Bava Batra 124b (קכד:) — the Talmud in English

What is the reason?

It is uncertain to him

whether the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi

only

when he disagrees with a single colleague

that is, when only one tanna disagrees with him],

but not when he disagrees with his colleagues

and the halakha is not in accordance with him when many disagree with him. Here, where many disagree with him, the halakha is not in accordance with him.

Or the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi even when he disagrees with his colleagues.

Therefore, if the judge ruled in accordance with either of them, we do not reverse his ruling.

Rav Naḥman said that Rav said: It is forbidden

to act in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion.

And if one did so, his ruling is void.

And this means that he

holds that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi when he disagrees with a single colleague, but not when he disagrees with his colleagues.

And Rav Naḥman, in his own view

[in his own name]

said: It is permitted to act in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion.

He

holds that the halakha is in accordance with Rabbi when he disagrees with a single colleague, and even when he disagrees with his colleagues.

Rava said: It is forbidden to act in accordance with Rabbi’s opinion, but if one did so, the action remains valid.

He holds that it was stated: “They incline.”

That is, it was stated in the beit-midrash that the ruling should be inclined toward the Rabbis—to adjudicate in accordance with their opinion initially. Nevertheless, if the ruling was issued in accordance with Rabbi, we do not reverse the ruling.

Rav Naḥman taught in “the other Sifrei de-Bei Rav”

[“Sifrei de-Bei Rav” means the Torat Kohanim] , and Rav Naḥman had the following version in them:

“Of all that is found in his possession”—this excludes appreciation produced by the heirs after their father’s death. But appreciation that the assets

produced

on their own after their father’s death, he takes.

And whose opinion is this? It is Rabbi’s.

As stated above.

Conversely,

Rami bar Ḥama taught in “the other Sifrei de-Bei Rav”: “Of all that is found in his possession”—this excludes appreciation produced by the assets

on their own

after their father’s death; and all the more so, appreciation produced by the heirs after their father’s death, which he does not take.

And whose opinion is this? It is that of the Rabbis.

This concludes the discussion concerning the ruling on the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis. However, in the final analysis, we rely on the statement of Rav Pappa cited below (125b), who ruled in accordance with the Rabbis. Since Rav Pappa was the last of all the amoraim cited above, [his ruling is authoritative].

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: A firstborn does not take a double portion of a loan

documented by a promissory note.

The Gemara raises a difficulty:

According to whom?

That is, in accordance with which opinion did Rabbi Yehuda consider it necessary to state this law?

If you say it is according to

the opinion of

the Rabbis,

it is obvious!

Now

even

appreciation that is in his possession

such as a pit that became produce, as stated above],

the Rabbis say that he does not take,

meaning that the firstborn does not take a double portion of it;

a

loan, which is not in his possession at all,

need it be stated?!

Rather, it is according to

the opinion of

Rabbi.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that even according to Rabbi, the firstborn does not take a double portion of a loan, since it is not in his possession at all; he has merely a piece of paper in his hand, and it is entirely a prospective asset.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so,

then regarding that which was taught in a beraita: “If they inherited a promissory note, the firstborn takes a double portion both of the principal and of the interest”—whose opinion is this? It is neither Rabbi’s nor the Rabbis’?!

Therefore, the Gemara retracts and explains Rabbi Yehuda’s statement:

Actually,

he innovated his ruling

according to

the opinion of

the Rabbis!

And

if you would say that according to the Rabbis it is obvious that he does not take a double portion, since the loan is not in his possession at all—as we challenged above,

one can say:

It was necessary. It might have entered your mind to say that since he holds the promissory note, a loan is considered like one that has already been collected,

and even the Rabbis would agree that the firstborn takes a double portion of a loan;

it teaches us

Rabbi Yehuda that he does not take a double portion of a loan, since it is considered a prospective asset.

However, according to Rabbi, the firstborn takes a double portion of a loan, since it is considered appreciation that arose automatically, as we explained above (124a).

They sent word from there,

[they sent from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia]:

A firstborn takes a double portion of a loan, but not of interest

[for example, where the father lent money to a gentile]. The reason will be explained below.

We inquire concerning this:

According to whom?

If you say it is according to the Rabbis, now, where appreciation is in his possession, the Rabbis say that he does not take; need it be stated with regard to a loan?!

Rather, it is according to Rabbi.

And according to Rabbi, he does not

take a double portion of interest?!

But wasn’t it taught in a beraita: “Rabbi says: A firstborn takes a double portion both of the principal and of the interest”?

Rather,

actually, it is the opinion of the Rabbis.

And

it teaches us that

a loan is considered like one that has already been collected,

and even according to the Rabbis it is considered to be in the creditor’s possession, so the firstborn takes a double portion of it. This is not in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Shmuel above.

However, he does not take a double portion of interest, since he is coming to take something that never belonged to him, and it is a prospective asset.

But with regard to the money of the loan, since the father lent money, and it is that money that he takes by virtue of the promissory note, it follows that the note is held in his possession in place of his money, and it is like collateral. And with regard to a loan for which collateral was deposited, everyone agrees that he takes a double portion, since a creditor acquires a lien on collateral.

Rav Aḥa bar Rav said to Ravina: Amemar happened to come to our place,

[Amemar happened to come to our locale]

and expounded: A firstborn takes a double portion of a loan, but not of interest.

He said to him: The people of Nehardea follow their own reasoning

[Amemar held in accordance with Rav Naḥman cited below, as both of them were from Nehardea],

as Rabba said:

orphans who

collected land

for their father’s debt,

he has

that is, the firstborn takes a double portion]. Since the land was liened to their father during his lifetime, it is like collateral. And it is considered to be in his possession.

But if they

collected money, he does not have

it. For “a loan is given to be spent,” and this is not the money that the father lent him. It is as though their father had never possessed it.

And Rav Naḥman said: If they collected money, he has it,

[he takes a double portion], since the father lent money, and with regard to money it is considered to be in his possession.

But if they

collected land, he does not have

it, since the father lent money, not land.

Abaye said to Rabba: This is difficult according to your view,

and

it is difficult according to Rav Naḥman: