Bava Batra 151b (קנא:) — the Talmud in English

And when she recovered,

when she recovered from her illness,

she would retract it,

she would retract it, in accordance with the law governing a deathbed gift of all of one’s property: If he recovers, he may retract it.

Once, when you became ill,

once, when she fell ill,

she sent him a message: “Come and acquire it!”

She sent word to Rav Yosef that he should come and effect the acquisition.

He sent back: “I do not want to!”

He replied that he did not want to come, since she had always retracted her gift.

She sent him back: “Come and acquire it in whatever manner you wish!”

Come and acquire it in whatever manner you wish.

He went, reserved a portion, and effected an acquisition from her.

He reserved a portion of the property for his sister and effected an acquisition, so that it would be a deathbed gift of part of one’s property,

when she recovered,

as she had recovered, and even if she recovered, she could not retract it.

She retracted it,

when she recovered from her illness, she again retracted it.

She came before Rav Naḥman,

she came before Rav Naḥman in order to annul the gift.

He sent him a message: “Come!”

He sent word to Rav Dimi that he should come.

He did not come.

He did not come.

He said: “Why should I come!? She reserved a portion, and an acquisition was effected from her!”

Rav Dimi said: I have no reason to come and litigate, since this was a gift of part of her property, and she cannot retract it.

Rav Naḥman sent him a message

to Rav Dimi:

“If you do not come,

if you do not come,

I will strike you with a thorn that does not draw blood,”

I will strike you with a painful thorn that does not draw blood! This refers to excommunication.

Rav Dimi bar Yosef came to court before Rav Naḥman.

He said to the witnesses,

Rav Naḥman asked the witnesses:

“What exactly was the incident?”

What was the procedure of the gift?

They said to him: “She said as follows!”

The witnesses said that she had said:

“Woe, for this woman is dying!”

Woe is me, for I am going to die and will not see my brother!

He said to them

Rav Naḥman said:

“If so, this was

that woman

a mitzva prompted by death,”

since she said that she was giving the gift because of her impending death.

And

whoever

gives a mitzva-prompted-by-death gift may retract it

even when the gift consists of only part of his property.

The Gemara now explains the law governing a deathbed gift of part of one’s property.

It was stated: With regard to a deathbed gift of part of one’s property,

what is its legal status?

Rava said in the name of Rav Naḥman: It is like the gift of a healthy person, and it requires an acquisition.

Once,

the Sages said before Rava, in the name of Mar Zutra, son of Rav Naḥman, who said it in the name of Rav Naḥman,

something different from what Rava had said in his name:

“It is like the gift of a healthy person, and it is like the gift of a person on his deathbed.”

This gift has both the laws of a gift from a healthy person and the laws of a deathbed gift.

The Gemara explains:

It is like the gift of a healthy person, in that if he recovers, he cannot retract it.

Since he gave only part of his property, it is presumed that he intended the gift to take effect during his lifetime, as does a gift from a healthy person.

And it is like the gift of a person on his deathbed, in that it does not require an acquisition.

It does not require an acquisition, because he is a person on his deathbed; therefore, the Sages instituted that he acquires the gift without an act of acquisition.

Rava said to them

to those Sages:

“Did I not tell you:’

Did I not tell you:

‘Do not attribute empty words to Rav Naḥman!’

Do not cite nonsense in the name of Rav Naḥman! Rather,

this is what Rav Naḥman said: ‘It is like the gift of a healthy person, and it requires an acquisition.’”

It has the status of a complete gift from a healthy person and requires an acquisition. The Sages instituted that he may retract only a gift of all his property, since such a gift clearly indicates that he is giving because of his impending death.

The Gemara attempts to refute Rav Naḥman’s statement that a deathbed gift of part of one’s property requires an acquisition.

Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman

from what we learned in the Mishna:

“If he reserved any amount of land, his gift stands,”

and he could not retract it when he recovered from his illness.

And Rava deduced: Is it not referring to a case in which no acquisition was effected from him,

even though this was a gift of only part of his property!?

Rav Naḥman rejects this:

“No; it is referring to a case in which an acquisition was effected from him.”

The Mishna is referring to a case involving an acquisition.

But Rava asked:

“If so,

if that is so,

consider the latter clause:

the latter clause will be difficult:

‘If he did not reserve any amount of land, his gift does not stand,’

and if he recovered, he could retract it.

“And if an acquisition was effected from him, why does his gift not stand!?”

If the Mishna is referring to a case involving an acquisition, then even when he gives all his property he should not be able to retract it, because once he effected an acquisition, it is considered a gift from a healthy person.

He said to him

Rav Naḥman said to him:

“This is what Shmuel said: When a person on his deathbed writes all his property to others, even though they effected an acquisition from him,

if

he recovers, he may retract it,

as in the case of a deathbed gift. The reason is that

it is known that he was giving only because of his impending death.”

It is evident to us that he gave only on the understanding that he would die; therefore, if he recovers, he may retract it despite the fact that an acquisition was effected.

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection to Rava: “There was an incident involving the mother of the sons of Rokhel, who was ill, and she said: ‘Let my ‘kavinta’ be given

a piece of jewelry

to my daughter, worth

the value of

twelve maneh, and she died, and the Sages upheld her words,”

after her death. This indicates that they upheld her words and not an acquisition, proving that even a gift of part of one’s property does not require an acquisition.

The Gemara rejects this:

“There, it was a mitzva prompted by death.”

There, she explicitly emphasized that she was giving because she was going to die, and therefore an acquisition was not required, since this too is included in the institution that the words of a person on his deathbed are considered as though they have been written and delivered.

Ravina raised an objection to Rava

from what we learned:

“With regard to one who says: ‘Give this bill of divorce to my wife, and this document of emancipation to my slave,’

one who appointed agents to divorce his wife or emancipate his slave,

they may not give them after his death,”

they may not give the bill of divorce or the document of emancipation after his death, since a bill of divorce cannot take effect after death. After death, she is no longer his wife and the slave is no longer his slave. But if he said:

“Give a maneh to so-and-so,” and he died, they should give it after his death.”

Ostensibly, this is a case without an acquisition, as the Gemara explains:

“And from where do we know that no acquisition was effected from him?”

From where is it known that there was no acquisition?

“It is analogous to a bill of divorce:

it is similar to a bill of divorce;

just as a bill of divorce is not subject to acquisition,

just as it is impossible to divorce a woman by transferring ownership of the bill of divorce to her through an act of acquisition; rather, the bill of divorce must be given into the woman’s hand, and only in that manner is she divorced.

So too here, no acquisition was effected from him.”

Thus, in the case of the gift as well, it is referring to a gift given without an acquisition.

This proves that a deathbed gift of part of one’s property does not require an acquisition.

The Gemara rejects this:

“There too, it was a mitzva prompted by death.”

Therefore, even when the gift consists of only part of his property, no acquisition is required, since it is evident that he is giving because of his impending death.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said,

disagreeing with the explanations stated above, and maintaining:

“Ordinarily, a mitzva prompted by death requires an acquisition,”

since this was a gift of only part of his property, the Sages did not institute that he could transfer it merely through a declaration.

“And when these baraitot were taught,

all the baraitot from which we proved that an acquisition is not required, they were referring to a case of

distributing all his property.

Although he gave so-and-so only a maneh, that was merely one portion of all the property that he was distributing and was not retaining for himself,

for that

they rendered a deathbed gift.”

In such a case, the Sages granted it the status of a deathbed gift, since ultimately he was distributing all his property.

And the halakha is:

but as the halakha, we do not rule in accordance with him; rather:

A deathbed gift of part of one’s property requires an acquisition,

even though he died,

and did not retract it.

But if

it is a mitzva prompted by death, it does not require an acquisition,

even when he gave only part of his property,

provided that he dies.

But if

he recovers, he may retract it!

If he recovers from his illness, he may retract it,

even though an acquisition was effected from him,

despite the fact that an acquisition was also effected, because there is an assessment that he gave only on the condition that he would die.