Bava Batra 39b — the Talmud in English

There is no lashon hara in it

[there is no prohibition of lashon hara in this], and if the listeners return to Shimon and say to him: “This and this Reuven said about you,” there is no prohibition of rechilut in this, because something said in the presence of three will ultimately become known to the one about whom it was said; and anything that is ultimately destined to become known contains no prohibition of rechilut.

And from what Rabba bar Rav Huna said—that something said in the presence of three contains no prohibition of rechilut because it is likely to become known—it follows that something said in the presence of two is not ultimately destined to become known. Therefore, if Reuven said this about Shimon in the presence of two, it is forbidden to go and tell Shimon that so-and-so said this and this about him.

And if so, perhaps we shall say:

the one who says

a mecha'a

in the presence of two does not hold like Rabba bar Rav Huna,

but rather holds that even when something is said in the presence of two, it is ultimately destined to become known; therefore a mecha'a in the presence of two is sufficient—even when he makes the mecha'a not in his presence—because ultimately the holder will hear the mecha'a.

And the one who says

a mecha'a

in the presence of three holds like Rabba bar Rav Huna,

for only something said in the presence of three is ultimately destined to become known; therefore, when the mecha'a is said not in his presence, it requires three.

And we reject this:

No; everyone

—both the one who holds that a mecha'a is in the presence of two and the one who holds that a mecha'a is in the presence of three—

holds like Rabba bar Rav Huna,

that the matter becomes known only when it is said in the presence of three,

and here they disagree about this:

The one who says, “in the presence of two,” holds: a mecha'a not in his presence is not a mecha'a,

and when he protests in his presence, the matter does not need to become known; therefore two alone are needed, not three, so that they can testify before the court concerning the mecha'a.

And the one who says, “in the presence of three,” holds: a mecha'a not in his presence is a mecha'a,

and therefore, when he protests not in his presence, his mecha'a is not a mecha'a, but only when he protests in the presence of three, through which the mecha'a will reach the ears of the holder.

If you wish, say

to explain their dispute:

Everyone agrees: a mecha'a not in his presence is a mecha'a,

and everyone holds like Rabba bar Rav Huna, that the matter is publicized only when it is said in the presence of three,

and here they disagree about this:

The one who says, “in the presence of two,” holds: testimony is required,

only testimony is required to testify concerning the mecha'a, but it is not necessary that the mecha'a be made in a manner concerning which it is reasonable to assume that the matter will reach the ears of the holder; rather, a mecha'a is sufficient where it is possible in some manner in the world that the mecha'a will reach the ears of the holder. Therefore three are not required for the mecha'a, since even when he protests in the presence of two, it is possible that the mecha'a will reach the ears of the holder.

And the one who says, “in the presence of three,” holds: disclosure of the matter is required,

meaning, a mecha'a is effective only when it is made in a manner such that it can be assumed that the mecha'a will reach the ears of the holder. Therefore three specifically are required, through whom the matter is publicized and reaches the ears of the holder.

An incident involving

Giddel bar Menyomi

in which

he had a mechita that he needed to protest,

[a person had been holding his land for one year, and he needed to protest so that the person would not acquire a presumption],

he found

Giddel bar Menyomi

Rav Huna, Chiyya bar Rav, and Rav Chelkiah bar Tovi, who were sitting, and he protested before them,

[Giddel bar Menyomi found these three sages sitting together, and he protested before them].

The following year he again came to protest,

[after a year Giddel bar Menyomi came before them to protest again],

they said to him

the sages:

You do not need

to protest every single year.

For

thus Rav said: Since he protested in the first year, he no longer needs to protest.

And some say,

not all the sages said this to him, but

Chiyya bar Rav said to him

alone:

Since he protested in the first year, he no longer needs to protest.

Reish Lakish said in the name of bar Kappara:

And

nevertheless,

he must protest at the end of each three-year period,

meaning, there must not be three consecutive years in which he did not protest; and if three years passed without a protest, the holder has a presumption, because a person is careful with his document only for three years from the protest, and no longer.

Rabbi Yoḥanan considered

[thought about it and raised an objection to it]

to

the words of bar Kappara, who holds that if he held the property for three years after the protest, he has a presumption:

And does a robber have a presumption!?

And we question Rabbi Yoḥanan’s words:

A robber, is it conceivable!?

What connection does a robber have here!?

Rather,

this is how Rabbi Yoḥanan wondered: Is one who is

like a robber to have a presumption!?

That is, since it became known to the holder that this one was contesting him and claiming that he was a robber, he should have been careful with his document until he went to court with the claimant, or until he showed his document to a court after the protest; and since he was not careful with his document, he should lose, because one can say that he is a robber.

And nevertheless,

Rava said: The halakha is: he must protest at the end of each three-year period,

and if he held the property for three years after the last protest, he has a presumption.

Bar Kappara taught:

He contested

the landowner’s presumption of the holder—that is, he made a mecha'a—and

returned

again at the end of the three years that followed them

and contested,

and again

returned

after three years

and contested:

If he contested on the basis of the first claim,

that is, all the protests were based on one claim against the holder—either that he was a robber, or that he was sitting in the field on a mortgage and had not purchased the land—then

he does not have a presumption.

And if not,

that he changed his claim against the holder—for example, the first time he said, “So-and-so is a robber,” and the second time he said, “It is in his possession on a mortgage”—then

he has a presumption,

as though he had not protested at all.

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman:

a.

A mecha'a

is made

in the presence of two,