Bava Kamma 27a — the Talmud in English

All of them ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location of the folio")

are exempt.

Rabbi Judah ben Bateira says:

If they struck him simultaneously, all of them are exempt; but if they struck him

one after the other, the last one

who struck him is

liable

to death,

because he brought closer

the time of

his death;

but the Sages hold: since it is written, “And a man who strikes any human life shall surely be put to death,” we have learned that he is not liable until he strikes “any life”; and since from the outset the first ones assisted in killing him, there is no “any life” in the last one’s blow.

And here too, according to Rabbi Judah ben Bateira, the one who received him with a sword is liable because he brought closer the time of his death, while according to the Sages he is exempt.

And if one threw a baby from the top of a roof and

an ox came

that was an ox with a forewarning

and received him with its horns

and killed him—whether its owner is liable for kofer, as is the law of an ox that kills a person—this law depends upon the

dispute between Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka and the Sages; for it was taught:

It is written: “If a ransom shall be imposed upon him [upon the owner of the ox that killed the person]

then he shall give the redemption of his life

“according to all that shall be imposed upon him”; and these tannaim disputed how much he pays:

The Sages hold:

the value of the injured party

he pays.

Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: the value of the injurer.

It follows that according to the Sages he is not liable for kofer, since the baby has no value, as he had already been thrown to his death; whereas according to Rabbi Ishmael son of Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, he pays kofer according to the value of the owner of the ox.

And

further

Rabba said:

A person fell

a person

from the top of a roof

in an ordinary wind, which is close to intentional,

and became embedded in a woman

by way of intercourse; this person is

liable for four matters,

and [the Gemara] proceeds to explain them.

And with his yevama,

if he became embedded in his yevama, who requires him for yibbum,

he has not acquired her,

for he acquires her only if he intended intercourse, even intercourse with another woman; but this one, who did not intend intercourse at all, does not acquire her.

And for which four matters is he liable?

He is liable for injury,

for even in an accident he is liable, and he is liable

for pain and for medical expenses,

and

for loss of livelihood,

because he is close to intentional, since he fell in an ordinary wind.

But for humiliation, he is not

liable to pay,

for we learned in the Mishna: he is not liable for humiliation until he intends [to humiliate],

and this one did not intend [it], although he was close to intentional.

And

further

Rabba said:

If he fell from the top of a roof in an uncommon wind and caused injury and humiliation, he is liable for the injury

for he is liable for it even in an accident,

and he is exempt for the four matters,

for he is neither intentional nor close to intentional.

And if he fell from the top of a roof

in an ordinary wind,

which is close to intentional,

and caused injury and humiliation:

He is liable for the four matters and exempt for the humiliation

because he does not intend [to humiliate].

And if he turned over

after he began to fall, and intends to fall upon the person for his own benefit, so that he will not strike the ground,

he is liable even for the humiliation,

and even though he did not intend to humiliate.

And because

it was taught: from what is implied by what is stated: “

and she stretches out her hand ...

at his private parts,”

do I not know that she grasped [him]!?

And if so, it would have sufficed for it to say, “and she stretches out her hand at his private parts”; and

what does the verse teach by saying: “

and she grasped

at his private parts,”

to tell you:

Once he intended to cause damage,

even though he did not intend to humiliate,

he is liable for the humiliation.

And

further

Rabba said:

if

one person placed upon him—

one person upon another person—

a live coal upon his heart,

and he did not remove it,

and he died, [the one who placed it] is exempt,

the one who placed it, because it was incumbent upon him to remove it.

But if he placed it

upon his garment, and the garment was burned,

the garment, then the one who placed it is

liable,

and even though it was within the injured party’s power to remove the coal, because he can say: “I did not remove the coal for this reason: I said, ‘I will summon him to court and he will pay me.’”

Rava said: both of them—

the last two laws that Rabba stated—

we have learned them

we already learned them in Mishnayot]! This statement of Rabba, that if he placed a coal

upon his heart

and he did not remove it, the one who placed it is exempt, we have learned it in this

Mishna

in Sanhedrin 76b:

If he held him down into the fire,

one person put the head of the other into a fire,

or

held him down

into the water, and he cannot rise from there,

and he died—that is, he held him until he was burned or died—

the one who held him down is liable

the one who held him down.

But if he

pushed him into the fire or into the water, and he can

the one held down

rise from there,

and he did not rise,

and he died, the one who held him down is exempt,

the one who held him down, since the one held down should have withdrawn; thus we have learned Rabba’s first law.

And this statement of Rabba, that if he placed a coal upon

his garment,

he is liable, and we do not say that through his silence he waived it, we have learned in this

Mishna

below, 92a:

One who says to his fellow: “

Tear my garment,”

or says to him: “

Break my jug,”

the one who tears or breaks is liable,

the one who tears or breaks, and his words do not include a waiver of payment. Only if he added and said to him: “

on condition that [I] exempt [you],”

then he is

exempt.

Rabba raised a question: [if] he placed a glowing coal on the heart of his slave,

and the slave was able to remove it, but did not remove it,

what

is the law: is the one who placed it liable to pay the master for the slave’s damage—whether placing a glowing coal on the heart of his slave is

like

placing a glowing coal on

the body

of the injured party,

or like

placing a glowing coal on

his property.

And Rabba adds:

if you should say:

that placing a glowing coal on the heart of the slave is

like

placing a glowing coal on

the body

of the injured party

is so;

there is still a doubt:

If he placed a glowing coal on the heart of

his ox

and the ox did not remove the glowing coal,

what

is the law: is the one who placed it liable for the value of the ox? For his ox is not similar to his slave, since an ox has no understanding to remove it?

He then resolved it,

Rabba himself again resolved his doubts and said:

His slave is like his body

is the legal status, and he is exempt. But

his ox is like his property

is the legal status, and he is liable.

We will return to you, chapter “How the foot.”

Mishna:

A person

who places a jug in the public domain

without supervision, even if he placed it there with permission, such as when he needed to stop to rest from the exertion of the journey,

and

another person

came and stumbled over it,

in a barrel [in a jug],

and broke it,

is exempt

from paying the owner of the barrel the value of the barrel, for the reason that will be explained in the Gemara.

And if

the one who stumbled over the barrel

was injured by it,

then

the owner of the barrel is liable for

the payments of

his damage.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks: For what reason did

the tanna open

his words in the Mishna

with “jug,”

“one who places a jug,” which is smaller than a barrel, and afterwards changed his wording

and concluded with “barrel,”

that “the owner of the barrel

is liable for the damage of the one who stumbled over it”?

And

likewise difficult is that which

we also learn

below [31b]: Two people who were walking in the public domain,

one came with his barrel and the other came

opposite him

with his beam,

and they encountered one another while walking, if

the jug of one was broken by the beam of the other,

the owner of the beam

is exempt,

because both of them were walking with permission. Why did

the tanna open

his words

with “barrel” [“one came with his barrel”],

and

conclude

his words

with “jug” [“his jug was broken”]?

[“his jug was broken”]?

And

likewise

we also learn

below:

This one came with his barrel of wine, and this one

the other

came with his jug of honey,

and the honey was more valuable than the wine, and it happened that

a barrel of honey cracked, and this one poured out

the owner of the wine, willingly,

his wine,

and saved the honey

by placing the honey

into it,

into his barrel,

he has no

right of claim to the wine that he poured out in order to save the honey,

but

he can claim only

his wages

as a laborer.

Here too the Gemara asks: Why did it

open with

this one came “with his

jug

of honey,”

and conclude with the cracked

“

barrel”

of honey?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Pappa said:

The tanna came to teach us this very matter, that

a jug is the same as a barrel.

There is no distinction between a jug and a barrel except that a barrel is large and a jug is small; therefore, one term may be used for both.

And we inquire concerning this:

What practical difference

is there? What halakhic innovation emerges from this law, and why did the tanna need to inform us of it?

The Gemara explains: Since it has been clarified that the terms jug and barrel may each be used for the other, an innovation emerges

for

the laws of

purchase and sale.

For example, if the buyer stipulated with the seller that he would supply him with a barrel, and they performed a kinyan concerning this, the seller may supply him with a jug, which is smaller than a barrel, and this is not a change from the condition of the transaction, since both of them may be called a barrel.

But the Gemara asks:

What are the circumstances?

In what manner can it be said that one who requests a barrel may be supplied with a jug, and that this is interpreted as his intention when he requested a barrel?

If you say

that it is speaking

in a place

where their custom is

that they do not call a jug

by the name

“barrel,”

for a jug they call only “jug” and not “barrel,” and likewise

they do not call a barrel a jug,

but only a barrel, how is it possible to supply the buyer who requested a barrel with a jug,

when they do not call it

a jug a barrel? Certainly the buyer who requested a barrel intended to receive a barrel and not a jug.

The Gemara explains:

It is not necessary

to state this law except in a place

where the majority

of the people of the place

call a jug a jug and a barrel

they call

a barrel, and there are also

a minority of people

who call a barrel

by the name

jug, and a jug

they call

a barrel.

Since there are a minority of people who call a barrel a jug, if they performed a kinyan over a barrel, the seller may supply the buyer with a jug, which is smaller than a barrel, because it is possible that he is of the minority who call a jug by the name barrel. We do not take into consideration the buyer’s claim, who says, “I am of the majority who call a barrel a barrel, and this was my intention at the time of the kinyan.”

And the novelty is:

Lest you say,

since the majority of the people of the place call a barrel a barrel,

follow the

majority,

and the seller must assume that the buyer who requested a barrel is of the majority, and he must supply him with a barrel.