Bava Batra 20b (כ:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara explains:

because it has no significant measure,

as there is no significant measure for the shard, and therefore it is considered as though it were nonexistent.

As we learned

in tractate Shabbat concerning the measure for carrying out:

A shard, sufficient to place between one jamb and another.

The measure of a shard for which one is liable when carrying it out on Shabbat is when it is large enough to be placed in the windows of a wall. For the usual practice when making windows in a wall was to distance the stones or bricks from one another so that light could enter there, and to place a wide shard in the space between them, above and below the window, and plaster it with clay; the shard would be thick and remain there like a stone. If the shard is of this measure, it is considered a significant object, and one is liable for carrying it out. The same applies here: If it is not of this measure, it is considered as though it were nonexistent.

We learned in a beraita:

Earthenware vessels

reduce [the measure].

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Earthenware vessels are fit for it;

an earthenware vessel is fit for use, and if so, he does not nullify it [in place]?

And the Gemara answers:

When it is soiled,

when it is dirty and unfit for use.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

It is fit for a bloodletter;

it is fit for a bloodletter to place the blood in it?

And the Gemara answers:

When it is perforated.

When it is perforated, and therefore it is unfit for placing blood in it.

We learned in a beraita:

A Torah scroll

reduces [the measure].

And the Gemara raises an objection:

It is fit for reading;

it is fit to read from.

And the Gemara answers:

When it is worn out,

when it is worn out and unfit to be read.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

But it requires burial,

and it must be buried; if so, he should take it from there in order to bury it?

And the Gemara answers:

Its burial shall be there.

When he says that its burial shall be there, in the window.

The Gemara now brings a discussion of the laws of a partition with regard to Shabbat: What constitutes a partition that encloses a private domain?

Rav said: A partition may be made from anything, except salt and grease.

Anything may be used to make a partition with regard to Shabbat and other laws, except salt and grease, because salt scatters, while grease melts when heated.

And Shmuel said: Even salt

may be used to make a partition.

Rav Pappa said: They do not disagree.

There is no disagreement between them, because each is speaking about a different type of salt:

This statement is referring to Sodomite salt, and that statement is referring to istrokunit salt.

Rav spoke about istrokunit salt, which is fine and scatters; therefore, even if one sets up a partition from it, it is not considered a partition that encloses the domain on Shabbat. Shmuel spoke about Sodomite salt, which is coarse and hard like a stone and does not scatter; therefore, it can serve as a partition.

And now that Rabba has said,

now that we have heard Rabba’s statement concerning the permissibility of carrying in a מבוי on Shabbat:

A person may make two piles of salt,

he may set up two piles of salt, at least ten handbreadths high, at the entrance to the מבוי, next to its walls, on both sides,

and place a crossbeam upon them

in order thereby to permit carrying in the מבוי on Shabbat—that is, he places the two ends of the crossbeam on the two piles of salt next to the walls of the מבוי—and he may do so because

the salt supports the crossbeam, and the crossbeam supports the salt.

The piles of salt support the crossbeam, while the weight of the crossbeam keeps the salt in a single mass so that it will not scatter. Therefore, this is considered placing a crossbeam upon something that endures.

Accordingly, there is no longer any need for Rav Pappa’s distinction regarding the statements of Rav and Shmuel, namely, that they were speaking about two types of salt. Rather, the statements of Rav and Shmuel can be established as referring to the same type,

even istrokunit salt.

And they do not disagree,

Rav and Shmuel:

This statement is referring to a case where there is a crossbeam, and that statement is referring to a case where there is no crossbeam.

Rav spoke of a case where no crossbeam is placed above the pile of salt, and therefore it can scatter. Shmuel spoke of a case where a crossbeam is placed on top of the pile of salt, and the crossbeam keeps the salt from scattering.

We learned in the Mishna:

One must distance a hand mill three [handbreadths] from the lower millstone, which is four [handbreadths] from the upper millstone:

And the Gemara explains:

What is the reason? Because of the vibration.

Why must one distance it from the mill? Because the vibration of the mill shakes the ground and weakens the foundation of the wall.

The Gemara asks:

But it was taught

in a beraita:

And in the case of a donkey-driven mill, three [handbreadths] from the istrobil, which is four [handbreadths] from the kelet.

A mill operated by a donkey, one must distance it three handbreadths from the base of the mill, called an istrobil, which is four handbreadths from the upper part of the millstone that grinds, called a kelet.

There, what vibration is present,

that it should be said that it shakes the ground?

And the Gemara answers:

Rather, because of the sound,

rather, the reason one must distance it is because of the sound of the donkey’s operation, or of the millstones while they grind, and the sound damages the wall.

We learned in the Mishna:

And an oven three [handbreadths] from the kiln, which is four [handbreadths] from the rim:

Abaye said: Learn from this that the kiln of an oven is one handbreadth [wider].

From the fact that the Mishna states that one must distance it three handbreadths from the kiln, which is four from the rim, we learn that the kiln projects beyond the rim—which is the body of the oven—by one handbreadth on each side.

The practical difference is with regard to buying and selling.

What relevance is there to knowing this? It is relevant with regard to buying and selling: If one sells another an oven, rim, and kiln without specification, and they did not establish by how much the kiln should be larger than the rim, we say that it must be larger by one handbreadth on each side, because we learned from the Mishna that this is the standard form of an oven.

Mishna:

A person may not place an oven inside a house unless there is a height of four cubits above it.

It is prohibited to place an oven inside a house unless there is an empty space of four cubits from the mouth of the oven to the ceiling, so that the flame will not catch the ceiling. Even when no one lives in the upper story above the ceiling, the neighbors may nevertheless prevent him from doing so, because if his house catches fire, the fire will spread to their houses as well.

If he placed it in an upper story, there must be plasterwork three handbreadths thick beneath it.

If he places it on an upper story, there must be a floor-plastering three handbreadths thick beneath it, so that the ceiling underneath it will not catch fire.

And for a stove, one handbreadth.

If he places a stove on an upper story, it is sufficient for there to be floor-plastering one handbreadth high beneath it. This is because a stove is not as hot as an oven. An oven is made with sloping sides, broad at the bottom and narrow at the top, and as a result the heat gathers inside it and it becomes very hot. A stove, however, is rectangular and has a place upon which to set two pots, and it is not as hot. Therefore, floor-plastering one handbreadth is sufficient.

And if he caused damage, he must pay for the damage he caused.

Even if he maintained the distance specified in the Mishna, nevertheless, if he caused damage, he must pay, because he is not considered an אונס, but rather is required to take care that he not cause damage. When he does not maintain the specified distance, they may prevent him from doing so, lest he cause damage and lack the means to pay.

Rabbi Shimon says: They stated all these measures only so that if he caused damage, he would be exempt from paying.

Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first tanna and maintains that if he maintained the specified distance, he is exempt from paying if he caused damage, because he is considered an אונס.

A person may not open a bakery or a dyer’s shop beneath another’s storeroom,

when another person has a storeroom in the upper story, it is prohibited to open in the house beneath it a bakery, meaning a place where a fire is constantly stoked for baking, or a dyer’s shop, where a fire is likewise stoked to boil the dye, because the heat damages the storeroom above.

Nor a cattle pen,

it is likewise prohibited to make a cattle pen beneath another’s storeroom, because the smell of the pen is harmful to the storeroom.

In the case of wine, they permitted it,

when there is a storeroom of wine, it is permitted to open a bakery or dyer’s shop beneath it, because the heat does not damage the wine,

but not a cattle pen.

It is prohibited to make a cattle pen beneath a storeroom of wine, because the smell damages the wine.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

But it was taught: For an oven, four [handbreadths], and for a stove, three,

we learned in a beraita that if one wishes to place an oven in an upper story, there must be floor-plastering four handbreadths thick beneath it, and for a stove three handbreadths. Yet our Mishna states that an oven requires only three handbreadths, and a stove one handbreadth?

The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: When that [beraita] was taught, it was with regard to bakers’ [ovens and stoves],

the beraita speaks of bakers’ ovens and stoves, meaning those of bakers, which are constantly stoked and are therefore hotter; consequently, a greater distance is required.

For our oven is like a baker’s stove.

Our oven, meaning that of householders who are not bakers, has the same heat as a baker’s stove; therefore, in both cases three handbreadths of floor-plastering are required.

We learned in the Mishna:

“A person may not open a shop, etc.” It was taught: If the cattle pen preceded the storeroom, it is permitted.

There is no longer any need to maintain a distance even if the other person subsequently makes a storeroom. The reason for this is explained above, on 18a, where Abaye and Rava disagreed about it.

Abaye raised a dilemma: If he swept and sprinkled water in preparation for a storeroom, what is the halakha?

If the owner of the upper story swept his roof in preparation for a storeroom, or sprinkled water there to settle the sand in the upper story for the purpose of making a storeroom, is this considered as though he had already made a storeroom, so that the homeowner may no longer open a shop below, or is it not considered as though he had made a storeroom, and the homeowner may still open a shop?

If he increased the number of windows, what is the halakha?

If you say that sweeping and sprinkling water are not considered establishing precedence, since he did not perform a significant act and it is not evident that he is sweeping and sprinkling because of a storeroom, what is the halakha if the owner of the upper story increased the number of windows in the upper story for the purpose of making a storeroom, in order to preserve the grain so that it would not rot? Is this considered as though he had already made a storeroom, since he performed a significant act, or not?

(An exedra beneath the storeroom—what is the halakha?)

If there is an exedra enclosed on three sides and open on the fourth side, beneath the storeroom, what is the halakha? Is it permitted to open a shop there and make a cattle pen there, or not? One might say that since it is open on the fourth side, the wind prevails there strongly, and the heat of the oven and the smell of the cattle pen do not damage the storeroom—or perhaps not?

If he built an upper story above his house, what is the halakha?

Teyku.

If the owner of the upper story built another upper story above the roof of his upper story, and it was customary to make a storeroom there, what is the halakha? If you say that increasing the number of windows is not a sufficient act to be considered establishing precedence, here, since he built the entire structure for the purpose of the storeroom, is this considered establishing precedence or not?

All the doubts remained with teyku and were not resolved.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, raised a dilemma: What is the halakha regarding dates and pomegranates? Teyku.

The owner placed dates and pomegranates in the upper story, which are not harmed by a shop or a cattle pen. Should we say that this is considered the beginning of a storeroom for grain and similar items, as it indicates that he intends to place other things there as well? Or, as long as he has not placed grain or the like there, is it not considered that the storeroom preceded the shop or pen? The matter remains with teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

“In the case of wine, they permitted it, etc.” It was taught: In the case of wine, they permitted it because it improves it,

the heat of the shop improves the wine.

But not a cattle pen, because it makes it foul-smelling.

The smell of the cattle pen damages the wine and makes it foul-smelling.

Rav Yosef said: This wine of ours

our wine

is harmed even by the smoke of a lamp.

It is harmed even by smoke that emerges from a lamp. If so, all the more so it is damaged by a bakery or dyer’s shop.

Rav Sheshet said: Hay is comparable to a cattle pen.

Straw from grain, because it is moist and heats up, gives off a foul odor, and is comparable to a cattle pen, which one may not place beneath a storeroom.

Mishna:

Regarding a shop in a courtyard, [the neighbors] may prevent him and say to him: I cannot sleep because of the sound of those entering and because of the sound of those leaving.

If one of the members of a courtyard wishes to open a shop in his house, the neighbors in that courtyard may prevent him and say that they are disturbed by the sound of those entering and leaving his shop.

But he may make vessels and go out and sell them in the marketplace,

he may make vessels in his house and sell them in the marketplace.

And [the neighbors] may not prevent him and say to him: I cannot sleep, neither because of the sound of the hammer,

even though he strikes with a hammer in his house, the neighbors may not prevent him from doing so.

nor because of the sound of the millstones,

if he grinds wheat with millstones in his house, the neighbors may not prevent him from doing so, even though the millstones make noise. This applies specifically when he grinds for himself; but if he grinds for others, they may prevent him because he increases the number of people entering and leaving the courtyard.

nor because of the sound of the children.

According to the initial assumption, this refers to children who come to purchase wine, oil, and similar products.

Gemara:

The Gemara asks:

What is different in the first clause, and what is different in the latter clause,

what is the distinction between the first clause and the latter clause? In the first clause, he may be prevented because of the sound of those entering and leaving, whereas in the latter clause he may not be prevented because of the sound of the children who come to make purchases. The Gemara answers:

Abaye said: The latter clause is referring to another courtyard.

The latter clause of the Mishna, “nor because of the sound of the children,” is speaking of the members of another courtyard: They cannot prevent him from allowing children to come and make purchases in his courtyard. The members of his own courtyard, however, may prevent him, as stated in the first clause.

Rava said to him: If so, let it teach: in another courtyard it is permitted.

If the Mishna comes to teach the law that the residents of another courtyard cannot protest, why did it say that they cannot prevent the noise of the children, without stating here that this is referring to another courtyard? Let it state explicitly: If it is in another courtyard, it is permitted.

Rather, Rava said: