Bava Kamma 118b — the Talmud in English

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What is the reason of Rav Hisda

who holds that theft without the owners' knowledge is more serious than theft with the owners' knowledge, for according to his view, in theft with the owners' knowledge, in order to fulfill the law of returning, it is sufficient that the owners count the flock, whereas in theft without the owners' knowledge, it is not sufficient that the owners count the flock, but they must know about the return of the theft

?

Since it learned the ways of going out,

since the flock that was stolen learned to go outside the fold, from now on it requires more careful guarding, and since the owners did not know that it had been stolen, they did not know to be careful with it and guard it properly. But if it was stolen with the owners' knowledge, returning it is effective when the owners counted the flock, for the owners recognized that it had been stolen and returned, and from now on they will be careful with it.

And did Rava say this

that in theft with the owners' knowledge, return is fulfilled when the owners count the flock after it was returned?

But Rava said: If one saw his fellow lift a lamb from his flock

in order to steal it,

and he raised his voice at him and he cast it down

and the master of the house raised his voice at him, and the thief cast it down,

and he did not know

the master of the house

whether he returned it,

whether it returned to the flock,

or whether he did not return it, and it died

the lamb

or was stolen—

he is liable

the thief

for its responsibility.

Is it not

the case

even though he counted

that the owners counted the flock?

And we reject this:

No,

it is speaking

where he did not count,

and therefore the thief is liable for responsibility for the theft.

And did Rav say this

that the owners must at least know the number of sheep in their possession?

But Rav said: If he returned it

the thief

to the flock

of the master of the house

in the wilderness—

he is exempt,

even though there is neither the owners' knowledge nor a count, since the owners did not count the flock.

And we answer:

Rav Hanan bar Abba said: Rav concedes in the case of rakuata,

for the lamb is recognizable when it is stolen, and the shepherd recognizes it when it is added to his flock, even in the wilderness, when he did not count them.

Let us say

the dispute between the amoraim

is like the dispute between tannaim,

like the dispute between the tannaim:

For we learned in a beraita:

One who steals a lamb from the flock, and a sela from a purse

of the owners—in order to fulfill the law of returning,

he must return it to the place from which he stole it; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says:

in order to fulfill the law of returning,

the owners' knowledge is required,

that they know about the theft that was returned.

They initially assumed

to explain the dispute:

that everyone accepts the view of Rabbi Yitzhak,

and no one disputes the law that he stated.

For Rabbi Yitzhak said: A person is accustomed to feel in his purse at every hour,

and as soon as a sela is missing from his purse, he knows of it; and likewise, immediately after the thief returned it, we say that the owners counted the coins in their purse and know that the theft returned.

Is it not

that the tannaim

with regard to the sela

that they stole

with knowledge

of the owners, that the owners knew of its theft,

and it is the dispute of Rav and Shmuel!

Whether, when the theft was with the owners' knowledge, the owners' knowledge is required for the return or not.

And we reject this:

No,

the tannaim disputed

with regard to the lamb

that was stolen

without knowledge

of the owners,

and it is the dispute of Rav Hisda and Rabbi Yohanan.

The tannaim disputed: Rabbi Ishmael, who says “he must return it to the place from which he stole it,” holds like Rabbi Yohanan, who said that in theft without the owners' knowledge, even a count by the owners is not required, but it is sufficient to return the object to its place. And Rabbi Akiva, who says that the owners' knowledge is required for the return, holds like Rav Hisda, who said that in theft without the owners' knowledge, the owners' knowledge is required for the return.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: In the case of a watchman who stole from the owners' domain—

everyone agrees with Rav Hisda

that the owners' knowledge is required for the return, and as its reason was explained: because the stolen lamb learned to go outside the fold, and from now on it requires more careful guarding; and since the owners did not know that it had been stolen, they did not know to be careful with it and guard it properly.

But here,

where Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael disputed, it is speaking

of a watchman who stole from his own domain,

for the lamb was in his domain for guarding, and he stole it for himself from his own domain, and they disputed whether

he should return it to the place from which he stole it

that is, to his domain, where he guarded it for the owners—

is effective.

Rabbi Akiva holds:

when the watchman became a thief,

his guardianship ended for him,

and he is no longer trustworthy to the owners, for he stole without knowledge; therefore, the owners' knowledge is required for the return, and the watchman's knowledge is not sufficient.

And Rabbi Ishmael holds: his guardianship did not end for him,

and he is still considered the owners' watchman, and it is sufficient if he returns it with his knowledge.

Let us say,

perhaps we may say that

a count

by which the owners counted their flock and knew that the stolen object was in their possession

exempts

the thief from liability, and the law of returning was thereby fulfilled—

it is a dispute between tannaim.

For it was taught: One who robs his fellow and causes it to be included in the account,

that the robber later purchased an object from the robbed person, and when he gave him the money, he added to it the money of the robbery and included it in the account, because the robber was embarrassed to say to the robbed person, “Here is what you were robbed of.”

One teaching says: He has fulfilled

the robber's obligation of returning.

And another teaching says: He has not fulfilled

the obligation of returning.

They initially assumed

to explain the dispute of the tannaim:

that everyone

all the tannaim who disputed

accepts the view of Rabbi Yitzhak, who said: A person is accustomed to feel in his purse at every hour and every hour,

and immediately when the money was robbed from him, he knew of it.

Is it not

that the tannaim

dispute in this:

The one who says, “He has fulfilled”—

holds: a count exempts,

and since he counts his money every hour, it is sufficient that he return the money without the owners' knowledge, for the owners will count their money and know that this money is in their possession.

And the one who says, “He has not fulfilled”—

holds: a count does not exempt!

Rather, the owners' knowledge of the theft and the return is required. Therefore, returning the robbery without the owners' knowledge is not effective.

And ultimately

they said

that there is no need to explain the dispute of the tannaim in this manner; rather, it can be explained as follows:

If we hold

if we hold

like Rabbi Yitzhak,

the dispute of the tannaim can be explained:

everyone

all the tannaim who disputed

does not dispute that a count

by which the owners count and know that the stolen object is found in their possession

exempts

the robber from liability, and by this he fulfills the return.

Rather,

only

with regard to Rabbi Yitzhak they dispute,

the tannaim, whether a person is accustomed to feel in his purse at every hour and every hour.

One holds the view of Rabbi Yitzhak

that a person is accustomed to feel in his purse, and therefore it is not necessary to inform the owners about the return of the robbery, since he will certainly count his money immediately at that time and know that the returned money is in his possession.

And the other does not hold the view of Rabbi Yitzhak,

and it is not certain that the owners will count their money at that time; therefore, it is necessary to inform the owners about the return of the robbery in order to be exempt from liability.

And if you wish, say

that another explanation may be stated:

that everyone accepts the view of Rabbi Yitzhak,

that a person is accustomed to feel in his purse at every hour and every hour.

And it is not difficult

to reconcile the teachings that contradict one another, for they can be explained:

This

the beraita that says that he fulfilled the return without the owners' knowledge speaks of a case

where he counted it and put it into his purse,

where the robber counted it and put it into the robbed person's purse; and since the coins are in the robbed person's purse, the robbed person certainly knew of it, for a person is accustomed to feel in his purse at every hour, as Rabbi Yitzhak said.

And this

the beraita that says that the owners' knowledge is required in returning the robbed money speaks of a case

where he counted it and put it into his hand,

where the robber counted it and put it into the robbed person's hand; and it is possible that the robbed person put it into his chest and did not count it, and did not know that the robbery had been returned to him.

And if you wish, say

it can be explained that

both this and that

the two beraitot speak of a case

where he counted it and put it into his purse,

where the robber counted it and put the money into the robbed person's purse.

Rather,

this

the beraita that says that the owners must know about the return of the robbed money speaks of a case

where he has

the robbed person

other coins in his purse,

and he does not know how much money he has in his purse, and he will not notice that the robbed money was returned to him.

This

the beraita that says that the owners' knowledge is not required in returning the money speaks of a case

where he does not have

the robbed person

other coins in his purse,

and when he counts the money in his purse, he will know that the robbed money was returned to him.

Mishna:

The Mishna specifies several things that one may not purchase, out of concern that they are stolen.

One may not purchase from shepherds wool, milk, or kids,

because there is concern that they stole them from the flock of the master of the house entrusted to them.

Nor

may one purchase

from fruit watchmen

in gardens and orchards—

wood and fruit,

out of concern that they are stolen.

But one may purchase from women: woolen articles in Judea, linen articles in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon,

since in Judea the women made woolen garments, in the Galilee they made linen garments, and in the Sharon they raised calves, and they sold them with the knowledge of their husbands.

And all of them,

all those women who sell woolen articles in Judea, linen articles in the Galilee, or calves in the Sharon,

who said

to the customers

to conceal

and hide what they bought—

it is forbidden

to purchase from them, for they have the presumptive status of stolen property.

And one may purchase eggs and chickens from any place

and from any person, and we do not suspect that they stole them. However, even with these, if the seller told them to conceal them, it is forbidden to purchase from him.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: One may not purchase from shepherds neither goats nor kids, neither fleeces nor detached wool,

for the wool was detached from the ewe little by little, and it appears that they stole it.

But one may purchase from them

garments

sewn, because they are theirs,

for even if they stole the wool, they acquired it for themselves through a change, and now it belongs to them.

And one may purchase from them

from the shepherds

milk and cheese in the wilderness,

for it is not the practice of the master of the house to go there and take them, and the shepherd took them.

But one may not

purchase milk and cheese from them

in an inhabited area,

for it is the practice to bring them to the master's house.

And one may purchase from them

from the shepherds

four or five sheep,

for their absence is noticeable in the flock, and the shepherd cannot evade the master of the house and tell him that a wolf devoured them.

And likewise it is permitted to purchase from the shepherds

four or five fleeces,

for their absence is noticeable,

but not two sheep and not two fleeces.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

sheep

that are domestic,

which are accustomed to be near the house,

one may purchase from them,

for the master of the house knows their number; but sheep

of the wilderness,

whose number the master of the house does not know,

one may not purchase from them.

The general principle of the matter: Whatever the shepherd sells and the master of the house notices—

one may purchase from them,

but if

the master of the house does not

notice

it

in the shepherd who sold it—

one may not purchase from them.

The Master said: One may purchase from them

from the shepherds

four and five sheep, four and five goats.

And we raised it:

Now, it is sufficient to say that we purchase four [

buy from them]; if so,

is it necessary for him to say five

as well? For it is obvious that if the householder notices the loss of four, all the more so he notices the loss of five; and why was it necessary for the tanna to say this?

Rav Hisda said:

The intention of the tanna is that it is permitted to purchase from the shepherd when he sells

four

sheep

out of five.

For if he had only five sheep in his flock and sells four of them, it is permitted to take them from him, because he will not steal so much from such a small quantity.

Some say: Rav Hisda said:

The intention of the tanna is that it is permitted to purchase from the shepherd

four

sheep

from a small flock, and five

sheep

from a large flock.

And we raise an objection:

This itself

the words of the beraita themselves

is difficult:

On the one hand,

you said: four and five sheep, four and five goats,

it is permitted to purchase from the shepherds, indicating that only a quantity of at least

four and five—

not

is permitted,

but three—

not

may he take from them.

And on the other hand,

say the latter clause: But he may not

take from the shepherds

two sheep,

indicating

that three we do purchase,

we purchase from them.

And we resolve it:

It is not difficult: This

that is indicated in the beraita, that he may take even three sheep from the shepherds, refers

to healthy ones,

which the householder considers important and notices;

this,

that is indicated in the beraita, that he may take from them only four sheep, refers

to emaciated ones,

which are not important to the householder, and he does not notice them; therefore, he notices only when four are missing.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Judah says:

Sheep

that are accustomed to the house, one may purchase from them,

but sheep

that are accustomed to the wilderness, one may not purchase from them, and so on.

It was raised before them:

Does

Rabbi Judah stand on the first clause

of the beraita, in which the first tanna permitted purchasing from them four and five sheep,

and he comes to be stringent,

saying that in every case one may not purchase wilderness sheep from them, even in a large quantity;

or perhaps he stands on the latter clause

of the beraita,

stands

Rabbi Judah’s statement

and is lenient?

And we explain: Do Rabbi Judah’s words

stand on the first clause and are stringent, as he said

that the first tanna said in the first clause:

One may purchase from them four and five sheep,

and concerning this Rabbi Judah said that

this applies

to sheep

that are accustomed to the house, but

sheep

that are accustomed to the wilderness—

even four and five one may not

purchase from them.

Or perhaps

Rabbi Judah’s words

stand on the latter clause and are lenient, as he said

that the first tanna said in the latter clause:

But he may not

purchase from them

two sheep or two goats,

and concerning this Rabbi Judah said that

this applies

to sheep

that are accustomed to the wilderness, but

sheep

that are accustomed to the house—

even two, one may also purchase?

And we resolve it from this:

Come and hear:

As it is taught

in another beraita:

Rabbi Judah says: One may purchase

sheep

that are accustomed to the house from them, but one may not purchase from them

sheep

that are accustomed to the wilderness.

And in every place

even in the wilderness

one may purchase from them

a quantity of

four and five sheep.