Bava Batra 134b — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara raises an objection:

“To inherit from him?! It is obvious

that he is trusted. Since he can give him his property as a gift, and on that basis is trusted to say, “He is my son” , what did the tanna of the Mishna teach us anew?

Lest you say: this law—that he is trusted

to exempt his wife from yibbum—was needed

for the tanna to teach anew in the Mishna,

even so, he has not taught us anything new, for

we have also learned this

in tractate Kiddushin (64a):

“One who said at the time of his death, ‘I have sons,’

and my wife is not subject to yibbum,

is trusted.

But if we did not know that he had brothers, and he said,

“I have brothers,”

and my wife is subject to yibbum from them,

he is not trusted

to forbid her,” as will be explained below.

And for what purpose did the tanna repeat and teach this law in our Mishna?

And the Gemara answers:

There,

in the Mishna in Kiddushin, it is speaking

of one who was not established for us as having a brother,

that is, we did not know that that man had either sons or brothers.

And if so, were it not for his words, his wife would be exempt from yibbum. Therefore, if he said, “I have sons,” he is trusted, since he imposes no obligation upon her. But if he said, “I have brothers,” he is not trusted to forbid her.

However,

here,

in our Mishna, the tanna taught anew that he should be trusted to say, “I have sons,”

even though he was established as having a brother,

and were it not for his words she would be obligated in yibbum, and nevertheless he is trusted to exempt her from yibbum.

The Gemara explains what the source is for the husband’s trustworthiness to exempt his wife from yibbum:

Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel: “Why did they say that

one who says

‘This is my son’ is trusted

to exempt his wife from yibbum? And why is he trusted to permit his wife to remarry without yibbum?

Since a husband who says, ‘I divorced my wife,’ is trusted.

Since he can divorce her now in our presence, here too he is trusted to exempt her from yibbum, by virtue of his ability to say, “I divorced her.”

Rav Yosef said: “Master of Abraham

! Is it possible to say that Shmuel

makes a dependent matter depend upon a matter that is not established?”

That is, Shmuel makes the Mishna “One who says, ‘This is my son,’ is trusted” depend upon a reason that is written neither in the Mishna nor in a beraita, and he too requires a reason in itself as to why “a husband who says, ‘I divorced my wife,’ is trusted.” It follows that he made the primary matter depend upon what is secondary to it.

Rather,

said Rav Yosef,

if it was stated, this is how it was stated

(if these words of Shmuel were said, they were said as follows):

“Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel: Why did they say, ‘This is my son’ is trusted? Since it is in his power to divorce her

and exempt her from yibbum, he is trusted to say, “I have sons,” and to exempt her from yibbum.

Rav Yosef said: “Now that you have said that we apply ‘since,’

one can learn an additional law from here:

a husband who says, ‘I divorced my wife,’ is trusted, since it is in his power to divorce her.”

When Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef came, he said that Rabbi Yohanan said: “A husband who says, ‘I divorced my wife,’ is not trusted.”

Rav Sheshet waved his hand, and Rav Yosef’s ‘since’ was gone.

And the Gemara raises an objection:

“Is that so? But Rav Hiyya bar Avin said that Rabbi Yohanan: ‘A husband who says, “I divorced my wife,” is trusted’?”

It is not difficult.

Here it is retroactively; there it is from now onward.

They raised a dilemma: He said

“I divorced my wife”

retroactively—what is the law concerning trusting him from now onward?

That is, although he is not trusted retroactively, nevertheless shall we trust him that she is divorced from now onward?

And the sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we divide his statement,

[do we divide his statement and trust him from now onward],

or do we not divide his statement,

and just as we do not trust him retroactively, we do not trust him from now onward.

And they disagreed concerning this matter,

Rav Mari and Rav Zevid.

One said, “We divide,” and one said, “We do not divide.”

And the Gemara raises an objection:

“What is different

about this case

from

the law of

Rava

cited below?

For Rava said:

If one says in the presence of a court,

“So-and-so had intercourse with my wife,” he and another join together to execute him.

And he is trusted only

to execute him, but not to execute her.

Since with regard to his wife he is a close relative, disqualified from giving testimony.

And it is explained that we divide his statement; so why did they disagree concerning this matter here?

And the Gemara answers: There, where he testified

concerning two persons,

concerning his wife and the adulterer,

we divide

his statement.

But in our case, where he testified

concerning one person,

concerning that same woman,

we do not divide

his statement, to trust him from now onward but not retroactively.