Bava Batra 76b (עו:) — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: He did not acquire

until he pulls it

into his domain,

or until he rents its place

and acquires it by means of kinyan hatzer, the acquisition effected through one’s domain. Even through “renting,” the place is considered his domain, and a person’s domain acquires for him whatever is inside it.

It follows that according to Rabbi, a ship is acquired through delivery. But how did we establish the aforementioned beraita as expressing Rabbi’s view? According to the Sages above, a ship is acquired through pulling and not through delivery!?

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

Here,

where Rabbi said that a ship is acquired through delivery, this is

in the public domain.

Here,

where the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Natan—that is, Rabbi—said that a ship is acquired through pulling, this is

in a simta.

The reason for the distinction between the public domain and a simta is that in a simta, where the ship can be acquired through pulling, it is not customary to acquire it through delivery. But in the public domain, where it cannot be acquired through pulling, as will be explained below, one acquires the ship through delivery.

And the Gemara asks:

On what basis did you establish,

in what way did you establish and interpret,

this

beraita,

the latter

[the last one]—

as referring to the public domain?

If so, this is difficult:

Consider the latter clause,

of the beraita:

And the Sages say: He did not acquire it until he pulls it,

or until he rents its place.

And if

it is speaking

in the public domain,

the difficulty is:

From whom did he rent it!?

It is a domain belonging to the public; how could he have the ability to rent the public domain for himself, so that he could acquire the ship through kinyan hatzer?

Furthermore,

if the beraita is speaking of the public domain, this is difficult: How could the Sages have said that he does not acquire it until he pulls it? Is

pulling in the public domain really

[indeed]

effective!?

But Abaye and Rava both said

[they both said] that there are three principles concerning where the various forms of acquisition are effective with movable property:

a.

Delivery acquires in the public domain, and

also

in a courtyard belonging to neither of them,

the seller and the purchaser, but belonging to a third person.

But in the seller’s courtyard, delivery is not effective, since a person’s courtyard acquires for him, and it is impossible for others to acquire an object from him in his courtyard.

Likewise, in a simta delivery does not acquire, since pulling is effective there, and one does not acquire through an inferior form of acquisition when it is possible to acquire through a more significant one.

b.

Pulling acquires in a simta and

also

in a courtyard belonging to both of them.

But pulling is not effective in the seller’s courtyard.

Likewise, in another person’s courtyard, and even in the public domain, pulling does not acquire, because pulling is normally performed in a domain in which the purchaser has a share.

c.

And lifting acquires everywhere,

even in a domain designated exclusively for the seller.

And since it is impossible to rent the public domain, and pulling does not acquire in the public domain, how can we establish the beraita as referring to the public domain!?

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “until he pulls it,” which

the tanna

also said, and what is the meaning of “until he rents its place,” which

the tanna said? He does not pull it in the public domain, nor does he rent the public domain.

Rather,

this is what

the tanna of the beraita

said: He did not acquire the ship

until he pulls it from the public domain

into a simta, where it is standing.

to a simta.

And if

the ship is in

the owners’ domain,

the seller’s,

it

is located there,

the purchaser does not acquire it

either through delivery or through pulling

until he rents its place,

and his courtyard acquires it for him.

And we raise an objection:

Shall we say

[that]

Abaye and Rava,

who say that delivery acquires in the public domain,

say

that they

follow

the

opinion of Rabbi,

who said that a ship standing in the public domain is acquired through delivery?

But according to the Sages, delivery is not effective in the public domain. This is difficult: How could Abaye and Rava set aside the view of the majority of the Sages and teach their statement in accordance with Rabbi’s view!?

He said:

he answered,

Rav Ashi:

The statements of Abaye and Rava do not contradict the statement of the Sages.

For

if he said to him

the seller said to the buyer:

Go

and

take possession of

the ship

and acquire

it,

so too here,

according to everyone—both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi—delivery is effective for acquiring the ship in the public domain, in accordance with the statements of Abaye and Rava.

But

here,

where Rabbi and the Rabbis disagree,

with what case are we dealing?

It is, for example,

where he said to him

the seller:

Go, pull

the ship

and acquire it.

One—

the Sages—

holds: He is particular:

the seller intends that the buyer acquire it only through pulling, as he told him, and does not agree that the buyer should acquire it through delivery, since he wants to retain the possibility of retracting until the buyer pulls it into his own domain.

And the other,

Rabbi,

holds:

he is not particular about this, and what the seller said to him, “Go, pull,”

is merely an indication of the manner:

if you wish to bring the ship into your domain, you may take it immediately, without delay, because you acquired it through delivery of the ship, and it is already yours. The sugya is explained here according to the words of the Rashbam; in the notes, the sugya will be explained according to the method of the Tosafot and the other Rishonim.

Rav Pappa said: In the case of one who sells a document to another

a creditor’s document to his fellow,

he must write him

another document, in order to transfer ownership of the debt.

And in the bill of sale it should be written:

Acquire

for

yourself

the promissory note,

and all the liens contained in it,

Rav Ashi said: I stated this teaching before Rav Kahana, I stated this teaching of Rav Pappa before Rav Kahana,

Rav Ashi said: I stated this teaching before Rav Kahana

I stated this teaching of Rav Pappa before Rav Kahana,

and I said to him

I challenged him:

The reason

the acquisition of the document is because

he writes for him this way

a bill of sale for the promissory note.

But

if he delivered the promissory note to him but

did not write for him this way, he does not acquire it

through delivery of the document alone.

And one should object: Is it possible to say that the seller did not intend to sell the debt at all, but intended only to sell the paper of the document!?

And is it

in order

for him to cover the mouth of his flask

the buyer

needs

the paper of the document!? Surely it is obvious that the buyer acquired it only in order to collect the debt written in it, and if so, it should suffice that the seller delivered the promissory note to the buyer, in accordance with Rabbi, and there is no need for a bill of sale!?

He said,

he replied,

to me

Rav Kahana:

No,

indeed so,

to cover it and to cover it:

if the seller does not write him another document in which it is written, “Acquire it for yourself, and all its liens,” we say that there is no proof that his intention was to sell the debt itself, and he acquires only the paper, in order to wrap it around his flask.