Bava Kamma 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

All of them

are exempt.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says:

If they struck him simultaneously, they are all exempt; but if they struck him

one after the other, the last one

who struck him

is liable

for death,

because he brought forward

the time of

his death;

but the Sages hold that since it is written: “And if a man strikes any human being, he shall surely be put to death,” we have learned that one is not liable until he strikes “the entire person.” Since the first ones already assisted in killing him, the last blow does not constitute striking “the entire person.”

Here too, according to Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira, the one who received him on a sword is liable because he brought forward the time of his death, whereas according to the Sages he is exempt.

And if one threw a child from a rooftop, and

a goring-accustomed ox

came

and caught him on its horns

and killed him, whether its owner is liable to pay kofer, as is the law regarding an ox that kills a person, this law depends on

a dispute between Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, and the Rabbis; as it was taught:

It is written: “If kofer shall be imposed upon him [upon the owner of the ox that killed the person]”

“then he shall give the ransom for his life

according to whatever is imposed upon him,” and these tannaim disagree as to how much he pays:

The Sages hold:

the value of the injured party

is what he pays.

Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, says: the value of the one causing the injury.

It follows that according to the Sages he is not liable for kofer, since the child has no monetary value, as he had already been thrown to his death; whereas according to Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, he pays kofer according to the value of the ox’s owner.

And

further

Rabba said:

If

A person

falls from a rooftop

in an ordinary wind, which makes him near intentional,

and collides with a woman

through intercourse; he is

liable for four types of payment,

and the Gemara proceeds to explain them.

And with his yevama,

if he collides with his yevama, who is obligated to him for yibbum,

he has not acquired her,

for he acquires her only if he intended intercourse, even if he intended intercourse with another woman; but in this case, since he did not intend intercourse at all, he does not acquire her.

And for which four matters is he liable?

He is liable for damage,

for he is liable even in a circumstance beyond his control, and he is liable

for pain and medical expenses,

and

for loss of livelihood,

because he is near intentional, since he fell in an ordinary wind.

But not for humiliation

is he liable to pay,

as we learned in the Mishna: He is not liable for humiliation unless he intended it,

and he did not intend it, even though he was near intentional.

And

further

Rabba said:

If one fell from a rooftop in an uncommon wind and caused damage and humiliation, he is liable for the damage

for which he is liable even in a circumstance beyond his control,

but is exempt from the four types of payment,

since he was neither intentional nor near intentional.

And if he fell from a rooftop

in an ordinary wind,

which makes him near intentional,

and caused damage and humiliation:

He is liable for the four types of payment, but exempt from payment for humiliation

because he did not intend it.

But if he turned

after he had begun to fall, intending to fall onto the person for his own benefit, so that he would not strike the ground,

he is liable even for humiliation,

even though he did not intend to humiliate him.

And because

it was taught: Since it is stated: “

And she sends forth her hand …

by his private parts,”

do I not know that she grasped them!?

If so, it would have sufficed for the verse to say: “And she sends forth her hand to his private parts.” Why, then,

does the verse say: “

and grasps

his private parts”?

To teach you:

Once he intended to cause harm,

even though he did not intend to humiliate,

he is liable for the humiliation.

And

further

Rabba said:

If he

placed for him—

one person for another—

a live coal on his heart,

and he did not remove it

and died, the one who placed it is exempt,

for the victim should have removed it in order to save himself.

But if he placed it

on his garment, and it burned,

the garment, the one who placed it

is liable,

even though the injured party could have removed the coal, because he can say: “I did not remove the coal for this reason: I said, ‘I will take him to court and he will pay me.’”

Rava said: Both of them—

the two most recent laws stated by Rabba—

we find them taught [we have already learned them in Mishnayot]! Regarding Rabba’s statement that if he placed a coal

on

on his heart

and he did not remove it, the one who placed it is exempt, we have learned it in this

Mishna

in Sanhedrin 76b:

If he held him down into the fire,

meaning, he placed the other person’s head into a fire,

or

held him down

into water, and he cannot rise from there,

and he died—meaning, he held him there until he was burned or died—

the one holding him down is liable

for holding him down.

But if he

pushed him into the fire or into the water, and he could

the one who was pushed

rise from there,

but did not rise

and died, the one holding him down is exempt,

for the one who was held down should have removed himself. We have thus learned Rabba’s first law.

And regarding Rabba’s statement that if he placed a coal on

his garment,

he is liable, and we do not say that through his silence he waived the payment, we have learned it in this

Mishna

below, on 92a:

One who says to his fellow: “

Tear my garment,”

or says to him: “

Break my barrel,”

is liable

the one who tears or breaks it; his words do not include a waiver of payment. Only if he added and said to him: “

On the condition that you are exempt,”

is he

exempt.

Rabba raised a dilemma: If one placed an ember on the heart of his slave,

and the slave was able to remove it, but did not remove it,

what

is the ruling as to whether the one who placed it must pay the master for the slave’s injury: Is placing an ember on the heart of his slave

like

placing an ember on

the body

of the injured party

and therefore like

placing an ember on

his property?

And Rabba adds:

If you should say:

that placing an ember on the heart of the slave

is like

placing an ember on

the body

of the injured party

and is therefore so regarded;

there still remains a dilemma:

If one placed an ember on the heart of

his ox

and the ox did not remove the ember,

what

is the ruling as to whether the one who placed it must pay the value of the ox? For his ox is not comparable to his slave, since an ox has no intelligence with which to remove it?

He subsequently resolved it,

Rabba resolved his own dilemmas and said:

His slave is deemed like his body,

and he is exempt. Whereas

his ox is deemed like his property,

and he is liable.

We will return to you, chapter “How Does the Foot Cause Damage?”

Mishna:

A person

who places a jug in the public domain

without supervision, even if he placed it there with permission—for example, because he needed to rest from the exertion of the road—,

and

another person

came and stumbled over it,

in the barrel [in place of “jug”],

and broke it,

is exempt

the person who stumbled over the barrel and broke it from paying the owner of the barrel the value of the barrel, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

And if

the person who stumbled over the barrel

was injured by it,

then

the owner of the barrel is liable for

payment of

his damage.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks: Why did

the tanna begin

his statement in the Mishna

with “jug” [“one who places the jug”], which is smaller than a barrel, and afterward change his wording

[“one who places a jug”], which is smaller than a barrel, and then change his wording

and conclude with “barrel,”

stating that “the owner of the barrel

is liable for the damage caused to the person who stumbled over it”?

And

it is likewise difficult concerning the statement that

we also learned

below [31b]: Two people were walking in the public domain;

one came with his barrel and the other came

opposite him

with his beam,

and they collided while walking. If

the jug of one was broken by the beam of the other,

the owner of the beam

is exempt,

because both of them were walking with permission. Why did

the tanna begin

his statement

with “barrel [“one came with his barrel”],

[“one was coming with his barrel”],

and conclude

his statement

with “jug” [“his jug was broken”]?

[“his jug was broken”]?

And

likewise

we also learned

below:

One came with his barrel of wine, and the other

the second one

came with his jug of honey,

and honey is more valuable than wine, and it happened that

the barrel of honey cracked, and he poured out

the owner of the wine, of his own accord,

his wine,

and saved the honey

by placing the honey

inside it,

inside his barrel,

he has no

right to claim the value of the wine that he poured out in order to save the honey,

but

he can claim only

his wages

as a laborer.

Here too the Gemara asks: Why

did it begin with

the statement that the one came with “his

jug

of honey,”

and conclude with the statement that the

barrel of honey

barrel

of honey cracked?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said:

This very matter is what the tanna came to teach us:

“Jug” and “barrel” are the same.

There is no distinction between a jug and a barrel other than that a barrel is large and a jug is small; therefore, the same term may be used for both.

And we inquire:

What practical difference does it make,

what halakhic novelty emerges from this ruling, and why did the tanna need to teach it?

The Gemara explains: From the clarification that the terms jug and barrel may each be used for the other, a novel ruling emerges

for

the laws of

commerce.

For example, if a buyer stipulated with a seller that he would supply him with a barrel, and they performed a kinyan concerning this, the seller may supply him with a jug, which is smaller than a barrel, and this does not constitute a deviation from the terms of the transaction, since both may be called a barrel.

But the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances,

in what situation can it be said that one who requests a barrel may be supplied with a jug, and that this was his intention when he requested a barrel?

If you say

that the case is

in a place

where it is customary

not to call a jug

by the name

“barrel,”

for they call a jug only “jug” and not “barrel,” and likewise

they do not call a barrel a jug,

but only a barrel, how can the seller supply a jug to a buyer who requested a barrel,

when they do not call it

a barrel? Certainly, the buyer who requested a barrel intended to receive a barrel and not a jug.

The Gemara explains:

It is necessary

to state this law only in a place

where the majority

of the people of the place

call a jug “jug” and a barrel “barrel,” and there are also

people who call

a barrel

a minority of people

“jug,”

by the name

“jug,” and a jug

they call

“barrel.”

Since there is a minority of people who call a barrel a jug, if they performed a kinyan for a barrel, the seller may supply the buyer with a jug, which is smaller than a barrel, because it is possible that he belongs to the minority who call a jug by the name barrel. The buyer’s claim, “I am from the majority who call a barrel ‘barrel,’ and this is what I intended when I performed the kinyan,” is disregarded.

And the novelty is:

Lest you say

that since most people of the place call a barrel “barrel,”

follow the

majority,

and the seller should assume that the buyer who requested a barrel belongs to the majority, and therefore he should be required to supply him with a barrel.