Bava Batra 170a (קע.) — the Talmud in English

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Documents are not acquired through delivery.

Therefore, the document in his possession does not suffice, since the field was not acquired by him through that document; rather, he must bring witnesses that he performed an act of ḥazaka on it through the owners, who said to him, “Take possession and acquire it.”

And Rabbi holds: Documents are acquired through delivery.

The document in his possession suffices for him, even though it was not written in his name but in the name of the person who sold him the field, and he need not also bring the witnesses to the act of ḥazaka.

Abaye said

to Rav Dimi:

If so, are you disputing your master?

Your words contradict those of our master, Rabba, who said above that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that documents are acquired through delivery, whereas according to your words he holds that documents are not acquired through delivery?

Rav Dimi said

to Abaye:

Let him dispute!

That is to say: I am not concerned about disputing him.

Abaye said

to him:

This is what I meant to say to you:

I intended to tell you as follows:

The beraita can be resolved only as your master resolves it.

The earlier beraita, in which Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages dispute the case of one who gives a gift to his fellow and then returns the document to him, can be explained only in accordance with Rabba’s statement, that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that documents are acquired through delivery.

If so, is there not a difficulty from Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel?

Rather, Abaye said: With what are we dealing here? With a case, for example,

in which the document in the possessor’s hands was indeed written in his name, but

one of them was found

among the witnesses signed on the document to be

a relative or disqualified.

And they disagree in accordance with the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar: Rabbi follows the view of Rabbi Elazar, who said

with regard to a bill of divorce:

The witnesses of delivery effect the divorce.

The witnesses before whom the bill of divorce was delivered are the essential element of the divorce, and they bring about the “severance”; as a matter of fundamental law, the witnesses who signed it are not needed at all. The same applies to all documents: their essential validity is established solely through the witnesses of delivery. Therefore, it does not concern us here that one of the witnesses who signed the document is disqualified, and the possessor may bring this document, provided that he brings with it the witnesses before whom the document was delivered.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel follows the view of Rabbi Meir, who said

with regard to a bill of divorce:

The witnesses who signed it effect the divorce.

They are the essential element of the bill of divorce, and likewise, with regard to other documents, witnesses who signed it are specifically required. Since one of the witnesses who signed the document is a relative or disqualified, he cannot rely on this document; rather, he must bring the witnesses to the act of ḥazaka.

And we raise an objection:

But Rabbi Abba said: Rabbi Elazar conceded

that although a bill of divorce with no witnesses who signed it at all is valid, nevertheless,

if it is forged from within,

meaning that disqualified witnesses signed it,

it is disqualified.

If so, even according to Rabbi, this document, in which there is a relative or disqualified witness, should be ineffective!?

Rather, Rabbi Avina said: Everyone agrees that if it is written in it

that the court wrote on the document: “

We examined the testimony of the witnesses and found their testimony to be forged,”

that is, one of the witnesses is a relative or disqualified,

it is disqualified—

in accordance with Rabbi Abba.

They disagree

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel

only with regard to a document upon which there are no witnesses at all.

That is, the possessor has such a document, upon which no witnesses signed at all:

Rabbi follows the view of Rabbi Elazar, who said, “The witnesses of delivery effect the divorce,”

and the document is valid even though there are no witnesses on it at all.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel follows the view of Rabbi Meir, who said, “The witnesses who signed it effect the divorce,”

and without witnesses who signed it, the document is disqualified. Therefore, he must bring the witnesses to the act of ḥazaka.

And if you wish, say instead: They disagree with regard to one who admits the document that he wrote,

that is, a debtor who admits that the document in the creditor’s possession is genuine, that he indeed wrote it and that these are its witnesses, and that it is not forged, but claims that the document has been paid: Does

the creditor need

to

to validate it,

this document, through other witnesses, so that the debtor will not retain a migo, since he could have claimed that it was forged? Or does the creditor not need to validate it?

They disagree about this.

This is referring here to a similar case, in which the claimant admits that the document in the possessor’s hands is not forged but was indeed written by him, except that he claims that he had not yet had the opportunity to use it and had never sold the field written in the document [since a document may be written for the seller even when no buyer is with him], and meanwhile he lost the document, while the possessor found it and is using it improperly.

For Rabbi holds: When one admits the document that he wrote, he need not

the creditor

validate it,

because the debtor has already validated it through his admission. And although he claims, “I paid,” he is not believed through the migo that he could have claimed, “It is forged.”

Here too, the possessor may rely on the document in his possession, even though it was validated only by the claimant, who claims that the document fell from him.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: When one admits the document that he wrote, he must

the creditor

validate it,

and as long as he does not validate it, the debtor is believed to claim, “I paid,” through the migo that he could have claimed that the document was forged.

Here too, since the possessor has no witnesses validating the document, it has no force, because the claimant has a migo: he could have invalidated it by claiming that it was forged. Therefore, he must bring the witnesses to the act of ḥazaka.

And we raise an objection:

But we find that they hold the opposite!

Elsewhere we find a dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel concerning whether one who admits the document that he wrote must validate it, the reverse of what is stated here?

As it is taught

in tractate Bava Metzia [7a]:

Two

who were

holding a document

of debt—the creditor and the debtor.

The creditor says: It is mine, and it fell from me, and you found it,

and you have still not repaid your debt.

And the debtor says: It is yours,

meaning, it was yours previously, but afterward

I repaid it to you

and you returned it to me, and it fell from me—

The document shall be validated through its signatures.

The creditor must validate the document, and then he may collect with it, as with any document in the creditor’s possession concerning which the debtor is not believed to claim, “I paid,”

the words of Rabbi.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: They shall divide,

the creditor and the debtor; that is, the debtor pays only half the debt.

And the Gemara discusses: Does Rabbi not accept

that Rabbi holds

that which we learned

at the beginning of tractate Bava Metzia:

Two people holding a garment.

One says: I found it,

meaning that he lifted it first and it belongs to him,

and the other says: I found it

and it is mine—

The law is:

This one shall swear that he has no less than half of it, and that one shall swear that he has no less than half of it.

Each one swears that at least half the garment belongs to him,

and they shall divide.

Here too, since both are holding the document, the law should have been “they shall divide,” so that the creditor and the debtor divide the amount written in the document. Why, then, did Rabbi say that the creditor collects the entire debt stated in the document!?

The Gemara explains:

And Rava said that Rav Naḥman said:

Indeed,

in

a

validated document,

one bearing the court’s confirmation of the signatures,

everyone agrees that they shall divide,

as in the Mishna’s law concerning two people holding a garment.

They disagree with regard to one that is not validated.

The dispute between Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is when they are holding a document that has no court validation, but the debtor admits that it is not forged: Is he required to pay anything at all or not?

Rabbi holds: When one admits the document that he wrote, he must validate it.

And if he validates it,

the creditor validates the document, in which case the debtor cannot claim that it was paid,

he collects half.

The creditor collects half the debt.

And if not,

he does not validate it,

it is merely a potsherd

[a shard of earthenware]

and nothing more,

and he cannot collect anything with it.

And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: When one admits the document that he wrote, he need not validate it.

Therefore, although the document has not been validated, the law is:

and they shall divide.

Thus, the positions of Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel are the reverse of those in our sugya!?

The Gemara explains:

Reverse them!

Reverse the statements of Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in one of the two disputes.

Alternatively, I could say: In fact, do not reverse it.

Rather, here they disagree concerning clarification.

Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel are disputing a different issue in our sugya: Must a person clarify and prove the truth of every claim he makes, even though had he made only one of those claims, he could have prevailed on its basis alone, or not?

This is referring to a case in which the possessor makes two claims: one, that he has a deed of sale for the field from the one challenging his ownership; and the other, that he has held it for three years. Rabbi holds that he is judged on the basis of the deed. That is, although his claim of hazaka alone would have sufficed, since he also claims that he has a deed, he must prove this and produce the deed.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that he is judged on the basis of the hazaka. It is sufficient for him to prove only his hazaka, and he need not also produce the deed [and all the more so, if he produces the deed, he need not also bring witnesses to the hazaka].

As in the case of Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef, who had money owed to him by Rabbi Abba,

similarly, there was an incident in which Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef claimed a debt from Rabbi Abba, but he had no document concerning it.

He came before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa.

They came before Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa for judgment.

He said

Rabbi Abba to Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef:

“I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so!”

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him

to Rabbi Abba:

“Let so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify!”

that they saw you repay him in their presence.

He said to him

Rabbi Abba:

“If they do not come, will I not be believed?”

And if witnesses do not come, am I not believed when I claim that I repaid him privately?

But we have established: If one lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, he need not repay him in the presence of witnesses!?

Rabbi Yitzḥak Nappaḥa said to him

Rabbi Abba:

“In that matter, I hold as you do, in accordance with the teaching of my master,”

in this law I hold as you do, as you stated in the name of Rav.

For Rabbi Abba said that Rav Adda bar Ahava said that Rav said: One who says to another, ‘I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,’ must have so-and-so and so-and-so come and testify.

Although he could have claimed, “I repaid you without witnesses,” since he claims, “I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so,” he must bring them.

Rabbi Abba said to him

Rabbi Abba:

“But Rav Giddel said that Rav said: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel,”

that a person need not prove a claim by which he could have prevailed even without it.

And it is indeed reasonable to rule in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because: