Bava Batra 76b — the Talmud in English

And the Sages say: He did not acquire it

the ship

until he pulls it

into his domain,

or until he rents its place

of the ship, and acquires it by means of “acquisition through a courtyard.” And even through “renting,” the place is considered his domain, and a person’s domain acquires for him whatever is inside it.

Rashbam wrote: “Until he pulls it into the domain designated for him”—this implies into his courtyard. Rashash raised an objection to him: If so, he should acquire the ship by means of a courtyard. [And one must discuss, according to those who maintain (see below, note 11) that from the public domain to a simta it suffices that he pulls part of the object into the simta, even though its main part is still in the public domain, whether in such a case acquisition through a courtyard applies, since its main part is not in his courtyard; see Maharit Algazi, Bekhorot, chapter 2, section 17, in Tosafot of Rabbi Asher, Gittin 78b, s.v. “But this,” and there in the “Chazon Ish.”] And below they said explicitly: “Until he pulls it from the public domain to a simta”—which is also considered “his domain” of the purchaser, as Rashbam wrote there. And it implies that according to Rabbi a ship is acquired through delivery. But how did we establish the earlier beraita as according to Rabbi? For according to the Sages above, a ship is acquired through pulling and not through delivery!?

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

Here,

what Rabbi said, that a ship is acquired through delivery, is

in the public domain.

Here,

what the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Natan—that is, Rabbi—said, that a ship is acquired through pulling, is

in a simta.

And the reason for the distinction between the public domain and a simta is that in a simta, where the ship can be acquired through pulling, there is no way to acquire it through delivery. But in the public domain, where acquisition through pulling is impossible, as below, he acquires the ship through delivery.

And the Gemara asks:

With what did you establish,

what did you establish and explain

this

beraita

the later one [

the last one]—

in the public domain.

If so, there is cause for astonishment:

Say its conclusion,

the conclusion of the beraita:

And the Sages say: He did not acquire it until he pulls it,

or until he rents its place.

And if

it is speaking

in the public domain,

you will have a difficulty:

From whom did he rent!?

For it is the domain of the public, and how is it possible for him to rent the public domain for himself, so that he could acquire the ship through “acquisition through a courtyard”!?

Furthermore,

and additionally, if the beraita is speaking in the public domain, you will have a difficulty: How did the Sages say that he did not acquire it until he pulls it? Is

pulling in the public domain

even

effective!?

But Abaye and Rava both said

[they both said] that there are three rules concerning where acquisitions are effective with movable property:

a.

Delivery acquires in the public domain, and

also

in a courtyard that belongs to neither of them,

the seller and the purchaser, but belongs to a third person.

But in the seller’s courtyard, delivery is not effective, since a person’s courtyard acquires for him, and it is impossible for others to acquire from him in it.

Likewise, in a simta delivery does not acquire, since pulling is effective there, and one does not acquire through an inferior acquisition when it is possible to acquire through a more important acquisition.

b.

Pulling acquires in a simta, and

also

in a courtyard that belongs to both of them.

But in the seller’s courtyard, pulling is not effective.

Likewise, in another person’s courtyard, and even in the public domain, pulling does not acquire, because the manner of pulling is in a domain in which the purchaser has a share.

c.

And lifting acquires everywhere,

even in a domain designated exclusively for the seller.

And since it is impossible to rent the public domain, and pulling does not acquire in the public domain, how is it possible to establish the beraita in the public domain!?

And we answer:

What is the meaning of “until he pulls it,” which

the tanna

said, and what is the meaning of “until he rents its place,” which

the tanna said? He does not pull it in the public domain, and he does not rent the public domain.

Rather,

this is what

the tanna of the beraita

said: He did not acquire the ship

that is standing

until he pulls it from the public domain

to a simta.

And if

the ship is in the

owners’ domain,

the seller’s,

it

is found there,

he did not acquire it

the purchaser, neither through delivery nor through pulling,

until he rents its place,

and his courtyard acquires it for him.

And we raise an objection:

Shall we say

that

Abaye and Rava,

who say that delivery acquires in the public domain,

who said,

maintain

in accordance with

the words of

Rabbi,

who said that a ship standing in the public domain is acquired through delivery?

But according to the Sages, delivery is not effective in the public domain, and you will have a difficulty: How did Abaye and Rava set aside the words of the numerous Sages and teach their ruling in accordance with Rabbi!?

He said,

he answered,

Rav Ashi:

the words of Abaye and Rava do not contradict the words of the Sages.

For

if he said to him

the purchaser:

Go,

and

take possession

of the boat

and acquire it

—

so too here,

according to everyone, both according to the Sages and according to Rabbi, delivery is effective for acquiring the boat in the public domain, as Abaye and Rava said.

And

here,

where Rabbi and the Rabbis disagree,

with what are we dealing?

With a case

where he said to him,

the purchaser:

Go, pull

the boat

and acquire it.

The master [the Sages]

holds: It is insistence—

the intention of the purchaser is to acquire only through pulling, as he said to him, and he does not agree that the purchaser should acquire through delivery, since he wants to retain the possibility of retracting until the purchaser pulls it into his possession.

And

the master,

Rabbi,

holds:

he is not particular about the matter, and what the purchaser said to him, “Go, pull,”

is an indication of the manner for him:

if you wish to bring the boat into your possession, you may take it immediately without delay, because through delivery of the boat you acquired it, and it is yours. The sugya is explained here according to the words of Rashbam, and in the notes the sugya will be explained according to the method of Tosafot and the other early authorities.

Rav Pappa said: One who sells a promissory note to his fellow,

one who sells a debt owed by a third party to his fellow,

must write for him

another document, in order to acquire the debt.

And in the document of sale it shall be written:

Acquire

for yourself

it,

the promissory note,

and all the liens that are in it,

Rav Ashi said: I stated this teaching before Rav Kahana, I stated this teaching of Rav Pappa before Rav Kahana,

and I said to him,

I raised an objection before him:

The reason

the acquisition of the document is because

he wrote for him thus,

a document of sale for the promissory note.

But,

if he delivered the promissory note to him, and

did not write for him thus, he does not acquire,

through delivery of the document alone.

And one should object: Is it possible to say that the seller did not intend at all to sell the debt, but intended to sell the paper of the document!? And is it in order to cover a flask with it that he,

through delivery of the document alone.

the purchaser,

needs

the paper of the document!? Surely it is certainly logical that the purchaser acquired it only in order to collect the debt written in it,

and if so, it is sufficient that the seller delivered the promissory note to the purchaser, according to Rabbi, and there is no need for a document of sale!?

the buyer

He said,

he replied, to me, Rav Kahana:

No,

indeed so,

for the flask, and for the flask,

if the seller does not write for him another document in which it is written, “Acquire for yourself it and all its liens,” we say that there is no proof here that his intention was to sell the debt itself,

and he acquires only the paper in order to wrap his flask with it.

indeed so:

to cover a jug, and let him cover it.

If the seller does not write for him another document containing the words, “Acquire for yourself this document and all its liens,” we say that there is no proof that his intention was to sell the debt itself, and the buyer acquires only the paper, in order to wrap it around his jug.