Bava Batra 39b (לט:) — the Talmud in English

There is no lashon hara in this

[that is, this does not involve lashon hara], and if the listeners later go to Shimon and say to him, “This is what Reuven said about you,” this does not involve the prohibition of rechilut, because something said in the presence of three will ultimately become known to the person about whom it was said; and anything that will ultimately become known does not involve rechilut.

And since Rabba bar Rav Huna says that something said in the presence of three does not involve rechilut because it is likely to become known, it follows that something said in the presence of two will not ultimately become known. Therefore, if Reuven said this about Shimon in the presence of two, it is prohibited to go and tell Shimon that so-and-so said this and this about him.

If so, perhaps we should say that

the one who says

that a protest is made

in the presence of two does not accept the view of Rabba bar Rav Huna

, but maintains that even when something is said in the presence of two, it will ultimately become known. Therefore, a protest made in the presence of two is sufficient—even when he protests in the claimant’s absence—because in the end the possessor will hear the protest.

And the one who says

that a protest is made

in the presence of three accepts the view of Rabba bar Rav Huna

, because only something said in the presence of three will ultimately become known. Therefore, when a protest is made in the claimant’s absence, three are required.

And we reject this:

No; everyone

—both the one who maintains that a protest is made in the presence of two and the one who maintains that it is made in the presence of three—

accepts the view of Rabba bar Rav Huna

that the matter becomes known only when it is said in the presence of three.

Rather, they disagree about this:

The one who says that it is made in the presence of two maintains: A protest made in his absence is not a valid protest

, and when he protests in the possessor’s presence, there is no need for the matter to become known. Therefore, only two are required, so that they can testify before the court that the protest was made.

And the one who says that it is made in the presence of three maintains: A protest made in his absence is a valid protest

, and therefore, when he protests in the possessor’s absence, his protest is effective only when he makes it in the presence of three, through which the protest will reach the possessor’s ears.

Alternatively, if you wish,

we can explain their dispute as follows:

Everyone agrees: A protest made in his absence is a valid protest

, and everyone accepts Rabba bar Rav Huna’s view that the matter becomes public only when it is said in the presence of three.

Rather, they disagree about this:

The one who says that it is made in the presence of two maintains: Testimony is required

; it is only testimony concerning the protest that is required. The protest need not be made in a manner in which it is reasonable to assume that the matter will reach the possessor’s ears; it is sufficient that the protest could, in some way in the world, reach the possessor’s ears. Therefore, three are not required for a protest, since even when he protests in the presence of two, it is possible that the protest will reach the possessor’s ears.

And the one who says that it is made in the presence of three maintains: Publicizing the matter is required

; that is, a protest is effective only when it is made in a manner that gives reason to assume that the protest will reach the possessor’s ears. Therefore, specifically three are required, because through them the matter becomes public and reaches the possessor’s ears.

There was an incident involving

Giddel bar Minyomi

who

had a protest to make

[a person had been possessing his land for one year, and he needed to protest so that the person would not establish a presumption of ownership],

Giddel bar Minyomi found

Rav Huna, Hiyya bar Rav, and Rav Helkiah bar Tovi,

who were sitting together, and he protested before them

[he found these three Sages sitting together and protested before them].

The following year he returned to protest

[Giddel bar Minyomi came before them to protest again],

they said to him

the Sages:

You do not need

to protest every year.

For

Rav said as follows: Once he protested in the first year, he need not protest again.

Some say

that not all the Sages said this to him; rather,

Hiyya bar Rav said to him

alone:

Once he protested in the first year, he need not protest again.

Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara:

And

in any event,

he must protest at the end of each three-year period

, that is, there must not be three consecutive years in which he did not protest. If three years pass without a protest, the possessor establishes a presumption of ownership, because a person is careful with his deed for only three years from the time of the protest, and no longer.

Rabbi Yohanan considered

[pondered and raised an objection concerning]

Rabbi Yohanan

against bar Kappara’s statement, for he maintains that if the possessor held the property for three years after the protest, he establishes a presumption of ownership:

Can a robber establish a presumption of ownership!?

We are astonished at Rabbi Yohanan’s words:

A robber, is this conceivable!?

What relevance does a robber have here?

Rather,

this is what Rabbi Yohanan asked: Can someone who is

like a robber establish a presumption of ownership!?

That is, since the possessor knew that the claimant was challenging him and asserting that he was a robber, he should have been careful with his deed until he went to court with the claimant or showed his deed to a court after the protest. Since he was not careful with his deed, he should suffer the loss, because one can say that he is a robber.

In any event,

Rava said: The halakha is: He must protest at the end of each three-year period

, and if the possessor held the property for three years after the last protest, he establishes a presumption of ownership.

Bar Kappara taught:

He challenged

the possessor’s presumption of ownership, that is, he made a protest, and

returned

again at the end of the three years that followed and

challenged

again, and

returned

after another three years and

challenged:

If he challenged on the basis of the first claim

, that is, if all the protests against the possessor were based on one claim—that he was a robber, or that he was occupying the field as a mortgagee and had not purchased the land—then

he does not establish a presumption of ownership.

But if not

, if he changed his claim against the possessor—for example, the first time he said, “So-and-so is a robber,” and the second time he said, “He holds it as a mortgagee”—then

he establishes a presumption of ownership

, as though he had not protested at all.

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

A.

A protest

is made

in the presence of two.