Bava Batra 175a — the Talmud in English

Here too,

with regard to one who consecrates his property,

a person may refrain from making himself appear wealthy!

so that they should not consider him wealthy during his lifetime, and it is possible that before his death he said that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars, even though in truth he did not owe him. And if so, this is difficult for Rav Huna, who said that they rely on his statement that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars, and set aside one hundred dinars for so-and-so from his consecrated property.

And we answer:

When Rav Huna said that there,

that they rely on the words of the one who consecrated his property, who admitted that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars, it was specifically in a case

that he holds a document,

in which that so-and-so holds a promissory note in his hand as evidence that the one who consecrated his property owes him. Therefore, they rely on the admission of the one who consecrated his property. But if that so-and-so has no document of evidence concerning the debt, they do not rely on the admission of the one who consecrated his property, since perhaps he said that he owed so-and-so only so that they should not consider him wealthy.

And we infer from the words of the one who answered:

By inference, Rav and Shmuel

spoke in a case

that he does not hold a document,

that so-and-so does not have a document concerning the debt in his possession. Therefore, if the father did not say to his sons, “Give,” they do not give him, since perhaps he admitted that he owed him only so that they should not consider him and his sons wealthy.

If so, it is difficult: Why, if the father

said, “Give,”

do they give?

After all, so-and-so has no document, and the debt

was an oral loan, and Rav and Shmuel both said: An oral loan

is not collected either from heirs or from purchasers!

And if the reason that they give is that it is a mitzva to fulfill the words of the deceased, then they should not have needed to give because of his command until after his death.

Rather, Rav Naḥman said: Both this and that are cases in which he holds a document,

both in the case of one who consecrated his property and admitted that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars, and in the case of one who bequeathed his property to his sons and admitted that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars, in all the cases it is speaking of a situation in which so-and-so has a document concerning the debt in his possession.

And it is not difficult: This

the case in which he consecrated his property is speaking of

a validated

document that so-and-so holds, one on which there is an “hannaq”—that the court examined the document, investigated it, and established the truth of the matter, that everything written in the document is true. Therefore, they rely on the admission of the one who consecrated his property that he owed him.

That

the case of one who bequeathed his property to his sons and admitted that he owed so-and-so one hundred dinars is speaking of

an unvalidated

document that so-and-so holds.

Therefore, if he

said

to his sons

“Give,”

with this

he validated his document

and admitted that the document was true.

If he did not say

to his sons

“Give,”

but merely said that he owed so-and-so—

he did not validate his document,

and they do not rely on the document in so-and-so’s possession. They are concerned that perhaps he admitted that he owed so-and-so only so that they should not consider him and his sons wealthy, and so-and-so cannot collect by means of the document until he validates the document and proves its authenticity in court.

Rabba said: In the case of a dangerously ill person who said, “I have one hundred dinars belonging to so-and-so in my possession,” and the orphans said, “We repaid

this debt—

they are believed.

And if the dangerously ill person said:

“Give so-and-so one hundred dinars,” and the orphans said, “We repaid

the debt”—

they are not believed.

And we are astonished:

To what direction is this tending?

What are these words referring to, when

the opposite is more logical!

The reasoning indicates the opposite. For on the basis of reason I would say that if their father

said, “Give one hundred dinars”—

since their father concluded the matter,

since their father finished his words and commanded them to repay it,

it is possible to say that he repaid it,

it is possible to say that the son repaid the debt.

But if their father merely said

“I have one hundred dinars belonging to so-and-so in my possession”— \-

since their father did not conclude the matter

and did not say to them, “Give,”

it is possible to say that he did not repay it,

it is possible to say that the son did not repay the debt.

Rather, if it was stated,

the statement of Rabba,

it was stated as follows:

In the case of a dangerously ill person who said, “I have one hundred dinars belonging to so-and-so in my possession,” and the orphans said, “Father later said to us: I repaid

the debt”—

they are believed!

What is the reason

that they are believed? Because perhaps the father

remembered

during the course of his words that he had already paid the debt, and therefore did not finish his words by saying that they should repay the debt.

But if the father said to them in the language of a command:

“Give so-and-so one hundred dinars,” and the orphans said, “Father later said: I repaid”—

they are not believed,

because

if it is so that he repaid it,

if there is room to say that he repaid the debt,

he would not have said

he would not have commanded them with the command:

“Give”

the payment of the debt. Rather, certainly their father did not repay him.

Rava inquired: In the case of a dangerously ill person who admitted

to so-and-so, who claimed, “You have one hundred dinars belonging to me in your possession,” and he said to him, “Yes,” in the presence of witnesses,

what

is the law?

Does he

need to say

to the witnesses

“You are my witnesses,”

and if he did not say to the witnesses, “You are my witnesses,” he can say that he was joking [saying foolish words] and did not intend to make a true admission, as explained in Sanhedrin [29b],

or

perhaps since he is a dangerously ill person,

he does not need to say, “You are my witnesses,”

since ordinarily a dangerously ill person who is going to die does not joke.

And likewise, it is uncertain whether the dangerously ill person

needs to say

to the witnesses

“Write”

my admission, so that they will be authorized to write,

or

perhaps a dangerously ill person

does not need to say, “Write”?

And the sides of the uncertainty are: Does

a person joke

[say foolish words]

at the time of death, or does a person not joke at the time of death?

After he inquired, he subsequently resolved it

after he was uncertain, he returned and resolved the uncertainty:

A person does not joke at the time of death,

and therefore his admission obligates him even if he did not say, “You are my witnesses,”

and the words of a dangerously ill person are considered as written and delivered,

and therefore they have permission to write a document even if he did not tell them to write.

Mishna:

One who lends to his fellow by means of a document,

even though it does not contain “responsibility for property,” meaning that it is not written in it that the borrower mortgaged his land to the lender for repayment of the debt,

collects

the lender’s debt

from mortgaged property

even from land that the borrower sold after the document was written, since the halakha is that “responsibility is a scribal error”; that is, it was the scribe who erred and did not write the responsibility in the document. Therefore, its law is as though the wording “mortgaged” had been written in it.

One who lends to his fellow

through witnesses

without a document

collects from unencumbered property,

which is in the borrower’s possession, but not from mortgaged property.