Bava Kamma 51a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

No!

The case where Rav Naḥman exempts in a pit less than ten [handbreadths] is

because there is no vapor in it,

and although [the animal] can die from the impact, Rav Naḥman holds like Rav, that one is never liable for impact.

And we challenge:

If so,

with regard to that which is taught at the end of our Mishna, “And if

he was injured in it, he is liable,”

for what reason is he liable?

But

in [a pit] less than ten,

there is no vapor in it!

He said to him:

Indeed,

there is no vapor for death,

but

there is vapor for damages

even in [a pit] less than ten!

He challenged him

from that which we learned:

The house of stoning [

from which those liable to stoning were thrown ],

was two stories high [

a story is three cubits ].

And it was taught concerning it

in a beraita that one must add to the number of stories also

his story [

the height of the one being stoned ],

there are three here

stories—for his impact is from a height of three stories.

And if it enters your mind that there is impact in less than ten

handbreadths,

why do I need all this

height of stories? And why can he not be thrown from a height of several handbreadths, since even at such a height he can die?

And we reject this:

According to your reasoning,

that there is no impact in less than ten, you must explain why these stories were necessary, and it would have been sufficient that

we make

the house of stoning

ten

handbreadths high, since you admit that at a height of ten impact causes death?

Rather,

certainly one must say according to his explanation,

that of Rav Naḥman.

For Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

The reason they throw those being stoned from a great height is that

the verse says, “And you shall love your fellow as yourself,”

and therefore we require

that a beautiful death be selected for him,

so that he dies quickly. And that is why we make the house of stoning so high. But I can properly say that death applies even in less than ten.

And we challenge Rav Naḥman in the name of Rabba bar Avuha:

If so,

since we require that a beautiful death be selected,

let us raise [

let us raise it ]

more

the house of stoning, so that it will be even higher and his death will be even quicker?

And we answer: We do not raise the house of stoning further

because he would be degraded

by this, the one being stoned, since with such a throwing he would be separated limb from limb.

The Gemara now comes to raise another difficulty against Rav Naḥman, who holds that there is impact in less than ten, from that which was taught: It is written in the passage concerning a parapet:

“For the one who falls shall fall from it.”

And the Sages expounded from here: “

From it, and not into it.”

That is to say, the obligation to make a parapet applies if the roof of his house was ten handbreadths higher than the public domain, so that if the one who falls falls from it, he will fall into the public domain; but he is not obligated to make a parapet if the roof of his house was lower than the public domain, and if the one who falls falls, he will fall from the public domain into his roof, and not from his roof.

How so? If the public domain was higher than it [

than the roof of his house ]

by ten handbreadths, and he fell [

that is, if the one who falls falls, he will fall ]

from within it

of the public domain

into it

of the roof, he is

exempt

from making a parapet at the edge of the public domain, so that the one who falls should not fall from it to it.

And only if the public domain was

deeper than it,

than the roof,

and he fell [

that is, if the one who falls falls, he will fall ]

from within it

of the roof

into it

of the public domain,

he is liable

to make a parapet for the roof.

And if it enters your mind

according to Rav Naḥman, that

there is impact

that causes death even

in less than ten

handbreadths,

why do I need ten

handbreadths of height in order to obligate the roof in a parapet!?

He said to him: “House” is different,

for the commandment of a parapet was stated with regard to the roof of a house,

for anything less than ten is not a house.

And the Gemara wonders:

If so,

that the need for a height of ten is not because of the impact, but because there is an obligation only concerning the roof of a house, and it is not called a house unless it has a height of ten, then the height of the house must be measured by the height of its inner space; and if so,

now too, when it is ten on the outside,

even if the roof is ten high on the outside,

remove it,

one should subtract from its measure of height the

ceiling

of the house and the

plaster

upon it, and it follows that

on the inside,

on the inner side of the house,

it is not ten.

He said to him: For example, where he hollowed out on the inside.

It is speaking of a case where he chiseled into the floor of the house and deepened it until the house’s inner space had a height of ten handbreadths.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty:

If so,

since you established it in a case where he deepened the floor of the house, then even

when it is not so,

even if the roof did not have a height

on the outside

outside [that is, the height of the upper surface of the roof]

of ten

handbreadths, it can nevertheless be the roof of a house whose interior has a height of ten, for

you find it where it is ten on the inside, for example, where he hollowed it out more,

in a manner that he chiseled a great depth into the floor of the house and completed the inner space to ten handbreadths; so why must the height of the roof at its upper surface be ten handbreadths?

Therefore the Gemara retracts and says that even according to Rav Naḥman there is no impact that causes death in less than ten handbreadths.

Rather, this is the reason for Rav Naḥman:

he regarded the animal’s fall from the irrigation channel as a fall that incapacitates the animal, because he

held

that even such a fall is a fall of ten handbreadths, according to this calculation:

From the belly of an ox to the ground, how much is it?

The belly of the animal is elevated above the ground

four

handbreadths.

The irrigation channel of the water-drawer,

its height,

how much is it? Six,

six handbreadths.

And when we combine a height of six with a height of four,

that is ten

handbreadths.

It is found

that

when it is impacted, from

a height of

ten is when it is impacted.

But as for the Mishna, which teaches, “Just as a pit that is sufficient to cause death is ten handbreadths, so too anything that has enough to cause death is ten handbreadths,”

why is a height of ten handbreadths necessary? After all,

six is also sufficient,

a height of six handbreadths, together with the height of the animal’s belly above the ground, which is four handbreadths; together they amount to ten handbreadths

!?

They say, to answer in the study hall:

The Mishna is in a case where it rolled,

our Mishna speaks of a case where the ox was lying on the ground and rolled

into the pit,

and its belly was not elevated above the ground at all.

Mishna:

A pit

that is

of two partners,

and

the first passed by it and did not cover it, and

also

the second

passed by

and did not cover it,

then

the second is liable

for payment of the damages of the one who fell into the pit; and the Gemara explains that the first transferred use of the pit to the second, or that he gave him the covering of the pit, and the second thereby accepted upon himself the guarding of the pit; therefore the second is liable and the first is exempt.

Gemara:

They say,

the members of the academy raised the difficulty:

A pit of two partners—how can you find it [

how do you find a pit of two partners ]!?

This works if we hold like Rabbi Akiva,

who says: A pit

that is

in his domain,

he is

liable

for it; indeed,

you find it in a courtyard belonging to both of them, with a pit belonging to both of them, where they rendered their domain ownerless but did not render their pit ownerless.

But if we hold: A pit

that is

in his domain,

he is

exempt

for it, then

how can you find it,

a pit of two partners,

for which he is liable!?

And we answer:

In the public domain

is where you can find a pit of two partners.

And we still challenge:

And in the public domain, how can you find a pit of two partners!?

If they appointed an agent together and said to him, “Go, dig for us,” and he went and dug for them,

[the two men sent a third person to dig a pit for them in the public domain, and he went and dug it], it is impossible to say this, because we maintain:

There is no agent for a transgression,

an agent is not effective in a transgressive matter to make his sender liable; rather, the agent himself is liable.

And if this one dug five, and that one dug five [the first dug to a depth of five handbreadths, and the second came and dug an additional five handbreadths], and it follows that through both of them a pit was dug that has the measure of death, namely ten handbreadths, even so it is impossible to say this, because:

A pit of two partners cannot be found in our Mishna; and this too apparently depends on the explanation of the matter of “an agent for a transgression” in our sugya; and all this requires study.

The first act has been removed

by the digging of the second; that is to say, only the second is considered the “owner of the pit.”

This works for Rabbi

below,

and

with regard to

damages

that occurred in the pit [but not death], indeed

you can find it

that both become liable, in a case where the first dug five and the second dug five.

But for Rabbi, and

with regard to

death,

that both should become liable for the death of an animal inside it—and

also

so

for the Sages,

who disagree with Rabbi and hold that the pit is attributed only to the last one, and the acts of the first have been removed even with regard to damages—

whether for death

and

whether for damages, how can you find it

that both become liable!?

He said

that

Rabbi Yoḥanan

explained: You can find a pit of two partners—

in a case where one dug a pit of nine handbreadths, and

for example, both uprooted a section

from the pit

at the same time, and completed it to ten

handbreadths; and both according to Rabbi and according to the Sages, both are considered owners of the pit, both for death and for damages.

And we explain:

What is Rabbi, and what are the Sages? For it was taught: One who digs a pit of nine

which is a pit with regard to damages,

and another comes and completes it

to ten

handbreadths and makes it a pit with regard to death,

the last one

alone is

liable

both with regard to death and with regard to damages, as its reason will be explained below; these are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi says: We follow the last one

only

for death,

since he made it a pit for death,

and the two of them

we follow

for damages,

since even through the digging of the first there was already a pit for damages; his act was not removed.

And we explain:

What is the reason of the Sages,

who hold that through the digging of the second the acts of the first were removed even with regard to damages?

Because

the verse says [Exodus 21:33]: “And

[Exodus 21:33]: “And

when a man opens

a pit [the owner of the pit shall pay],”

and it says further [there]: “Or

it says further there: “Or

when he digs

a man a pit … [the owner of the pit shall pay].” But surely it may be challenged:

If for opening

a dug pit—which is merely the removal of guarding—the Torah has already taught that the one who opens it is

liable

for the damages of the pit,

for digging, all the more so

the one who digs is liable for the damages of the pit; why then did the Torah need to say further, “Or when a man digs a pit”!?

Rather, it comes to include one who digs after another, where he removed the first act.

And Rabbi—

who disagrees and holds that the act of the first was not removed—

can say to you:

Those—

opening and digging—

are each necessary, as we said

above, 51a: either according to Rabbi Yishmael or according to Rabbi Akiva; therefore we cannot derive from this a case of one who digs after another, where he removed the first act.

And the Sages too,

but

they are each necessary

the verses for the reason we said!?

Rather,

because of this difficulty the Gemara retracts and explains that

this is the reason of the Sages:

Because

the verse says: “Or

a

when a man digs

[the singular form]

a pit,”

which implies that

one

is liable for it

and not two; the verse came to teach that the second removed the acts of the first.

the verse comes to teach that the second person’s digging removes the first person’s act.

And Rabbi

can say to you:

That

verse, “a man [of] a pit,”

is needed to him

to teach:

“When a man digs a pit, and not an ox a pit,”

for a person does not become the owner of the pit when his ox dug the pit.

And the Sages

can say to you:

Two

“a man [of] a pit”

a man’s pit”

are written

in the passage, for the Torah says: “And when a man opens a pit, or when a man digs a pit”; from one verse we derive the exclusion of the ox, and from the second verse we learn: one and not two.

And Rabbi

can say to you:

Since it wrote this, it wrote

also

this, [

since it wrote “a man [of] a pit” with regard to opening, it also wrote “a man [of] a pit” with regard to digging ].

And we still challenge the Sages:

And from where

does the verse come

to make the last one liable?

Perhaps it comes to make the first one liable: from where do we know that the verse came to make the second liable for the damages and exempt the first, perhaps the verse came to make only the first liable and to exclude the second from liability for the damages of the pit!?

And we answer:

It cannot enter your mind

to explain it this way, because

the verse says: “The owner of the pit shall pay; he shall return money to its owner,

and

and the dead animal shall be his,”

which implies

the one who causes death

is the one called “the owner of the pit.”

And we challenge this:

And

behold,

this “

and the dead animal shall be his”

is needed for the teaching of Rava!?

For Rava said:

Ox of disqualified consecrated animals -

such as a blemished firstborn that belongs to a kohen, or another offering in which a blemish occurred and which was redeemed -

fell into a pit, he is exempt

the owner of the pit concerning it, even though it is not of consecrated property, since it belongs to the kohen or to the redeemer, and because

it is stated: “

And the dead animal shall belong to him,”

to one whose dead animal it is

entirely, and he can feed it to dogs; this excludes an ox of disqualified consecrated animals, which you cannot feed to dogs.

They say

the members of the academy, to reconcile:

Let it be according to your words; nevertheless,

and

is it not the case that

you hear from it by itself that we are dealing with that which caused death?

The Sages taught:

One who digs a pit ten [handbreadths deep], and another comes and completes it to twenty, and another comes and completes it to thirty—all of them are liable,

and the third did not remove the acts of all of them.

And we raise a contradiction

from this, as it was taught in a baraita:

One who digs a pit ten [handbreadths deep], and another comes and plasters

the pit and reduces its width and increases the vapor in it,

and paints

or makes raised designs on its walls, and the width of the pit is diminished and its vapor is increased in it,

the last one is liable,

and he removed the act of the first, since, having increased the vapor in it, he is like one who dug, whereby he removed the act of the first.