Bava Batra 134b (קלד:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection:

“In order to inherit from him? It is obvious

that he is believed. Since he can give him his property as a gift, and consequently is believed when he says, ‘He is my son’” , what novel point did the tanna of our Mishna teach us?

You might say: The tanna needed to teach this law—that he is believed

to exempt his wife from yibbum

in the Mishna.

Still, he has taught us nothing new, for

we already learned this as well

in tractate Kiddushin (64a):

“One who said at the time of his death, ‘I have sons,’

and my wife is not subject to yibbum,

is believed.

But if we did not know that he had brothers, and he said,

‘I have brothers,’

and my wife is subject to yibbum from them,

he is not believed

to render her forbidden,” as will be explained below.

And why did the tanna repeat this law in our Mishna?

And the Gemara answers:

There,

the Mishna in Kiddushin is speaking

of a brother not established for us,

that is, we did not know whether that man had sons or brothers.

Accordingly, had it not been for his statement, his wife would have been exempt from yibbum. Therefore, if he said, “I have sons,” he is believed, since he does not thereby impose any obligation upon her. But if he said, “I have brothers,” he is not believed to render her forbidden.

However,

here,

in our Mishna, the tanna taught that he is believed to say, “I have sons,”

even though a brother is established for him,

and had it not been for his statement, she would have been obligated in yibbum; nevertheless, he is believed to exempt her from yibbum.

The Gemara explains the source for the husband’s credibility in exempting his wife from yibbum:

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel: For what reason did they say

that one who says

“This is my son” is believed

to exempt his wife from yibbum? And why is he believed to permit his wife to marry anyone without yibbum?

Since a husband who says, “I divorced my wife,” is believed.

Since he can divorce her now in our presence, here too he is believed to exempt her from yibbum, by virtue of the fact that he could say, “I divorced her.”

Rav Yosef said: Master of Abraham !

Is it possible to say that Shmuel

bases a matter that is taught on one that is not taught?

That is, Shmuel bases the Mishna, “One who says, ‘This is my son,’ is believed,” on a reason that is written neither in the Mishna nor in a beraita; and that reason itself also requires an explanation as to why “a husband who says, ‘I divorced my wife,’ is believed.” It follows that he bases the primary matter on what is secondary to it.

Rather,

said Rav Yosef,

if this is what was stated, this is how it was stated

[If these words of Shmuel were said, they were said as follows]:

Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel: For what reason did they say, ‘This is my son,’ is believed? Since he has the power to divorce her

and exempt her from yibbum, he is believed to say, “I have sons,” and to exempt her from yibbum.

Rav Yosef said: Now that you have said that we apply the principle of “since,”

one can derive an additional law from here:

A husband who says, “I divorced my wife,” is believed, since he has the power to divorce her.

When Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan had said: A husband who says, “I divorced my wife,” is not believed.

Rav Sheshet waved his hands, and Rav Yosef’s principle of “since” was gone.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

Is that so? But Rav Hiyya bar Avin said that Rabbi Yohanan had said: A husband who says, “I divorced my wife,” is believed?

It is not difficult.

Here, it is with regard to the past; there, it is with regard to the future.

They raised a dilemma: If he said

“I divorced my wife”

with regard to the past, what is the ruling regarding believing him with regard to the future?

That is, although he is not believed with regard to the past, should we nevertheless believe him that she is divorced from this point onward?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Do we divide his statement,

[do we separate his statement and believe him from this point onward],

or do we not divide his statement,

and just as we do not believe him with regard to the past, we do not believe him with regard to the future either?

And

Rav Mari and Rav Zevid

disagreed concerning this matter. One said: We divide his statement; and the other said: We do not divide his statement.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

What is different

about this case

from

the case of

Rava

cited below?

For Rava said:

One who says before a court,

“So-and-so had intercourse with my wife,” he and another join together to have him executed.

But he is believed only

to have him executed, and not to have her executed.

Since with regard to his wife, he is a relative and therefore disqualified from giving testimony.

It is evident that we divide his statement; so why did they disagree about this matter here?

And the Gemara answers: There, where he testified

about two bodies,

his wife and the adulterer,

we divide

his statement.

But in the case under discussion, where he testified

about one body,

the same woman,

we do not divide

his statement, to believe him from this point onward but not with regard to the past.