Bava Kamma 101a — the Talmud in English

Dodi's monkey,

wiped the wool with the remnants of the dye that remained in the vat.

The Sages taught:

One who gives wood to a craftsman to make a chair from it, and he made a bench from it; or a bench, and he made a chair from it—

The carpenter acquired the wood for himself through the change he made in it without the owner's knowledge, and it therefore belongs to him, and

he gives him

the owner of the wood

the value of his wood.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

the Sages penalized the craftsman, so that his hand is on the lower side, and therefore:

If the enhancement is greater than the expenditure, he gives him the expenditure. And if the expenditure is greater than the enhancement, he gives him the enhancement.

And Rabbi Meir concedes: If one gave wood to a craftsman to make a beautiful chair from it, and he made an ugly chair from it,

that he did not acquire it through the change; and likewise, if he gave him wood to make for him

a beautiful bench, and he made a bench

ugly,

that he did not acquire it through the change, his hand being on the lower side, so that

if the enhancement is greater than the expenditure, he gives him the value of the expenditure, and if the expenditure is greater than the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement:

They raised a dilemma:

whether

there is enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, or there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool?

That is, the Gemara is uncertain whether “appearance is a substantial matter”; that is, whether the appearance of the dye on the wool, which was produced by the dye-substances when they were boiled in the vat together with the wool, “is a matter,” meaning that the dye upon the wool is considered a real and tangible thing. Or perhaps the appearance of the dye upon the wool “is not a matter.”

And the Gemara discusses:

What are the circumstances?

With regard to what is the uncertainty?

If we say that he robbed dye-substances

of dye,

and ground them,

and crushed them,

and soaked them,

and immersed them in the vat,

and dyed with them

his wool, and now the uncertainty is whether the robbed party can claim his right to the appearance of the dye upon the wool of the robber.

It is impossible to say so, for there is no room for uncertainty at all, and certainly the entire appearance of the dye belongs to the robber, because:

It follows automatically

that the robber acquired it

because he acquired them

the dye-substances already

through a change!

Therefore, the Gemara establishes the uncertainty as follows:

No, it is necessary [to discuss a case] where he robbed soaked dye-substances,

and the robber did not change anything in them,

and dyed with them

his wool.

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

What [is the law]?

Whether

there is enhancement of dye-substances upon wool,

and it follows

that he says to him

the robbed party to the robber:

Give me my dye-substances that you took!

Give me the dye-substances that you robbed from me, and they are now present in your possession, in the appearance of the dye upon the wool!

Or perhaps, there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool,

for “appearance is not a substantial matter,” and it follows

that he says to him

the robber to the robbed party:

You have nothing with me!

You have no claim against me.

They said,

they argued in the beit-midrash against the Gemara’s uncertainty:

But

even if,

even if we say that

there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool,

it is still difficult:

Can he say to him

the robber, the owner of the wool, to the robbed party, the owner of the dye-substances:

You have nothing with me!?

But

let him say to him,

the robbed party can claim and say:

Give me my dye-substances, for you caused me to lose them!

That is, even if we say that appearance is not a substantial matter, the robbed party can still demand from him the loss of the dye-substances that he robbed from him.

Therefore, the Gemara explains the uncertainty in another manner:

Rather,

the uncertainty is

in the other direction,

on the other side, and the uncertainty is as follows:

Whether

there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, and

therefore

he must pay him,

the robber must pay the robbed party for the loss of his dye-substances, since he caused them to be lost and cannot return them as they are.

Or perhaps there is enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, and he says to him

the robber to the robbed party:

Here they are placed before you; take them!

The dye-substances that I robbed from you [when they were soaked in the water of the vat] are considered still to be present now upon the wool, because appearance is a substantial matter, and here is yours before you; come and take it for yourself. Therefore I am not obligated to pay you for the loss of the dye-substances, since they still exist as they were, and you are able to take them as they are.

And the Gemara is astonished:

Take them—

with what?

By what means can the robbed party remove the dye from the wool and take it for himself?

And the Gemara answers:

He takes it off with soap,

he can remove the dye and take it by washing the wool in soapy water.

And the Gemara is astonished:

Soap,

the soapy water, only

passes through,

it removes the dye from the wool, but the obligation of

return

of the robbed property

it does not perform,

the robber has not fulfilled the return of the dye-substances that he robbed!

Rather,

the Gemara establishes the uncertainty in another manner:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case where he robbed wool and dye-substances belonging to one [person],

where he robbed from one person both the wool and the dye-substances,

and he dyed that wool

that he robbed

with those dye-substances

that he robbed from him.

And

now he

is returning the wool to him,

the robber wishes to return the dyed wool to its owner, and thereby fulfill the mitzva of returning the robbed property of the wool and the dye-substances.

And these are the sides of the uncertainty: Whether

there is enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, and

it follows that by returning the dyed wool he

is returning to him the dye-substances and the wool,

and thereby fulfills the mitzva of returning the robbed property of both.

Or perhaps, there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, and

it follows that only

he is returning wool to him,

but

he is not returning the dye-substances to him,

and he must pay for them.

They said,

they argued in the beit-midrash against this resolution: Why must the robber make a separate payment for the dye-substances? But

it follows automatically that he caused it to become more valuable for him in money.

For by dyeing the wool, the robber increased the monetary value of the wool, and it follows that by returning the wool he also returned to the robbed party the value of the dye-substances, since the wool is now worth more than it was at the time he robbed it, because of the dyeing that he performed!

And concerning this argument, the Gemara answers that there are two circumstances in which the enhancement of dyed wool does not cover the value of the robbery:

One circumstance:

It is necessary [to discuss a case] where the dye became cheap.

For now the price of the dyed wool has fallen from the value it had been worth at the time of the robbery. Therefore, the robbed party can claim that, had there been no robbery, he could now have sold the dye-substances separately and received their full price, since the price of the dye-substances had not fallen. Or he could have dyed a garment with them, and not wool, and would have received their full value.

And if you wish, say: [it is a case] where he dyed a monkey with them.

That is, together with the dye-substances he robbed a monkey, and not wool, and dyed the monkey with them; and such dyeing has no monetary value.

Ravina said:

the Gemara’s uncertainty does not concern robbery, but rather,

here, with what are we dealing

with two people

, for the wool belonged to one,

where the wool belonged to one person,

and the dye-substances belonged to one,

they belonged to another person, and neither robbed anything from the other.

And there came

a

monkey, and it dyed that wool

of the one

with those dye-substances

of the other.

And the Gemara’s uncertainty is: Whether

there is enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, so that he says to him

the owner of the dye-substances to the owner of the wool:

Give me my dye-substances, for they are in your possession.

For they are tangibly present upon your wool.

Or perhaps there is no enhancement of dye-substances upon the wool, and he says to him

the owner of the wool

you have nothing with me

with me

at all!

And now the Gemara comes to resolve the uncertainty:

Come and hear

a proof from the Mishna in tractate Orla [3:1], as we learned:

A garment that one dyed with

a dye that emerges from

the peels of

a fruit that is

orla shall be burned!

That is, its law is that it must be burned, since the fruit of orla [within three years of the tree’s planting] is forbidden for benefit.

Apparently, appearance

of the dye

is a substantial matter.

For if the appearance of the dye had no substance, the dyed garment would not have been forbidden for benefit.

Rava said:

There is no proof from this Mishna, for there is a special novelty in the prohibition of benefit from orla, that even

benefit visible to the eyes,

such as dye or light,

the Torah prohibited,

even though they have no substance [for there is no substance at all in light].

For it was taught:

The verse says concerning the fruits of orla [Leviticus 19]:

“Orla—

it shall not be eaten.”

I have only [learned] the prohibition of eating. From where [do I learn] that one may not benefit from it, nor dye

with it

, nor light a lamp with it? The verse states: “You shall regard its foreskin as forbidden, its fruit; orla it shall not be eaten,” to include them all.

And the Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that which was taught concerning the prohibition of commerce in the produce of the seventh year:

A garment that one dyed

with a craftsman’s dye

with the peels of the seventh year

in order to receive payment for his dyeing, or in order to gain a commercial profit,

shall be burned!

And it is proven that appearance is a substantial matter.

And the Gemara rejects the proof:

There, it is different,

with regard to the prohibition of commerce in the produce of the seventh year,

for the verse says “it shall be,” in its state it shall remain.

The verse comes to say that one must not impair at all the sanctity of the seventh year in the produce of the seventh year, in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, even in the form of the appearance of dye, one may not engage in commerce with seventh-year produce, despite the fact that appearance is not a substantial matter.