Bava Batra 146b — the Talmud in English

And she answered him,

She said to him: “Who will give us dates from Jericho, and we shall eat it!?”

Since you have a radish, who will bring us dates from Jericho, for it was their practice to eat dates together with a radish. And it may be understood from her answer that she did not smell the radish; rather, since she understood that he had come to test her, she answered him thus by way of jest. But she was in truth a בעלת מום.

Afterward,

a ruin fell upon her, and she died.

The ruin that was there fell upon her and she died, and her husband wished to inherit her, in accordance with the law that a husband inherits his wife.

The Sages said: Since he entered after her only to examine her,

and she was found to be בעלת מום, if so, his intention was to divorce her, and therefore, if

she died, he does not inherit her.

And from here it is possible to learn that one whose wife died amid a quarrel, where he had the intention of divorcing her, no longer inherits her.

We learned in the Mishna:

“Few gifts of betrothal, for her to use in her father’s house”:

The Gemara now summarizes the laws that emerge from the Mishna:

Ravin the Elder sat before Rav Pappa, and he sat and said: Whether she died, or he died,

or

he retracted,

that is, the husband changed his mind—

the gifts of betrothal are returned,

meaning gifts of betrothal that are not subject to deterioration,

but food and drink are not returned,

since they are subject to deterioration. And all this applies specifically if he ate in his father-in-law’s house.

But if

she retracted from it,

she is the one who wishes to annul the betrothal—

she returns even a bundle of vegetables.

She must return even a bundle of vegetables, which is a small matter, for he does not waive it with this intention.

And the Gemara explains how much she must return.

Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: And they assess for them the value of meat at a cheap price.

She does not need to return the entire value of the food that she ate, but rather the value of meat at a cheap price, since if she had known that she would have to return it, she would not have expended so large a sum; but she must pay the value of meat at a cheap price.

The Gemara asks:

How cheap?

How much is deducted from the price of the food that she must return?

The Gemara answers:

Up to one-third,

the entire price less one-third is called the value of meat at a cheap price, and this she must return.

Mishna:

A dangerously ill person who wrote all his property to others,

one who was ill and inclined to die and transferred all his property to others,

but retained any amount of land

for himself, and recovered from his illness,

his gift stands,

and he cannot retract the gift.

But if he did not retain any amount of land,

but gave all his property, and recovered from his illness,

his gift does not stand,

since there is an assessment that if he gave all his property and left nothing for himself, apparently he gave it only on the condition that he would ultimately die; and if he did not ultimately die, he may retract.

Gemara:

It is evident from the Mishna that an acquisition can be annulled if the reasoning indicates that everything he transferred was [given] under a certain condition; therefore, when he gave all his property, he may retract, even though he did not explicitly say that this was his intention—that if he recovered from his illness, he would be able to annul the gift.

And therefore the Gemara asks:

Who is the tanna who follows an assessment?

Who is the tanna who holds that one may rely on an assessment of his intention and thereby annul an acquisition?

Rav Naḥman said: It is Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

It once happened that his son went overseas, and he heard that his son had died, and

immediately afterward

he arose and wrote all his property to another,

but did not explain that he was transferring it to him because his son had died,

and afterward his son came,

and he wished to annul the gift,

his gift is a gift,

since he did not explicitly stipulate that this was his intention.

But

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: His gift is not a gift,

and he may retract the gift,

for had he known that his son was alive,

if he had known that his son had not died,

he would not have written them

to another.

And it is evident that this is his position: that an acquisition may be annulled through an assessment of intention; and the same applies to our Mishna.

Rav Sheshet said:

We have found another tanna who holds that one may rely on an assessment, and our Mishna is according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri.

As it was taught

in a beraita:

At first they would say: One who is taken out in chains,

one whom they are taking out to be executed by hanging,

and says: “Write a get for my wife,”

so that she will not have to undergo levirate marriage—even though he did not say that they should deliver it, but only said, “Write,”

they shall write and deliver it,

since this was certainly his intention. And the fact that he did not explain it was because he was preoccupied and distressed. But in the case of another person who says, “Write a get for my wife,” they do not deliver it, lest he does not intend to give it.

They went back and said:

They added to the dangerously ill person

also one who sets sail and one who goes out with a caravan,

that if they say, “Write a get for my wife,” their intention is that they should also deliver it. And the fact that they did not explain it is because they are preoccupied.

Rabbi Shimon Shezuri says: Also the dangerously ill person

who said “Write”—they also write and deliver.

And his innovation is that although a dangerously ill person has more leisure to say “Deliver,” nevertheless they rely on the assessment that his intention is also to deliver it. But according to the Sages, in the case of a dangerously ill person they do not deliver it.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Naḥman,

who established the Mishna according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya,

for what reason does he not establish it

why did he not establish the Mishna

according to Rabbi Shimon Shezuri!?

The Gemara answers:

That case is different,

from there it is impossible to prove that one follows an assessment, because since

he said, “Write,”

there is here a partial revelation of intention that he wishes to divorce her; for if not, why did he ask that a get be written?

This is unlike our Mishna, where there was no revelation of intention at all.

The Gemara asks:

And Rav Sheshet, for what reason does he not establish it

why does he not establish the Mishna

according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya!?

And the Gemara answers:

A clearly evident assessment is different.

There it is very clearly evident that he gave only because his son had died, since he gave only when he heard that his son had died. But perhaps in the case of a dangerously ill person, where there is no strong assessment, he did not say [that he intended to retract].

The Gemara attempts to say that the law of the beraita as well depends on the dispute between the tannaim:

Who is the tanna for this,

according to which tanna does the tanna of the following beraita hold?

For the Sages taught:

It once happened that he was ill and lying in bed, and they said to him: “To whom [are] your possessions?”

Since he was a dangerously ill person, they asked him to whom he wished to transfer his possessions?

And he said to them,