the thief to the court: “

I stole, but I did not slaughter or sell”:

The thief

pays only the principal,

which is monetary liability; but he does not pay the double payment, even though witnesses came and testified, since he admitted to a fine and was exempt. Consequently, he also does not pay for the slaughter, concerning which they testified, even though he did not admit to it, because the Torah stated liability for a thief only in the form of “fourfold and fivefold payment”—namely, double payment for the theft and fourfold or fivefold payment for the slaughter or sale—and anyone who does not pay double payment for the theft does not pay for the slaughter either.

We have therefore learned: If one admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive, he is exempt. This poses a difficulty to Shmuel!?

He said to him

Shmuel said to Rav, resolving the challenge from the beraita:

Here,

in the beraita,

with what are we dealing? For example, the witnesses turned back

and subsequently did not testify concerning the theft, but only concerning the slaughter.

Rav returned and challenged him:

But from what is taught in the latter clause

of that same beraita:

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: Let the

same

witnesses come and testify

before the court, and let them obligate him even for the theft.

By inference,

it is evident

that the first tanna holds: No,

the witnesses should not come and testify concerning the theft. Since he admitted, it is explicit that the first tanna holds like Rav!?

Shmuel said to him

Rav: Even if it is as you say, is there

not Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who agrees with me

[does Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, not hold as I do]!? If so,

I am stating my position in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara explains:

As for

the position of

Shmuel, it is certainly a dispute between tannaim;

there is no doubt that tannaim disagreed whether or not to follow his position, since the first tanna certainly does not hold like him.

But

as for

the position of

Rav, can one say

that it is necessary to say

that it is a dispute between tannaim, that they disagree in accordance with his position, and that Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, does not hold like him? Or perhaps there is reason to say that he too agrees with Rav’s position?

Rav can say to you:

It is not a dispute between tannaim. Rather,

I am stating my position even according to Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

because

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, made his statement there only

that “the witnesses should come and testify,” despite the fact that he had first admitted to the fine,

because

the beraita is dealing with a case in which he “saw witnesses approaching,” and this admission does not exempt him, because he did not admit of his own accord, but

he admitted because of the fear of the witnesses

[because of fear of the witnesses]—

But here—

in the dispute between Shmuel and me—

he admits of his own accord,

in such a case,

even Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, agrees

that the witnesses should not come and testify, because he was already exempted through his admission, in accordance with my position.

Rav Hamnuna said: Rav’s statement stands to reason, meaning: Rav too said that one who admits to liability for a fine and afterward witnesses arrive is exempt only

when he says: “

I stole,”

and witnesses came that he stole,

and then indeed he is

exempt.

for he has rendered himself liable

for

himself

by his admission, in any event,

for the principal

which is monetary liability, and his admission renders him liable for it; and such an admission has the power to exempt him.

But if he said: “

I did not steal,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole, and he then said: “

I slaughtered it and sold it,”

and witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered it and sold it,

then he is

liable

to pay fourfold or fivefold payment on the basis of the witnesses.

for he exempted himself from anything

by this admission, meaning: he did not intend by this admission to render himself liable at all, since he knew that one who admits to a fine is exempt; and whenever a person does not render himself liable through the admission he made, such an admission has no power to exempt him.

Rava said

to

Rava

Rav Hamnuna:

You have injured the elders of the house of Rav—you have distressed, angered, and wronged all the members of the academy of the bейт-midrash by saying before them something incorrect whose refutation is self-evident, for I have proof that this is not the interpretation of Rav’s words, namely:

For Raban Gamliel

who admitted that Tavi’s eye had been blinded,

he

had exempted himself from anything,

as there was no monetary liability in this matter at all—

and he says [he expressed astonishment]

Rav Ḥisda to Rav Huna—

who, in the name of Rav, exempted one who admits to a fine and afterward witnesses came—from Rabbi Yehoshua, who did not exempt Raban Gamliel even should witnesses come!

And

you surely see that

he did not answer him

Rav Huna: Rav spoke only with regard to one who rendered himself liable, but not with regard to one who admits that he blinded his slave’s eye, thereby exempting himself from anything.

This proves from Rav Huna that he understood Rav’s words to mean that Rav exempts him even in this situation; and he certainly knew well what Rav had said.

It was also stated:

we find another amora who agrees with Rav Hamnuna concerning the basic law:

we find another amora who agrees with Rav Hamnuna regarding the basic law:

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

One who says: “

I stole,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole,

then he is

exempt

from the double payment,

for he rendered himself liable for the principal,

and such an admission exempts him.

But

if

he

said: “

I did not steal,”

and witnesses came and testified that he stole; and he then said: “

I slaughtered it and sold it,”

and witnesses came and testified that he slaughtered it and sold it,

then he is

liable

on the basis of the witnesses,

for he exempted himself from anything.

Rav Ashi said: The Mishna and the beraita also indicate this [one can infer this precisely from the Mishna and the beraita in accordance with this approach], namely, from our Mishna and from the beraita that states: “He saw witnesses approaching”:

And Rav Ashi specifies:

the Mishna,

namely, from that

which we learned

in our Mishna:

If he stole on the testimony of two witnesses, and slaughtered or sold the animal on the testimony of one witness, or on his own admission,

then he

pays the double payment, but does not pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

And it would seemingly be difficult:

why was it necessary for it to teach “‘

he stole on the testimony of two witnesses’”?

Since the double payment for theft is also a fine, and one does not become liable through an admission, let the tanna teach us that an admission—and all the more so, one witness—are ineffective with regard to theft; and let him instead teach:

If he stole and slaughtered or sold the animal on the testimony of one witness or on his own admission, he pays only the principal,

and is not liable even for the double payment!?

and he is not liable even for the double payment!?