Bava Kamma 16b (טז:) — the Talmud in English

this is difficult:

But didn’t we learn,

we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Elazar says

even the wolf, the lion, and the bear, etc.,

when they are domesticated

[that people raised them in the house]

are not mu’ad.

And

only

the snake is always mu’ad.

Thus, according to Rabbi Elazar, only the snake is mu’ad, but the other animals are not.

The Gemara answers:

Read

the beraita as follows: “Rabbi Elazar says:

snake”

[without the word “even”]. That is, only the snake is always mu’ad, even when it is domesticated, but not the other animals mentioned in the Mishna.

The Gemara cites Shmuel’s statement concerning the laws applicable when a lion caused damage:

Shmuel said: A lion

that

trampled an animal in the public domain

and

ate it

, meaning that it did not kill it first, but ate it alive,

is exempt.

But if it

preyed upon it and ate it,

meaning that it first killed it and afterward ate it,

it is liable.

The Gemara explains Shmuel’s statement:

What Shmuel said, that a lion that

trampled and ate is exempt,

if this occurred in the public domain, is because

since it is its manner to trample,

as it is the lion’s usual manner to trample and eat,

it is comparable to an animal that ate produce and vegetables,

as this is comparable to an animal that eats produce and vegetables,

which is a derivative of “tooth”

in the public domain, and it is exempt.

But if the lion

preyed upon

the animal before eating it,

this is not its usual manner;

it is not its manner to do so, and since its behavior is unusual, it is a derivative of “horn.” Therefore, it is liable even in the public domain, as in the case of “horn,” although it is liable only for half-damages, as in the case of “horn.”

The Gemara asks:

Does this mean that preying is not

its usual manner,

are you saying that it is not the lion’s manner to prey before eating?

But isn’t it written

[Nahum 2]

“A lion preys for its cubs”?

[A lion preys in order to provide sufficient food for its cubs ]. It is evident that it is the lion’s manner to prey.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of

providing for

its cubs

it is its manner to prey, but for the purpose of eating itself, its manner is only to trample and eat.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues:

“And strangles prey for its lionesses,”

so it is evident that it is the lion’s manner to strangle and kill.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of its lionesses

[the female lions], it is its manner to strangle and kill.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues:

“And it fills its lairs with prey,”

so it is evident that it is the lion’s manner to prey.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of

bringing food and storing it in

its lairs,

it is its manner to prey. But for the purpose of eating immediately, it is not its manner to prey.

The Gemara asks: But the verse continues:

“And its dens with carcasses,”

so it is evident that it is its manner to prey.

The Gemara answers: Indeed,

for the sake of bringing food to

its dens

[from the term meaning dwelling and habitation], it is its manner to prey. But it is not its manner to prey and eat immediately.

The Gemara challenges Shmuel from a beraita:

The Gemara challenges Shmuel from a beraita:

But it was taught

in a beraita:

And similarly, an animal that entered the courtyard of the injured party and

and

preyed upon

and killed the

animal

belonging to the owner of the courtyard,

and ate

the

flesh

of the

animal,

the owner of the damaging animal

pays full damages to the owner of the animal.

Since it pays full damages in the injured party’s domain, it follows that this is its usual manner, and it is a derivative of “tooth,” which pays full damages. And since the beraita used the inclusive term “animal,” this also includes a lion,

it follows that even a lion that preyed in the injured party’s domain pays full damages under the category of “tooth,” because this is its usual manner. Accordingly, if it preys in the public domain, it should be exempt, according to the law of “tooth,” which is exempt in the public domain. This is difficult for Shmuel, who said that a lion that preys in the public domain is liable, since this is unusual behavior and is therefore a “horn.”

The Gemara answers:

What are we dealing with here?

The beraita is speaking

of a case where it preyed in order to put it down,

where the animal preyed in order to store and conceal its prey. In such a case, it is also the lion’s usual manner to prey, as explained. Shmuel, however, is speaking of a case where it preys in order to eat immediately, which is not the lion’s usual manner.

The Gemara asks concerning this answer:

But it teaches: “and ate it,”

and it is explicit in the beraita that the animal preyed upon it and ate it. How can it be said that it preyed in order to put it down?

The Gemara answers:

Where it changed its mind —

the beraita is speaking, as we explained, of an animal that preyed in order to put it down, which is also the lion’s usual manner. But afterward it changed its mind

and ate

its prey immediately. Shmuel is speaking of a case where it preyed in order to eat it immediately.

The Gemara rejects this answer:

How do we know?

How do we know what its intention was, so that we can say that it initially intended to put it down and then changed its mind and ate it?

Furthermore,

if it is possible to say that the animal preyed in order to put it down and then changed its mind,

even with regard to Shmuel,

the same difficulty applies to what Shmuel said: that a lion that preys in the public domain is liable because this is not its usual manner. We explained that he is speaking of a case where it preyed in order to eat it immediately. But how do we know this?

Perhaps this is what happened:

perhaps the same was true there: the lion preyed in order to put it down, and then changed its mind and ate it. If so, this is its usual manner, and it is “tooth,” which is exempt in the public domain. How do we know that it intended to eat immediately, so that it should be liable under the category of “horn”?

The Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said:

The “preyed upon” stated by the beraita refers to a case where it preyed in order to put the prey down. One cannot reject this by saying that the beraita says, “It preyed upon an animal and ate flesh,” because the beraita

teaches with regard to different cases,

meaning that the words of the beraita are divided into separate clauses, referring to two different cases. This is what the beraita means to say: An animal that entered the injured party’s courtyard

and preyed upon

an animal in order

to put it down,

and the case is one where it put it down and did not eat it,

or trampled and ate it, pays full damages.

Ravina explains Shmuel’s statement differently, thereby resolving the difficulty from the beraita:

Ravina said,

in truth, it is also the lion’s usual manner to prey and eat, as we learned in the beraita.

And when Shmuel said

that a lion that preys in the public domain is liable because this is not its usual manner, he was speaking

of a lion

that is

domesticated, and in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

according to Rabbi Elazar’s method in our Mishna,

who says

that when a lion is domesticated, it is not mu’ad from the outset, because

it is not its usual manner

to cause damage. Therefore, when a domesticated lion preys, this is “horn,” and it is consequently liable even in the public domain for half-damages.

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Ravina’s statement:

If so,

if the case is one of a domesticated lion whose usual manner is not to cause damage, then

even if it trampled

and ate,

it should also be liable.

It should be liable in the public domain for half-damages under the law of “horn,” since it is not the usual manner of a domesticated lion to cause damage even by trampling. Why, then, did Shmuel exempt it?

The Gemara explains that Ravina’s statement concerns the beraita:

Rather,

this

that

said

Ravina

said, namely, that the case is one of a domesticated lion,

was not stated with regard to Shmuel;

he did not say it concerning Shmuel’s statement,

but concerning the beraita,

the beraita in which we learned: “And similarly, an animal that entered the injured party’s courtyard, preyed upon an animal, and ate flesh, pays full damages.” Concerning this, he said:

When the beraita was taught,

the statement we learned in the beraita, that it preyed and ate and pays full damages, is not because it is the lion’s usual manner to prey and the liability is under the category of “tooth.” In truth, it is not the lion’s usual manner to prey, and the liability is under the category of “horn.” The beraita is speaking even

of a lion

that is

domesticated and in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who says that it is not its usual manner

to cause damage, and the liability is under the category of “horn.” Consequently, there is no difficulty for Shmuel from the beraita, because the beraita imposes liability under the category of “horn,” not “tooth,” since in truth it is not the lion’s usual manner to prey.

The Gemara raises a further difficulty against this explanation:

If so,

if the liability stated by the beraita is under the category of “horn,” then

it should have to pay half-damages.

The owner of the animal should have to pay half-damages, as required for “horn.” Why, then, does the beraita say that it pays full damages?

The Gemara answers:

It had been rendered mu’ad.

Although it is not the lion’s usual manner to prey, the beraita is speaking of a lion that preyed three times and thereby became mu’ad. Therefore, even a domesticated lion pays full damages, like a mu’ad “horn.”

But the Gemara raises another difficulty against this answer:

If so,

if the liability is under the category of “horn,”

what is the meaning of the fact that it teaches this together with the derivative of “tooth”?

Why is this law taught in the beraita among the liabilities of “tooth” and its derivatives?

It should have taught it together with the derivative of “horn,”

the beraita should have taught this law among the derivatives of “horn,” when explaining the liabilities of “horn” and its derivatives.

The Gemara concludes:

It is difficult.

Indeed, this is difficult for Ravina’s statement.

Mishna:

After the previous Mishna explained that there are tam and mu’ad animals, the Mishna explains the distinctions between their laws:

What

difference is there

between

the law of a

tam

that caused damage

and a mu’ad

that caused damage?

Rather,

the tam pays

only

half-damages,

and the payment is made

from its own body,

from the damaging ox itself. The damaging ox is sold, and if its value is sufficient to cover half the damages, payment is made from it; if not, the owners do not add money from their other assets.

And a mu’ad pays full damages,

and pays

from the superior property

[which the Gemara will explain immediately] .

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: “And a mu’ad pays from the superior property.”

What

is the meaning of “from the

superior property”?

Rabbi Elazar said: From the best of his property,

as “superior property” is an expression indicating what is choice or best. The damager must pay from the best [the highest-quality] of his property.

The Gemara cites what Rabbi Elazar interpreted similarly:

And so he says [A004]:

II Chronicles 32]:

“And Hezekiah slept with his fathers, and they buried him in the uppermost part of the tombs of the sons of David,” and Rabbi Elazar said: “In the uppermost part,”

an expression denoting superiority; that is, they buried him

among

the

most distinguished members of the family

of David.

And who are they,

who are the most distinguished?

David and Solomon!

In the course of explaining the verse concerning Hezekiah’s burial, the Gemara cites what Rabbi Elazar interpreted concerning the burial of Asa, king of Judah. It is stated [II Chronicles, chapter 16]:

“And they buried him in his tombs that he had hewn for himself in the City of David, and they laid him in a bed that they had filled with spices and varieties of perfumes.”

What [

what is the meaning of

“spices and varieties of perfumes” ?

Rabbi Elazar said: Varieties upon varieties—

spices of various kinds; that is, spices from many different species.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said that

“spices and varieties of perfumes” means:

spices whose fragrance causes anyone who smells them to be aroused to licentiousness [

adultery].

The Gemara cites another dispute between them in the interpretation of verses:

It is stated in the Book of Jeremiah [chapter 18] that Jeremiah the prophet lamented and said:

“For they have dug a pit to capture me, and they have concealed traps for my feet.”

What was the “pit” that they dug in order to capture him?

Rabbi Elazar said: They suspected him concerning a prostitute,

meaning, they suspected that he had married a prostitute; and Jeremiah, who was a kohen, was forbidden to marry a prostitute.

Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: They suspected him concerning a married woman!

Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said: They suspected him concerning a married woman!

The Gemara discusses these two interpretations:

Granted, according to the one who says that they suspected him concerning a prostitute,

according to Rabbi Elazar, who interprets the “pit” that they dug as meaning that they suspected him concerning a prostitute, this is understandable, for

that is,

we find the expression “pit” used in connection with a prostitute,

as it is written: “For a prostitute is a deep pit” [

Proverbs 23].

But according to the one who says

according to Rabbi Shmuel, who interprets it as

“They suspected him concerning a married woman,” what is the meaning of “pit”?

From where do we know that a married woman is called a “pit”?

The Gemara answers:

Is that so? Does a married woman not fall within the category of a prostitute?

Is a “married woman” not included in the category of “prostitute,” and consequently included in the verse “For a prostitute is a deep pit”?

The Gemara raises a difficulty against Rabbi Elazar:

Granted, according to the one who says [

Rabbi Shmuel]

that they suspected him

concerning Jeremiah

of a married woman, this is why it is written,

the continuation of Jeremiah’s words is understandable:

“And You, Lord, know all their counsel against me, to kill me,”

for they were plotting to kill him because they suspected him of the transgression involving a married woman, which carries the punishment of death.

But according to the one who says,

according to Rabbi Elazar,

“They suspected him concerning a prostitute,” what is the meaning of “to kill me”?

What did they plot against him that would result in his death? Although he was a kohen, there is no death penalty for one who marries an unmarried prostitute.

The Gemara answers:

They threw him into a muddy pit,

in addition to suspecting him concerning a prostitute, they sought to kill him and threw him into a muddy pit; and concerning this he said, “their counsel against me, to kill me.”

The Gemara expounds the continuation of Jeremiah’s words:

Rava expounded: What is the meaning of that which is written,

what is the meaning of the words that Jeremiah said before God concerning the men of Anathoth: [Jeremiah, there]

“Let them be made to stumble before You; at the time of Your anger, act against them”?

This is what

Jeremiah said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the Universe! Even when they perform charity, cause them to stumble with people who are unworthy,

so that the recipients will be people who are unworthy and not deserving of receiving charity,

so that they will not receive reward for it.

And once the Gemara has interpreted the beginning of the verse dealing with Hezekiah’s burial, the Gemara expounds its continuation:

“And they showed him honor in his death,” teaches

the verse

that they established a yeshiva at his grave.

They seated students who would engage in Torah study near his grave. This was the honor that they showed him.

And how long did the yeshiva remain at his grave?

They disagree about this [

they dispute this matter]:

Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis; one

said three

days.