Bava Kamma 109a — the Talmud in English

5. But if he explicitly said, “Konam: he shall not benefit from his property”

during his lifetime and after his death, if he died

the father

did not bequeath to him

his son, because a person can prohibit for his fellow a thing that is in his possession when it leaves his possession,

and he shall return

his share of the inheritance

to his sons

or

to the brothers

of his father,

And if he has nothing

to eat, and he needs money, he

shall borrow

money in the amount of his share of the inheritance,

and creditors

of his

shall come and collect

from his brothers or from his father’s brothers his share of the inheritance as one who is mudar hanaa, for even though he is prohibited from benefiting from the inheritance, he is permitted to benefit through the payment of his debt from the inheritance:

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: One who robs his father must pay the principal and the fifth to his sons or to his brothers.

Rav Yosef said,

if the robber has neither brothers nor paternal brothers, he may not take the stolen property for himself; rather, he shall remove it from his possession and

even to a charity purse.

Rav Pappa said: And he must say

when he gives the stolen property to charity ,

“This is my father’s stolen property.”

And we raise an objection: Why must he remove the stolen property from his possession? After all, he is his father’s heir, and

why

do we not say: Just as his father could forgive him, in which case he would not be obligated to remove the stolen property from his possession, so too he

should forgive himself—

he should forgive himself, and again he will not need to remove the stolen property from his possession ?

Did we not learn,

the robbed person who

forgave him the principal but did not forgive him the fifth,

and so on;

apparently

stolen property

is subject to forgiveness,

and even if the stolen property has not left his possession, he is exempt from returning it after he has ceased to have the status of a robber through his stolen property having been forgiven; and here too, let us say that the robber who is the heir can forgive himself and will not need to remove the stolen property from his possession;

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is not difficult; this

where we find that it is possible to forgive stolen property

is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

is the view;

that

which we say in our Mishna, that he must remove it from his possession and cannot forgive himself,

is Rabbi Akiva

is the view.

For it was taught:

It is stated concerning one who robs his fellow, denies it, and swears falsely: “He shall restore his guilt offering in its principal, and its fifth he shall add to it,”

“And if the man has no redeemer to restore the guilt offering”

to him, “the guilt offering that is restored to the Lord shall belong to the priest, besides the ram of atonement with which he shall make atonement for him” [Numbers 5:8]. And we explain below that from the fact that it is written “to the Lord, to the priest”—that the Name acquired it and gave it to the priest—we learn that if the robbed person died and has no redeemer who can receive the principal and the fifth, the robber must pay the principal and the fifth to a priest.

And we consider it:

Is there a person in Israel who has no redeemers?

For in the law of inheritance it is stated, “the closest relative comes first,” as far as Jacob our father, and there is no Jew who does not have some relative in the world.

Rather,

of necessity,

the verse is speaking of the stolen property of a convert,

for if he robbed a convert and swore to him that he had not robbed him, and the convert died, the robber shall pay the principal and the fifth to the priests.

It follows that if he robbed

a

convert and swore to him

that he had not robbed him,

and he heard that the convert had died

and wished to atone for his theft,

and he was bringing his money and his guilt offering to Jerusalem

to give them to the priests,

and he encountered

on the road

that convert

about whom a report had gone out that he had died,

and the convert set it upon him

the convert

as a loan—

he said to him, “Let the money be in your possession as a loan”—

and

afterward

the convert died,

the convert,

the other acquired

the robber, who had become a borrower,

what was in his possession,

as is the law concerning one who borrows from a convert and the convert dies, that he has no one to whom to return the debt and he acquires it as ownerless property,

the words of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

Rabbi Akiva says: He has no

that robber

remedy until he removes his stolen property from his possession,

and even though the money has already become a loan in his possession, he is obligated to remove it from his possession . Apparently, even if the robber has been forgiven for his theft, he must remove the stolen property from his possession .

And we explain:

with regard to the

view of

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, it makes no difference

whether it is a son who robbed his father, who is his heir and wishes to forgive

himself

for the stolen property that he inherited,

it makes no difference

whether it is a robbed person who wishes to forgive

others

who robbed him;

he can forgive,

and therefore the earlier Mishna, which teaches that he forgave him the principal but not the fifth, is in accordance with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili.

And with regard to the

view of

Rabbi Akiva,

who says that the robber of a convert has no remedy until he removes the stolen property from his possession,

it makes no difference

whether it is a robbed person who wishes to forgive

others

who robbed him,

and it makes no difference

whether it is a son who robbed his father and inherited his stolen property and wishes to forgive

himself; he cannot forgive .

And he must remove the stolen property from his possession. It follows that what is stated in our Mishna—that one who robs his father shall return it to his sons or to his brothers, and cannot forgive himself—is in accordance with Rabbi Akiva.

Text missing (the missing note may be note 4 on folio 102: “...he explained that there is no dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda regarding the law of change, whether it acquires”...)

And

we raise an objection:

To Rabbi Yosei

HaGelili, who says that if one robs a convert, and the convert sets the debt upon him as a loan and dies, the robber acquires what is in his possession, according to the law of one who borrows from a convert and the convert dies, that he acquires it as ownerless property—for it is implied from his words that if the convert did not set the stolen property upon him as a loan and died, the robber must remove the stolen property from his possession—why do we not say that he acquires the convert’s money as ownerless property and forgives himself? For you said that according to Rabbi Yosei it makes no difference whether it is for himself or for others: he can forgive.

And we answer: Do not infer from Rabbi Yosei’s words that it is only through setting it as a loan that the robber is exempt from removing the stolen property from his possession, for

the same law applies even if he did not set it

the convert upon the robber

as a loan.

If he dies, the robber acquires it as ownerless property, and he forgives himself and is exempt from removing the stolen property from his possession.

And this that it teaches

in the beraita

“he set it upon him as a loan,”

is stated

to inform you of the force of Rabbi Akiva, who

says

even if he set it upon him

the convert

as a loan,

it is still considered that the money in the robber’s possession is stolen money, and

he has no remedy until he removes the stolen property from his possession.

But according to Rabbi Yosei, even without setting it as a loan, if the convert dies, the robber can acquire the money and forgive himself for the theft.

Rav Sheshet challenged

Rabbi Yohanan:

If so,

as you said, that

according to the

view of

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, a person can forgive stolen property that is in his possession, why did the Mishna bring Rabbi Yosei’s view only concerning the fact that he can forgive others, as it says, “He forgave him the principal,” and Rabbi Yohanan establishes it in accordance with Rabbi Yosei?

Let it teach us

that he can forgive

himself,

such as a son who robbed his father and inherited him, who need not remove the stolen property from his possession, but rather forgives his theft to himself and thereby leaves the status of a robber,

and

it would follow that we learn

all the more so

that he can forgive

others

who robbed him.

And likewise,

according to the

view of

Rabbi Akiva,

who says that even if the robbed person forgave, the robber must remove the stolen property from his possession, why did the Mishna bring his view only concerning the fact that he cannot forgive himself, as it says, “One who robs his father shall pay his sons or his brothers,” and Rabbi Yohanan establishes it in accordance with Rabbi Akiva?

Let it teach us

that even if the robbed person forgave

others, he cannot forgive,

and they must remove the stolen property from their possession,

and

it would follow that we learn

all the more so

that if he robbed his father and he died, and the robber wishes to inherit him and forgive

himself, he cannot forgive.

Rather, Rav Sheshet said: This

which we said above, “He forgave him the principal,” implying that it is possible to forgive stolen property,

and this

which is stated in our Mishna, that one who robs his father cannot forgive himself,

is Rabbi Yosei HaGelili

is the view.

When Rabbi Yosei HaGelili said that he can forgive

the stolen property, he was speaking of a robbed person who wishes to forgive

others

who robbed him,

but

one who wishes to forgive

himself,

such as a son who robbed his father and he died and wishes to inherit him and forgive himself,

cannot forgive.

Unlike Rabbi Akiva, according to whom even the robbed person cannot forgive the robber, and the robber must remove the stolen property from his possession.

And we consider it:

But why

did Rabbi Yosei say that one who robs a convert, and the convert sets it upon him as a loan and dies,

the other acquires what is in his possession,

and need not remove the stolen property from his possession, implying that a person can forgive himself concerning stolen property that he acquired? And we explain: The reason that the robber acquired the convert’s money was

because he set it upon him

the convert

as a loan,

and thereby he forgave him his debt and the money in his possession became a loan; but otherwise, if the convert died without setting the stolen property upon the robber as a loan, the robber cannot acquire the stolen property as ownerless property and forgive himself.

Rava said: Both this and that are Rabbi Akiva,

for he says that the robber has no remedy until he removes the stolen property from his possession.

And as for what is difficult for you—that above we said, “He forgave him the principal,” and so on, implying that it is possible to forgive stolen property—

when Rabbi Akiva said that he cannot forgive,

it is specifically where the robber comes to forgive

himself,

when he acquired the stolen property, such as one who robs a convert and the convert dies, or a son who robs his father and the father dies ;

but

one who comes to forgive

others

who robbed him

can forgive.

Unlike Rabbi Yosei, according to whom the robber can forgive himself even without the robbed person setting the stolen property upon him as a loan. Therefore our Mishna cannot hold in accordance with him, for it says that one who robs his father pays his sons, implying that he cannot forgive himself.