Bava Batra 170a — the Talmud in English

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: documents are not acquired through delivery.

Therefore, the deed in his possession is insufficient, for the field was not acquired by him through that deed; rather, he must bring witnesses that he performed an act of ḥazaka in it through the owners, who said to him, “Take possession and acquire.”

And Rabbi holds: documents are acquired through delivery.

The deed in his possession is sufficient for him, although it was not written in his name but in the name of that person who sold him the field, and he need not also bring the witnesses of the ḥazaka.

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi:

“If so, it is a dispute for you!

Your words contradict the words of our teacher, Rabba, who said above that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that documents are acquired through delivery, whereas according to your words he holds that documents are not acquired through delivery.”

Rav Dimi said

to Abaye:

“Let it be a dispute!”

That is to say, I am not concerned about disagreeing with him.

He said

Abaye

to him: “This is what I meant to say to you:

I intended to say this to you:

The beraita can be resolved only as my master resolves it.”

For surely the earlier beraita, in which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages disputed the case of one who gives a gift to his fellow and he returned the deed to him, cannot be explained except according to Rabba’s words, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that documents are acquired through delivery.

“And if so, is there a difficulty from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?”

Rather, Abaye said: Here, with what are we dealing? With a case, for example,

that the deed in the possession of the holder was indeed written in his name, but

that one of them

of the witnesses signed on the deed was

a relative or disqualified.

And they dispute in the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar: Rabbi holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who said

with regard to a bill of divorce:

the witnesses of delivery effect the divorce.

The witnesses before whom the bill of divorce was delivered are the essence of the bill of divorce and they cause the “severance,” and according to the basic law there is no need at all for witnesses of the signatures. And the same is true of all deeds: their validity rests only upon the witnesses of delivery. Therefore, it does not matter to us here that one of the witnesses of the signatures is disqualified, and the holder may bring this deed, provided that he brings with it the witnesses before whom the deed was delivered.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who said

with regard to a bill of divorce:

the witnesses of the signatures effect the divorce.

They are the essence of the bill of divorce, and likewise with other deeds, specifically witnesses of the signatures are required. Since one of the witnesses of the signatures is a relative or disqualified, he cannot rely on this deed; rather, he must bring the witnesses of the ḥazaka.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Elazar would concede

that although a bill of divorce with no witnesses of signatures at all is valid, nevertheless

in a case forged from within,

if disqualified witnesses are signed on it,

it is disqualified.

And if so, even according to Rabbi this deed in which there is a relative or disqualified person should not be effective!?

Rather, Rabbi Avina said: Everyone agrees that if it is written in it

that the court wrote on the deed

“We required the testimony of the witnesses, and their testimony was found to be forged,”

that is to say, that one of the witnesses is a relative or disqualified,

it is disqualified—

as Rabbi Abba.

They did not dispute

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

except with regard to a deed upon which there are no witnesses at all.

For the holder has such a deed, upon which no witnesses are signed at all:

Rabbi holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who said: The witnesses of delivery effect the divorce,

and the deed is valid although there are no witnesses upon it at all.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds in accordance with Rabbi Meir, who said: The witnesses of the signatures effect the divorce,

and without witnesses of the signatures the deed is disqualified; therefore, he must bring the witnesses of the ḥazaka.

And if you wish, say: They dispute with regard to one who admits the deed that he wrote,

a borrower who admits that the deed in the lender’s possession is genuine, that he indeed wrote it and these are its witnesses, that it is not forged, but he claims that the deed has been paid—whether

the lender needs

to

validate it,

this deed, through other witnesses, so that the borrower will not retain a migo, for he could have claimed “forged.” Or whether the lender need not validate it—

they dispute.

The case here is similar: the challenger admits that the deed in the holder’s possession is not forged, but that he indeed wrote it; however, he claims that he never had the opportunity to use it and never sold the field written in the deed [for they write a deed for the seller even when no buyer is with him], and meanwhile he lost the deed, and the holder found it and is using it unlawfully.

For Rabbi holds: one who admits the deed that he wrote need not

the lender

validate it,

because the borrower already validated it through his admission, and although he claims, “I paid,” he is not believed through the migo that he could have claimed “forged.”

And here too, the holder may rely upon the deed in his possession, although it was validated only through the challenger, who claims that the deed fell from him.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: One who admits the deed that he wrote must

the lender

validate it,

and so long as he does not validate it, the borrower is believed to claim, “I paid,” through the migo that he could have claimed “forged.”

And here too, since the holder has no witnesses of validation for the deed, it has no force, because the challenger has a migo: he could have invalidated it with the claim of “forged.” Therefore he must bring the witnesses of the ḥazaka.

And we raise an objection:

But we hear the opposite from them!

Elsewhere we find a dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning one who admits the deed that he wrote, whether it must be validated, opposite from here?

As it was taught

in tractate Bava Metzia [7a]:

Two

who were

clinging to a deed

of debt—the lender and the borrower.

The lender says: “It is mine, and it fell from me, and you found it,”

and you have still not paid your debt.

And the borrower says: “It is yours,”

that is, previously it was yours, but afterward

“I paid it to you,”

and you returned it to me, and it fell from me—

“The deed shall be validated through its signatures.”

The lender must validate the deed, and then he may collect with it, according to the law of every deed in the lender’s possession concerning which the borrower is not believed to claim, “I paid,”

the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: “They shall divide,”

the lender and the borrower; that is, the borrower will pay only half the debt.

And the Gemara asks: Does Rabbi not hold

that Rabbi does not hold

that which we learned

at the beginning of tractate Bava Metzia:

Two are holding a garment.

This one says: “I found it,”

that I lifted it first and it belongs to me,

and this one says: “I found it,”

and it is mine—

The law is:

“This one shall swear that he has no less than half of it, and this one shall swear that he has no less than half of it.”

Each one shall swear that at least half the garment is his,

and they shall divide.

And here too, since both are holding the deed, the law should have been “they shall divide,” that the lender and borrower divide the amount written in the deed. Why, then, did Rabbi say that the lender collects the entire debt stated in the deed!?

And the Gemara explains:

And Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

Indeed,

with

a

validated deed,

which has authorization from the court concerning the signatures,

everyone agrees that they shall divide,

as in the law of the Mishna concerning two holding [an object].

They dispute with regard to one that is not validated.

The dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is when they are clinging to a deed that has no court validation, but the borrower admits that it is not forged: whether he must pay anything at all or not.

Rabbi holds: One who admits the deed that he wrote must validate it.

And if he validates it,

the lender validates the deed, so that the borrower can no longer claim that it was paid,

he collects half.

The lender collects half the debt.

And if not,

he does not validate it,

it is a potsherd

[a shard]

alone

and he does not collect anything with it.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: One who admits the deed that he wrote need not validate it.

Therefore, although the deed is not validated, the law is:

“And they shall divide.”

Thus, Rabbi’s and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel’s reasoning is the opposite of that in our passage!?

And the Gemara explains:

“Reverse it!”

Reverse the statements of Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in one of the two disputes.

And if you wish, say: Actually, do not reverse it.

Rather, here they disagree concerning the need to clarify.

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagreed in our sugya over another dispute: must a person clarify and prove the truth of every claim that he makes, even though, had he made only one of them, he could have prevailed on its basis alone, or not?

This is referring to a case in which the possessor makes two claims: one, that he has a deed of sale for the field from the challenger; and the other, that he has held it for three years. Rabbi holds that he is judged on the basis of the deed. That is, although the claim of possession alone would have sufficed for him, since he also claims that he has a deed, he must prove this and bring the deed.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he is judged on the basis of possession, for it is sufficient if he proves only his possession, and he need not also bring the deed [and all the more so, if he brings the deed, he need not also bring witnesses to possession].

As in the case of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, who had money outstanding from Rabbi Abba,

similarly, there was an incident in which Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef demanded a debt from Rabbi Abba, but he had no deed concerning it.

He came before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa.

They came before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa for judgment.

He said

Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef:

I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so!

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him

to Rabbi Abba:

Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify!

that they saw that you repaid him in their presence.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba:

If they do not come, am I not believed?

And if witnesses do not come, am I not believed to claim that I repaid him privately?

But we hold: One who lends money to his fellow in the presence of witnesses need not repay him in the presence of witnesses!?

He said to him

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa:

As for that matter, I hold as in my master's teaching,

in this law I hold as you said in the name of Rav.

For Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rav Adda bar Ahava in the name of Rav: One who says to his fellow, “I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,” must have so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify.

Although he could have claimed, “I repaid you without witnesses,” since he claims, “I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,” he must bring them.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba:

But Rav Giddel said in the name of Rav: The halakha is in accordance with the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,

that a person need not prove such a claim, which he could have won even without it.

And indeed it is more reasonable to rule in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because: