Bava Batra 138b — the Talmud in English

But

if he said "

Give two hundred zuz to my wife

in her ketuba" ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page location")

she has the upper hand; she wants

to

take them, if her ketuba is less than this sum.

her marriage settlement is less than this amount.

She wants

to

take her ketuba, if her ketuba is greater than two hundred zuz .

if her marriage settlement is more than two hundred zuz.

And

likewise

a shakhiv mera who said, "Give two hundred zuz to so-and-so, my creditor, as is fitting for him," he takes them and takes his debt.

And if he said "

Give two hundred zuz to so-and-so

against his debt," he takes them against his debt .

This is the end of the baraita.

And the Gemara objects:

Because he said, "as is fitting for him," he takes them and takes his debt?! Perhaps he meant, "as is fitting for him against his debt"?

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me, this is whose opinion?

The opinion of this baraita is

that of Rabbi Akiva, for he carefully interprets an extra expression.

And since he added a superfluous expression, certainly his intention is to confer upon him something in addition to his debt.

And where were the words of Rabbi Akiva taught?

For we learned

above, in the chapter "One who sells a house" (64a): "One who sells a house does not sell

... nor the cistern, nor the cellar, even though he wrote for him the depths and the heights; and he must purchase a way for him. These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Rabbis say: he need not purchase a way for him.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when he said to him, "Except for these," he need not purchase a way for him.

Evidently,

Rabbi Akiva holds that

since it is not necessary

to say, "Except for these,"

and

nevertheless

he said it,

certainly

it comes to add something

[he came to add some matter], and therefore he need not purchase a way for him.

Here too, since it is not necessary

to say, "as is fitting for him,"

and

nevertheless

he said it, it comes to add something.

The Sages taught

in a baraita:

A shakhiv mera who said, "I have a maneh with so-and-so," the witnesses write

what they heard from him, in this wording: "Record of testimony that was before us, that so-and-so, a shakhiv mera, said that so-and-so owed him a maneh; and what we heard, we wrote and signed."

They may write this

even though they do not recognize

and know that he owes him.

Therefore,

since the witnesses write even without knowing whether the matter is true or not,

when he

[that is, the heir]

collects, he must bring proof

of his words.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: they do not

the witnesses

write unless they recognize.

Therefore, when he collects, he need not bring proof

since the document testifies in accordance with his words, and witnesses who signed a document are considered as one whose testimony was investigated in a court. This is the end of the baraita.

Rav Naḥman said: Huna said to me: teach

[read in this baraita the opposite],

"Rabbi Meir says: they do not write, and the Rabbis say: they write."

And even Rabbi Meir

agrees according to the law with the Rabbis that they may write.

And he did not say

that they should not write

except because of

his concern for

a mistaken court.

That is, they are concerned lest a court err and think that the witnesses demanded and investigated the matter, and it became clear to them that that so-and-so owed him a maneh. And since they signed the document, they are considered as one whose testimony was investigated in a court, and they will extract money by virtue of the document.

Therefore, they enacted that they should write only if the matter became clear to them.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: the halakha is

that they write even though they do not recognize, and

they are not concerned about a mistaken court.

And the Gemara objects:

And what is different from the case of Rava, for Rava said:

a yavam and a yevama who come before us to perform halitza,

we do not perform halitza

for them

unless we recognize

that he is the yavam fit for halitza.

And

likewise, a minor girl who wished to refuse her husband before a court,

we do not allow refusal unless we recognize.

Therefore,

the witnesses who saw the act of halitza in a court

write a document of halitza and a document of refusal, even though they do not recognize

that he is the yavam fit to perform halitza. For certainly the court recognized them when they performed halitza and refused. Therefore, if they wrote for her, "We saw that she performed halitza or refused before so-and-so," she may marry on the basis of this document.

This is the end of Rava's words.

And the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

that we do not perform halitza and do not allow refusal unless we recognize

? Is it not

that is, is it not

because we are concerned about a mistaken court?!

And this is not in accordance with the halakha that we said above, that we are not concerned about a mistaken court?

And the Gemara answers:

No.

Indeed, in general we are not concerned about a mistaken court.

Only concerning halitza and refusals are we concerned about a mistaken court, because

one court after another does not

investigate carefully .

And they will err, saying that the first court investigated the matter fully.

But in general, there is no concern that a court will err and rely on the earlier witnesses without examination, since

one court after witnesses investigates carefully.

Mishna:

As a continuation of the previous Mishna (above, 136a), our Mishna too discusses the law of a father who wrote his property to his sons after his death:

As stated above, one who writes his property to his sons after death: they acquire the land immediately, and the produce after death.

Therefore,

the father

who wrote his property to his son after his death

plucks and feeds

from the produce of his property during his lifetime

to anyone he wishes.

For as long as he has not died, the produce belongs to him.

And what he left

at his death

detached,

he had already acquired it during his lifetime, and

it belongs to

the other

heirs,

and not to the recipient of the gift.

But what remained attached to the land belongs to his son.

Even if the produce was ready to be plucked . And it will be explained in the Gemara.

Gemara:

It is explained in the Mishna that only detached produce that the father plucked during his lifetime belongs to the heirs, but what was attached to the land they do not inherit; rather, it is to be given to the recipient of the gift.

And the Gemara objects:

Detached—yes; attached—not?!