Bava Kamma 49b — the Talmud in English

And if what is difficult for you is: Why did he acquire it, say to you:

that which is difficult for you—why did he acquire it—say to you:

teach

in the beraita: “

she acquired”; that is, this that we taught “he acquired” means that the one in possession acquired it: if he injured her during the lifetime of the convert, and the one who struck her is the one in possession of the debt of the value of the miscarried fetuses, then he acquired it; but if the convert died before he injured her, and she is in possession of the fetuses, she acquired the value of the miscarried fetuses.

that is, when the Mishna says “he acquired,” it means that whoever has possession acquired it. If he injured her during the convert’s lifetime, and the man who caused the injury is the one who has possession of the claim to the payment for the fetuses, then he acquired it. But if the convert died before he injured her, and she has possession of the fetuses, then she acquired the payment for the fetuses.

Shall we say—

the dispute between Rabba and Rav Hisda—

is [a dispute] between tanna’im, [that is, shall we say that the tanna’im in the following beraita disputed in their dispute]?

that is, shall we say that the tannaim in the following beraita disagreed about the same issue?

An Israelite woman who married a convert, became pregnant from him, and he injured her during the lifetime of the convert—the value of the miscarried fetuses is given to the convert.

And if he injured her

after the death of the convert:

One [beraita] teaches [we learned in one beraita]:

in one beraita:

the one who struck her is liable.

to pay.

And one [beraita teaches: the one who struck her is exempt.

from payment.

Is it not that they are tanna’im, such that one beraita follows Rabba, who holds that the woman acquired the fetuses and their payments, and therefore we taught: “liable,” meaning liable to the woman?

The first beraita follows Rabba, who says that the woman acquired the fetuses and their payments; therefore it taught: “He is liable,” meaning that he is liable to the woman.

Whereas the second beraita follows Rav Hisda, who holds that the woman did not acquire the fetuses, and therefore he is exempt.

And the Gemara explains:

According to Rabba—who holds that the woman acquired the fetuses when her convert husband died—

who holds that the woman acquired the fetuses when her convert husband died—

it is certainly a dispute between tanna’im. That is, Rabba cannot explain the beraita in which we taught “exempt” in accordance with his view; necessarily, he will explain that the beraitot dispute this matter, and he follows the beraita that obligates payment of the value of the fetuses to the woman.

that is, Rabba cannot explain the beraita that says “he is exempt” according to his own view. He must therefore explain that the two beraitot disagree on this matter, and he follows the beraita that obligates payment for the fetuses to the woman.

But according to Rav Hisda—who holds that the woman did not acquire the fetuses when her convert husband died—

who holds that the woman did not acquire the fetuses when her convert husband died—

shall we say—is it indeed necessary to say that

that it is necessarily so that

it is a dispute between tanna’im? That is, must it be that the beraita that says “liable” does not follow Rav Hisda, and that he follows the tanna of the second beraita, or perhaps this beraita also does not dispute him?

That is, must we say that the beraita that says “he is liable” does not follow Rav Ḥisda, and that he follows the authority in the second beraita? Or can it be said that this beraita, too, does not disagree with him?

And we explain that this is not necessary, for one may say that both beraitot are not dealing with “the value of the miscarried fetuses,” but with “the improvement of the fetuses,” concerning which, when the convert did not die, the Sages and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disputed whether it all belongs to the husband or whether the woman too shares it with the husband; and

they do not contradict one another:

with one another:

this—the beraita in which we taught: “After the death of the convert, exempt”—

the beraita that says: “If he injured her after the convert’s death, he is exempt”—

is the Sages’ opinion, for according to them the woman has no right to the improvement of the fetuses during the convert’s lifetime, and not even after the convert’s death.

who hold that the woman has no right to the enhancement of the fetuses during the convert’s lifetime, and likewise has no right to it after the convert’s death.

This—the beraita in which we taught: “After the death of the convert, liable”—

the beraita that says: “If he injured her after the convert’s death, he is liable”—

is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s opinion, who holds that the woman too has a right to the improvement of the fetuses during her husband’s lifetime; and he proceeds to explain it.

who holds that the woman also has a right to the enhancement of the fetuses during her husband’s lifetime, as the Gemara proceeds to explain.

It entered our minds that according to this explanation, that which it teaches “liable” refers to half of the improvement of the fetuses, which was the woman’s share during her husband’s lifetime; therefore we ask:

If the beraita deals with the improvement of the fetuses, and

барайте говорит об увеличении стоимости выкидышей и

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is its author, who holds that half of the improvement of the fetuses belongs to the woman even during her husband’s lifetime—

holds that half of the enhancement of the fetuses belongs to the woman even during her husband’s lifetime—

if so,

why specifically does the beraita say [why did the beraita state] that

that

“after death” the one who struck her is liable to give the woman her share, when

the one who caused the injury is liable to give the woman her share? After all,

even during the lifetime

of the convert

she too has [the woman]

a

half [half of the improvement of the fetuses] of it!?

of the enhancement of the fetuses!?

And the Gemara innovates that the intention is not as we initially thought—that only half of the improvement of the fetuses belongs to the woman when the convert dies, as it also belonged to her during his lifetime—but rather:

during his lifetime she has

the woman

half בלבדof the improvement of the fetuses, whereas

of the enhancement of the fetuses, whereas

after death

she has

all of it, and that which it teaches “liable” refers to the entire improvement of the fetuses.

If you wish, say—to resolve the matter according to Rav Hisda, so that it will not be necessary to say that “it is a dispute between tanna’im”:

Both this and that—both beraitot—are the opinion of

both beraitot—

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, but:

Here—the beraita in which we taught “liable”—deals

the beraita that says “he is liable”—is dealing

with the improvement of the fetuses, which after the convert’s death belongs entirely to the woman.

которое после смерти гера целиком принадлежит женщине.

Here—the beraita in which we taught “exempt”—deals

the beraita that says “he is exempt”—is dealing

with the value of the miscarried fetuses, from which the one who struck her is exempt, and this is according to Rav Hisda.

от которой нанесший удар освобожден, согласно мнению Рав Хисды.

They said, the members of the academy, to challenge both resolutions:

ученики йешивы, возражая против обоих объяснений:

But surely

from “

the improvement of the fetuses”

can it be inferred

from

the value of the miscarried fetuses, and from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel can it be inferred to the Sages!? That is: Just as you say according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning the improvement of the fetuses, that although during the convert’s lifetime she has only half, nevertheless after his death she acquired all of it, so too let us say this concerning the value of the miscarried fetuses, even according to the Sages: although during his lifetime she has no right to the value of the miscarried fetuses, nevertheless after his death she acquired it!?

That is: Just as, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, you say concerning the enhancement of the fetuses that although during the convert’s lifetime she has only half, nevertheless after his death she acquired all of it, so too we should say this concerning the payment for the fetuses, even according to the Sages: although during his lifetime she has no right to the payment for the fetuses, nevertheless after his death she acquired it!?

They said, the members of the academy, to resolve the matter:

ученики йешивы, разрешая это затруднение:

No, this is not so, and the value of the miscarried fetuses cannot be compared to the improvement of the fetuses in this respect, because:

that is not so, and one cannot compare the payment for the fetuses to the enhancement of the fetuses in this matter, because:

the improvement of the fetuses, in which her hand has a connection [she has a connection with them], since half of it is hers even during his lifetime; therefore, after death,

since half of it belongs to her even during his lifetime; therefore, after his death,

she acquires all of it [she acquires all of it].

and becomes entitled to the entire amount.

But

the value of the miscarried fetuses, which

during his lifetime

her hand has no connection with them, for they all belong to the husband,

because it all belongs to the husband; therefore,

she does not acquire them at all

after death.

Rav Yeiva the Elder asked Rav Nahman [Rav Yeiva the Elder asked Rav Nahman]:

Rav Yaiva the Elder asked Rav Naḥman:

One who is holding the documents of a convert—that is, an Israelite had mortgaged his land to him in them for payment of his debt —

after the convert died,

what is the law of the holder acquiring the field? Does

is the law concerning whether the holder acquires the document itself? Is it that

one who holds a document intend by holding it to acquire the land stated in the document,

that is written in the document,

but he did not take possession of the land in order to acquire it,

so as to acquire it,

and consequently

therefore

the document [the document itself]

itself

he too did not acquire, because

because

for

he

does not intend the document [he does not intend to acquire the document, but the land]; and if another comes and acquires the document, he acquires it.

он намеревался приобрести не документ, а землю], а если другой придет и завладеет документом — тот приобрел его.

Or perhaps: his intention

of the holder

was also for the document

[on the paper itself], and in any event he acquired the paper.

S

aid Rav Naḥman to Rav Yevai the Elder:

Answer me, my master

[answer me, my master]:

And does

paper suffice

to wrap around

the mouth of

his flask ,

until it can be said: his intention was for the document itself !?

He said to him :

indeed,

to wrap and to wrap.

Rabba said:

The collateral of an Israelite in the possession of a convert ,

where the Israelite owed money to the convert and the Israelite gave him collateral,

and the convert died, and another Israelite came and took possession of it

[of the collateral],

they remove it from his possession

and give it to the owner of the collateral.

And we explain:

What is the reason:

Once the convert died, his lien lapsed ,

when the convert died, the debt lapsed, and consequently the lien; and once the lien lapsed from the collateral, it belongs to the borrower who pledged it.

And if it was

the collateral of a convert in the possession of an Israelite ,

where the convert was the one who gave the Israelite collateral for his debt that he owed the Israelite,

and the convert died, and another Israelite came and took possession of it ,

this is the law:

This one —

the lender —

acquired

through the collateral

against his money

[his debt].

And this one —

the one who seized it —

acquired the remainder.

And we raise an objection to this:

But why

did the lender not acquire all the collateral?

Let his courtyard acquire it for him

from ownerless property !?

For Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: A person’s courtyard acquires for him without his knowledge ,

and if so, even though he did not know of the convert’s death and did not intend to acquire it, his courtyard should acquire it for him without his knowledge !?

The members of the academy said

to resolve it:

Here, with what are we dealing :

with a case

where he is not present

the lender is not in the city at the time of the convert’s death, and in this manner his courtyard does not acquire for him, because:

Wherever he himself is present

[the owner of the courtyard is in the city],

so that if he wished to acquire it, he could acquire it ,

for if he wished to take possession of the object himself, he would take possession of it,

his courtyard also acquires it for him.

But

wherever he himself is not present, so that if he wished to acquire it, he could not acquire it, his courtyard also does not acquire it.

And the halakha is

not in accordance with this resolution; and what Rabba said, that he does not acquire the collateral through the courtyard, deals with a case

where it is not present

the collateral

in his courtyard

of the lender,

and he did not acquire it.

Mishna:

The Mishna before us establishes the rule that the “place of the pit” is determined according to the place of the pit’s opening.

If it is open onto the public domain, its law is that of a pit in the public domain; and if it is open onto a private domain, its law is that of a pit in a private domain. And it makes no difference where the hollow of the pit is located.

One who digs a pit in a private domain and opens

its opening

to the public domain.

Or

digs it

in the public domain and opens

its opening

to the private domain.

Or

digs it

in the private domain and opens

its opening

to another private domain.

And an ox or a donkey fell there and was injured,

he is liable

the digger for payment of the damage.

And the tanney in our Mishna holds that a person’s liability for damage caused by his pit applies whether he dug it in the public domain or whether he dug it in the private domain. Therefore, whether he opened it in the public domain or whether he opened it in the private domain, he is liable.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One who digs a pit in a private domain and opens it to the public domain

is

liable

for damage caused by the pit.

And this is the pit mentioned in the Torah, the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: He declared his domain ownerless but did not declare his pit ownerless,

that is, the pit remained in his possession,

this is the pit mentioned in the Torah.

And the Gemara explains their dispute:

Rabba said: With regard to a pit in the public domain, everyone agrees that he is liable.

What is the reason?

For the verse says: “When a man

opens

a pit, or

when he digs

a man a pit, the owner of the pit shall pay.”

And seemingly there is a difficulty: Why did the Merciful One write “or when he digs”? In any event, we know that one who digs a pit is liable for damage caused by the pit by means of a

kal va-chomer:

even though by opening he does not create a pit from the outset, but merely removes its protection,

for digging

which makes an actual pit

is it not all the more so

that he should be liable,

Rather ,

why did the verse write it? To teach you that the liability of the digger of the pit is not because the pit is his, but

for the acts of opening and digging it comes upon him.

Since he opened or dug the pit, he became liable for its damage, even though the pit is not his and is not in his possession.