Bava Batra 20b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara answers:

for it has no measure,

when there is no significant measure in the potsherd, and therefore it is considered as though it does not exist.

As we learned

in tractate Shabbat concerning the measure of carrying out [82a]:

a potsherd, enough to place between one doorpost and its fellow.

The measure of a potsherd for which one is liable when he carries it out on Shabbat is if it has a measure from which it is possible to place on the windows in a wall. For the practice was that when they made windows in a wall, they would distance the stones or bricks from one another so that light could enter there; and they would place in the window, above and below, a wide potsherd between the two, and plaster it with mortar, and the potsherd would be thick and stand there like a stone. If the potsherd has this measure, it is considered a significant object, and one is liable for carrying it out. And the same is true here: if it does not have this measure, it is considered as though it does not exist.

We learned in a beraita:

earthenware vessels

reduce.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

earthenware vessels are suitable for it,

for earthenware vessels are fit for use, and if so, he does not nullify them?

And the Gemara answers:

when they are filthy,

when they are filthy and unfit for use.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

they are suitable for a bloodletter,

for they are fit for the bloodletter to put the blood into them?

And the Gemara answers:

when they are perforated.

When they are perforated, and therefore they are unfit for putting blood into them.

We learned in a beraita:

a Torah scroll

reduces.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

it is suitable for reading,

for it is fit to read from it.

And the Gemara answers:

when it is worn out,

when it is worn out and unfit for reading.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

but it requires burial,

for it must be buried; if so, he should take it from there in order to bury it?

And the Gemara answers:

there shall be its burial there.

When he says that its burial shall be there, in the window.

The Gemara now brings a discussion concerning the laws of a partition with regard to Shabbat: what is a partition that encloses a private domain:

Rav said: With everything one may make a partition, except with salt and grease.

With all objects it is possible to make a partition for purposes of Shabbat and for other laws, except with salt and grease, because salt scatters and grease melts when it becomes hot.

And Shmuel said: Even with salt

it is possible to make a partition.

Rav Pappa said: They do not disagree.

There is no disagreement between them, because each one is speaking about a different type of salt:

This one is with Sodomite salt, and this one is with Istrokunit salt.

Rav spoke about Istrokunit salt, which is fine and scatters, and therefore even if one makes a partition from it, it is not considered a partition that encloses the domain on Shabbat. And Shmuel spoke about Sodomite salt, which is coarse and hard like a stone and does not scatter, and therefore it can serve as a partition.

And now that Rabba said,

now, after we have heard Rabba’s statement concerning the permissibility of carrying in an alleyway on Shabbat:

A person may make two heaps of salt,

he may set up two heaps of salt [at least ten handbreadths high] at the entrance of the alleyway, adjacent to the walls of the alleyway, on its two sides,

and place a beam upon them

in order thereby to permit carrying in the alleyway on Shabbat; that is, he places the two ends of the beam upon the two heaps of salt adjacent to the walls of the alleyway, and he may do so because

the salt supports the beam, and the beam supports the salt.

The heaps of salt support the beam, while the weight of the beam supports the salt, so that it remains heaped as one mass and does not scatter; therefore this is considered placing a beam upon something enduring.

Accordingly, there is no longer a need to arrive at Rav Pappa’s distinction concerning the words of Rav and Shmuel, and to say that they spoke about two types of salt. Rather, it is possible to establish the words of Rav and Shmuel as referring to the same type,

even Istrokunit salt.

And they do not disagree

Rav and Shmuel:

This one is where there is a beam, and this one is where there is no beam.

Rav spoke when a beam is not placed above the heap of salt, and therefore it can scatter. And Shmuel spoke when a beam is placed upon the top of the heap of salt, and the beam supports the salt so that it does not scatter.

We learned in the Mishna:

One distances the millstones three [handbreadths] from the lower millstone, which are four from the upper millstone:

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason? Because of vibration.

What is the reason that one must distance [them] from the millstones? Because the shaking of the millstones makes the ground tremble and loosens the foundation of the wall.

The Gemara asks:

But it was taught

for we learned in a beraita:

And in the case of a donkey-driven mill, three from the istrovil, which are four from the kela.

Millstones operated by a donkey, one must distance [them] three handbreadths from the seat of the millstones, which is called the istrovil, which are four handbreadths from the upper part of the millstones that grinds and is called the kela.

There, what vibration is there,

what relevance is there there to saying that it makes the ground tremble?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, because of sound,

rather, the reason that one must distance [it] is because of the sound of the donkey’s operation, or of the millstones when they grind; and the sound harms the wall.

We learned in the Mishna:

And the oven, three from the kelya, which are four from the rim:

Abaye said: Learn from this: The kelya of an oven is one handbreadth.

From the fact that the Mishna states that one must distance three handbreadths from the kelya, which are four from the rim, we learn that the kelya projects beyond the rim, which is the body of the oven, by one handbreadth on each side.

A practical consequence is for buying and selling.

Why do we need to know this? Rather, it concerns buying and selling: if one person sells another an oven with a rim and a kelya without specifying, and they did not establish between them by how much the kelya would be larger than the rim, we say that it must be larger by one handbreadth on each side, because we learned from the Mishna that this is the ordinary oven.

Mishna:

A person may not set up an oven inside a house unless there is a height of four cubits above it.

It is forbidden to set up an oven inside a house unless there is an empty space of four cubits from the mouth of the oven to the ceiling, so that the fire should not catch the ceiling. And even when no one lives in the upper story above the ceiling, nevertheless the neighbors can prevent him, for if his house catches fire, the conflagration will also pass to their houses.

If he set it up in an upper story, there must be plasterwork three handbreadths beneath it.

If he sets it up upon the upper story, there must be earth-plastering three handbreadths thick beneath it, so that the ceiling beneath it should not burn.

And for a stove, one handbreadth.

If he sets up a stove upon an upper story, it is sufficient that there be plasterwork one handbreadth high beneath it. This is because a stove is not as hot as an oven: an oven is made sloping, broad below and narrow above, and through this the heat gathers and it becomes very hot. But a stove is made in the form of a rectangle, with a place upon which to set two pots, and it is not so hot; therefore one handbreadth of plasterwork is sufficient.

And if he caused damage, he pays for what he damaged.

Even if he distanced [it] by the measure specified in the Mishna, nevertheless, if he caused damage, he must pay, because he is not considered coerced; rather, it is incumbent upon him to take care that he should not cause damage. And when he does not distance [it] by the specified measure, they can prevent him, lest he cause damage and not have the means to pay.

Rabbi Shimon says: They stated all these measures only so that, if he caused damage, he should be exempt from paying.

Rabbi Shimon disputes the first tan, and holds that if he distanced [it] by the specified measure, he is exempt from paying if he caused damage, because he is considered coerced.

A person may not open a bakery or dyeworks beneath his fellow’s storehouse,

when his fellow has a storehouse in the upper story, it is forbidden to open in the house beneath it a bakery, meaning a shop where a fire is constantly stoked for baking, and likewise dyeworks, where a fire is also stoked in order to boil the dye, because the heat damages the storehouse above it.

Nor a cattle pen,

it is likewise forbidden to make a cattle pen beneath his fellow’s storehouse, because the smell of the pen is harmful to the storehouse.

In truth, with wine they permitted it,

when there is a wine storehouse, it is permitted to open beneath it a bakery or dyeworks, for the heat does not harm wine,

but not a cattle pen.

It is forbidden to make a cattle pen beneath a wine storehouse, because the smell harms the wine.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

But it was taught: For an oven, four, and for a stove, three,

for we learned in a beraita that if one comes to set up an oven in an upper story, there must be plasterwork four handbreadths beneath it, and for a stove three handbreadths are required, whereas in our Mishna it is written that for an oven only three handbreadths are required and for a stove one handbreadth?

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: When that was taught, it was with regard to bakers’ [ovens and stoves],

the beraita speaks of a bakers’ oven and stove, that is, of those used by bakers, which are stoked constantly and are therefore hotter; consequently, greater distancing is required.

For our oven is like a bakers’ stove.

Our oven, that is, that of householders who are not bakers, has heat equal to that of a bakers’ stove; therefore, in both cases three handbreadths of plasterwork are required.

We learned in the Mishna:

“A person may not open a shop,” and so on: It was taught: If the cattle pen preceded the storehouse, it is permitted.

And he no longer needs to distance [it], even if the other person afterward makes a storehouse. And the reason for this is explained above, 18a, where Abaye and Rava disputed this matter.

Abaye raised a problem: If he swept and sprinkled [water] for a storehouse, what is the law?

If the owner of the upper story swept his roof for the purpose of a storehouse, or sprinkled [water], that is, sprinkled water there to settle the sand in the upper story for the purpose of a storehouse, is it considered as though he had already made a storehouse, so that the owner of the house below may no longer open a shop, or is it not considered as though he had made a storehouse, and the owner of the house may still open a shop?

If he increased the windows, what is the law?

If you should say that sweeping and sprinkling are not considered precedence, since he did not perform a significant act and it is not recognizable that he sweeps and sprinkles because of a storehouse, what is the law if the owner of the upper story increased the windows in the upper story for the purpose of a storehouse, in order to preserve the produce so that it should not rot? Is it considered as though he had already made a storehouse, since he performed a significant act, or not?

(A colonnade beneath the storehouse: what is the law?)

If there is a colonnade that is enclosed on three sides and open on the fourth side, beneath the storehouse, what is the law? Is it permitted to open a shop there and make a cattle pen there, or not? For one might say that since it is open on the fourth side, the wind prevails there strongly, and the heat of the oven and the smell of the pen do not harm the storehouse, or not?

If he built an upper story upon his house, what is the law?

The matter remains [unresolved].

The owner of the upper story built another upper story upon the roof of his upper story, and it was customary to build there for a storehouse. What is the law? If you should say that increasing the windows is not an act sufficient to be considered precedence, here, where he built the entire structure for the purpose of the storehouse, is this considered precedence or not?

And all the uncertainties stood at teyku and were not resolved.

Rav Huna son of Rav Yehoshua raised a problem: Dates and pomegranates, what is the law? Teyku.

The owner brought dates and pomegranates into the upper story, which the shop and the cattle pen do not harm. Shall we say that this is considered the beginning of a storehouse for produce and the like, since it shows that he is going to place other things there, or is it not considered that the storehouse preceded [the shop], as long as he has not placed produce and the like there? The matter remained at teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

“In truth, with wine they permitted it,” and so on: It was taught: With wine they permitted it because it improves it,

the heat of the shop improves the wine.

But not a cattle pen, because it makes it stink.

The smell of the pen harms the wine and makes it stink.

Rav Yosef said: This wine of ours

our wine

even the smoke of a lamp is also difficult for it.

Even smoke that comes from a lamp is harmful to it. If so, all the more so a bakery or dyeworks harms it.

Rav Sheshet said: Chopped fodder is comparable to a cattle pen.

Straw of produce, because it is moist and becomes hot, gives off a foul smell, and is comparable to a cattle pen, which one is forbidden to place beneath the storehouse.

Mishna:

With regard to a shop in a courtyard, he may prevent him and say to him: I cannot sleep because of the sound of those entering and because of the sound of those leaving.

One of the members of a courtyard who wishes to open a shop in his house, the neighbors in that courtyard may prevent him and say to him that the sound of those entering and leaving his shop disturbs them.

But he may make vessels, go out, and sell them in the marketplace,

he may make vessels in his house and sell them in the marketplace.

And he may not prevent him and say to him: I cannot sleep, neither because of the sound of the hammer,

even though he strikes with a hammer in his house, the neighbors may not prevent him.

nor because of the sound of the millstones,

if he grinds wheat with millstones in his house, the neighbors may not prevent him, even though the millstones make sound. This applies specifically when he grinds for himself; but if he grinds for others, they may prevent him because he increases those entering and leaving the courtyard.

nor because of the sound of the children.

According to the initial assumption, the explanation is children who come to buy wine, oil, and the like.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the latter clause,

what is the difference between the first clause and the latter clause, such that in the first clause he may prevent him because of the sound of those entering and leaving, while in the latter clause he may not prevent him because of the sound of the children who come to buy? The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: The latter clause comes to [speak of] another courtyard.

The latter clause of the Mishna, “nor because of the sound of the children,” is speaking of the members of another courtyard: they cannot prevent him from having the children come to buy from him in his courtyard. But the members of the same courtyard can prevent him, as it is written in the first clause.

Rava said to him: If so, let it teach: in another courtyard it is permitted.

If the Mishna comes to innovate the law that the residents of another courtyard cannot protest, why did it say that they cannot prevent it because of the sound of the children, when it is not written here that this is in another courtyard? Let it say explicitly: if it is in another courtyard, it is permitted.

Rather, Rava said: