Bava Kamma 29a — the Talmud in English

The owner of the pitcher or the camel

is exempt under human law,

the court cannot obligate him to pay for the damage caused by those who stumbled over it,

but is liable under Heavenly law,

for not having removed the obstacle from the public domain

, as in indirect causation of damages, for which one is exempt under human law but liable under Heavenly law.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir

that there are circumstances in which the owner of the obstacle is liable under human law even when he abandoned it, such as

with regard to his stone, his knife, and his burden, which he placed on the roof,

a place where winds are commonly found,

and they fell in an ordinary wind and caused damage, in which case he is liable

because he was negligent in placing an obstacle in a place where it was likely to fall and cause damage.

And Rabbi Meir concedes to the Rabbis

that there are circumstances in which it is impossible to hold the owner of the obstacle liable under human law, such as

when one raises jugs

onto the roof in order to dry them, and they fell in an uncommon wind and caused damage, in which case he is exempt,

since he is not obligated to guard his jugs against an uncommon wind, and this is an accident for him. Therefore he is exempt under human law, but nevertheless liable under Heavenly law for not having removed the obstacle from the public domain.

It follows that if the obstacle was created through negligence, its owner is liable under human law according to everyone; and if through an accident, everyone agrees that he is exempt under human law.

And it is proven that the principle “the Merciful One exempted one under compulsion” is stated even with regard to damages. And this is difficult for Rabba, who holds that Rabbi Meir makes the owner of the obstacle liable even if it was created through compulsion, such as when its handle remained in his hand.

Rather, Abaye said:

In truth, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda did not disagree with regard to one who causes damage under compulsion. And according to everyone, if the jug slipped from his hand and caused damage at the time of the fall, he is exempt.

And according to everyone, after an accidental fall, if it caused damage after the fall, the law is as follows: if he did not abandon his shards, he is liable, since he must remove his shards; and if he abandoned them, he is exempt.

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir

disagree in two matters,

in two cases and with regard to two laws.

They disagree

with regard to damage done

at the time of the fall,

such as when the pitcher fell upon a person and injured him, or when one was injured by the shards immediately after they fell, when there had not yet been time to remove them.

And they disagree

with regard to damage done

after the fall

, such as when a person stumbled over shards remaining from the pitcher.

And this is the explanation of the dispute:

They disagree at the time of the fall, with regard to

the law of

“one who stumbles is negligent,”

such as when the owner of the pitcher stumbled while walking in the public domain, over the ground, and fell, and in his fall injured another person or damaged another’s object.

The master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds: one who stumbles is negligent,

because he should have taken care not to fall, and he is not considered compelled with regard to this.

And the master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds: one who stumbles is not negligent,

for he is not obligated to guard himself so that he will not stumble.

And these are Rabbi Yehuda’s words in the Mishna: If his pitcher was broken in the public domain intentionally, such as when he broke it deliberately, he is liable. But if it was broken unintentionally, such as when he stumbled over the ground, he is exempt

.

Further,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree

when the shards of the pitcher caused damage

after the fall, with regard to

the law of

one who abandons his hazards

when they are in the public domain. For it is the way of people to abandon broken shards that they have no need for.

The master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds

that the one who

abandons

his

hazards

in the public domain, if they cause damage, is

liable

to pay under the law of a pit.

The reason is that Rabbi Meir holds that according to Torah law the owner of a pit is liable

and the master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds

that one who abandons his hazards in the public domain

is exempt,

even if they fell from him through negligence.

Because according to his view, the pit for which the Torah made one liable is a case in which he abandoned the domain around his pit, but not the pit itself. But if he also abandoned his pit, he is exempt.

Therefore Rabbi Yehuda said in the Mishna that if his pitcher was broken in the public domain, and he abandoned the shards, and afterward they caused damage, he is exempt.

And the explanation of the distinction between “intentionally” and “unintentionally” will be explained below in the Gemara.

And

the Gemara explains:

From where,

do we know that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning two matters?

Since it teaches

in the Mishna

two,

two forms of damage: a.

“One slipped on water.”

b.

“Or was injured by the shards.”

And apparently, why did the tan(n)ay repeat the matter and mention two cases that are essentially

the same thing?

Rather, is it not

necessarily that the Mishna mentioned the two cases in order to teach us two laws?

And

this is what it is saying:

his jug broke in the public domain and

one slipped on the water,

for example, there was not sufficient time for the owner of the jug to remove the water from the public domain, and the damage occurred

at the time of the fall. [And in this Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning the law of one who stumbled: is he negligent?]

or one was struck

afterward

by the potsherds,

that is, damage caused

after

the

fall. [And in this Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagreed concerning the law of one who abandons his damages.]

And

the Gemara infers: according to Abaye,

from the Mishna

they disagreed

in two matters,

it is reasonable that also in the

beraita

corresponding to the Mishna

likewise

they disagreed in two matters.

In two matters.

And this is the interpretation of the beraita: his jug broke in the public domain, and it caused damage at the time of the fall; Rabbi Meir holds him liable under the law of one who stumbled being negligent, while the Sages [Rabbi Yehuda] exempt him, because one who stumbled is not negligent.

And if it caused damage after the fall, for example, he abandoned his potsherds and did not remove them, Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who abandons his damages is liable, while the Sages [Rabbi Yehuda] exempt him because one who abandons his damages is exempt.

The Gemara asks in astonishment:

Granted,

the first part of the beraita, “his

jug

broke and he did not remove it,”

you can find it,

it can be established that it refers

either

to a case in which the potsherds of the jug caused damage

at the time of the fall,

and they disagreed concerning the law of one who stumbled: is he negligent?

or

when the potsherds caused damage

after the fall,

and they disagreed whether one who abandons his damages is liable or not.

But,

the second case in the beraita, “his

camel

fell and he did not stand it up,”

granted,

if it caused damage

after the fall, you can find it,

it can be said that they disagreed

concerning the

law of

one who abandons his carcass

in the public domain, whether he is liable or not.

But,

but if it caused damage

at the time of the fall, how can you find it,

how can it be said that they disagreed whether one who stumbled is negligent? After all, he cannot guard the camel so that it will not stumble? And the Gemara explains:

Rav Aḥa said: for example, it crossed through water along the bank of the river.

He led the camel along the bank of the river, in a place where the water covered the ground and it was impossible to discern obstacles; and when the camel stumbled and fell, this was because of the negligence of the one leading the camel, who led it through this place.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, if the camel fell and caused damage at the time of the fall, the owner of the camel is liable.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Aḥa:

what are the circumstances,

in what manner did the case occur?

If

it is referring to a case in which the one leading the camel could have led it not along the bank of the river, for example,

there is another road,

then,

he is negligent

in the camel’s falling, and why, according to the Sages, is the owner of the camel exempt?

And if

it is referring to a case in which he led it along the bank of the river because

there is no other road,

then

he is compelled,

and why, according to Rabbi Meir, is he liable for the mishap?

The Gemara answers the beraita in another manner:

rather, you can find it;

it is possible to interpret the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda also in the case of his camel that caused damage at the time of the fall, for example,

the

that the owner of the camel

stumbled,

he stumbled on the ground and stopped,

and

and

the camel stumbled into him,

the camel stumbled into him and caused damage to another person.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, one who stumbled is not negligent, and consequently he is exempt also for damage caused by the camel’s stumbling. But according to Rabbi Meir, since he was required to be careful, if he stumbled, he is negligent; and consequently, the camel that stumbled into him caused damage because of its owner’s negligence. Therefore he is liable for the camel’s damage at the time of the fall.

And now the Gemara returns to complete the explanation of the Mishna according to Abaye.

It is stated in the Mishna: “His jug broke and one slipped on the water, or one was struck by the potsherds—he is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he intended [it], he is liable; if he did not intend [it], he is exempt.”

And it was explained above that “slipped on the water” refers to damage caused at the time of the fall. Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who stumbled is negligent, while Rabbi Yehuda says: if he intended to break it, he is liable, and if not, he is exempt, because one who stumbled is not negligent.

And the second part, “or one was struck by the potsherds,” speaks of damage done after the fall. Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who abandons his damages is liable. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who abandons his damages is exempt.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Yehuda’s words Since

one who abandons his damages

is exempt,

what case of intending is there,

in what manner did Rabbi Yehuda say, “If he intended [it], he is liable”?

Rav Yosef said: [it means] intending to acquire the potsherds.

For Rabbi Yehuda exempts him for damages caused after the fall because one who abandons his damages is exempt; but if he intended to acquire them, he is liable under the law of his pit that caused damage.

And Rav Ashi likewise said: [it means] intending to acquire the potsherds.

Rabbi Elazar said:

concerning damage done

at the time of the fall,

there is

a disagreement

between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir whether one who stumbled is negligent or not.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against his words:

but

concerning damage done

after the fall, what

does Rabbi Elazar hold?

If we say that with regard to damage caused after the fall, according to

If it is said that concerning damage after the fall, everyone is exempt,

but

in the beraita it is stated, “his jug broke and he did not remove it; his camel fell and he did not stand it up,” and it appears that the beraita speaks of damage done after the fall ,

and there is Rabbi Meir, who holds him liable,

and it is impossible to say that everyone is exempt.

Rather, what

shall we say? With regard to damage caused after the fall, according to

is it to be said? That concerning damage done after the fall, everyone is liable,

but

in the beraita

there are the Sages, who exempt,

concerning damage done after the fall?

And the Gemara explains:

Rather,

by force of necessity,

what

Rabbi Elazar said

“at the time of the fall”

—“there is a disagreement”—his intention is to say that

even at the time of the fall

they disagreed, although from the beraita it appears that they disagreed only after the fall.

And Rabbi Elazar inferred this indeed from our Mishna, for it appears that they disagreed in two matters.

And he teaches us

Rabbi Elazar

in accordance with Abaye,

who explained the disagreement between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda as being in two matters.