Bava Kamma 70b — the Talmud in English

He said to him:

It is a rabbinic ordinance that anyone who holds land for three years—that is, he eats its produce—and claims that he purchased it from its original owners is believed in his claim and need not produce a deed of sale. And the Sages instituted this because it is not the way of purchasers to preserve their deeds for more than three years. The Sages relied on this: if the land did not belong to the purchaser, the original owners would not have allowed him to eat its produce without protesting.

If he ate it

the purchaser—the produce of the field concerning which he claims: “It is purchased by me”—

the first year in the presence of two,

that is: two testify concerning his eating of the first year, and

the second in the presence of two

others, and

the third in the presence of two

others,

what

is the law: may their testimony be joined so as to establish the land in the purchaser’s possession?

He said to him: This is possession!

He said to him: I too say so, except that Rabbi Akiva disagrees in this matter, for Rabbi Akiva used to say: “A matter”

and not half a matter,

and each group does not testify concerning a complete matter, namely, possession for three years.

And if so, shall we say that our Mishna, which validates witnesses to slaughter who are witnesses to “half a matter,” is not according to Rabbi Akiva?

Abaye said: You may even say that our Mishna is Rabbi Akiva’s

opinion.

Does Rabbi Akiva not concede: in the case of two who said,

“He betrothed

a woman,”

and two

others

say

about another man that he

had intercourse

with this woman, that they put the paramour to death on the basis of this testimony? And this is because:

Even though witnesses to intercourse require witnesses to betrothal,

and it is “half a matter,” nevertheless

since witnesses to betrothal do not require witnesses to intercourse,

for even without the testimony of the second group that she committed adultery, they testify concerning her that she is a married woman and forbidden to everyone, therefore also concerning the testimony of the second group

“a matter”

a complete one

we call it.

This is not comparable to witnesses to possession, for the testimony of each group, without the other groups, amounts to nothing.

And if so,

here too,

in our Mishna,

although witnesses to slaughter require witnesses to theft,

for without theft there is neither slaughter nor sale, nevertheless

since witnesses to theft do not require witnesses to slaughter,

for they obligate the thief to pay double whether he slaughtered or did not slaughter,

“a matter”

we call it concerning the testimony of slaughter, and

even Rabbi Akiva agrees in our Mishna that the witnesses to slaughter are accepted.

And we explain:

And the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Akiva even concerning witnesses to possession and validate testimony that is “half a matter,”

this

verse of

“a matter,”

which implies:

“and not half a matter”—what does it exclude

[which half a matter did the verse come to exclude]?

And we explain:

To exclude

witnesses to a woman’s adulthood through two hairs, when one witness

says: “One”

hair I saw on her

back

[between the joints of her fingers], and

one says: “One”

hair I saw on her

belly.

And we object: but

this

testimony is

half a

matter

and half

testimony

is it!?

For you have no two witnesses testifying concerning two hairs: this one testifies concerning one hair and that one testifies concerning another hair, and concerning each hair you have only one witness.

Rather,

according to the Rabbis, the verse “a matter” came

to exclude: two say: ‘One on her back,’ and two say: ‘One on her belly.’

And because

these—

the first group—

say: ‘She is a minor,’ and

also

these—

the second group—

say: ‘She is a minor.’

We learned in the Mishna: “He stole and sold on Shabbat” ... and he pays the fourfold and fivefold payments. And we challenge this: But it was taught in a beraita, a tannaitic source not included in the Mishna, that one who sells on Shabbat is exempt from the fourfold and fivefold payments!? He said— he answered— Rami bar Hama: When that exemption was taught, it referred to a case in which the sale was performed in violation of Shabbat, and when he said to him, the purchaser said to the thief on Shabbat: “Cut off a fig from my fig tree”—for which he is liable to death— from my fig tree as payment for the stolen animal, “and let your thefts acquire me.”

We learned in the Mishna:

He stole and sold on Shabbat ...

he pays fourfold and fivefold payments. And we ask:

But it was taught

in a baraita that one who sells on Shabbat

is exempt

from fourfold and fivefold payments!?

He said—

he gave the answer—

Rami bar Hama: When that exempt case was taught,

it was in a case where the sale was in violation of Shabbat, and

when he says to him,

the purchaser to the thief on Shabbat:

“Cut off a fig

from my fig tree”—for which he is liable to death—

“from my fig tree”

in payment for the stolen animal,

“and let your thefts be acquired by me.”

And since the sale was carried out in violation of Shabbat, we have the established principle concerning one who became liable for death and money simultaneously, that “kam lei bid’rabba minei” [he stands under the more severe punishment]; here too, the thief becomes liable for death and is exempt from payment of four and five.

They said

the members of the academy to challenge this interpretation:

And

behold,

since when

the buyer sues the thief

before us in court [when he sues him in court], so that he will return to him the figs that he picked

or the stolen animal that he sold him in exchange for the value of the figs— we do not say to him

the thief: “

Go, pay

”

to the buyer,

for

behold, he

is liable with his life

, and “kam lei bid’rabba minei”; and if so,

this sale too is not a sale—

Rather, Rav Pappa said:

this is how you will find exemption in a sale on Shabbat because of “kam lei bid’rabba minei”:

When he says to him

the buyer says to the thief:

Throw your stolen animals [the ox or sheep that you stole]

from the public domain

into my courtyard, and let my courtyard acquire for me

your

stolen animals

by the acquisition of “courtyard”; and in this manner, the “sale” is a sale, except that the thief is exempt for it because it was carried out in violation of the prohibition of transferring from one domain to another and he became liable for death, and he is exempt from payment of four and five because “kam lei bid’rabba minei.”

And we challenge this:

According to whom

is the beraita, according to whose view is the beraita interpreted in this manner? Necessarily,

it is according to Rabbi Akiva

who

says

with regard to bringing in from the public domain into the private domain on Shabbat:

An object caught

in the air of the private domain

is considered as though it had come to rest

it is comparable, and the thief becomes liable—immediately when the stolen animal enters the air of the courtyard, which is also the moment when the stolen animal is acquired by the buyer—for bringing in from the public domain into the private domain; and therefore he is exempt for the sale because of “kam lei bid’rabba minei,” since the two liabilities came upon him simultaneously.

и вор становится обязанным — сразу при вхождении украденного имущества в воздух двора, то есть в тот же момент, когда украденное приобретается покупателем, — за внесение из общественного владения в частное. Поэтому за продажу он освобождается по правилу «кэм лей бе-рабба миней», поскольку оба обязательства возникли одновременно.

For if

you say that this beraita

is according to the Rabbis,

who hold: a person becomes liable for bringing in only when it comes to rest on the ground of the courtyard, and the object’s being caught in the air of the courtyard is insufficient with regard to Shabbat, then the following difficulty arises:

Since it reaches

the stolen animal

the

air

of the buyer’s courtyard

of the buyer’s house,

he acquires

the buyer acquires the stolen animal—

Whereas

with regard to Shabbat—

since “an object caught is not considered as though it had come to rest,” and this is according to the Rabbis—

the thief does not become liable

the thief

until it reaches the ground [until the stolen animal comes to rest on the ground].

And we explain that even according to the Rabbis the beraita can be interpreted, for example,

when

the buyer says

to the thief:

“Your stolen animals shall not be acquired for me”—

immediately upon their entering the air of the courtyard—

“until they come to rest”

in my courtyard; and if so, the liability for Shabbat for bringing in, and the liability of four and five for the sale, came simultaneously, when the stolen animal came to rest on the ground of the buyer’s courtyard, and therefore he is exempt for the sale because of “kam lei bid’rabba minei.”

Rava said:

In any event,

it is possible to interpret the beraita

according to Rami bar Hama,

who said that it should be interpreted in a case where he said: “Pluck a fig from my fig tree, and let it acquire your stolen animals for me!”

And what is difficult for you: Behold, this is not a sale at all, since the thief did not become obligated to accept the figs or anything whatsoever!?

It is not difficult: for even though the buyer cannot sue him in court for accepting the figs, nevertheless it is a sale, since:

The hire

of a prostitute, which the man who has intercourse gives the woman as payment for her intercourse,

the Torah prohibited

offering it upon the altar:

even if he had intercourse with his mother—

and became liable for death for his intercourse—and gave her the hire!

And

behold, here too you should have said:

If she had sued him before us in court [if his mother had sued him in court] to pay her the hire that he became obligated to her,

do we say to him: “Get up and give her the hire” [would we perhaps obligate him to give what he became obligated to give her], when behold, “kam lei bid’rabba minei”!?

And if so, we should have said that even if he gave her hire, this is not “hire,” for only what is given to the woman “as payment” for her intercourse is called “hire,” and not a mere gift given for the intercourse.

Rather,

it is compelled by the fact that the Torah prohibited hire even when he gave it to his mother, that

even though when she sues him in court we do not say to him, “Go, give it to her” [even though she cannot legally sue him for her hire], nevertheless

since when he gives it to her,

that is, since in any event he gave it to her,

it is

“

hire

” [the designation “hire” applies to what he gave her], since he must fulfill his obligation before Heaven even in a place where, according to human law, “kam lei bid’rabba minei.”

Here too, in the beraita, even though with regard to payment, if the buyer sues

[the designation “payment to a prostitute” applies to what he gave her], since he is obligated to fulfill his duty before Heaven even in a case where, under human law, “he stands liable for the greater of them.”

» [на переданную ей вещь распространяется название «плата блудницы»], поскольку он обязан исполнить свой долг перед Небесами даже там, где по человеческому суду к нему применяется правило «кэм лей бе-рабба миней».

the thief

before us in court, we do not say to him

the thief

“Go, pay”

to the buyer—

the thief:

“Go and pay”

the buyer—