Bava Kamma 52b — the Talmud in English

Rather, is it not the case

that he covered it with a covering

proper for oxen ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location of the folio")

but not proper for camels.

And

we raise an objection: whichever way you look at it,

if

it is speaking of a place

where camels are common

there,

camels, why

is the owner of the pit

exempt

when

he is negligent,

because he did not cover it with a covering proper for camels,

And if

it is speaking of a place

where camels are not common,

this

is obvious,

that he is exempt, because

he is compelled.

Rather, is it not the case,

necessarily, the beraita speaks of a case

where

the camels

come periodically, and

it happened that

camels came

onto the covering,

and damaged it,

they destabilized it,

and oxen came

after them

and fell into it, and it teaches: exempt.

It follows

that in a place where camels are there periodically,

since now they are not present

he is not liable to cover it on their account, and if camels arrived,

he is compelled,

and resolve your question.

And we reject this:

they say: no,

resolve your question from here, for

actually

the beraita speaks of one who covered it with a covering

proper for oxen and proper for camels, and that which is difficult for you

if so,

how did they fall?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar bar Ḥana said:

here, with what are we dealing? With a case

where the covering became worm-eaten

the covering

from within.

Come and hear:

a pit in the public domain whose

owner did not cover it

its owner

properly, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died

the owner of the pit

is liable

for its damage.

And we inquire concerning it,

what are the circumstances? If you say

that he covered it

neither properly for oxen nor properly for camels,

this

is obvious!

And is it

necessary

to say that

the owner of the pit

is liable? Rather, is it not

speaking of one who covered it

properly for oxen but not properly for camels.

And

what are the circumstances? If

in a place

where

there

camels are common,

if he did not cover it on their account,

he is negligent,

and it is obvious that he is liable.

And if camels are not common

and it happened that camels arrived and the covering broke, behold,

he is compelled,

for he had no reason to consider covering it on account of camels, so why do we say in the beraita that he is liable?

Rather, is it not,

necessarily, the beraita speaks of a case

where

camels

come periodically, and

it happened that

camels came

onto the covering

and damaged it, and oxen came

after them

and fell into it, and it teaches

in the beraita

liable.

It follows that since

camels

come periodically

and he did not cover it on their account,

he is negligent, for he should have taken it into consideration,

and resolve your question.

And we reject this:

actually

the beraita speaks of one who covered it

properly for oxen, but not properly for camels, and camels are common

in that place

camels.

And that which is difficult for you

that if so, he should have covered it on account of the camels, and it is obvious that he is liable, for

he is negligent,

this is not difficult, for

since he stated in the first clause, “he covered it properly,” he also stated in the latter clause, “he did not cover it properly.”

There are those who say: this also, we certainly did not ask,

whether, if he covered it properly for oxen but not properly for camels,

since they come periodically, he is negligent,

and he is liable because

he should have taken into consideration

that camels might come.

What we did ask, this is what we asked:

a pit whose

covering can withstand oxen, but cannot withstand camels, and camels are common

in that place,

and

an ox fell into it, but not because camels destabilized the covering; rather,

the covering became worm-eaten

the covering

from within—what is the law?

Do we say: migo, since

he is negligent with regard to

a covering that is not fit for

camels, he is likewise negligent with regard to becoming worm-eaten,

for we consider him as though he had not covered his pit,

Or perhaps we do not say migo,

and he is compelled and exempt.

Come and hear:

a pit whose

owner covered it

its owner

properly, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died—he is exempt. And it was said concerning this: Rabbi Yitzḥak bar bar Ḥana said

here, with what are we dealing? With a case

where it became worm-eaten from within,

and we inquire concerning it:

what are the circumstances? If you say

that he covered the pit

properly for oxen and properly for camels, and it became worm-eaten from within, it is obvious that he is exempt,

for he is compelled, and

what could he have done? Rather, is it not

speaking of a case where he covered it with a covering

proper for oxen but not proper for camels, and camels are common

in that place, and it is negligence with regard to camels,

and it became worm-eaten from within

and the ox fell because of the worm-eating and not because a camel destabilized the covering,

and it teaches

in the beraita

exempt. It follows that we do not say: since he is negligent with regard to camels, he is negligent with regard to becoming worm-eaten,

rather, since becoming worm-eaten is compulsion, we exempt him; and resolve your question.

And we reject this,

no,

you cannot resolve our question from here, for

actually

it is speaking of a case where he covered his pit with a covering

proper for camels and proper for oxen, and it became worm-eaten from within

and an ox fell into it because of the worm-eating.

And that which is difficult for you—that when it became worm-eaten, what could he have done

since he is compelled, and what does it teach us by saying that he is exempt—this is not difficult.

Lest you say: he should have

the owner of the pit

gone and knocked,

to knock and inspect

it

lest it had become worm-eaten,

it teaches us

that he is exempt.

Come and hear:

a pit whose owner

did not cover it properly, and an ox or a donkey fell into it and died—he is liable,

And we inquire concerning it: this that it teaches, he covered it improperly,

what are the circumstances?

If you say: neither properly for oxen nor properly for camels,

for he is negligent, and is it

necessary to say that he is liable!?

Rather, is it not

that he covered it

properly for oxen but not properly for camels.

And

if so, whichever way you look at it:

if

it is speaking of a place

where camels are common,

behold,

he is negligent,

and this too is obvious: he is liable.

And if camels are not common,

what of it that he did not cover it on their account? Behold,

he is compelled!

Rather, is it not,

necessarily, the beraita speaks of a place

where camels are common

and he did not cover it with a covering proper for camels,

and it became worm-eaten from within

and the ox fell because of the worm-eating.

And it teaches: liable.

It follows that we say: since he is negligent with regard to camels, he is negligent with regard to becoming worm-eaten.

And we reject this:

they say:

from here

you cannot

resolve our question, for

actually

the beraita speaks of a pit that they covered

properly for oxen but not properly for camels, and camels are common

in that place,

and camels came and damaged it,

they destabilized the covering,

and oxen came

after them

and fell into it.

And that which is difficult for you

that since he did not cover it on account of camels, which are common,

it is obvious

that he is liable, and

he is negligent,

what novelty did the beraita teach?

This is not difficult, for

since it stated in the first clause, “he covered it properly,”

that he is exempt,

it also stated in the latter clause, “he did not cover it.”

And in truth, there is no novelty in this.

Come and hear:

a pit into which

an ox fell

that is

deaf

or

mad, and a minor

that is unfit for plowing, or

blind, and

likewise a sound ox that

walks at night—he is liable.

An ox fell into it

that is sound and walks during the day—he is exempt,

for we say that it should have looked carefully and seen where it was going.

And we raise an objection,

and why

do we exempt a sound ox walking during the day?

Let us say: since he is negligent with regard to

the falling of an

deaf ox,

for if it fell into it, he is liable,

he is likewise negligent with regard to

the falling of a

sound ox

that walks during the day.

Rather, is it not so? Learn from it: we do not say “migo.”

And we conclude: indeed,

learn from it.

We learned in the Mishna:

If it fell before him because of the sound of the digging, he is liable.

Rav said:

this that we say, it fell

before him,

is when it fell upon

its actual face,

and likewise, if it fell

behind him,

for which he is exempt, it is when it fell

directly behind him.