Bava Kamma 25b (כה:) — the Talmud in English

The discharge of a zav, and his saliva, seminal fluid, and urine

of the zav,

and menstrual blood,

which

render impure both through contact and through carrying,

This clearly indicates that there is a tanna who maintains that the discharge of a zav renders impure through carrying.

And we challenge this:

Perhaps here

in this Mishna

also,

the seminal fluid of a zav does not itself render impure through carrying. Rather, it renders impure through carrying

because it is impossible

for him

to be without traces of zav discharge,

and we still have not found a tanna who states that the seminal fluid of a zav itself renders impure through carrying!?

And we answer:

If so,

according to your statement—that the seminal fluid of a zav, which renders impure through carrying according to this Mishna, does so because of traces of zav discharge—

let him teach

“his seminal fluid”

alongside his discharge,

and let him teach as follows: “Above them are the discharge of a zav, his seminal fluid, and his saliva,” for even his seminal fluid renders impure through carrying because of his discharge—

and

why did he teach it

“his seminal fluid”

alongside

“his saliva”

[adjacent to his saliva]!?

Rather,

surely the reason that the tanna taught the seminal fluid of a zav adjacent to his saliva

is that

his seminal fluid can be shown to render impure through carrying by means of a kal va-chomer

from his saliva,

and not because of traces of zav discharge.

Rabbi Akha of Difti

raised this difficulty

to Ravina:

But this tanna—

in the beraita cited below—

does not expound

“dayyo”

even though the kal va-chomer is not undermined

by applying “dayyo”; and if so, we too should say that Rabbi Tarfon maintains this view!?

As it was taught:

It is written [Numbers 31:19]: “You shall encamp outside the camp for seven days. Anyone who has killed a person and anyone who has touched a corpse shall purify himself [become pure through the water of the red heifer] on the third day and on the seventh day—you and your captives [the captives whom you took in the war against Midian]. And every garment and every leather article and everything made of goat’s hair and every wooden vessel [that became impure through contact with a corpse] shall you purify.”

Until this point, we have learned only that these items become impure through contact with a corpse. But

a mat

[a mat designated for lying], which is not included among these items, yet becomes impure

in

the tent of the

corpse,

from where do we know this?

And it is a logical inference: Just as small narrow-mouthed earthenware vessels

[whose mouths are narrow]

that are pure in the case of a zav,

as the zav cannot render them impure through any of the forms of impurity through which he renders other vessels impure: Since their mouths are narrow, he cannot insert his hand into them, but touches them from the outside, and an earthenware vessel becomes impure only through its airspace; and even through the impurity of “the lying-place of a zav” [the zav’s sitting or lying upon it], the zav does not render them impure, since they are not made for sitting; and he does not render them impure through shifting either, since anything susceptible to impurity through contact is rendered impure through shifting by a zav, whereas anything not susceptible to impurity through contact is not rendered impure through shifting by a zav—

nevertheless, they

become impure

[become impure]

through a corpse,

for if small vessels were in a tent containing a corpse, they would be impure.

A mat that

is

rendered impure by a zav

through the impurity of the zav’s lying-place, since it is suitable and intended for the zav to lie upon,

is it not logically inferred that it should become impure in

the tent of the

corpse?

And

this tanna

derives it—

the impurity of a mat through a corpse—

both for one-day impurity and for seven-day impurity,

meaning: he does not derive only one-day impurity [impurity for a single day, after which he immerses on that day and becomes pure at sunset], but rather seven-day impurity [he remains impure for seven days, is sprinkled with the water of the red heifer on the third and seventh days, immerses on the seventh day, and becomes pure at sunset], as with small vessels, which become impure in a tent containing a corpse with seven-day impurity.

And

if you say that this tanna maintains that we say “dayyo,” then

why does the mat become impure with seven-day impurity? Surely

does the mat become impure with seven-day impurity? We should

let us say

[we should say]:

The kal va-chomer is effective

[after “dayyo” has been stated]

for

the mat to be impure

with one-day impurity, and “dayyo” is effective

to exclude

from

the mat

seven-day impurity, as applies to small vessels; because “dayyo” dictates that the mat’s status through a corpse should be like the mat’s status through a zav, and a mat is impure through a zav only with one-day impurity.

It necessarily follows that this tanna maintains that although the kal va-chomer would not be undermined if we were to say “dayyo,” since ultimately the kal va-chomer teaches that a mat is impure with one-day impurity, nevertheless we do not say “dayyo.”

Rabbi

said

he answered

to

Rabbi Akha of Difti, Ravina:

Rabbi Naḥman bar Zekharya had already raised this

[had already raised this difficulty]

to Abaye, and Abaye said

he answered

to him:

The tanna

did not derive that a mat becomes impure through a corpse with seven-day impurity from the case of a mat and a zav. Rather,

from a mat and a creeping creature

it

derives it—the impurity of a mat through a corpse—

by means of a gzera shava, as follows.

And

as for what the tanna derived by means of a kal va-chomer from a mat through a zav,

this is what he is saying:

Since the Torah stated [Leviticus 11:31]: “These [the creatures mentioned there] are impure for you among all the creeping creatures. Anyone who touches them when they are dead shall be impure until evening. And anything upon which one of them falls when they are dead shall be impure, any wooden vessel or garment or leather or sack—any vessel in which work is done—shall be brought into water and shall be impure until evening, and then it shall become pure”—

A mat through a creeping creature,

which is not included among all these items—from where do we know that it becomes impure?

And concerning this the tanna says:

And

here

it is a logical inference:

Just as small vessels that

are

pure in the case of a zav

because they are not suitable for contact from within

are impure

in the case of

a creeping creature, since a lentil-sized portion of it—which is the measure of its impurity—can enter the airspace of the vessels and render them impure,

since even a lentil-sized portion of it, which is the measure that conveys impurity, can enter the airspace of the vessels and make them impure,

A mat that is rendered impure by a zav—does it not follow that it should be rendered impure by a creeping creature?

The Gemara explains, according to what we answered—that the tanna derived by means of a kal va-chomer the case of a mat through a creeping creature, and not that of a mat through a corpse, while a mat through a corpse is derived from a mat through a creeping creature:

But a mat through a corpse—from where

is it derived; that is, by what method is it derived from the case of a corpse?

The Gemara explains that it is derived by means of a gzera shava:

“Garment and leather”

are stated

with regard to a creeping creature, [“and anything ... any wooden vessel or garment or leather”];

and “garment and leather” are stated

with regard to a corpse, [“and every garment and every leather article ... you shall purify”]—

Just as

“garment and leather”

stated with regard to a creeping creature

also

include a mat as impure through it, like a garment and leather,

; so

so too,

“garment and leather”

stated with regard to a corpse

also

include a mat as impure through it, like a garment and leather.

like a garment and skin.

The Gemara explains that this gzera shava must necessarily be

available for derivation

[the matching terms are superfluous for purposes of the gzera shava]!

For if it were not available for derivation,

the rule would be that if there is a refutation against a gzera shava, we do not derive from it; and here too

there is a basis for refuting

the derivation of a corpse from a creeping creature:

What is true of a creeping creature is that

it is more stringent, for it

renders impure with

a small measure,

a lentil-sized portion,

and therefore the Torah was stringent with regard to it and rendered a mat impure through it.

Can you say the same with regard to a corpse,

which is less stringent,

as

it

does not

render impure with

a lentil-sized portion, but with an olive-sized portion? And from where do we know that the Torah was likewise stringent with regard to it, rendering a mat impure through it?

No;

[rather, this is necessarily the case:]

it is available for derivation, because:

because:

Since a creeping creature is compared to seminal fluid,

[for a creeping creature is indeed compared to seminal fluid],

as it is written [Leviticus 22:4]: “Or a man from whom there issues”

[Leviticus 22:4]:

seminal fluid,”

and juxtaposed to it is

[verse 5] is:

“or a man who touches any creeping creature”

that renders him impure”—

And

it is already

written with regard to seminal fluid [Leviticus 15:17]:

[Leviticus 15:17]:

“And any garment and any leather upon which there will be seminal fluid

shall be washed in water and remain impure until evening.” If so,

“garment and leather”

that the Merciful One wrote with regard to a creeping creature—why do I need it,

since we would derive it through the comparison!?

Rather,

infer from it—that “garment and leather” which the Merciful One stated with regard to a creeping creature

“garment and skin” which the Merciful One said with regard to a creeping creature—

is available for derivation, to derive from it with regard to a corpse that a mat also becomes impure through it.

to teach from it with regard to a corpse that a mat also becomes impure through it.

Nevertheless,

we challenge this: It is only

available for derivation on one side

[the terms are superfluous on only one of the two sides, namely “garment and leather” with regard to a creeping creature]—

and if so,

this works according to the one who says that a gzera shava that is

even a gezerah shavah which is

available for derivation on one side is derived

from it

and is not refuted,

even when there is a valid objection against it—

it is well, and it is acceptable to derive a corpse from a creeping creature despite the refutation.

it is understandable that we learn the law of a corpse from that of a creeping creature, despite the possible refutation.

But according to the one who says that a gzera shava that is available for derivation on only one side

a gezerah shavah which is made available on only one side

is derived

from it,

but

nevertheless

may be refuted

when there is a valid objection,

what can be said? How can we derive a corpse from a creeping creature despite the objection against the derivation: What is true of a creeping creature is that it renders impure with a lentil-sized portion!?

How shall we learn a corpse from a creeping creature, even though there is something with which to refute the learning: What is there concerning a creeping creature, since it renders impure with the size of a lentil!?

And we answer: “Garment and leather”

with regard to a corpse are also available for derivation, because:

for:

Since a corpse is also compared

to seminal fluid, as it is written [Leviticus 22:4]: “He may not eat of the sacred offerings until he becomes pure,

to semen, as it is written

[Leviticus 22:4]: “He shall not eat of the sacred offerings until he becomes pure,

and one who touches any impure person

[that is, impurity from a corpse],

or a man from whom there issues

seminal fluid”—

And

it is already

written with regard to seminal fluid:

“And any garment and any leather upon which there will be seminal fluid”;

if so,

“garment and leather”

that the Merciful One wrote with regard to a corpse

also

why do I need it!?

Rather,

infer from it that it is available for derivation

that it was written,

and

if so,

it is available for derivation on both sides, and in every case where a gzera shava is available for derivation on both sides, everyone agrees that it may not be refuted, even when there is a valid objection.

and concerning anything made available on both sides, according to everyone one does not refute, even when there is something with which to refute.

The Gemara nevertheless challenges this: Even according to the answer that a mat through a corpse is not derived by means of a kal va-chomer from a mat through a zav, because one could say “dayyo,” so that it would have the status of a mat through a zav, which is impure only with one-day impurity, but rather it is derived from a mat through a creeping creature by means of a gzera shava:

This works according to the one who says that with every gzera shava one should

with regard to every gezerah shavah:

derive from the source and restore it to its context,

[derive from the source from which the teaching is learned and establish it according to the context of the subject being taught]. For example, a mat through a corpse, which is derived from a creeping creature: We do not say, “Just as a mat through a creeping creature becomes impure only with one-day impurity, so too a mat through a corpse should become impure only with one-day impurity.” Rather, we say: Once you have derived that a mat is included as impure through a corpse, restore it to the context of a corpse; just as all other vessels that become impure through a corpse become impure with seven-day impurity, so too a mat becomes impure with seven-day impurity.

But according to the one who says that with every gzera shava one should

with regard to every gezerah shavah:

derive from the source, and from it,

[derive from the source from which the teaching is learned and treat the subject as having the status of that source], for example, a mat through a corpse, which is derived from a mat through a creeping creature: We say, “Just as a mat through a creeping creature becomes impure only with one-day impurity, so too, once you derive it with regard to a corpse, it becomes impure only with one-day impurity”—

if so,

what can be said? From where will we derive that a mat through a corpse becomes impure with seven-day impurity!?

And from where shall we learn concerning a mat through a corpse, to render it impure with seven-day impurity!?

Rava

said

he answered:

Since

the verse states with regard to a corpse:

concerning a corpse:

“And you shall wash your garments on the seventh day, and you shall become pure”,

we learn:

All impurities through which you render items impure through a corpse shall be no less than seven days, and this is a special scriptural decree concerning a mat: derive from the source and restore it to its context.

and it is a decree of the verse to say concerning a mat: Learn from it and establish it in its place.

Here the Gemara returns to the laws of torts and raises several difficulties:

a.

Should an animal’s tooth and foot therefore be liable in the public domain

at least for half-damages,

by means of a kal va-chomer:

And just as with a horn, when it is in the injured party’s domain, the owner pays

only

half-damages, but in the public domain it is liable

for half-damages,

so too, with an animal’s tooth and foot, when in the injured party’s domain the owner pays

full

damages, is it not logically inferred that in the public domain it should be liable

for full damages? And although it is impossible to obligate him for full damages, because “the conclusion derived through an inference cannot be more stringent than the source from which it is derived,” and with a horn in the injured party’s domain he pays only half-damages, nevertheless, he should at least be liable for half-damages!?

And we answer: The verse states concerning damage caused by an animal’s tooth and foot: “And he sends forth his animal,

and it consumes in another’s field.”

We learn from this that the Torah imposed liability for an animal’s tooth and foot only in the injured party’s domain,

and not in the public domain.