Bava Kamma 101a (קא.) — the Talmud in English

Kafra Dodi,

he wiped the wool with the remnants of the dye that remained in the vat.

The Sages taught: If one gives wood to a carpenter to make a chair from it, and he made a bench; or a bench, and he made a chair—

Rabbi Meir says:

The carpenter acquired it for himself through the change that he made in the wood without the owner's knowledge, and it is therefore his, and

he gives him

the carpenter gives the owner of the wood

the value of his wood.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

The Sages fined the carpenter, so that his hand is on the lower side; therefore:

If the enhancement is greater than the expenditure, he gives him the expenditure. And if the expenditure is greater than the enhancement, he gives him the enhancement.

And Rabbi Meir concedes that if one gave wood to a carpenter to make an attractive chair from it, and he made an ugly chair,

he did not acquire it through the change; and likewise, if one gave him wood to make an attractive

bench, and he made a bench

that was ugly,

he did not acquire it through the change, and his hand is on the lower side, for

if the enhancement is greater than the expenditure, he gives him the value of the expenditure, and if the expenditure is greater than the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement.

They raised a dilemma before them:

Does

the dye have an enhancement upon the wool, or does the dye not have an enhancement upon the wool?

That is, the Gemara is uncertain whether “appearance is significant”—meaning, whether the appearance of the dye on the wool, produced by the dyeing substances when they were boiled in the vat together with the wool, is something tangible, so that the dye on the wool is considered a real, concrete substance; or perhaps the appearance of the dye on the wool “is not significant.”

The Gemara analyzes the matter:

What are the circumstances?

With regard to what is the dilemma?

If you say that he robbed dye substances

of a type used for dyeing,

and ground them,

and crushed them,

and soaked them,

and immersed them in the vat,

and dyed with them

his wool, and the dilemma now is whether the robbery victim can claim his right to the appearance of the dye on the robber's wool—

This cannot be the case, because there is no room for a dilemma at all, and certainly the entire appearance of the dye belongs to the robber, because:

It follows automatically

that the robber acquired it

because he acquired

the dye substances already

through a change!

Therefore, the Gemara establishes the dilemma as follows:

No, it is necessary to state the case of one who robbed soaked dye substances,

and the robber did not alter them in any way, and

dyed with them

his wool.

The sides of the dilemma are:

What?

Is it the case that

the dye has an enhancement upon the wool,

and it follows

that he says to him

the robbery victim says to the robber:

Give me my dye substances that you took!

Give me the substances that you robbed from me, which are now in your possession in the form of the appearance of the dye on the wool!

Or perhaps the dye does not have an enhancement upon the wool,

because “appearance is not significant,” and it follows

that he says to him

the robber says to the robbery victim:

You have nothing with me!

You have no claim against me.

They said

in the study hall in response to the Gemara's dilemma:

But

if

even if we say that

the dye does not have an enhancement upon the wool,

it is still difficult:

Can he say to him

the robber, the owner of the wool, say to the robbery victim, the owner of the dye substances:

You have nothing with me!?

But

let him say to him,

the robbery victim can claim and say:

Give me my dye substances, which you caused me to lose!

That is, even if we say that appearance is not significant, the robbery victim can still demand compensation from him for the loss of the substances that he robbed from him.

Therefore, the Gemara explains the dilemma in a different manner:

Rather,

the dilemma is

in the other direction,

as follows:

Is it the case that

the dye does not have an enhancement upon the wool, and

therefore

he must pay him,

the robber must pay the robbery victim for the loss of his dye substances, since he caused them to be lost and cannot return them in their original form?

Or perhaps the dye does have an enhancement upon the wool, and he says to him

the robber says to the robbery victim:

Here they are before you; take them!

The substances that I robbed from you [when they were soaking in the water of the vat] are considered still to be present now upon the wool, since appearance is significant; therefore, yours is before you. Come and take them for yourself. Accordingly, I am not required to pay you for the loss of the substances, since they still exist as they were, and you are able to take them in their present form.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Take them—

with what?

By what means can the robbery victim remove the dye from the wool and take it for himself?

The Gemara answers:

He can take it with detergent,

as he can remove the dye and take it by washing the wool in soapy water.

The Gemara raises an objection:

Detergent,

the soapy water, only

passes through,

as it removes the dye from the wool, but the obligation of

returning

the robbed item

it does not fulfill,

as the robber has not fulfilled his obligation to return the dye substances that he robbed!

Rather,

the Gemara establishes the dilemma in a different manner:

Here, with what are we dealing? With a case in which he robbed wool and dye substances belonging to one person,

as he robbed from one person both the wool and the substances used for dyeing,

and dyed that wool

that he robbed

with those dye substances

that he robbed from him.

And

now he

is coming to return the wool to him,

as the robber wishes to return the dyed wool to its owner and thereby fulfill the mitzva of returning both the robbed wool and the dye substances.

The sides of the dilemma are as follows: Is it the case that

the dye has an enhancement upon the wool, and

it follows that by returning the dyed wool he

is returning the dye substances and the wool to him,

and thereby fulfills the mitzva of returning both robbed items?

Or perhaps the dye does not have an enhancement upon the wool, and

it follows that only

he is returning the wool to him,

but

he is not returning the dye substances to him,

and he must pay for them.

They said

in the study hall in response to this resolution: Why must the robber make a separate payment for the dye substances? After all,

it follows automatically that he increased its value for him in monetary terms.

By dyeing the wool, the robber increased the wool's monetary value, and it follows that when he returns the wool, he has also returned the value of the dye substances to the robbery victim, since the wool is now worth more than it was when he robbed it, as a result of the dyeing!

In response to this claim, the Gemara explains that there are two circumstances in which the enhancement of dyed wool does not cover the value of the robbery:

One circumstance is:

No, it is necessary to state a case in which the dye became cheaper.

The price of dyed wool has now fallen below the value it had at the time of the robbery. Therefore, the robbery victim can claim that, had he not been robbed, he could now have sold the dye substances separately and received their full price, since the price of the dye substances had not fallen. Alternatively, he could have dyed a garment with them rather than wool and received their full value.

And if you wish, say: The case is one in which he dyed a monkey with them.

That is, together with the dye substances he robbed a monkey rather than wool, and dyed the monkey with them; such dyeing has no monetary value.

Ravina said:

The Gemara's dilemma does not concern robbery. Rather,

here, with what are we dealing

with two people,

, such as where the wool belongs to one,

the wool belonged to one person,

and the dye substances belong to one,

the dye substances belonged to another person, and neither robbed anything from the other.

And a

monkey came

and dyed that wool

belonging to the first person

with those dye substances

belonging to the second.

The Gemara's dilemma is: Is it the case that

the dye has an enhancement upon the wool, for he says to him

the owner of the dye substances says to the owner of the wool:

Give me my dye substances, for they are in your possession.

For they are tangibly present upon your wool.

Or perhaps the dye does not have an enhancement upon the wool, and he says to him

the owner of the wool says

you have nothing with me

in my possession,

at all!

The Gemara now seeks to resolve the dilemma:

Come and hear

a proof from the Mishna in tractate Orla [3:1], as we learned:

A garment that one dyed with

a dye extracted from

the peels

of a fruit that is

orla must be burned!

That is, it must be burned, since fruit of orla [during the first three years after the tree's planting] is prohibited for benefit.

Apparently, the appearance

of the dye

is significant.

For if the appearance of the dye had no substance, the dyed garment would not be prohibited for benefit.

Rava said:

There is no proof from this Mishna, because there is a special novel aspect to the prohibition of benefit from orla: even

benefit that is visible to the eyes,

such as dye or light,

the Torah prohibited,

even though they have no substance [as light has no substance].

As it was taught:

The verse says concerning fruit of orla [Leviticus 19]:

“Orla—

it shall not be eaten.”

I have derived only the prohibition against eating. From where do I derive that one may not benefit from it, nor dye

with it

, nor kindle a lamp with it? The verse states: “And you shall treat its orla as orla; its fruit, orla—it shall not be eaten,” to include them all.

The Gemara brings another proof:

Come and hear

from that which was taught concerning the prohibition against engaging in commerce with produce of the Sabbatical year:

A garment that one dyed

with a professional dye

using peels of Sabbatical-year produce

in order to receive payment for the dyeing or to earn a commercial profit,

must be burned!

And it is thus proven that the appearance is significant.

The Gemara rejects the proof:

That case is different,

with regard to the prohibition against engaging in commerce with produce of the Sabbatical year,

as the verse says: “It shall be,” retaining its status as it is.

The verse comes to teach that one may not impair the sanctity of the Sabbatical year in produce of the Sabbatical year in any manner whatsoever. Therefore, even when it is merely the appearance of dye, one may not engage in commerce with Sabbatical-year produce, despite the fact that appearance is not significant.