Bava Batra 175a (קעה.) — the Talmud in English

Here too,

in the case of one who consecrates his property,

a person may refrain from declaring his own wealth!

so that people would not consider him wealthy during his lifetime, and it is possible that before his death he said that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person, even though in truth he did not owe him anything. If so, this is difficult for Rav Huna, who said that we rely on his statement that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person and separate a hundred dinars for that person from the property he consecrated.

And we answer:

When Rav Huna stated that there,

we rely on the statement of one who consecrated his property, who admitted that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person, it was specifically in a case

where that person held a document,

meaning that the person held a promissory note as proof that the consecrator owed him money. Therefore, we rely on the consecrator’s admission. But if that person did not have a document proving the debt, we do not rely on the consecrator’s admission, because perhaps he said that he owed the person money only so that he would not be considered wealthy.

And we infer from the answerer’s words:

By inference, Rav and Shmuel

spoke in a case

where he did not hold a document,

meaning that the certain person did not possess a promissory note for the debt. Therefore, if the father did not say to his sons, “Give,” they do not give him the money, because perhaps he admitted that he owed it only so that he and his sons would not be considered wealthy.

If so, this is difficult: Why, if the father

said, “Give,”

do they give?

After all, the certain person has no document, and the debt

was an oral loan, and Rav and Shmuel both said: An oral loan

cannot be collected either from heirs or from purchasers!

And if the reason they give the money is that it is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased, then they should not have needed to give it because of his instruction until after his death.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said: In both cases, he held a document,

both in the case of one who consecrated his property and admitted that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person, and in the case of one who bequeathed his property to his sons and admitted that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person. In all cases, the certain person possessed a promissory note for the debt.

And it is not difficult: This

case, in which he consecrated his property, refers to a document

that was authenticated,

meaning that the promissory note held by the certain person bore an hanpaka: the court had examined the document, investigated it, and established that everything written in it was true. Therefore, we rely on the consecrator’s admission that he owed the money.

That

case, in which he bequeathed his property to his sons and admitted that he owed a hundred dinars to a certain person, refers to

a document that was not authenticated

that was held by the certain person.

Therefore, if he

said

to his sons

“Give,”

then by doing so

he validated his document

and admitted that the document was genuine.

If he did not say

to his sons

“Give,”

but merely said that he owed money to a certain person,

he did not validate his document,

and we do not rely on the document held by the certain person. We are concerned that perhaps he admitted that he owed money to the person only so that he and his sons would not be considered wealthy, and the person cannot collect with the document until he authenticates it and proves its genuineness in court.

Rabba said: If a shekhiv mera said, “I have a hundred dinars belonging to a certain person,” and the orphans said, “We repaid

this debt,”

they are believed.

But if the shekhiv mera said:

“Give a hundred dinars to a certain person,” and the orphans said, “We repaid

the debt,”

they are not believed.

And we wonder:

What is this directed toward?

What do these words refer to? After all,

the opposite is more logical!

Logic would indicate the opposite. For on the basis of logic, I would say that if their father

said, “Give a hundred dinars,”

since their father concluded the matter,

since their father finished speaking and commanded them to repay the debt,

it may be said that they repaid it,

that is, one may say that the son repaid the debt.

But if their father merely said

“I have a hundred dinars belonging to a certain person,” \-

since their father did not conclude the matter

and did not tell them, “Give,”

it may be said that they did not repay it,

that is, one may say that the son did not repay the debt.

Rather, if

Rabba’s statement

was stated, it was stated as follows:

If a shekhiv mera said, “I have a hundred dinars belonging to a certain person,” and the orphans said, ‘Our father subsequently told us, “I repaid

the debt already,’”

they are believed!

What is the reason

that they are believed? Perhaps the father

remembered

during the course of his statement that he had already paid the debt, and therefore did not finish his words by telling them to repay it.

But if the father said to them by way of an instruction:

“Give a hundred dinars to a certain person,” and the orphans said, “Our father subsequently told us, ‘I repaid

it,’” they are not believed,

because

if it were the case that he had repaid it,

if there were grounds to say that he had repaid the debt,

he would not have said

that he would not have commanded them with the instruction:

“Give”

the payment of the debt. Rather, certainly their father had not repaid him.

Rava raised a dilemma: If a shekhiv mera admitted

to a certain person who was claiming from him, “You have a hundred dinars belonging to me,” and said to him, “Yes,” in the presence of witnesses,

what

is the law?

Does he

need to say

to the witnesses

“You are my witnesses,”

and if he did not say to the witnesses, “You are my witnesses,” he can say that he was merely jesting [saying nonsensical words] and did not truly intend to admit the debt, as explained in Sanhedrin [29b],

or

perhaps, since he is a shekhiv mera,

he need not say, “You are my witnesses,”

because ordinarily a shekhiv mera who is approaching death does not jest.

Likewise, there is a dilemma whether the shekhiv mera

needs to say

to the witnesses

“Write”

his admission, so that they would be authorized to write it,

or

perhaps a shekhiv mera

need not say, “Write”?

The alternatives of the dilemma are: Does

a person jest

[say nonsensical words]

at the time of death, or does a person not jest at the time of death?

After raising the dilemma, he resolved it

after considering the matter, he returned and resolved the dilemma:

A person does not jest at the time of death,

and therefore his admission is binding even if he did not say, “You are my witnesses,”

and the words of a shekhiv mera are considered as though they were written and delivered,

and therefore the witnesses are authorized to write a document even if he did not tell them to write.

Mishna:

One who lends money to another by means of a document,

even though it does not contain “responsibility for property,” meaning that it does not state that the borrower encumbered his land to the lender for repayment of the debt,

may collect

the debt

from encumbered property

even from land that the borrower sold after the document was written, since the halakha is that “responsibility is an error of the scribe”; that is, it was the scribe who erred and failed to write the provision regarding responsibility in the document. Therefore, the law is as though the document contained the wording “encumbered property.”

One who lends money to another

through witnesses

without a document

collects from unencumbered property,

which remains in the borrower’s possession, but not from encumbered property.