Bava Kamma 15b — the Talmud in English

One who says:

“My ox killed so-and-so. Or

who says: My ox killed

so-and-so’s ox!” —

he must pay on the basis of

his own

admission,

a ransom-payment to the heirs of the killed person, and compensation for damage to the owners of the ox that was killed.

Does this not mean, in the case of an innocuous ox,

and does the Mishna not speak of an innocuous ox? And if so, it is proven that the half-damage which an innocuous ox pays is a monetary obligation, and he pays on the basis of his own admission. The Gemara rejects this:

No.

The Mishna does not speak of an innocuous ox, but

of a forewarned ox

which pays full damage, and its obligation is monetary.

The Gemara raises an objection to the rejection:

But

in the case of

an innocuous ox, what

is the law?

Is it likewise that he does not pay on the basis of his own admission,

and indeed he will not pay on the basis of his admission because his obligation is a penalty?

If so, instead of teaching in the latter clause,

if so, when the Mishna at its end comes to present a case of a penalty, let it state the law of one who says:

“My ox killed so-and-so’s slave,”

since the obligation of thirty shekels is a penalty,

let it divide and teach the distinction in its own case,

the Mishna could have divided the law concerning the ox that caused the damage itself:

“In what case are these matters said,”

that one who says “My ox killed so-and-so’s ox” is liable? Only

in the case of

an

forewarned

ox. But

in the case of

an

innocuous

ox, which pays half-damage, it is a penalty and

he does not pay on the basis of his own admission.

And if the Mishna did not state this distinction, but instead brought proof from the matter of a slave, it implies that both an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox pay on the basis of their own admission.

The Gemara answers:

The entire Mishna is speaking of a forewarned ox,

the Mishna speaks of a forewarned ox and teaches the distinctions that apply to a forewarned ox. Therefore, it did not distinguish between an innocuous ox and a forewarned ox, but sought to distinguish within the forewarned ox itself between a monetary obligation and a penalty.

And the Gemara brings another proof from the end of the preceding Mishna:

Come and hear: This is the principle: Whoever pays more than what he damaged does not pay on the basis of his own admission,

every payment-obligation which the Torah imposed, to pay more than what he damaged, is a penalty and he does not pay on the basis of his admission.

Does this not mean,

does the Mishna not intend to teach us:

“This”,

but if he pays

less than what he damaged, he pays

on the basis of his own admission? Thus we have that half-damage is a monetary obligation.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

The Mishna did not come to teach us this. Rather,

“this”,

if the payment-obligation is

as much as he damaged, he pays

on the basis of his own admission, because this is not a penalty.

The Gemara raises an objection to the rejection:

But

one who pays

less

than what he damaged,

what

is his law?

Is it likewise that he does not pay,

and is his law indeed that he does not pay on the basis of his own admission?

If so, instead of teaching,

since the Mishna says

“This is the principle: Whoever pays more than what he damaged does not pay on the basis of his own admission,” let it teach,

it would have been appropriate for the Mishna to say:

“This is the principle: Whoever does not pay as much as he damaged

does not pay on the basis of his own admission,”

which implies both less and more,

for this would imply that both when he pays less and when he pays more it is a penalty, and he does not pay on the basis of his own admission. Since the Mishna did not state it in this wording, it implies that specifically one who pays more than what he damaged is subject to a penalty. But one who pays less than what he damaged has a monetary obligation. And from here there is proof for the one who says, “Half-damage is monetary.”

The Gemara agrees with the objection:

Refutation!

Indeed, this Mishna is an answer and a refutation to the view of the one who says that half-damage is a penalty-obligation.

But concerning the halakha the Gemara decides:

And the halakha is: Half-damage is a penalty.

The halakha is that the obligation of half-damage is by virtue of a penalty.

And the Gemara is astonished:

A refutation and a halakha?!

This view has been refuted from the Mishna, so how is it possible that the halakha follows it?!

The Gemara answers:

No,

indeed this is the halakha, despite the refutation from the Mishna, because

what is the reason that it is a refutation

—what is the reason that this view was refuted? It is

because it did not teach,

because the Mishna did not say, “Whoever does not pay

as much as he damaged

does not pay on the basis of his own admission.” However, this is not a complete refutation, for one can say that the tannai did not state it in this wording because

it was not definite for him,

he could not state it in an absolute manner,

since there is

an obligation of

half-damage

of

pebbles

[an animal that walked and kicked up pebbles with its feet, and they broke vessels],

which the halakha has been received is monetary,

for we have learned by a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai that it is a monetary obligation. And for damage that occurred in this manner, the one who caused the damage pays on the basis of his own admission, and

because of

this it did not teach,

therefore the Mishna did not say, “Whoever does not pay as much as he damaged.”

And the Gemara explains the laws that result from the fact that half-damage is a penalty:

And now, since you have said that half-damage is a penalty,

now that you have said that half-damage caused by goring is a penalty-obligation and not a monetary obligation,

this dog that ate lambs,

a dog that strangled live lambs and ate them,

and this cat that ate a chicken,

a cat that seized a chicken, the damage

is unusual,

and therefore it is considered “goring,” and it pays half-damage, which is a penalty,

and we do not collect it in Babylonia,

and a court does not collect this payment in Babylonia, because cases of penalties are not adjudicated except by judges with ordination, and there are no judges with ordination there.

And these matters,

this matter that we said is unusual and is considered goring, applies

with large ones,

when the dog and cat seized large lambs or chickens.

But with small ones,

if they seized small ones,

it is its normal manner,

this is their way, and it is considered “eating,” which pays full damage, and this payment is also collected in Babylonia.

And

although half-damage is not collected in Babylonia,

if he seized

the injured party seized the property of the one who caused the damage,

we do not remove it from him,

we do not take it out of his possession.

And if

he did not seize, but only

said

to the court:

“Set a date for me, so that I may go to the Land of Israel,”

set a time for the one who caused the damage to go with me to the Land of Israel to litigate before judges with ordination,

we set a date for him,

we set a time for him and obligate the one who caused the damage to go to litigate with him.

And if he does not go,

and if the one who caused the damage does not go with him,

we place him under a ban,

we excommunicate him.

The Gemara adds:

And in either case,

whether the injured party, the owner of the lambs and the chicken, wishes to go to litigate in the Land of Israel, or whether he did not demand this,

we place him under a ban

we excommunicate the owner of the dog and cat that caused the damage

until he removes the danger,

until he kills them. And this law, that it is forbidden to leave a harmful animal in his possession, is learned

from

the law of

Rabbi Natan.

For it was taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Natan says: From where [do we know] that a person should not raise a vicious dog inside his house, and should not place a rickety ladder inside his house? The verse says

[Deuteronomy 22:8]: “

and

you shall not place blood in your house.”

And therefore we place him under a ban until he kills them.

Mishna:

This Mishna adds to teach the laws of damage, innocuousness, and being forewarned:

Five innocuous [types],

there are five types of damage which it is not an animal’s way to perform, and if they cause damage, the owners pay only half-damage [as follows in the next Mishna].

And five forewarned [types],

whose way it is to cause damage, and when they cause damage they pay full damage:

The Mishna specifies the five forms of innocuousness:

An animal is not forewarned

from its beginning: a.

to gore,

with its horn. b.

or to push with its body,

to push with its body. c.

or to bite,

to bite with its teeth. d.

or to lie down

on vessels and damage them. e.

or to kick

with its feet.

All these are derivatives of goring, since it is not an animal’s way to perform them.

And the Mishna specifies the five forewarned types:

a.

“Eating” is forewarned to eat what is fit for it,

an animal is forewarned from its beginning to eat fruits and vegetables.

b.

“Foot” is forewarned,

the animal is forewarned from its beginning

to break

vessels

in the course of its walking.

c.

And a forewarned ox,

an ox after it has gored, or butted, or bitten, or lain down, or kicked three times.

d.

And an ox that causes damage in the domain of the injured party.

An ox that entered the courtyard of the injured party and caused damage by goring or butting, and the like—even if it is an innocuous ox, its law is like that of a forewarned ox, paying full damage.

e.

And a person,

who is forewarned forever.

And the Mishna adds animals that are forewarned from their beginning:

The wolf, the lion, the bear, the leopard, the bardelas, and the serpent—these are forewarned

from their beginning, and even if they cause damage by biting and the like, they pay full damage.

Rabbi Elazar says: When they are domesticated,

when a person has raised them inside his house and they are accustomed to living among human beings,

they are not forewarned

from their beginning.

And the serpent is forewarned forever,

even if it is domesticated.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses what position our Mishna holds concerning the law of the horn in the courtyard of the injured party:

Since it teaches,

from what we have taught in our Mishna:

“The tooth is forewarned to eat”

and is liable for full damages,

by inference

you learn this,

that we are dealing with the courtyard of the injured party,

for our Mishna speaks when the damage was done inside the courtyard of the injured party and not in the public domain. For the tooth is liable only in the courtyard of the injured party, and exempt in the public domain.

And it teaches,

and we have taught at the beginning of the Mishna:

“An animal is not forewarned to pay”

for goring, pushing, biting, crouching, and kicking

all of

the damage. But

“It pays half-damages.”

And if we are precise that our Mishna speaks when the damage was done in the courtyard of the injured party, it is explained that the horn, even in the courtyard of the injured party, pays only half-damages when it is innocuous.

Whose [opinion is this]?

Our Mishna that holds this—according to whose method is it stated? Necessarily, according to the method of

the Rabbis, who say: “The horn is unusual

in the courtyard of the injured party; it is half-damages that it pays.”

And the Gemara raises an objection: If so,

say the latter clause,

say [learn] the latter clause of the Mishna:

“An ox that is forewarned, and an ox that causes damage”

that is, the horn

in the domain of the injured party, and a person,

are forewarned from the outset and pay full damages. It is thus explicit that the horn in the courtyard of the injured party pays full damages from the outset, and according to this,

we have arrived

the Mishna follows here

the

the method of

Rabbi Tarfon, who says: “The horn is unusual in the courtyard of the injured party; it is full damages that it pays.”

And it turns out that the Mishna contradicts itself, for in the

first clause

it follows the method of

the Rabbis, and the latter clause

is according to

Rabbi Tarfon?

And the Gemara answers:

Yes,

indeed, it is possible to establish our Mishna in this way,

for Samuel said to Rav Yehuda: “Sharp one”

sharp and keen are you ,

leave the Mishna,

leave the Mishna—that is, do not trouble yourself to reconcile it according to the method of a single tanna,

and come after me,

come after me and say as I do, for I established the Mishna in such a manner that the

first clause

is according to

the Rabbis, and the latter clause

is according to

Rabbi Tarfon.