Bava Batra 56a — the Talmud in English

If

in one domain

they are—that is, if he carried out the second half of a dried fig to the same public domain to which he carried out the first—then he is

liable.

But in one unwittingness,

in two domains,

such as where he carried out half a dried fig to one public domain, and half a dried fig to the public domain separated from the first public domain—and he explains and proceeds to explain by what it is separated—then he is

exempt,

because the domains divide [the acts].

And concerning “two domains” separated by a boundary and a hatzav, Rabbi Yohanan and Rava above disagreed as to whether they are considered two domains. And Rabbah said

to explain what the separation is that makes two domains:

There are four domains with regard to carrying out on Shabbat:

A. A public domain; B. a private domain, which is a place ten [handbreadths] high or deep and four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide, or which is surrounded by partitions ten [handbreadths] high; C. a karmelit, such as a valley that is not surrounded by partitions but is not a place of public passage; and likewise a place higher than three handbreadths [but less than ten handbreadths] and four by four [handbreadths] wide, and more; D. a “place of exemption,” which is a place three handbreadths or more high or deep, but does not have a width of four [handbreadths].

One who carries out from a private domain to a public domain, or brings in from it to a private domain, is liable for a sin-offering if he did so unwittingly. But one who carries out from a private or public domain to a karmelit, or from a karmelit to them, is not liable for a sin-offering, but the Sages prohibited it. Whereas one who carries out from a place of exemption, or brings into it from any of the aforementioned domains, incurs neither a prohibition from Torah law nor a prohibition from rabbinic enactment.

And there must be liability for a sin-offering between them,

that is: the separation of these public domains from one another occurs only when there is another domain between them, such that if one brings in from the public domain to it, he is liable for a sin-offering; namely, a private domain separates between the two public domains—

But

if a

karmelit

separates between them,

for one who brings into it from the public domain is not liable for a sin-offering, since the prohibition against carrying out from it and into it is only rabbinic—

it does not

constitute a separation according to Rabbi Yosei.

And Abaye said:

Even

when there is a domain that is a

karmelit

separating between two public domains, it constitutes a separation according to Rabbi Yosei;

but a plank

[a piece of wood or a pillar] that is not four handbreadths by four handbreadths wide—

does not

constitute a separation according to Rabbi Yosei!

Whereas Rava said: Even a plank constitutes a separation. And also what Rava said above, that the boundary and the hatzav separate with regard to Shabbat, follows his method, according to which even a plank separates.

And Rava proceeded—

who holds that a boundary, a hatzav, and a plank separate—

according to his reasoning

[Rava followed his method]!

For Rava said: A Shabbat domain according to Rabbi Yosei

is considered like the domain of bills of divorce,

that is: Just as with a bill of divorce, if he transferred his courtyard to her so that she would receive her bill of divorce in it and thereby become divorced, and he gave her bill of divorce upon a plank in the courtyard, she is not divorced, because the plank is separate from the courtyard that he transferred to her and is not nullified to it, and they are like two places;

so too with regard to Shabbat, the plank between the two domains is not nullified with regard to the public domain, and it is considered like another place, and it separates between the two domains.

The Gemara is uncertain according to Rabbi Yohanan, who said [at the beginning of the matter above, 55a]: The boundary and the hatzav separate with regard to the property of a convert, so that one does not acquire by taking possession of his fellow’s property until he takes possession of both of them:

If

there is neither—

in a field among the property of a convert—

neither a boundary nor a hatzav, what [is the law]?

That is, a field that is not marked by its boundaries: how much of it does one acquire with one strike of a pickaxe, according to Rabbi Yohanan?

Rabbi Marinus explained in his name

of Rabbi Yohanan: If he struck with a pickaxe in a field, he acquired

all

the field

that is called by his name,

that is, any field that is called one field, such that one does not say, “They are so-and-so’s fields,” but rather, “It is so-and-so’s field.” What are the circumstances? He said,

he explained,

Rav Pappa:

All

that they call it “

the irrigation well of so-and-so,”

the entire field that the convert irrigated from one well, he acquires all of it with one strike of a pickaxe.

Rav Aha bar Avya sat before Rav Asi, and sat and said in the name of Rav Asi bar Hanina [Rav Aha bar Avya sat before Rav Asi and said in the name of Rav Asi bar Hanina]: Hatzova [it is the hatzav] separates in the property of a convert, and if one took possession on one side of it, he did not acquire on its other side. And we explain: What is hatzova, that is, what thing is it, and what importance does it have to be considered like a boundary? Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: It is a grass or tree with which Joshua marked out [he defined the boundaries] the Land for Israel, that is: He planted the hatzav between the portion of each tribe and the portion of each individual within the tribe. He planted the hatzav there and marked out the boundary with it because it stands on the boundary and draws nourishment neither from this side nor from that side, for its roots do not spread to the sides.

said,

explaining:

All

that people call “

the field watered from so-and-so’s well.”

The entire field that the convert watered from one well is acquired with a single hoe-stroke.

And

further

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

Joshua counted nothing except

the

towns that stand

on the boundaries

alone.

That is, those towns—in the portion of each tribe—that Joshua mentioned in his book [“Joshua”],

why did he count specifically these towns?! Because these towns stood on the boundary of the portion of those tribes, and in order to teach how far the portion of each tribe extended.

It is a plant or tree

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

Everything that the

Omnipresent showed Moses

at the time of his death, as it is said [Deuteronomy 34:1]: “And Moses went up from the plains of Moab to Mount Nebo, the top of the summit, which is before Jericho, and the Lord showed him the entire land, Gilead as far as Dan. And all of Naphtali, and the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah as far as the western sea. And the Negev and the plain, the valley of Jericho, the city of palms, as far as Zoar. And the Lord said to him: This is the land that I swore to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, saying, ‘To your offspring I shall give it’; I have shown it to you with your eyes, but there you shall not cross. And Moses died there...”—this land alone is

liable

for

tithe.

Joshua counted only

the

towns situated

on the borders,

and no others.

That is, those towns—in the portion of each tribe—that Joshua mentioned in his book [“Joshua”]. Why did he specifically count those towns? Because those towns stood on the boundaries of the portions of those tribes, and this was intended to teach how far the portion of each tribe extended.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel:

Everything that the

Almighty showed Moses

at the time of his death, as it is stated [Deuteronomy 34:1–4]: “Moses went up from the plains of Moab to Mount Nebo, to the summit of the peak that faces Jericho, and the Lord showed him the entire land: the Gilead as far as Dan; and all of Naphtali, and the land of Ephraim and Manasseh, and all the land of Judah as far as the western sea; and the Negev and the plain, the valley of Jericho, the city of palms, as far as Zoar. And the Lord said to him: This is the land that I swore to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, saying, ‘To your descendants I shall give it.’ I have shown it to you with your eyes, but you shall not cross over there. And Moses died there…” This land alone is

liable

to be subject

to the tithe.

And we explain:

to exclude what?

What place does this statement come to exclude, such that he is not obligated in tithe

To exclude

the land of the

Keni

the

Kenizi and

the

Kadmoni,

which is the land of three nations in the Land of Israel, which were promised to Abraham our forefather in the Covenant between the Pieces, and which will be given to Israel only in the future; and even when they are given to them, they will not be obligated in tithe.

It was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Meir says,

he explains: Where is the place of the land of the Keni, the Kenizi, and the Kadmoni?:

Naftuha, Arva’a, and Shalma’a,

these are the lands of the Keni, the Kenizi, and the Kadmoni.

Rabbi Judah says:

Mount Seir, Ammon, and Moab.

Rabbi Shimon says:

Ardiskis, Asia, and Hispania.

Mishna:

A. Our Mishna deals with the law of witnesses who testified concerning a three-year presumption of ownership, and were disqualified as conspiring witnesses by witnesses who said to them, “You were with us elsewhere,” and the Torah said [Deuteronomy 19:18], “And the judges shall inquire thoroughly, and behold, the witness is a false witness; he has answered falsely against his brother. And you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his brother.” Our Mishna explains how witnesses to a presumption of ownership become conspiring witnesses, and how they pay.

B. Witnesses do not become conspiring witnesses, making them liable for money, until they disqualify all of them; and even if there are more than two witnesses, they do not become conspiring witnesses until they disqualify all of them.

C. Witnesses in a monetary case who were disqualified as conspiring witnesses divide the money that they had stood to make the defendant liable for among all the witnesses, even if they are one hundred.

If

there were two

witnesses

testifying concerning him

[the possessor]

that he had consumed it for three years

of the presumption of ownership, and they came to assist him in claiming, “I bought it from the original owners,” and

it was found that

the two

were conspiring witnesses:

those two witnesses together

pay him

the original owners

the entire amount

[the entire value of the land], for they had schemed to remove the land from its owners, and it is established for us [Makkot 5a]: “They divide monetary liability,” meaning, they divide the monetary loss among the conspiring witnesses.

There were

two

testifying concerning him

in the first year,

that is, testifying that he had consumed its produce in the first year of his presumption of ownership,

and two

others testifying concerning him

in the second year

[concerning the second year],

and two

others testifying concerning him

in the third year,

and it was found that all of them were conspiring witnesses: