Bava Batra 145a (קמה.) — the Talmud in English

What is the reason?

The reason is that

she can say

“Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him.”

Since she is ready to fulfill her obligation and marry him, and the entire delay is on his part, she need not return the money.

Here, too,

the same should apply to shushvinut:

let us say, “Give me my shushvin, and I will rejoice with him,”

so that she should not have to return the money to the other brothers.

Rav Yosef said: Here, with what are we dealing?

We are dealing with shushvinut in a case

where he rejoiced with him for the seven days of feasting, but the shushvin

had not managed

to repay him

and return his gift to him

before he died,

the groom. Therefore, she pays his brothers.

The Gemara analyzes this:

Shall we say

that the claim

“Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him” is subject to a tannaitic dispute?

The tannaim disagreed whether one may make this claim and thereby be exempt from returning the betrothal money.

As it was taught:

we learned in a beraita:

If one betroths a woman

and divorces her, or if he dies,

a virgin collects

for her ketuba

two hundred zuz, and a widow

collects

one hundred zuz. In a place where the custom is to return the betrothal money

[as will be explained],

it is returned. In a place where the custom is not to return the betrothal money, it is not returned; this is the statement of Rabbi Natan.

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: In truth, they said that in a place where the custom is to return

[as will be explained],

it is returned, and in a place where the custom is not to return it, it is not returned; this is the statement of Rabbi Natan.

The Gemara infers from this that there is apparently cause for wonder:

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi—that is the first tanna!

For both of them say the same thing: The matter depends on the local custom.

Rather, is it not

necessarily evident that the difference between them concerns the claim

“Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him”?

Their disagreement concerns whether the woman must return the betrothal money when the delay is on the husband’s part.

And the text is incomplete,

for something is missing from the wording of the beraita.

And this is what it teaches:

it should be emended as follows:

If one betroths a woman

and divorces her or dies,

a virgin collects two hundred zuz, and a widow one hundred zuz. In what case is this statement said?

In a case where she collects the ketuba and does not return the betrothal money:

where he changed his mind,

the husband retracting and wishing to divorce her. Therefore, the woman need not return the money, since he caused the annulment of the betrothal.

But if she dies,

the woman, then

in a place where the custom is to return it, it is returned; in a place where the custom is not to return it, it is not returned.

And this applies specifically when she dies.

All this is when the annulment of the betrothal depends on her.

But if he dies,

so that the betrothal is annulled because of him,

the betrothal money is not returned

by her.

What is the reason?

She can say: “Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him!”

Since she is prepared to fulfill the marriage.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi came to say,

Rabbi Yehuda came to disagree and say:

“In truth, they said: Whether he dies or she dies, in a place where the custom is to return it, it is returned; in a place where the custom is not to return it, it is not returned.

And she cannot say, ‘Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him’!”

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree with regard to this reasoning.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

this is not the matter of their disagreement. Rather,

everyone,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, maintains:

She can say, “Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him.”

Therefore, in a case where

he dies,

the husband,

everyone agrees

that she does not return the betrothal money.

When they disagree

is with regard to a case

where she dies.

And here, they disagree with regard to whether the betrothal money was given for forfeiture—

that is the issue of their disagreement.

The question is whether, at the time of the betrothal, the betrother intended to give the betrothal money only on the understanding that they would ultimately marry, so that if she died the money would return to him, or not, as will be explained.

Rabbi Natan holds that betrothal money is not given for forfeiture,

and therefore she must return it, and the money does not remain “forfeited” to her.

And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi

disagrees and

holds that betrothal money is given for forfeiture,

meaning that his intention is to give the money so that it will remain with her in every case, as though it were “forfeited” to her, and she need not return it.

But the Gemara asks about Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s reasoning: If he holds that betrothal money is given for forfeiture, and he waives his claim to the money,

but we learned: In a place where the custom is to return it, it is returned,

how can the custom require its return? The betrother gave the woman the money on the condition that it remain with her; surely this does not depend on the local custom.

The Gemara answers:

This is what he is saying:

This is Rabbi Yehuda’s intent:

“As for engagement gifts, certainly, in a place where the custom is to return them, they are returned.”

The reference is to gifts that the groom sent to his betrothed. They were not given for forfeiture; rather, his intention was that if they did not ultimately marry, the gifts would be returned to him. But the betrothal money is not returned, since he gives that money for forfeiture.

According to the Gemara’s conclusion, that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Natan disagree over whether betrothal money is given for forfeiture, another dispute may be attributed to their disagreement:

And these tannaim

in the beraita below maintain

in accordance with those tannaim,

like Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Natan.

As it was taught:

we learned in a beraita:

If he betrothed her with a talent,

meaning that one betrothed a woman with a silver talent containing twenty-five maneh and ultimately divorced her,

a virgin collects two hundred zuz, and a widow one hundred zuz,

as the Gemara will explain below with regard to what case this refers,

this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Rabbi Yehuda says: A virgin collects two hundred zuz

and a widow one hundred zuz;

she takes the amount of her ketuba from the silver talent that she received for the betrothal,

and returns the remainder to him.

She returns to the betrother whatever remains of the talent.

Rabbi Yosei says:

If

he betrothed her with twenty, he gives her thirty half-units.

And if

he betrothed her with thirty, he gives her twenty half-units.

The Gemara explains the words of the beraita.

With what are we dealing?

In what case does the beraita say that the woman receives her ketuba?

If we say that she died,

if the case is that the woman died,

does she have a ketuba?!

After all, she receives a ketuba only if her husband dies or divorces her.

Rather, it is that he died,

the husband, and therefore she receives a ketuba. But if so, this is difficult:

Why does she return the remainder to him,

why, according to Rabbi Yehuda, does she return the remainder of the betrothal money?

Let us say: “Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him!”

She is prepared to marry him, and the entire delay is only on his part; why, then, must she return the money? It was already explained above that everyone holds that she may claim, “Give me my husband, and I will rejoice with him.”

Rather, it is a case of a married Israelite woman who committed adultery

while married, and therefore her husband wishes to divorce her.

The Gemara considers this:

And in what circumstances

did the adultery occur?

If it was voluntary,

if she committed adultery willingly,

does she have a ketuba

when her husband divorces her for this reason? Since she rendered herself forbidden to her husband, she forfeits her ketuba.

Rather, it was under duress,

and if you wish to say that the adultery occurred under duress, then

she is permitted to him

and he need not divorce her. And if he nevertheless wishes to divorce her, she need not return the betrothal money!

Rather, it is a case of the wife of a koen who was raped.

The case is that of the wife of a koen, who is forbidden to her husband even after being raped, and therefore he must divorce her. But since it occurred under duress, she does not forfeit her ketuba. The tannaim’s dispute

concerns whether betrothal money is given for forfeiture,

whether the betrothal money must be returned at the time of the divorce.

Rabbi Meir holds that betrothal money is given for forfeiture,

and therefore she receives her ketuba and does not return the talent that she received for the betrothal.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is not given for forfeiture,

and therefore she takes the amount of her ketuba from the talent and must return the remainder to her husband.

And Rabbi Yosei is uncertain whether it was given for forfeiture or whether it was not,

and therefore, in a case of property of uncertain ownership, they divide it, as he holds with regard to all property of uncertain ownership.

Accordingly,

if

he betrothed her with twenty

shekels, which are eighty zuz [there are four zuz in each shekel], and there is uncertainty whether she must return this money, they divide it because of the uncertainty. Therefore, she receives forty, and she collects the remaining forty toward her ketuba. If she is a widow, who receives one maneh, which is one hundred zuz, her husband must add to it:

he gives her thirty half-units,

thirty half-shekels, and each half-shekel is two zuz. Thus, thirty half-shekels equal sixty zuz, so that she receives one hundred zuz, the amount of her ketuba.

And if

he betrothed her with thirty

shekels, which are one hundred twenty zuz, she receives half because of the uncertainty, namely sixty, and he must add enough to bring the total to one hundred zuz. Therefore,

he gives her twenty half-units,

which equal forty zuz, and in total she has received one hundred zuz. This is the Gemara’s intent above in saying that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda disagree in the same dispute as Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

The Gemara’s halakhic conclusion is:

Rav Yosef bar Minyomi said that Rav Naḥman said: In every place where the custom is to return

the betrothal money,

it is returned,

since they hold that betrothal money is not given for forfeiture, and therefore the matter depends on the local custom.

And the reference is to Nehardea,

that is, ordinary towns: If they are adjacent to Nehardea, where the money is returned, they are treated like Nehardea.

The Gemara is uncertain:

What is the status of the rest of Babylonia?

Do the other cities of Babylonia follow Nehardea and likewise have to return the money, or not?

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say: Engagement gifts are returned;

the gifts that the groom sends to the bride after the betrothal must be returned.

Betrothal money is not returned.

The betrothal money need not be returned. This does not depend on the local custom, since they hold that betrothal money is given for forfeiture.

Rav Pappa said: The halakha is—

whether he dies or she dies, and he changes his mind,

if the husband retracts his intention regarding the betrothal and does not wish to marry her,

engagement gifts are returned, but betrothal money is not returned.

She must return the engagement gifts, but she does not return the betrothal money.

But if

she changes her mind,

if the woman wishes to annul the betrothal,

even the betrothal money is returned.

She also returns the betrothal money, since although we hold that betrothal money is given for forfeiture and the betrother gave it on the condition that it remain with her, nevertheless, if she retracts, his intention is that she return the money.

It follows that Rav Pappa, too, holds that betrothal money is given for forfeiture and does not depend on the local custom; he merely adds that if she retracts, she must return it.

Ameimar said:

He disagrees and maintains that in every case

betrothal money is not returned, lest people say that the betrothal was invalid and that betrothal takes effect with her sister.

If people see that she returns the betrothal money, they will think that the betrothal was mistaken and will say that she is permitted to him. Therefore, even when she retracts, she does not return the betrothal money.

Rav Ashi said:

He does not accept Ameimar’s decree, since

the bill of divorce demonstrates her status,

for he divorces her with a bill of divorce, and it is therefore evident that she was his wife. It is only that she nevertheless must return the betrothal money. Consequently, there is no basis for decreeing lest people say that betrothal takes effect with her sister.

But the Gemara rejects Rav Ashi’s objection:

But Rav Ashi’s statement is nonsense.

His words are incorrect because

there are those who hear this but do not hear that.

Some people may know that the betrothal money was returned but not know that he divorced her with a bill of divorce. Therefore, there is still concern lest they say that betrothal takes effect with her sister.

We learned in the Mishna:

that shushvinut is collected in court:

We learned in the Mishna that shushvinut is a complete debt, and therefore one may bring a claim for its fulfillment before the court.

The Gemara cites a beraita that adds further laws derived from this:

The Sages taught: Five matters

laws

were stated with regard to shushvinut,

as the Gemara will explain them below.

a.

It is collected in court.

Since it is an ordinary debt, he may demand that the obligation be fulfilled.

b.

And it is returned at its proper time.

He must return it when the original contributor marries, and not beforehand. Even if he wishes to return it, the recipient may refuse, because he also wishes the contributor to rejoice with him on his day of celebration.

c.

And it does not involve interest

if he returns more than he received from him. The reason will be explained below.