Bava Batra 146b (קמו:) — the Talmud in English

And she replied to him,

“Who will give us dates from Jericho so that we may eat them?”

Since you have a radish, who will bring us dates from Jericho, as it was customary to eat dates together with a radish. It can be understood from her reply that she had not smelled the radish; rather, since she understood that he had come to test her, she answered him jokingly in this manner. In truth, however, she was indeed בעלת מום.

Afterward,

a ruin collapsed upon her, and she died.

The ruin that stood there fell upon her and she died, and her husband wished to inherit her, in accordance with the law that a husband inherits his wife.

The Sages said: Since he entered only to examine her,

and she was found to be בעלת מום, it follows that he had intended to divorce her; therefore, if

she died, he does not inherit her.

It can be learned from here that if a man’s wife dies during a quarrel, when he had intended to divorce her, he no longer inherits her.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Few betrothal gifts, which she may use in her father’s house”:

The Gemara now summarizes the laws that emerge from the Mishna:

Ravin the Elder sat before Rav Pappa, and sat and said: Whether she died, or he died,

or

he retracted,

meaning that the husband changed his mind—

the betrothal gifts are returned,

referring to betrothal gifts that are not made to be consumed;

but food and drink are not returned,

since they are made to be consumed. All this applies specifically when they were eaten in the house of her father-in-law.

But if

she retracted,

meaning that she was the one who wished to annul the betrothal—

everything is returned, even a bundle of vegetables.

She must return even a bundle of vegetables, which is something of little value, because he does not waive his claim with this in mind.

The Gemara explains how much she must return.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: They assess for them the value of inexpensive meat.

She does not have to return the full value of the food that she ate, but rather the value of inexpensive meat, since had she known that she would have to return it, she would not have spent such a large sum; nevertheless, she must pay the value of inexpensive meat.

The Gemara asks:

How inexpensive?

How much is deducted from the price of the food that she must return?

The Gemara answers:

Up to one-third,

meaning the entire price less one-third. This is called the value of inexpensive meat, and this is what she must return.

Mishna:

If a dangerously ill person wrote all his property over to others,

meaning one who was ill and near death and transferred all his property to others,

but retained any amount of land

for himself, and then recovered from his illness,

his gift stands,

and he cannot retract the gift.

But if he did not retain any amount of land,

but gave away all his property, and then recovered from his illness,

his gift does not stand,

since there is an אומדנא that if he gave away all his property and left nothing for himself, he evidently gave it only on the assumption that he would ultimately die; and if he did not ultimately die, he may retract.

Gemara:

It is evident from the Mishna that an acquisition can be annulled when the reasoning indicates that the entire transfer was made under a particular condition. Therefore, when he gave away all his property, he can retract even though he did not explicitly say that it was his intention to be able to annul the gift if he recovered from his illness.

Therefore, the Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna who follows an אומדנא?

Who is the tanna who maintains that one may rely on an assessment of a person’s intention and thereby annul an acquisition?

Rav Naḥman said: It is Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

If his son had gone overseas, and he heard that his son had died, and

immediately afterward

he arose and wrote all his property over to another,

without specifying that he was transferring it to him because his son had died,

and afterward his son came,

and he wished to annul the gift,

the gift stands,

since he had not explicitly stipulated that this was his intention.

But

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: The gift does not stand;

he may retract the gift,

for had he known that his son was alive,

if he had known that his son had not died,

he would not have written it

over to another.

It is evident that this is his position: an acquisition can be annulled on the basis of an assessment of the person’s intention, and the same applies to our Mishna.

Rav Sheshet said:

We find another tanna who maintains that one may rely on an אומדנא, and our Mishna follows the view of

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

Initially they would say: One who is being taken out in chains,

meaning one who is being led out to be executed by hanging,

and said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,”

so that she would not have to undergo yibbum—even though he did not say that they should deliver it, but only said, “Write,”

they shall indeed write it and deliver it,

since this was certainly his intention. His failure to specify this was because he was preoccupied and distressed. But if another person said, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” they do not deliver it, lest he did not intend to give it.

They subsequently said:

They extended this ruling beyond one in mortal danger to

one who sets sail and one who departs with a caravan;

if they say, “Write a bill of divorce for my wife,” their intention is that they should also deliver it. Their failure to specify this is because they are preoccupied.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Even one in mortal danger

who said, “Write,” has it written and delivered.

His innovation is that although a dangerously ill person has more time to say, “Deliver it,” nevertheless we rely on the אומדנא that his intention was also that it be delivered. But according to the Sages, in the case of one in mortal danger, they do not deliver it.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Naḥman,

who established the Mishna as following Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

what is the reason he did not establish it

as following

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri?

The Gemara answers:

That case is different,

and it cannot serve as proof that one follows an אומדנא, because

he said, “Write,”

and there is partial evidence of his intention that he wished to divorce her, for if not, why did he ask them to write a bill of divorce?

This is unlike our Mishna, where there was no indication of his intention at all.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Sheshet, what is the reason he did not establish it

as following

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya?

The Gemara answers:

A compelling אומדנא is different.

In that case, it is extremely clear that he gave the property only because his son had died, since he gave it only after hearing that his son had died. But in the case of a dangerously ill person, where the אומדנא is not as strong, he may not have said so.

The Gemara attempts to say that the law of the beraita also depends on a dispute between tannaim:

Who is the tanna of this statement,

meaning, according to which tanna does the tanna of the following beraita hold?

The Sages taught:

If one was ill and bedridden, and they said to him: “To whom shall your property belong?”

Since he was a dangerously ill person, they asked him to whom he wished to transfer his property?

And he said to them,