Bava Kamma 29a (כט.) — the Talmud in English

The owner of the jug or camel

is exempt under human law,

meaning that the court cannot obligate him to pay for the damage caused by those who encountered them,

but is liable under the laws of Heaven,

because he did not remove the obstacle from the public domain

, as in the case of indirect causation of damage, for which one is exempt under human law but liable under the laws of Heaven.

And the Sages concede to Rabbi Meir

that there are circumstances in which the owner of the obstacle is liable under human law even when he abandoned it, such as

in the case of his stone, knife, or load that he placed on the roof,

where the winds are commonly present,

and they fell in an ordinary wind and caused damage, in which case he is liable

because he was negligent in placing the obstacle in a location where it was likely to fall and cause damage.

And Rabbi Meir concedes to the Sages

that there are circumstances in which it is impossible to hold the owner of the obstacle liable under human law, such as

when one raises jugs

onto the roof in order to dry them, and they fall in an extraordinary wind and cause damage, in which case he is exempt,

since he is not obligated to protect his jugs from an extraordinary wind, and this is an unavoidable accident for him. Therefore, he is exempt under human law; nevertheless, he is liable under the laws of Heaven because he did not remove the obstacle from the public domain.

It follows that if the obstacle was created through negligence, its owner is liable under human law according to everyone; and if it was created through unavoidable accident, everyone agrees that he is exempt under human law.

It is therefore evident that the principle “an unavoidable accident is one for which the Merciful One exempts” applies also to damages. This is difficult for Rabba, who maintains that Rabbi Meir obligates the owner of the obstacle even if it was created through unavoidable accident, such as when its handle remained in his hand.

Rather, Abaye said:

Actually, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda never disputed the case of one who causes damage through unavoidable accident. Everyone agrees that if the jug slipped from his hand and caused damage at the time of the fall, he is exempt.

Everyone likewise agrees that after an unavoidable fall, if it caused damage after the fall, the law is as follows: If he did not abandon his shards, he is liable, since he must remove his shards. But if he abandoned them, he is exempt.

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir

dispute two matters,

in two cases and with regard to two laws.

They dispute

damage that occurs

at the time of the fall,

such as when the jug fell on a person and injured him, or when someone was injured by the shards immediately after they fell, before there had yet been time to remove them.

And they dispute

damage occurring

after the fall,

such as when a person stumbled over shards remaining from the jug.

This is the explanation of the dispute:

They dispute with regard to the time of the fall, concerning

the law of

“one who stumbles is negligent,”

for example, when the owner of the jug stumbled while walking in the public domain, over the ground, fell, and injured a person or damaged another’s object through his fall.

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds that one who stumbles is negligent,

because he should have taken care not to fall, and he is not considered an unavoidable victim in this regard.

And one master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds that one who stumbles is not negligent,

as he is not obligated to guard himself so that he will not stumble.

And this is the meaning of Rabbi Yehuda’s words in the Mishna: If his jug broke in the public domain intentionally, such as when he broke it deliberately, he is liable. But if it broke unintentionally, such as when he stumbled over the ground, he is exempt.

.

Furthermore,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda dispute

the case in which the shards of the jug caused damage

after the fall, concerning

the law of

one who abandons his damaging property

while it is in the public domain. For people customarily abandon broken shards that they have no use for.

One master,

Rabbi Meir,

holds

that

one who abandons

his

damaging property

in the public domain, if it causes damage,

is liable

to pay under the law of Pit.

The reason is that Rabbi Meir holds that according to Torah law, the owner of a Pit is liable

and one master,

Rabbi Yehuda,

holds

that one who abandons his damaging property in the public domain

is exempt,

even if it fell from him through negligence.

because, according to him, the Pit for which the Torah imposes liability is a case in which one abandoned the area surrounding his Pit, but not the Pit itself. If he also abandoned his Pit, he is exempt.

Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda says in the Mishna that if his jug broke in the public domain, and he abandoned the shards, and they subsequently caused damage, he is exempt. [

The distinction between intentional and unintentional action will be explained below in the Gemara.]

And

the Gemara explains:

From where

do we know that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda dispute two matters?

From the fact that it teaches

in the Mishna

two

forms of damage: a.

“One slipped on the water.”

b.

“Or was injured by the shards.”

Apparently, why did the tanna repeat himself and mention two cases that are essentially

the same thing?

Rather, is it not

necessarily the case that the Mishna mentions the two cases to teach us two laws?

And

this is what he is saying:

his jug broke in the public domain, and

one slipped on the water,

for example, the jug’s owner did not have enough time to remove the water from the public domain, and this was damage

at the time of the fall. [This is the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda concerning whether one who stumbled is negligent].

Or if another was injured

by

the pottery,

that is, damage caused

after

the

fall. [This is the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda concerning one who renders his hazards ownerless].

And

the Gemara infers: According to Abaye,

from the Mishna

they disputed

two matters,

it stands to reason that in the

beraita

corresponding to the Mishna

also

they disputed two matters.

Two matters.

This is the explanation of the beraita: If his jug broke in the public domain and it caused damage at the time of the fall, Rabbi Meir holds him liable under the law that one who stumbles is negligent, while the Sages [Rabbi Yehuda] exempt him, because one who stumbles is not negligent.

And if it caused damage after the fall—for example, he rendered his pottery ownerless and did not remove it—Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who renders his hazards ownerless is liable, while the Sages [Rabbi Yehuda] exempt him because one who renders his hazards ownerless is exempt.

The Gemara asks:

Granted,

the first part of the beraita, “his

jug

broke and he did not remove it,”

can be found,

it can be established as referring

either

to a case where the pottery of the jug caused damage

at the time of the fall,

and they disputed the law that one who stumbles is negligent,

or

to a case where the pottery caused damage

after the fall,

and they disputed whether one who renders his hazards ownerless is liable or not.

But

concerning the second case in the beraita, “his

camel

fell and he did not raise it,”

granted,

if it caused damage

after the fall, it can be found,

it can be said that they disputed the

law of

one who renders his carcass ownerless

in the public domain, whether he is liable or not.

But

if it caused damage

at the time of the fall, how can it be found,

how can it be said that they disputed whether one who stumbles is negligent? After all, he cannot control the camel so that it will not stumble. The Gemara explains:

Rav Aḥa said: For example, [the camel] crossed through water along the bank of the river.

He led the camel along the riverbank, in a place where the water covered the ground and obstacles could not be discerned. When the camel stumbled and fell, this resulted from the negligence of the camel’s driver, who led it through that place.

Therefore, according to Rabbi Meir, if the camel fell and caused damage at the time of the fall, the camel’s owner is liable.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Aḥa:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner did the case occur?

If

the case concerns a situation in which the camel’s driver could have led it somewhere other than along the riverbank, for example,

there was another path,

then,

he is negligent

with regard to the camel’s fall; why, according to the Sages, is the camel’s owner exempt?

And if

the case concerns a situation in which he led it along the riverbank because

there was no other path,

then

he is an accident victim,

so why, according to Rabbi Meir, is he liable for the mishap?

The Gemara offers another explanation of the beraita:

Rather, it can be found:

the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda can also be explained as applying to a camel that caused damage at the time of the fall, for example,

the

camel’s owner

stumbled,

stumbling on the ground and stopping,

and

because of his stopping,

the camel stumbled into him,

the camel stumbled into him and caused injury to another person.

According to Rabbi Yehuda, one who stumbles is not negligent, and consequently he is exempt even for damage caused by the camel’s stumbling. But according to Rabbi Meir, since he should have taken care, if he stumbled he is negligent, and consequently the camel that stumbled into him caused damage because of its owner’s negligence. Therefore, he is liable for damage caused by the camel at the time of the fall.

The Gemara now returns to complete the explanation of the Mishna according to Abaye.

The Mishna states: If his jug broke and one slipped on the water, or if another was injured by the pottery, he is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he intended it, he is liable; if he did not intend it, he is exempt.

It was explained above that “one slipped on the water” refers to damage caused at the time of the fall. Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who stumbles is negligent, while Rabbi Yehuda says: If he intended to break it, he is liable, and if he did not, he is exempt, because one who stumbles is not negligent.

The second part, “or if another was injured by the pottery,” refers to damage caused after the fall. Rabbi Meir holds him liable because one who renders his hazards ownerless is liable, while Rabbi Yehuda holds that one who renders his hazards ownerless is exempt.

The Gemara raises a difficulty concerning Rabbi Yehuda Since

one who renders his hazards ownerless

is exempt,

what intent is there,

in what manner did Rabbi Yehuda say, “If he intended it, he is liable”?

Rav Yosef said: [It means] that he intended to acquire the pottery.

For Rabbi Yehuda exempts him for injuries caused after the fall because one who renders his hazards ownerless is exempt; but if he intended to acquire them, he is liable under the law of his pit that caused damage.

And Rav Ashi likewise said: [It means] that he intended to acquire the pottery.

Rabbi Elazar said:

With regard to damage caused

at the time of the fall,

there is a

dispute

between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir as to whether one who stumbles is negligent or not.

The Gemara challenges his words:

But

with regard to damage caused

after the fall, what

does Rabbi Elazar hold?

If we say that with regard to damage caused after the fall, according to

everyone he is exempt,

but

the beraita states, “His jug broke and he did not remove it; his camel fell and he did not raise it,” implying that the beraita discusses damage caused after the fall , and

there is Rabbi Meir, who holds him liable,

and it is impossible to say that according to everyone he is exempt.

Rather, what

shall we say? With regard to damage caused after the fall, according to

everyone he is liable,

but

in the beraita

there are Sages who exempt,

for damage caused after the fall?

The Gemara explains:

Rather,

necessarily,

what

Rabbi Elazar said,

“at the time of the fall,”

means that he intended to say that

even at the time of the fall

they disputed, despite the implication from the beraita that they disputed only with regard to after the fall.

Rabbi Elazar inferred this from our Mishna, which implies that they disputed two matters.

And Rabbi Elazar teaches us

that the view of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda is

like Abaye’s,

who explained that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disputed two matters.