Bava Batra 94b — the Talmud in English

And we raised it:

If so,

that it is only because of stringency that he must remove it,

say the latter clause of the Mishna in Kilayim:

of the Mishna in tractate Kilayim:

Rabbi Yosei says: He must sort it out,

he must sort out from the mixture all the quarter-kav of the other species.

If you say that

a quarter-kav in kilayim

is equivalent to more than a quarter-kav of refuse

in a sale,

it is comparable,

and by law he must remove it, then it is possible to say that

in this they disagree,

the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei—

The first tanna holds: We do not penalize what is permitted on account of what is forbidden,

for we do not penalize him to remove also the quarter-kav that is permitted, on account of the more-than-a-quarter-kav that is forbidden.

And Rabbi Yosei holds: We do penalize

what is permitted on account of what is forbidden, for we penalize him to remove also the quarter-kav although it is permitted.

But if you say that

a quarter-kav in kilayim

is equivalent to a quarter-kav

of refuse

it is comparable,

and by law he need not remove it, then

why

did Rabbi Yosei say that he

must sort it out?

Since it is only a stringency, why is it necessary to add another stringency, that he remove everything?

And we answer:

There, this is the reason for Rabbi Yosei: because it appears as though he is maintaining kilayim.

Since he has already begun removing from the other species, if he leaves some of it and sows it together with the second species, this appears as though he intentionally wishes to sow kilayim.

Come and hear

from that which we learned in Bava Metzia [37a]:

Two who deposited with

one

person, this

deposited with him

a maneh, and this

deposited with him

two hundred.

And when they came to take their deposits:

This one says:

The

two hundred

zuz are

mine,

for I deposited them.

And this one says:

The

two hundred

zuz are

mine,

for I deposited them.

The depositary

gives this one a maneh and that one a maneh, and the remainder shall be left until Elijah comes,

and says who is the owner of the two hundred zuz.

Thus, they do not penalize the liar among them so that he should lose also the maneh. And why here do they penalize the seller so that he should pay also for the quarter-kav?

And we answer:

Can it be compared!?

What is the comparison!? Behold, the matters are not at all similar, for

there, certainly

there is

a maneh for this one and a maneh for that one

with the depositary, and with regard to that maneh the liar did not lie, so why should we penalize him for it? But

here,

in the mixture of refuse with the grain,

who can say that he did not mix all of it?

For there is evidence indicating that he mixed refuse intentionally, since there is more than a quarter-kav; and if so, perhaps he mixed all the refuse, and by law he should be penalized for everything.

Come and hear from the latter clause

of the Mishna in Bava Metzia:

Rabbi Yosei said: If so,

that you give each one a maneh,

what has the liar lost?

For he has taken everything that he deposited, and he will never admit the truth.

Rather, everything shall be left until Elijah comes.

For then the liar will lose the maneh that he has, and in the end he will admit.

Here, then, is proof for the view of those who say that they penalize also the quarter-kav, just as here they penalize the liar with regard to the maneh.

And we reject this:

Can it be compared!? There, certainly there is a liar.

One of them is certainly a liar and deserves to be penalized.

Here, who can say that he mixed it!?

Perhaps the seller did not mix any refuse at all, and therefore, because of the uncertainty, we do not penalize him.

Come and hear

from that which is taught in tractate Bava Metzia [72b]:

A document in which there is interest,

in which it is written: So-and-so borrowed a maneh from so-and-so for two hundred,

we penalize him,

the lender,

and he may collect neither the principal nor the interest, the words of Rabbi Meir.

Here, they penalize even what is permitted because of what is forbidden, a proof for the view of those who hold that they penalize the seller so that he pays also for the quarter-kav.

And we reject this:

Can it be compared!? There, from the time of writing he made for him a valuation.

Already from the time of writing the document, the lender imposed usury upon the borrower, and thereby transgressed the prohibition of “You shall not place interest upon him”; therefore he should be penalized. But

here, who can say that he mixed it?

And one may not penalize the seller on the basis of uncertainty.

Come and hear from the latter clause

of that same beraita:

And the Sages say: He collects the principal, but he does not collect the interest.

Here it is the opposite: they do not penalize what is permitted on account of what is forbidden. If so, this is a difficulty for the one who says that they penalize the seller so that he pays also for the quarter-kav?

And we answer:

Can it be compared!? There, certainly the principal is permitted.

With regard to the principal, the lender transgressed no prohibition, and therefore it is not fitting to penalize him so that he should lose also the principal. But

here, who can say that he did not mix all of it?

Perhaps he acted culpably with regard to all the refuse that he mixed intentionally; therefore it is fitting to penalize him for everything.

Come and hear:

We learned below [103b]: If one sells a field to his fellow and says to him at the time of the sale in these words, “A beit kor of earth [a field suitable for sowing a kor, namely thirty se'a of grain] I sell to you, whether it is lacking or exceeding,” meaning with an inexact measure, then even if there was there more land or less land by an amount suitable for sowing a quarter-kav in relation to an area suitable for sowing a se'a—namely, thirty quarter-kav in relation to a beit kor [one twenty-fourth]—the sale is established, and the buyer need not return or deduct from the payment. And if there was more than the measure of a quarter-kav per se'a, the buyer or seller returns the difference.

For Ravin bar Rav Naḥman taught: It is not only the excess

over a quarter-kav per se'a

that he returns, but all the quarter-kav measures in their entirety,

he returns all thirty quarter-kav of a beit kor.

Evidently, wherever he must return

in a place where he must return,

he returns all of it.

He returns everything.

And this is proof for Rav Huna, who said: If refuse amounting to more than a quarter-kav is found, the seller pays for everything.