Bava Batra 138b (קלח:) — the Talmud in English

But

if he said “

Give my wife two hundred zuz

as part of her ketuba”

she has the upper hand; she may take them if she wishes,

if

she wishes to take them,

when her ketuba is less than this sum.

If she wishes

to

take her ketuba,

when her ketuba is greater than two hundred zuz.

And

likewise,

if a dangerously ill person said, “Give two hundred zuz to so-and-so, my creditor, as is fitting for him,” he takes them and also takes his debt.

But if he said “

Give two hundred zuz to so-and-so

toward his debt,” he takes them toward his debt.

This concludes the baraita.

And the Gemara asks:

Because he said, “as is fitting for him,” does he take them and also take his debt? Perhaps he meant, “as is fitting for him toward his debt”?

Rav Naḥman said that Huna said: Whose opinion is this?

This baraita is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Akiva, for he interprets an extraneous expression.

Since he added an unnecessary expression, his intention was certainly to grant him something beyond his debt.

And where are the words of Rabbi Akiva taught?

As we learned

above, in the chapter “One Who Sells a House” (64a): “One who sells a house has not sold ...

nor the pit, nor the cistern, even though he wrote for him ‘depth and height,’ and he must acquire a path for him. These are the words of Rabbi Akiva.

And the Rabbis say: He need not acquire a path for him.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes that when he said to him, ‘Except for these,’ he need not acquire a path for him.”

Evidently,

Rabbi Akiva held that

since there was no need

to say “except for these,”

and

nevertheless

he said it,

it certainly

comes to add something [

it comes to add something]; therefore, he need not acquire a path for him.

Here too, since there was no need

to say “as is fitting for him,”

and

nevertheless

he said it, it comes to add something.

The Sages taught

in a baraita:

If a dangerously ill person said, “I have one hundred dinars with so-and-so,” the witnesses write

what they heard from him, in the following language: “A record of testimony that took place before us: So-and-so, a dangerously ill person, said that so-and-so owes him one hundred dinars; and what we heard, we wrote and signed.”

They may write this

even though they do not recognize

and know that he owes him.

Therefore,

since the witnesses write even without knowing whether the matter is true,

when he

that is, the heir

collects, he must bring proof

of his claim.

These are the words of Rabbi Meir.

And the Rabbis say: The witnesses do not

write

unless they recognize him.

Therefore, when he collects, he need not bring proof

since the document testifies in accordance with his claim, and witnesses who signed a document are considered as though their testimony had been examined in court. This concludes the baraita.

Rav Naḥman said that Huna said: Teach

this baraita in the reverse manner:

“Rabbi Meir says: They do not write, and the Rabbis say: They write.”

And even Rabbi Meir

by law agrees with the Rabbis that they may write.

He did not say

that they should not write

except because

he was concerned about

an erring court.

That is, they are concerned lest the court err and think that the witnesses investigated and examined the matter, and it became clear to them that this person owed him one hundred dinars. Since they signed the document, they are considered as though their testimony had been examined in court, and the court will extract money on the basis of the document.

Therefore, they enacted that they should not write unless the matter became clear to them.

Rav Dimi of Nehardea said: The halakha is

that they write even though they do not recognize him,

and we are not concerned about an erring court.

And the Gemara asks:

And how is this different from the statement of Rava, as Rava said:

a levir and a yevama who come before us for ḥalitza,

we do not perform ḥalitza

for them

unless we recognize

that he is the levir fit to perform ḥalitza.

And

likewise, when a minor wishes to refuse her husband before a court,

we do not effect refusal unless we recognize them.

Therefore,

the witnesses who saw the act of ḥalitza in court

write a document of ḥalitza or a document of refusal, even though they do not recognize

that he is the levir fit to perform ḥalitza. For certainly the court recognized them when they performed ḥalitza or effected refusal. Therefore, if they wrote for her, “We saw that she performed ḥalitza or effected refusal with so-and-so,” she may marry on the basis of this document.

This concludes Rava’s statement.

And the Gemara infers:

What is the reason

that we do not perform ḥalitza or effect refusal unless we recognize them

? Is it not

the case that

it is because we are concerned about an erring court?!

And this is not in accordance with the halakha stated above, that we are not concerned about an erring court?

The Gemara answers:

No.

In general, we are not concerned about an erring court.

Only with regard to ḥalitza and refusal are we concerned about an erring court, because

one court does not

carefully examine after another court.

And they will err, saying that the first court investigated the matter fully.

But in general, there is no concern that a court will err by relying on the earlier witnesses without investigation, since

one court carefully examines after witnesses.

Mishna:

As a continuation of the previous Mishna (above, 136a), this Mishna too discusses the law concerning a father who wrote his property to his sons after his death:

As stated above, when one writes his property to his sons after his death, they acquire the land immediately, and its produce after his death.

Therefore,

the father

who wrote his property to his son after his death

may pluck and feed

from the produce of his property during his lifetime

to anyone he wishes.

For as long as he has not died, the produce is his.

And whatever he left

at his death

detached

has already been acquired during his lifetime,

and it belongs to

the other

heirs,

and not to the recipient of the gift.

However, whatever remained attached to the land belongs to his son.

Even if the produce was ready to be plucked. The Gemara will explain this.

Gemara:

The Mishna indicates that only detached produce that the father plucked during his lifetime belongs to the heirs, whereas whatever remained attached to the land is not inherited by them; rather, it is given to the recipient of the gift.

And the Gemara asks:

If it is detached, yes; but if it is attached, no?!