Bava Kamma 16b — the Talmud in English

:

But did we not learn in the Mishna,

we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar says

also the wolf, the lion, and the bear, etc.,

when they are domesticated

[that they raised in the house]

they are not forewarned.

And

only

the snake is always forewarned.

It follows that according to Rabbi Elazar only the snake is forewarned, but the other animals are not.

The Gemara answers:

Teach:

teach in the beraita: “Rabbi Elazar says

the snake,”

[without the word “also”]; that is to say, only the snake is always forewarned, even when it is domesticated, but not the other animals mentioned in the Mishna.

The Gemara brings Shmuel’s statement concerning the laws of a lion that caused damage:

Shmuel said: A lion

that

trampled in the public domain

an animal

and ate it—

that is, it did not kill it first, but ate it alive—

is exempt.

But if it

tore and ate

—that is, it first killed it and afterward ate it—

is liable.

And the Gemara explains Shmuel’s statement:

As for what Shmuel said, that a lion that

trampled and ate is exempt,

if this took place in the public domain, then

since it is its manner to trample,

it is the lion’s usual manner to trample and eat,

it is equivalent to its having eaten produce and vegetables,

it is like an animal eating produce and vegetables,

which is a case of “tooth”

in the public domain, and it is exempt.

But if the lion

tore

the animal before eating it,

it is not its manner,

it is not its way to do this, and since it is unusual, it is a derivative of “horn”; therefore it will be liable even in the public domain, like “horn,” except that it is liable only for half-damage, like “horn.”

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean that tearing is not

its manner,

do you mean to say that it is not the lion’s way to tear before eating?

But it is written

[Nahum 2]

“A lion tears for the sake of its cubs”

[a lion tears so that there will be sufficient food for its cubs ]. It follows that it is the lion’s way to tear.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of

bringing to

its cubs

it is its way to tear, but for the purpose of its own eating its way is only to trample and eat.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues,

“and strangles prey for its lionesses,”

it follows that it is the lion’s way to strangle and kill.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of its lionesses

[the female lion], it is its way to strangle and kill.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues,

“and it fills its lairs with prey,”

it follows that it is the lion’s way to tear.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of

bringing and concealing in

its lairs

it is its way to tear. But for the sake of eating immediately, it is not its way to tear.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues,

“and its dens with torn animals,”

it follows that it is its way to tear.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of

bringing to

its dens

[from the expression “dwelling” and “habitation”] it is its way to tear. But it is not its way to tear and eat immediately.

The Gemara raises an objection to Shmuel from a beraita:

But it was taught

in a beraita:

And likewise, an animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party

and

tore

and killed the

animal

belonging to the owner of the courtyard,

and ate

the

flesh

of the

animal,

the owner of the damaging animal

pays full damage

to the owner of the animal. Since it pays full damage in the domain of the injured party, it follows that this is its manner, and it is a derivative of “tooth,” which pays full damage. And if the beraita used the inclusive expression “animal,” this also includes the lion, Tosafot. And see there: from where do we know that it is “tooth,” and not “horn” according to Rabbi Tarfon? When it tore and ate, there are two actions for which liability may arise: a. for the tearing and killing; b. for eating the carcass. It was explained above [see 15b, note 62], in the name of the Rosh, concerning a dog that ate lambs, that only with regard to the loss resulting from the death is it unusual and it pays half-damage, but what it ate of the carcass is its usual manner and it pays full damage. And the Yam of Solomon [chapter 2, section 9] asks: if so, it may be said that in the beraita it pays full damage with regard to eating the carcass, which is “tooth” in the domain of the injured party, since this is its manner; but Shmuel is speaking of the public domain, and therefore one can impose liability for eating the carcass only for the loss resulting from the death that it caused by tearing, which is unusual, and it pays half-damage. Therefore the Yam of Solomon disagrees and holds that if the beginning was a deviation, then even the eating that resulted from it is considered a deviation, and it pays half-damage even for the eating. And in Imrei Moshe section 31 he wrote to reconcile the words of the Rosh: it is explained below, 24a, that one who saves from a lion acquires them, because the owners despair of recovering them. Therefore, here it is impossible to obligate the owner of the lion for eating the carcass under the category of “tooth,” because as soon as it tore, the owners despaired of the carcass, and the liability is only for the loss resulting from the death, which is unusual, and it pays half-damage. See there also what he wrote concerning the view of the Rosh.

it follows that even a lion that preyed in the injured party’s domain pays full damages under the category of “tooth,” because this is its usual manner. Accordingly, if it preys in the public domain, it should be exempt, according to the law of “tooth,” which is exempt in the public domain. This is difficult for Shmuel, who said that a lion that preys in the public domain is liable, since this is unusual behavior and is therefore a “horn.”

The Gemara answers:

Here, with what are we dealing?

The beraita is speaking

about one that tore in order to put it aside,

about an animal that tore in order to put it aside and conceal it. In such a case, even the lion’s way is to tear, as was explained; however, Shmuel is speaking of a case in which it tears in order to eat immediately, which is not the lion’s way.

The Gemara asks about the answer:

It teaches that it ate,

but it is explicit in the beraita that the animal tore and ate; how can one say that it tore in order to put it aside?

The Gemara answers:

When it changed its mind—

the beraita is speaking, as we answered, of an animal that tore in order to put it aside, and this too is the lion’s way. But afterward it changed its mind

and ate

its torn prey immediately, while Shmuel is speaking when it tore in order to eat it immediately.

The Gemara rejects this answer:

From where do we know?

From where do we know its thought, so that we can say that at first it intended to put it aside and then changed its mind and ate?

And furthermore,

if it is possible to say that the animal tore in order to put it aside and then changed its mind,

also concerning Shmuel,

also what Shmuel said, that a lion that tears is liable in the public domain because this is not its manner, and we explained that he is speaking of a case in which it tore in order to eat it immediately—there is a difficulty: from where do we know this?

Perhaps it is so,

perhaps the same occurred there: the lion tore in order to put it aside and then changed its mind and ate it. If so, this is its manner and it is “tooth,” which is exempt in the public domain; from where do we say that it intended to eat immediately and obligate it on the grounds that it is “horn”?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: The “tore” stated by the beraita is speaking of a case in which it tore in order to put it aside, and one cannot reject this by saying that the beraita says, “it tore an animal and ate flesh,” because the beraita

sets out its statement in separate cases,

teaches in separate aspects,

the words of the beraita are divided into separate aspects, that is, into two different cases. And this is what the beraita means to say: An animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party,

that tore

an animal in order

to put it aside,

and it is speaking of a case in which it put it aside and did not eat it,

or trampled and ate it—pays full damage.

Ravina interprets Shmuel’s statement differently, and through this the difficulty from the beraita is resolved:

Ravina said,

in truth, it is also the lion’s manner to tear and eat, as we learned in the beraita,

and when Shmuel said,

and as for what Shmuel said, that a lion that tears in the public domain is liable because this is not its manner, he is speaking

of a lion

that is

domesticated, and according to Rabbi Elazar,

and according to Rabbi Elazar’s method in our Mishna,

who said

that a lion when it is domesticated is not forewarned from the outset, because

it is not its manner

to cause damage. Therefore, when a domesticated lion tears, it is “horn,” and it is liable even in the public domain for half-damage.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Ravina’s statement:

If so,

if it is speaking of a domesticated lion whose manner is not to cause damage, then

even if it trampled

and ate,

it too should be liable,

it should be liable even in the public domain for half-damage, according to the law of “horn,” since a domesticated lion’s manner is not to cause damage even by trampling; why, then, did Shmuel exempt it?

And the Gemara explains that Ravina’s statement concerns the beraita:

Rather,

this

that

said

Ravina,

that it is speaking of a domesticated lion,

was not stated concerning Shmuel,

he did not say it concerning Shmuel’s statement,

but concerning the beraita,

concerning the beraita in which we learned: “And likewise, an animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party, tore an animal and ate flesh, pays full damage.” And concerning this he said:

When the beraita teaches,

what we learned in the beraita, that it tore and ate and pays full damage, this is not because it is the lion’s manner to tear and the liability is under “tooth.” For in truth it is not the lion’s manner to tear, and the liability is under “horn.” And the beraita is speaking even

of a lion

that is

domesticated and according to Rabbi Elazar, who said it is not its manner

to cause damage, and the liability is under “horn.” Consequently, there is no difficulty against Shmuel from the beraita, because the beraita imposes liability under “horn,” and not under “tooth,” since in truth it is not the lion’s manner to tear.

And the Gemara raises a difficulty against this interpretation as well:

If so,

if so, that the liability stated by the beraita is under “horn,” then

it ought to pay half-damage,

the owner of the animal should have paid half-damage, according to the law of payments for “horn”; why, then, did the beraita say that it pays full damage?

The Gemara answers:

It had been made forewarned,

indeed, it is not the lion’s manner to tear, and the beraita is speaking of a case in which it tore three times and became forewarned. Therefore even a domesticated lion pays full damage, according to the law of a forewarned “horn.”

But the Gemara raises a further difficulty against this answer:

If so,

if the liability is on account of “horn,”

what is this that it teaches it together with the derivative of “tooth,”

why is this law taught in the beraita among the liabilities of “tooth” and its derivatives?

It ought to teach it together with the derivative of “horn,”

the beraita should have taught this law among the derivatives of “horn,” when it explains the liabilities of “horn” and its derivatives.

And the Gemara concludes:

It is difficult,

indeed, there is a difficulty against Ravina’s statement.

Mishna:

After the previous Mishna explained that there are innocuous and forewarned cases, the Mishna explains the differences in the laws between them:

What

difference

is there between

the law of an

innocuous

animal that caused damage

and a forewarned

animal that caused damage?

Rather

the innocuous animal pays

only

half-damage,

and the payment is made

from its body

of the damaging ox: the damaging ox is sold, and if its value is sufficient for half the damage, he pays that amount; and if not, the owners do not add from their own property.

And a forewarned animal pays full damage,

and pays

from the superior property

[and in the Gemara it will be explained immediately] .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And the forewarned animal pays from the superior property.”

What

does “from the

superior property” mean?

Rabbi Elazar said: From the finest of his property,

for “superior property” is an expression meaning finest. And the damager must pay from the finest [the best] of his property.

The Gemara brings what Rabbi Elazar explained similarly:

And so he says [

Chronicles II, 32]:

“And Hezekiah lay with his fathers, and they buried him in the upper part of the tombs of the sons of David,” and Rabbi Elazar said: “In the upper part,”

in the sense of superior; that is, they buried him

beside

the

superior members of the family

of David,

and who are they,

who are the superior ones

David and Solomon!

Incidentally to the explanation of the verse concerning Hezekiah’s burial, the Gemara brings what Rabbi Elazar explained concerning the burial of Asa, king of Judah: It is stated [Chronicles II, 16]:

“And they buried him in his tombs which he had hewn out for himself in the City of David, and they laid him in the bed which they had filled with spices and various kinds.”

What [

what is the meaning of]

“spices and various kinds” ?

Rabbi Elazar said: Various varieties —

spices of their kinds, that is, spices of many kinds.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: “Spices and various kinds” means

“spices” whose every inhaler comes to licentiousness

spices that bring whoever smells them to licentiousness [

adultery].

The Gemara brings another dispute between them in the explanation of verses:

It is stated in the Book of Jeremiah [chapter 18] that Jeremiah the prophet was complaining, and said

“For they have dug a pit to capture me, and they have hidden traps for my feet.”

What was the “pit” that they dug in order to capture him with it?

Rabbi Elazar said: That they suspected him concerning a prostitute,

that they suspected him of having married a prostitute; and Jeremiah, who was a kohen, was forbidden to a prostitute.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: That they suspected him concerning a married woman!

Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said: They suspected him concerning a married woman!

The Gemara discusses these two explanations:

Granted, according to the one who says that they suspected him concerning a prostitute,

according to Rabbi Elazar, who explains that the “pit” they dug means that they suspected him concerning a prostitute, the matter is understood, for

that is,

since we find the expression “pit” written with regard to a prostitute,

as it is written, “For a prostitute is a deep pit” [

Proverbs 23].

But according to the one who says,

according to Rabbi Shmuel, who explains

that they suspected him concerning a married woman, what is the “pit”?

From where do we know that a married woman is called a “pit”?

The Gemara answers:

Is it so that a married woman does not emerge from the category of a prostitute?

Is a “married woman” not considered included in the category of “prostitute,” and consequently she too is included in “For a prostitute is a deep pit”?

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Elazar:

Granted, according to the one who says [

Rabbi Shmuel]

that they suspected him

concerning Jeremiah

of a married woman, that is why it is written,

the continuation of Jeremiah’s words is understood,

“And You, Lord, know all their counsel against me to kill me,”

that they were counseling against him to kill him, because they suspected him of the prohibition of a married woman, for which there is a punishment of death.

But according to the one who says,

but according to Rabbi Elazar,

that they suspected him concerning a prostitute, what is “to kill me”?

What did they counsel against him, to kill him? For although he was a kohen, there is no liability for death for one who marries an unmarried prostitute.

The Gemara answers:

That they cast him into a muddy pit,

in addition to suspecting him concerning a prostitute, they wanted to kill him and cast him into a muddy pit, and concerning this he said, “their counsel against me to kill me.”

The Gemara expounds the continuation of Jeremiah’s words:

Rava expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written,

what is the meaning of the words that Jeremiah said before the Lord concerning the men of Anathoth: [Jeremiah there]

“Let them be made to stumble before You; at the time of Your anger, act against them”?

Thus

Jeremiah said before the Holy One, blessed is He: Master of the Universe! Even when they perform charity, make them stumble with people who are unworthy,

so that those receiving will be people who are not proper, who are not worthy to receive charity,

so that they will not receive reward for it.

And since the Gemara explained the beginning of the verse dealing with Hezekiah’s burial, the Gemara expounds its continuation:

“And honor was done to him in his death,” teaches

the verse

that they established a yeshiva at his grave.

They seated students who would engage in Torah near his grave. And this was the honor that they did for him.

And for how long did the yeshiva continue at his grave?

They disagree about it [

they differed concerning this],

Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis; one

said three

days.